A recent cartoon in the Sowetan by well-known social commentator Zapiro depicts the African condition as it existed ‘then’ (under colonialism) and ‘now’ (under independence). In the first sketch, a white man — dressed in colonial splendour, with gun in hand — holds an angry-looking black man — dressed in loincloth — by a chain. On the iron ring around his neck appears the word ‘slavery’. In the second sketch, the same two people appear, except that the white man is now dressed in the conservative dark suit often associated with World Bank employees. The gun made way for a clipboard under his arm. The angry-looking black man is dressed in faded Western-style clothing, and is still chained to the other. This time, the word on the iron ring is ‘debt’. The cartoon speaks for itself.

I have read this chapter on two levels. One is theoretical and conceptual, where concepts and linkages between them are explored. The other is practical, and in my view encouraged, as the author claims "... the ultimate purpose of knowledge and its application is aimed at improving the human condition." There is also a claim that regionalisation may provide a means for securing Southern Africa. So, can one use this chapter to improve the understanding or interpretation of often contradictory and frequently depressing developments in our part of Africa?

With some exception (too short on analysis), the chapter is successful on the first count. It is worth recounting the (logical) contours of the chapter’s first section. There is a useful brief overview of the evolution of the concept ‘development’, which concludes with Goulet’s three core values of development, namely sustenance, self-esteem and freedom from servitude. The section then explores a broad and deep understanding of the concept ‘security’. "Critical security studies", according to the author, "refers to an orientation towards studying security and, as a subfield, also constitutes a reconstructive agenda that broadens not only the dimensions of security (from military and political to environmental, social and economic) or of the referents of security (to include people), but also the agents of security." The third signpost in this section has to do with the nexus between the two, which the author explores by employing the idea of a ‘secure community’ which is based on the assumption that security is a condition and development a process, that they are mutually reinforcing, and that the link between them necessitates a co-ordinated approach.

What then is this ‘secure community’ — the central feature of the chapter? It appears to be a version of a ‘security community’, which in the understanding of Deutsch and others refers to a recognition and acknowledgement of shared interests (also on a moral plane) and that common problems can and must be resolved peacefully. Shared purpose determines the process of community-building and maintenance. If the purpose of a security community is the elimination of war, then the purpose of a secure community is the dual objective of security and development. A regional grouping will qualify as a secure community only if four conditions are present:

a concern with both security and development;



a timeline that sets limits for achieving a secure environment in order for development to take place;



an inclusive process that allows for participation by both states and societies; and



institutionalisation of the process in order to allow for structure, regulation and management.

The latter section of the chapter is an evaluation of whether the Southern African Development Community (SADC)can be viewed as a secure community. In essence, SADC appears unable to meet the first three criteria defined above, and only partially meets the test of institutionalisation. Although only briefly dealt with, a clear picture emerges from the evaluation: SADC suffers from a serious lack of commitment to deal with the issues of security and development. One can reinforce this analysis by pointing to SADC’s inability or unwillingness to deal with the crises in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Lakes region in general, the debt crisis, and the democratic deficit apparent in many member countries. This means that, if SADC is indeed the premier vehicle to achieve a community of interests in Southern Africa, then the region cannot yet be regarded as a security or secure community. In fact, it might not be able to reach that state, given its current approach to co-operation and integration. Indeed, the institution seems overwhelmingly biased towards economic integration via market liberalisation, to the exclusion or neglect of the goals of development and security — all stated aims and principles contained in the SADC Treaty.

How valuable is the concept of a ‘secure community’? It works as an ideal type. It usefully and without major theoretical difficulty marries our critical understanding of security and development. But it describes a vision of a shared community in such a way that puts it in dreamland for most of the people of Southern Africa. It makes for depressing reading because it does not suggest routes for SADC to follow in order to escape the trouble it finds itself in at present. Where there is no hope, there is no vision. Could it be possible that further research could operationalise the process of building a secure community?

One is left with a nagging question. How should one view the role of the state in the region’s quest for security and development? Clearly, it has a role to play, as described in the chapter, but where are its limits? Who determines its role? As I see it, the main actors in the drama that is SADC are states and the political élite in control of the levers of power. The details may change, but states will occupy centre stage for a long time to come. The question then becomes: What must be done so that people can replace states as the key makers of history? Thinking about Zapiro’s cartoon, it strikes me that the men in the sketches might actually represent states, not people. I think some follow-up work is in order.