

Conclusion

Earlier chapters examined the concept of a security community in a largely conceptual manner. In the discussion of the concept, it has been apparent that there is a need to broaden and indeed deepen the understanding of security community. The case is made that the application of the security community paradigm should go beyond the Deutschean model to the latter version by Adler and Barnett. The major handicap with the former is its restrictive character, which eliminates areas experiencing conflicts from being subjected to an analysis using the model. Application of the model would then entail strict adherence to one of the conditions of a security community, which demand that member states do not target each other militarily.

In contrast to this classical model, Adler and Barnett's model sees the path to a security community as transitional, or what Schoeman refers to as "an evolutionary approach".¹ This enables the model to be applied to areas that may not strictly conform to that presented by Karl Deutsch. Wallensteen et al point, for instance, to the Baltic region which is endemic with conflict, the Hungarian–Soviet Union war in 1956 between two members of the Warsaw Pact, and the 1982 war between the UK and Argentina—both allied to the US—as areas which are regarded as security communities or as states allied to security communities.² In this respect, the Southern African region, although experiencing various conflicts as discussed in Chapter 4, may nevertheless be regarded, according to the Adler and Barnett model, as developing into a security community. The Deutschean model does not leave space for such a conclusion.

From the outset, the major preoccupation has been to determine what the main political problems have been in establishing a security community in the Southern African region. The essence has been how the problems could be understood in the context of Adler and Barnett's

security community model. The objective has been to set out to investigate, assess and evaluate whether the history of the Southern African region shows signs of an evolving security community. In describing early efforts to establish alliances in the region, the chapters showed them to be premised along racial identity lines ('white' and 'black').

This was followed by concerted efforts to seek solutions to the regional security question, and later moves which have attempted to consolidate the general desire for regional harmony. An apparent transition towards a security community has been observed from the progression of Chapters 1 to 5. It has also been shown that the transition has not been without problems.

Problems in the evolution of the security community in the region include intra- and inter-state conflicts. Examples of the former include the civil wars in Angola and the DRC, as well as the conflicts in Lesotho, while the latter has been exhibited by the Namibia–Botswana border conflict and the DRC conflict. The number of foreign states which have been actively involved in the civil war in the DRC is an indication of the multiplicity of problems the Great Lakes region has been experiencing.

Other problems include a preoccupation with state sovereignty and some animosity between some of the region's political leaders, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 in the matter of SADC and the OPDS. The issue of South Africa's hegemony arising from the country's unsavoury past, and dominance in such areas as the military and economic fields, is also discussed.

In discussing the major conclusions, the chapter uses Adler and Barnett's three-tier approach to determine whether the situation in the Southern African region can be described as a nascent, ascendant or mature security community. This involves the identification of causal factors that motivate states to establish common policies in order to reduce fear among them, the development of mutual trust and collective identity considered to be the 'building blocks' upon which security communities may emerge, and the actual development of trust and collective identity formation from which arise either a loosely or tightly coupled security community.

The question that the book initially endeavours to answer is whether in the Southern African region there has been a significant reduction in fear of one another and consequently any formation of alliances among the states. Let us, however, re-examine Adler and Barnett's thesis on the matter.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

TOWARDS A SECURITY COMMUNITY: FEAR REDUCTION AND ALLIANCE FORMATION

Chapter Two has shown that Adler and Barnett stipulate that the *first tier* of a security community is characterised by *causal factors* (i.e. changes in technology, demography, economics and environment, and the development of new interpretations of social reality as well as external threats). The factors are said to *magnetise states towards one another* and lead to the co-ordination of security matters, which results in the type of relationship between states that *necessitates the unification of both domestic and foreign policies*. According to Adler and Barnett, this state of affairs *implies a reduction of fear of each other, which encourages the formation of alliances by states*. Reflective of this tier in the Southern African region is the formation of the ‘white’ and ‘black’ blocs discussed in Chapter 2. The formation of the blocs was clearly a hostile move from both sides and therefore the very reason for their creation, but also an indication of the potential for a regional security community.

While the creation of alliances was largely due to the desire to reduce the fear the blocs had of each other, the extent to which these alliances conform to security communities is a matter that subsequent sections of this chapter evaluate. The four attempts by the ‘white’ bloc—Malan’s ‘African Charter’, the Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury alliance during Prime Minister Vorster’s tenure, the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the Constellation of Southern African States of President PW Botha’s era—were characterised by aspects relating to the evolution of security communities. The closeness of the settler leadership, the compatibility of values among them and the constituency they represented, and their collaboration at political and military levels in the face of a common perceived threat against them as an entity, led them to seek solutions in a co-operative arrangement.

Malan’s African Charter was an attempt to form an alliance of ‘white’ South Africa with the rest of the states in Africa in order to bring peace and stability to the continent. However, the problem was that it was intent on privileging ‘white’ interests over those of the ‘blacks’ and predictably failed to receive the support of African states and, therefore, failed as an initiative.³ The fact that South Africa’s relatively higher technological development and advanced economy could contribute to sustainable growth and development in the rest of the continent, just as the rest of the continent could provide a ready market for South Africa,

would have been adequate causal factors to bring the two sides together, save for totally different interpretations of social reality. The lack of a common threat within the membership of the charter was a major consideration, which sidelines the 'African Charter' as a security community in formation. However, the Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury axis exhibited an interpretation of the new social reality with the 'white' people in the region becoming a coherent social grouping (what has sometimes been referred to as the 'white tribe') in the predominantly 'black' region. Chapter 2 also noted that although the racially different groups were in conflict with one another, this was not the only level of disagreement. There also existed serious conflict within the 'white' race; a case in point being the differences between the Afrikaner and English-speaking 'whites' in Rhodesia, and between some South African and Rhodesian leaders.

The most elaborate of the alliances in the 'white' bloc was that of CONSAS. This attempted to bring about security for the 'white' community in South Africa in particular, and that of the region in general. An accommodation with 'black' states in the region in political, economic and security areas in a policy of 'co-prosperity', CONSAS was nevertheless seen by the 'black' states in the region as a nuanced form of the previous attempts and by the 'homeland' governments as well as those of the other inner ring countries as forced encirclement designed to serve as a security buffer, a source of labour and a market for the economy of South Africa. It was also doomed to failure.

The 'white' bloc nevertheless made the effort to develop a security community, as can be seen from its desire for increased exchanges and interactions in both the security and developmental areas. This was triggered by a number of factors, which included a perception of a mutual security threat, and similarities at the cultural, political, social and ideological level, as well as the existence of a powerful core state, which then evolved into a strategic alliance, which would be characterised as the nascent phase of a security community.

Chapter 2 also provides another dimension to the 'black' bloc. This reflected some accommodation with some aspects of the 'white' bloc, the joining of economic communities by some members of the Southern African region, as well as the formation of the FLS and the SADCC to deal with socio-economic issues. Among some of the trigger conditions were the economic strangulation and security harassment by the 'white' states in the region towards the 'black' bloc. In Chapter 2, Pettman quotes Kenneth Kaunda, the former President of Zambia, as arguing that

membership to the EAC provided the country with a means to “ensure common defences”.⁴ This was seen through close collaboration on the political and military fronts in search of a defence against the threat posed by the apartheid regime in South Africa, thereby making the efforts characteristic of the nascent phase, albeit not strictly within the Southern African area.

The EAC, with its much larger membership, and viewed by Shaw and Anglin as a complex grouping that sought, amongst other things, to link military, diplomatic and economic aspects, was a formidable strategic alliance that complied to a significant extent with the model of a security community.⁵ However, the major drawback was geographical since participation by states in the Southern African region was insignificant.

Yet another indication of a structure in the *first tier*, the Mulungushi Club—described in Chapter 2 as comprising Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda—was another forum that served as a means of resolving political and security challenges facing the countries. It was argued that the strategic alliance of the most elaborate of the organisations was shown to be the FLS alliance which, together with its security structure (the ISDSC), was a concerted effort by the region to, more than ever before, develop a regional structure that could be defined as the ascendant phase of security community development. Like the Mulungushi Club, the FLS was characterised by state elites whose closeness explained their uniformity in foreign policy, which, from the military security angle, led to the development of the ISDSC and, from the developmental side, the SADCC. Chapter 2 revealed that the strategic alliance was driven by solidarity and a common vision, which were championed by states’ leaders. While for one, this meant that the FLS membership and those of the SADCC would not launch hostile military attacks against each other, the friendship that had apparently evolved among the leaders meant that these elites held similar objectives and compatible values—all factors that point towards the formation of a security community.

The FLS, although resolute in its mission, survived some severe challenges such as the tensions created following Kenneth Kaunda’s dialogue with John Vorster and the fraternisation of Malawi with South Africa. Other difficulties included a lack of power—both military and economic—and unequal commitment to the ideals of the regional group, as the differences over the Nkomati Accord appear to suggest. Notwithstanding these problems, the FLS was committed to the development of a regional security structure, while the SADCC served

as a means of meeting the economic challenges facing the region. This could be said to be the emergence of a real security community. Despite the several problems that inhibited both the emergence of the 'white'-led security community and the 'black'-led one discussed in Chapter 2, there was a concerted effort to develop security communities, albeit either to serve the interests of the 'white' regimes in the region or to look after the interests of the 'black' regimes.

Chapter 3 exhibits a more intensive exploration for a regional security structure, notwithstanding the demise of apartheid South Africa, the traditional enemy of the now expanded 'black' bloc. The period discussed in the chapter is characterised by numerous efforts to form alliances in an effort to reduce fear among the states. The chapter also shows that this fear continued even with the post-1994 South Africa as the 'new' state was unable to quickly shed its aggressive past and become a trusted member of the Southern Africa community. The distrust of South Africa's motivation in regional politics, brought out particularly by Zimbabwean officials, is discussed in Chapter 3. This indicated the unlikelihood of any new development towards a security community, rather, as Peter Vale put it, a "community of insecurity". However, subsequent positive events have indeed suggested a more positive outlook for the Southern African community.

The region's transition from a mere co-ordination relationship, provided by the SADCC, to a deeper one of a community through the SADC structure in a variety of areas including "politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security", represented a qualitative improvement. The nature of SADC, as stipulated by its treaty as well as its objectives premised on "common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations", firmly conforms to the security community paradigm.⁶

The existence of any problems in the nature of the regional grouping provides neither an empirical nor theoretical difficulty to explain the evolution of a security community. The region created the physical structures necessary for the community and considered other security communities like NATO, themselves not without any political problems. In this manner, it responds adequately to the empirical aspect. Insofar as the theoretical question is concerned (as indicated in Chapter 1), constructivist theory argues in part that a community is one as long as it has the "subjective idea of feeling part of a community".⁷ Peter Vale does not believe that such a community exists in the Southern African region. In this regard, I respectfully disagree. The details thus far shown and the

further arguments that will be presented in this chapter point to the evolution of a regional security community. Surely the existence of structures (i.e. treaties, protocols, and buildings) pays tribute in itself to the existence of such a structure. The chapters thus far show that the existence of the treaties, protocols and physical structures has complemented what has been in the minds of both the governments and people in the region. It may therefore be concluded that the development from the SADCC to SADC was indeed an intentional transition towards a security community.

The CSBM seminars from 1993 to 1996 and the subsequent military co-operation, including joint operations and the sharing of intelligence (described in Chapter 3 as the ‘jewel of the crown’) revealed a serious effort by the members of the region to form a peaceful organisation that would assure a lasting non-conflictual relationship among the states in the region. Providing parliamentary oversight and a closer working relationship among state agencies within Southern Africa in what Spanger and Vale described as a “twin approach” signified a serious effort to not only develop an accountable regional system, but also create a cordial relationship, which would make the region symptomatic of a security community.⁸ While the continued solidarity within the FLS was clearly a result of close co-operation between security agencies in the region, as seen from the establishment of the ISDSC, participation by the states’ legislative bodies and even that of the SADC Parliamentary Forum in the regard remains an unexplored matter.

The chapter nevertheless indicates the serious intention by the states in the region to form a security community. The Federation of Southern Africa idea highlighted such factors as ethnic similarities, which implied common historical experiences, identical problems and expectations, among other things. The transition from the SADCC to SADC, a movement from co-ordination to a community, was a more vigorous movement towards a security community, although partly negated by the lack of a coherent regional structure that would withstand the stringent tenets of a security community.

STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL FACTORS

While the *first tier* is said to be built on fear of insecurity and demands that states co-ordinate in the security arena, the *second tier* is premised on *the existence of factors that enable the development of mutual trust and collective identity* through structural and procedural regimes. The

study also details the second tier and its two dimensions, namely, structural and procedural in the region. In respect of the former, power and knowledge were identified as the prime factors, with power as the most crucial. Associated most closely with “advanced political units” which consequently form the core states, power is regarded by Adler and Barnett as leading the weaker states to expect the core states to provide security for them and even to be rather ‘bullish’ about collective efforts. South Africa’s leading role in the ‘white’ bloc and its prominent role in SADC, particularly in the development of security arrangements for the region, and the acceptance by other states in the region that it possesses the means of resolving their economic difficulties and other forms of assistance, appear to conform to the thesis.

It may also be argued that the evolution of the FLS, covered in some depth in Chapter 2, was led by Tanzania, which although economically weaker than other members was at that time politically the most stable in the ‘black’ bloc. It was also militarily the strongest until Zimbabwe joined the organisation. Zambia’s dominance in regional power politics following the retirement of President Nyerere showed the strength of personality and leadership. The roles of presidents Mugabe and Mandela in regional political dynamics revealed the critical role of political elites in the formation of a security community. Therefore, although the ‘traditional’ linkage of military and economic preponderance remains an important dimension, other ‘non-power’ dimensions are also important.

Adler and Barnett have defined the knowledge factor of the structural dimension as implying a shared meaning and understanding, ultimately leading to the development of mutual trust, a collective identity and peaceful change. The post-FLS structures appear to accurately conform to this dimension. This was unlike the earlier efforts, which, although ascribing to mutual trust and collective identity, were limited to either the ‘white’ or ‘black’ blocs and did not directly aspire to a peaceful change. Subsequent structures, such as the SADCC, SADC, ASAS and the OPDS and others, not only focused on mutual trust and collective identity but were also poised for peaceful change. The liberal tendencies of SADC in particular, showed the “shared developmentalist ideology” associated with South-East Asia by Adler and Barnett.

The process dimension of the second tier can also be related to such structures as the FLS, SADCC and SADC in respect of the symbolic, economic, and political forms of the transactions component. Given the relative weakness of the FLS in relation to the enormous power wielded

by apartheid South Africa and its allies, it could have been deduced (and not without some merit) that the FLS was largely symbolic, but together with the SADCC, resolute on the political front. The SADCC, as has been SADC, was also fairly firm on the economic front. The dynamic density (i.e. the amount of transactions, their intensity and the level of activity which determine the relationship between states) may be deduced to have been significant in respect of both the 'white' and 'black' blocs. However, the former was weak on the political front, given its failure to attract significant support in the region and the latter weak on the technological and economic dimensions.

The international organisation or institutional component's contribution to monitoring behaviour and the development of trust as well as the enhancement of trust building through providing political actors with the means to socialise, seems to have been progressively strong. Chapter 5 states that the Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Co-operation signed in 2001 appears to have attained a level where state action could be constrained through the regional structures and practices.

The social learning component, i.e. redefinition of what is considered as both practical and desirable, and considered by Adler and Barnett to be dominated by the views of core powers but nevertheless ascribing to the existence of an asymmetrical relationship, addresses the situation in the Southern African region. Not only have deliberations over regional security arrangements been the preserve of heads of states and their ministers as well as their government officials, but also dominated by core states. South Africa, during the apartheid period, dominated the 'white' bloc as reflected and, together with Zimbabwe, continued to do so in post-apartheid era.

In respect of the latter, the debate over the security direction of the region was largely a debate between South Africa and Zimbabwe as shown by the SADC impasse discussed in Chapter 3. Zimbabwe's core status was also apparent in the formation of the SADC military alliance between itself, Angola and Namibia. South Africa's dominance is also evident in its preferred positions, such as the necessity of the OPDS to be subordinate to SADC, in the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.

The subsequent establishment of a Mutual Defence Pact for the region should be identified as a major development symptomatic of elements of both the second and third tiers in that this was a crucial requirement for the genuine development of mutual trust and positive collective identity

for the region. However, the pact falls short of integration of the region's security forces.

DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION

Given the movement towards convergence of domestic and foreign policies among states and the subsequent reduction of fear of each other which leads to the formation of alliances, including the search for the existence of factors that point towards mutual trust and collective identity, it remains to be determined whether the final stage of development of trust and collective identity formation has indeed been arrived at.

The development of trust and collective identity was shown in two models—loosely coupled and tightly coupled security communities. The former was described as one whose *people partially identify themselves as one people* and who have the *power to restrain states' action* as well as *empower them to participate in global activity and participate in joint action*. The members of the states in this model were said to determine their motivation. In the latter model, *the members of the community take its identity and norms seriously* rather than the partial approach by the former, from which the member states deduce "their meaning, purpose and role". Moreover, both the *aspiration of the states and how citizens considered themselves uniform with those of the community* as well as the *behaviour of the state and its legal language considered pertinent in a regional dimension rather than those of the state*, are characteristic of the tightly coupled security community.

The 'white' bloc does not qualify to be placed in the 'tightly coupled' security community model. It, however, does meet some aspects of the 'loosely coupled' model such as regarding themselves as an entity, albeit along racial lines whilst, along the lines of statehood, South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique only tended to seek some co-ordination at the security level. A more resolute relationship was between South Africa and Rhodesia whose economies were intensely intertwined. The participation by South Africa in the hydro-electric scheme at Cabora Bassa in Mozambique could be accurately regarded as more self-serving for South Africa than a move to engage in a regional project. The motivation for the bloc was, as indicated, designed to serve the 'white' racial group and not necessarily the people of the region, despite efforts to include other racial groups through the CONSAS policy.

Events in the ‘black’ bloc, unlike those in the ‘white’ bloc, were not premised on racial lines but rather on the desire for socio-economic political emancipation, which only appeared to be ‘black’ because the majority of those who sought emancipation happened to be of the ‘black’ race. The FLS appeared to assent to the loosely coupled security community in that while the members were united by the common desire to resist the aggressive onslaught by the ‘white’ bloc and provide support to the liberation movements, the commitment was not always the same. For instance, not all the states in the alliance provided liberation movements with the freedom to carry out trans-border operations. Botswana was said by a former member of Umkhonto we Sizwe to be hostile to any intentions by the movement to maintain transit camps in the country, let alone permit it to cross into South Africa along the stretch of its border. The level of unity between Zambia and Tanzania (both founding members of the FLS) could be considered as moving towards ‘one people’. This sense of ‘oneness’ became even more apparent with the SADCC projects (TAZAMA and TAZARA) designed to provide Zambia with a means to export and import such critical goods as petroleum, and transport its exports.

While Chapter 2 showed the vigorous efforts by the region to develop a regional security structure, the subsequent chapters focused on developing structural and procedural matters designed to create the regional structure that takes the form of a security community. Table 2 shows the fitting of the Southern African region into the template of Adler and Barnett’s security community model.

Table 2: Southern African region: A template for a security community

| Tier | Conditions | Situation on the ground |
|------------|---|--|
| ONE | 1. Changes in technology 2. Changes in economics 3. Changes in environment 4. New interpretations of social reality 5. New interpretations of external threats <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trigger conditions • Fear reduction • Alliance formation | Formation of ‘White’ & ‘Black’ blocs White Bloc: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Malan’s ‘African Charter’ b. Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury Axis c. Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (CAF) d. Constellation of Southern African States Black Bloc: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. East African Commission (EAC) b. Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) |

Table 2: Southern African region: A template for a security community (cont.)

| Tier | Conditions | Situation on the ground |
|-------|--|--|
| | | c. Mulungushi Club d. Frontline States (FLS) e. Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) |
| TWO | a. Advanced political units as core states b. Expectation of security by weaker states c. Core states coercive on collective issues d. Collective thinking ('we-feeling') e. Uniformity of perception f. Bounded communication (i.e. symbolic, economic, material, political & technological) g. International institutions (behavioural guide, monitoring and sanctioning) h. Social learning (redefinition of reality: real, possible & desirable) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structural and procedural focus • Factors for development of mutual trust and collective identity | a. Apartheid Period: South Africa core state in the 'white' bloc b. Pre-1980 'black' bloc: Tanzania and Zambia core states c. Post-1980 'black' bloc: Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe core states d. Post-apartheid period: South Africa and Zimbabwe core states e. CONSAS f. FLS g. Association of Southern African States (ASAS) h. Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) i. Southern African Development Community (SADC) j. Mutual Defence Pact of the 'SADC' Allies k. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation l. SADC's Mutual Defence Pact |
| THREE | a. Loosely coupled security community <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partial identification as one people 2. Ability by people to restrain states 3. Empowerment of states on global and joint issues by people 4. People determine their motivation b. Tightly coupled security community <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complete corporate identity 2. Adherence to community's identity and norms 3. Meaning, purpose and role from community 4. States' interest and citizens' identity interchangeable with community 5. States' behaviour and legal language synonymous with that of the region | <i>Apartheid period:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. FLS b. SADC(C) <i>Post-Apartheid period</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. SADC b. OPDS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 August 2001, Blantyre: Adoption of Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation • SADC Mutual Defence Pact (Draft) <p>– Concerted movement towards a tighter security community in the Southern African region</p> |

The template in Table 2 shows a fairly clear link between the conditions for Adler and Barnett’s three tiers of the security community model. The conditions for the first tier include what Schoeman aptly describes as the “trigger mechanism”, fear reduction and alliance formation, and in this regard describe the formation of the ‘white’ and ‘black’ blocs.⁹ Tier two’s conditions of structural and procedural issues as well as the factors for the development of mutual trust and collective identity cover most of the developments in the region from the dominance of South Africa during the apartheid period to the establishment of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

Addressing whether the region can be identified as a security community, Adler and Barnett’s third tier provides two categories: loosely and tightly coupled security communities. The period of the FLS and the SADC(C) could be classified as the culmination of the former category. In the post-apartheid period, the SADC and OPDS era conforms to the characterisation of a loosely coupled security community. It is further argued that through the adoption on 14 August 2001 of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and SADC’s draft Mutual Defence Pact, the region has taken measures to justify the entry of the region into the ‘tightly coupled’ security community.

Complementing the analysis provided by Table 2, Table 3 provides the phased development of a security community and a more detailed response to specific issues that characterise the nascent, ascendant and mature phases of security community.

Table 3: Security community developmental phase in Southern Africa

| Phase of security community | Factors | Identifiable issues and events in Southern Africa |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| Nascent Phase | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Desire to co-ordinate relations through several exchanges and interactions 2. Structures for monitoring contracts and obligations 3. Casus belli: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Mutual security threat b. Homogeneity at cultural, political, social & ideological level 4. Desire for stable economic environment | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 'African Charter', Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury, ECA, EAC, FLS, SADC(C) 2. 1970s – ISDSC, SADC 3. 'Black', 'white' blocs (1970/80s) 4. EAC, ECA, SADCC, SADC |

Table 3: Security community developmental phase in Southern Africa (cont.)

| Phase of security community | Factors | Identifiable issues and events in Southern Africa |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Existence of powerful, core states/coalitions of states for leadership (strategic alliance) 6. Modest co-ordination of security policies 7. Development of a more refined threat analysis 8. Identification of possible friction areas and structural security programmes for mutual benefit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-operative security • Development purposes | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. 'African Charter', Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury, FLS, SADC, OPDS, SA, Zimbabwe 8. Territorial boundaries, water resources, illegal migration, land <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISDSC, OPDS • SADC(C) |
| Ascendant Phase | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rise in development of security community 2. Intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states leading to the emergence of several international organisations 3. Increased military co-ordination and co-operation 4. Reduction of fear 5. Existence of structures that facilitate perception of issues to promote concerted behaviour likely to lead to improved mutual respect 6. Emergence of collective identities that give rise to a belief in peaceful change 7. Dynamic density leads to several organisations that desire unity 8. Similarity of missions and sharing of intelligence (reflection of mutual trust) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 1970s to date 3. 'Blue Hungwe & Blue Crane; SADC Protocol & Pact 4. SADC Protocol & Pact 5. SADC, OPDS 6. 'SADC Citizens', SADC Protocols 7. 1970s (FLS)–2002 (Draft mutual Defence Pact) 8. ISDSC, OPDS |
| Mature Phase | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high degree of trust 2. Casus belli: Regional actors share identity and the inevitability of a peaceful change <p>1. Loosely-coupled security community</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mutual respect of states | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NO: Nationalism still strong 2. YES: Existence of strong regionalism <p>YES</p> |

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acknowledgement of an identical way of life • States' interests may be at odds • States may have disagreements • States may have unequal bargaining positions • Practice of multilateralism • Preference for consensus in decisions and conflict resolution • Unfortified territorial borders • States do not militarily target each other • Core state defines common threat • Discourse, language and behaviour that of states' aspiration | <p>2. Tightly-coupled security community</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • States' assistance of one another becomes a norm • Common identity seen through multilateral power within institutional context • Use of power the preserve of the collective only • Power used to counter threat external to the region • Power used against a renegade member • Existence of collective security arrangements • High level of military integration • Co-operative and collective security • Security regarded as an interdependent issue • Policy co-ordination in dealing with commonly defined internal threats • Free movement of population from one country in region to another • Internationalisation of authority • Co-ordination against internal threats • Shared rule at the national, transnational, and supranational levels | <p>YES</p> <p>YES: Strategy on land reform and governance issues</p> <p>YES: As above</p> <p>YES: Economic dominance (South Africa)</p> <p>YES</p> <p>YES: SADC and OPDS principles and objectives</p> <p>NO: South Africa-Zimbabwe and Mozambique (fortified)</p> <p>NO: Last: 1992 (Namibia/Botswana)</p> <p>NO: Multilateral approach (within SADC/OPDS)</p> <p>YES: Regionalism: solidarity</p> <p>PARTIAL</p> <p>YES</p> <p>PARTIAL</p> <p>PARTIAL</p> <p>NO</p> <p>YES</p> <p>PARTIAL</p> <p>YES</p> <p>YES</p> <p>YES: ISDSC</p> <p>NO: Draft protocol in place but not yet signed by such states as South Africa and Botswana</p> <p>NO: Restricted to regional or international missions</p> <p>YES: ISDSC</p> <p>NO</p> |
|---|--|---|

The table provides a phased development of a security community in the Southern African region. The affirmative responses to the issues which characterise the nascent and ascendant phases suggest that the region, most definitely, has been developing into a security community and partially fulfils the requirements for the mature phase. The failure to allow the free movement of people across territorial boundaries is amongst a short but critical list of issues that require resolution for the region to become a bona fide security community.

The template of security community given in Table 2 shows that the developments in the Southern African region have tended to generally fit the conditions of Adler and Barnett's conditions for tiers one to three. It is also shown fairly clearly by Table 3 that the security community phases (nascent, ascendant and mature) generally apply to the developments in the region to the extent that it could be concluded with a certain measure of accuracy that the region is a loosely-coupled security community. However, the partial and non-fulfilment of conditions for the tightly-coupled security community is an indication that, although the region is not an established security community, it is nevertheless progressively moving in that direction.

OVERCOMING POLITICAL PROBLEMS

By implication, it also means that the region has been generally successful in its resolution of problems that have stood in the path of the development of a security community through a sense of solidarity,¹⁰ oneness by the regional elites, and the inbuilt realisation by the peoples of the region that their destiny is inexplicably tied. While national interest (and therefore rational choice) may have been an important factor in the determination of decisions, the behaviour of the members of the FLS, SADCC SADC, and OPDS have also been driven by this sense of regionalism which rational theory fails to explain but is nevertheless explained by constructivism.

The developments described in Chapter 4 and 5—the establishment of the OPDS Protocol on Politics, Defence and Co-operation, the draft SADC Mutual Defence Pact, and the summits and protocols, which have shown an extensive sense of unity among the states in the sub-region—are an indication that the Southern African region has similar values and predictable interests, its elites hold similar aims, and the states have reached the stage where they would not target each other militarily. The positivism is further evidenced by the SADC institutional structures and

procedures, which are becoming more democratic and responsive to the peoples of the region as an entity.

The inter-linkage of security and developmental issues seen from the evolution of sub-regional institutions, especially in the 'black' bloc and post-'black' bloc eras, can be observed from the nature and character of the FLS, SADCC, SADC, OPDS and the OPDSC. The 'twinning' of the issues has, as stipulated earlier, not been without political problems but nevertheless it is this very linkage that has also served as the solution to the problems. The ability by the states in the sub-region to overcome or contain the various obstacles that have come their way, such as the potentially divisive pressure from external powers and the feeling of relative deprivation by the smaller and poorer states in the sub-region in particular, signifies a coming of age. The similarity of the sub-region's strategies to those of the regional structures, namely the AU and NEPAD, suggests a unity of purpose, which may itself be an area for future study. In this chapter some fundamental issues regarding the extent to which regional developments further the cause of the drive towards a security community for the continent, will be briefly analysed as the case for the Southern African region is made.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

The historical analytical study of the Southern African region has shown that the region has indeed been evolving towards a security community in spite of challenges on the democracy front by some members. The region has been actively seeking to resolve its political challenges peacefully. The nature of the issues that remain as obstacles to this development are those that require the region to address issues of power, particularly as it relates to the issues of military security which, despite some co-ordination through such institutions as the ISDSC, remain state-focused and a huge drain on the region's financial resources.

A major reduction in all the SADC states except for South Africa is shown at Appendix I.2. However, examined in conjunction with that of the force size at I.1, the large budgetary increase by South Africa does not necessarily translate into a high force level. The increase in the budget probably has more to do with a combination of new equipment and modernisation. The comparison of the reading in 1989 and 2001 shows in terms of force levels a general increase in most SADC states with the exception of Mozambique which shows a significant decrease,

and its Portuguese-speaking 'cousin' an equally significant increase. Whilst Angola's increase was evidently a response to a combination of hostilities by apartheid South Africa and internal instability due to UNITA activities, Mozambique was experiencing 'war fatigue' and was keen to recover from the decades of civil war. It may, however, be surmised from this data that there is certainly a link between decreased defence expenditure and a movement towards better sub-regional co-operation. This is nevertheless an area requiring more intensive study.

The challenge for the future in this respect is one of complete integration of the security forces, a move that would be expected to rationalise defence expenditure since the envisaged threat analysis would recognise senseless military expenditure at the expense of human security needs.

Yet another area for future research would be the study of external influence in evolving the regional security community. This is particularly pertinent given the problems of military intervention. The work begun by Schoeman on the application of the security community framework to the continental level is also another important area which could be built upon. What may, however, prove to be an even more challenging endeavour is the conceptual approach to be applied along with that of security community. The introduction provides a number of possible approaches that could effectively contribute to the articulation of a variety of issues that remain possible areas of future research.

One such approach would be the resurgence of the classical approaches informed by the theories of realism and liberalism on security in the contemporary environment, which has seen the apparent reversion to concert security approaches by the sole superpower, the US, as well as the UK. The decision by the US and UK to seek a solution outside the UN system¹¹ and, together with a few of their allies,¹² to forcibly remove the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and their stubbornness in denying the lack of wisdom of that position, reveals a desire to adopt an overarching moral position over global security issues and their presumed destiny to save the rest of mankind. The potential effect of the concert security approach for regional security is likely to be significant in securing peace and security, and will of necessity require intensive research. Some of the assumptions of the classical approaches, such as the distribution of power, role of hegemonies and the special position played by national interest, further signify the relevance of keeping these approaches in the mainstream, for a better understanding of regional security.

Although including the new security dimension in interrogating regional security would receive little opposition—if any at all—the challenge in using the concept is more than a pursuit of its state-centric nature, as identified in the introduction. Inclusive in this would be the reluctance by some states, politicians and even a segment of the population to share sovereignty. The June 2004 European elections showed such Euro-pessimism, with the UK government and some of its opposition Members of Parliament elected to the EU Parliament vigorously opposing the formation of what they describe as the formation of a European “super-state”. They regard such a development as not being in the best interests of their country. The overwhelming rejection of the European constitution by France—a leading European country—and the Netherlands—the ‘home’ of the European Parliament—and the reluctance of some states to continue with the ratification process, signifies the major challenges in Europe. The challenge is therefore in finding a new security approach that will seek to achieve the benefits of integration while providing sufficient latitude to those inclined towards state sovereignty.

Overcoming such opposition to the sharing of sovereignty is where the greatest challenge is likely to lie. In Africa, the dimensions of states which may be analysed include those of geographical and population size, economic dominance, and political astuteness. Although any of these dimensions can have a significant influence on states’ behaviour in a widened security environment, a matrix combination is a more likely scenario. In the Great Lakes region, the DRC is geographically the largest and potentially the richest, and therefore economically the most dominant. At the lowest end of the spectrum would be Rwanda and Burundi, with the smallest geographical space but the highest population density, and comparatively less economically endowed but possibly politically the most astute. Sharing sovereignty in such an environment will offer enormous challenges for the fulfilment of what the new security dimension provides. Further areas of concern include the extent to which states on the continent would take the route of ‘Afro-optimists’ or ‘Afro-pessimists’ in respect of regional integration.

Future research on regional security should also be undertaken through a regional security approach. The introduction identified five models: the collective defence and collective security, common and concert security, and comprehensive and co-operative security models. Each of these models and their combinations may be investigated as possible means of understanding the security challenges facing the continent in general and Southern Africa in particular.

It seems evident that the collective defence model presents some useful aspects, which may contribute to an understanding of security on the continent. The model's characteristics of the dominance of one member in the alliance of states with a common identity and purpose and faced by a threat beyond the states' borders appears to be explanatory of the Southern African region in the pre-1994 era, when apartheid South Africa represented the major source of conflict in the region. With little doubt, the critical point is the extent to which the assumption of "like-mindedness" referred to in the first chapter holds true in the region. The later conflict in the DRC is yet another indication of the suitability of the model to the region. Common defence against a regional power or indeed the aggressive tendencies of a smaller power also characterises the model, and in this sense provides a possible explanation for the situations that could develop in regions. Further indicating the suitability of the model is its other characteristic of a formal defence treaty. The existence of such an arrangement in both the Western and Southern African regions means the model fits the collective defence model and is therefore an approach that may be considered in future research.

The collective security model's assumption of an alliance, which comprises states that are not necessarily alike but are bound by shared fears of issues such as violence or the expectation of violence, reflects a general acceptance that, although there may be similarities among states, particularly within a sub-region or region, states are viewed as having distinct characteristics that place them apart from others. It is a moot point whether states in Southern Africa are in fact distinctly different. However, assumptions that do not invite any significant opposition, if any, were identified in the introduction as reciprocity, rules and norms of society, and movement of issues through mutual consent, and these can be said to explain the dynamics in a region, including Southern Africa.

The model's recognition of a generally complex environment as a result of numerous factors that bring to the fore the debate of narrow and wider interpretations of security, consequently stressing the complexity of the regional dimension, is particularly valuable in future research in Southern Africa and beyond. Factoring in the many sources of insecurity and curbing the destructive competitive tendencies between states through such instruments as agreements, protocols and firmer legal provisions such as SADC's Mutual Defence Pact is discussed extensively in this book.

Unlike the collective security model, the comprehensive security one developed in the Asian region is valuable to the Southern African sub-region only in terms of its nominal coverage of all dimensions of security and the search for a stable political and economic order at the bilateral, regional and international levels, as mentioned during the articulation of the model. The more intensive focus on technological development and concern with aspects of such knowledge falling into the hands of unstable states may well be reflective of states and regions that are significantly more developed, such as those in the northern hemisphere and the Asian region. The balanced national development described in the introduction remains a valuable projection in that, through ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military dimensions, the comprehensive security model articulates the ideal, which is of universal relevance. However, some of the model's unique assumptions tend to be best suited to the ASEAN region from which it emerged.

In contrast to the comprehensive security model, the co-operative security model's preference for a gradualist and flexible approach in which informality plays a significant role and bilateralism lays the basis for multilateral security arrangement provides avenues for future research in the African region. The co-operative security approach, with its emphasis on joint development projects and CSBMs, characterises Southern African historical development from the FLS to the present-day operations of the OPDS. This makes co-operative security one of the appropriate means of studying security developments in the sub-region and beyond.

While dispensing with concert security as a means of examining security in Africa, it may be argued with some conviction that the approach tends to explain adequately the behaviour of the US, UK and other Western states, and in this sense could provide an appropriate avenue for following their activities. Unlike this approach, the common security approach is yet another way in which security may be studied in the African region. Its characteristics of long-term interdependence in such critical issues as security, economic, cultural and political issues provide it with a similar broadness to other models already discussed. Making it particularly useful for future research is its particular focus on the security of people and non-provocative defence, in which the professional military force is regarded as the best means of ensuring security of all states and people by eliminating what has been described as the notion of a security dilemma.

From the examinations of the collective defence, collective security, comprehensive security and co-operative security models as well as

common and concert security, it can be seen that their suitability for future research varies. They tend to focus on various aspects of security and other pertinent issues and in this way individually assist in interrogating some aspects of the sub-region and beyond; therefore, in their own way, each offers a contribution to enhancing the understanding of security on the continent.

NOTES

- 1 M Schoeman, Imagining a community: The African Union as an emerging security community, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 29(1), 2002.
- 2 P Wallensteen (ed), *Preventing violent conflicts: Past record and future challenges*, Uppsala University, 1994.
- 3 SC Nolutshungu, *South Africa in Africa: A study in ideology and foreign policy*, Manchester University Press, 1975.
- 4 J Pettman, *Zambia security and conflict*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, Sussex, 1974.
- 5 TM Shaw & DG Anglin, The crises of liberalism, in GM Carter & P O'Meara (eds), *Southern Africa: The continuing crisis*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982.
- 6 SADC, *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ*, 16 May 1993, pp 1, 18.
- 7 P Vale, *The first among unequals*, 2003 (forthcoming), p 121.
- 8 H-J Spanger & P Vale, *Bridges to the future. Prospects for peace and security in Southern Africa*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995.
- 9 Schoeman, op cit.
- 10 In an interview with Professor Ali Mazrui, the African academic argued that the concept of solidarity is African!
- 11 The US and UK argue that sufficient UN resolutions existed for military intervention against the Iraq regime and therefore, in their view, their position was justified.
- 12 Amongst the "coalition of the willing" were Australia and Poland.