

Searching for a new security structure

Commenting on regional security in Southern Africa, Peter Vale argued that “[t]he region lacks an appropriate regional institution to handle security issues”, notwithstanding SADC’s role and its “regional economic and development priorities to the emerging needs in security”.¹ Thompson, interrogating the same issue at about the same time, identifies one major dilemma facing regional security as being when the political identity of individuals “is classically understood to lie within the borders of the ‘sovereign’ state”.² While this does not conflict with the state-centric focus of the security community approach, its application to the regional level is seen as problematic. It may therefore be deduced that the presumed lack of political identity at the regional level makes achievement of security at this higher level difficult. Thompson articulates a broader view of security in his focus on development and security in Southern Africa. The security community state-centric approach is evidently a major shortfall of this approach.

The search for a new security structure following the ‘demise’ of the ‘white’ bloc would seem to have been an enormous undertaking among states with an individualistic approach, particularly in the case of security. However, despite recognising the need for such a regional structure, Fernando Goncalves did not think such an eventuality through SADC could “in the foreseeable future, move beyond the level of rhetoric”. He argues that this was merely a “convenient way of masking disagreements that could otherwise be interpreted as an indication of disunity”.³ In this regard he takes a rather lukewarm approach to the feasibility of putting in place a SADC Sector for Political and Security Co-operation, as proposed by SADC in 1992, arguing that the formation of such a formal collective security structure for the region would probably take a lot longer than envisaged. Joao Honwana, co-author of a study on the Sector for Political and Security Co-operation by the Cape

Town-based Centre for Conflict Resolution, regarded the sector as “counterproductive” because it “would be a co-operation between institutionally fragile states both in terms of human and financial resources”.⁴ Yet the pessimism exhibited by both Goncalves and Honwana is without sufficient foundation. To suggest, as Goncalves does, that SADC has failed to progress beyond the level of rhetoric as the previous chapter indicated, is to deny the obvious solidarity and successes of the FLS, while Honwana’s argument is flawed for the same reason. However, Khabele Matlosa correctly perceives the existence of such a security structure for the region as possible, but one which had to be embedded in the region’s political history: “[a] sustainable security arrangement for Southern Africa must evolve from within the region and must be well-woven within its political history and sensitive to capacities of the states involved”.⁵

The development of security arrangements in the Southern African region has taken on many dimensions that have spanned the history of time. It has been shown in Chapter 2 that the colonial period witnessed efforts by South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia and the other new states in the region to develop regional security structures. It was also shown that just as states in the ‘black’ bloc strove to develop a structure to serve their interests at great cost to themselves, so did the states in the ‘white’ bloc.

The attainment of a new political dispensation in the region reached completion in 1994 with the ANC taking over the reins of government in South Africa. This meant that there was no longer a “frontline” for the FLS⁶ and therefore a need for a new perspective. This chapter will argue that the FLS has not in fact become “a moribund institution” as Omari has argued, but that it has rather become part of the ‘living’ development of regional security in the sub-region.⁷

The earlier chapters, and indeed this one, follow a conscious decision by the states in the region to establish structures intended to meet the defence and security concerns of the region. In this sense, therefore, this chapter is a step forward from Abdilla Omari’s and Gilbert Khadiagala’s groundbreaking work on the FLS, albeit with a different theoretical approach, which shows a preference for the constructivism and a security community paradigm. The chapter will show that the region has throughout its existence been making concerted efforts to develop a security community, and in this regard seeks to study the developments of the post-1994 era with a view to interrogating the policies and structures that have arisen in the setting up of an appropriate regional

security structure. It will be shown that although the focus is on defence and security issues, these issues are linked to the development of both the SADCC and SADC, just as that of the security community in Europe was related to the development of the European Community.⁸ The development of security structures in the sub-region has therefore always undertaken the posture of development and security as 'close cousins':

War and security are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security ...⁹

The chapter covers two major themes: South Africa's transition to democracy and new ideas of regional security during and after the transition. The former examines the era without the fear of the apartheid regime, consequently necessitating a re-evaluation of the nature and character of the 'black' bloc. The chapter will examine the effects of the 'new' South Africa on the expanded sub-regional body. The second theme focuses on the period characterised by the conception of new ideas about regional security arrangements as the region warmed up to the challenge of creating a new sub-regional security structure appropriate for the post-apartheid and post-conflict era, which culminated in the formation of the OPDS in 1996. In both instances the chapter will endeavour to determine whether or not the developments have in any way conformed to the evolution of a security community. Possibly one of the most critical aspects is whether, given a history of hostility, the sub-region could overcome intense suspicions and undertake the challenge of developing a sub-regional security structure that entailed a desire for sustained peace.

TRANSFORMATION OF A 'PREDATOR STATE'?

Apartheid South Africa was a major factor in the socio-economic and political development of Southern Africa, given the aggressive nature of the apartheid regime's conduct and action against the rest of the region, which brought about numerous deaths and destruction of infrastructure.

The South Africa of this period had a stranglehold on the region and was a source of considerable instability for other states, while at the same time continuing to serve as an attractive country for some of the peoples in the region.

Gumende has argued that South Africa of the post-apartheid era has remained the same: “South Africa’s tactics resemble the divide and rule strategies of the former apartheid regime”.¹⁰ Mandaza reinforces this perception when he argues that “Southern Africans [would] have to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the need for restructuring and re-defining a sub-region which was made after the image of a white dominion on the one hand and on the other, the persistent temptation not to mention the attempts on the part of the forces of old amongst us—to project the past as part of the ideology of bigness”.¹¹

South Africa’s attraction was due largely to its relatively stronger economy and vibrant industry which provided much-needed goods and services as well as employment for the generally depressed economies of the rest of the Southern African region. What role the post-apartheid South Africa played and continues to play for the rest of the region is a matter that this chapter endeavours to interrogate. The ‘new’ South Africa has undergone major political transformation, as observed in the changes to the political leadership; from one that was non-indigenous, racist, hostile and aggressive to its neighbours to one largely indigenous, a product of nationalist liberation wars and survivors of the harsh and discriminatory apartheid governance.

Peter Vale, acknowledging the nature of the relationship between South Africa and the rest of the region, writes that “[p]reviously, many threats to security could be attributed to apartheid or destabilisation: today, South Africa’s neighbour states have to respond, not to a powerful pariah, but to a democratic country”. Of pertinence here is whether this ‘new’ South Africa has in fact transformed itself from the pariah to a member of the family of the Southern African community, especially since “the new South Africa as a regional partner is as the old South Africa, a rich and well-armed state which now enjoys, as a result of its political transition, the support of the international community”.¹²

The transition in the Southern African region can be characterised by several factors appearing over a period of time but which generally could be placed in the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter recognises the existence of a relatively peaceful region; one with the majorities in power but embroiled in a civil war in Angola and insurgencies in Mozambique and Zambia. In Angola the two major political parties—the ruling MPLA

and UNITA—and the ruling Frelimo and the MNR rebel forces in Mozambique continued to fight one another after the removal of their common enemy, the Portuguese state and their settler communities, while Zambia was experiencing an apartheid-inspired insurgency in its North Western province. The absence of a common enemy posing a threat to the region, like apartheid South Africa, suggests a need to re-evaluate the need for the FLS alliance, and there is consequently “little need for confidence or security building in Southern Africa”.¹³

There was nevertheless a view that the FLS had served the region well and therefore needed to be retained in its original configuration or at least in its character. Abilla Omari refers to its contribution to the signing of the SADC Treaty and argues that it is responsible for regional co-operation and economic integration.¹⁴ However, this led to a duality of institutions, with the “existence of the FLS on the one hand, and of the SADC on the other” with their respective focuses on regional security and regional development, and whose “membership roughly coincides in both organisations”.¹⁵ The uniqueness of the Southern African region, with security and development fused, therefore validating the role of the FLS, not merely in respect to regional security but to regional development too, would appear to have been a logical deduction by Omari. The relevance of the FLS continued to be evident given its decision not to take the back stage with the ever-increasing importance of regional development issues such as HIV/AIDS and further reinforced by additional roles given to the ISDSC of intervening in coups d’etat, civil disorder and multiparty democracy.¹⁶

Another angle to the FLS during the period of transition was that the establishment of SADC in 1992 created “a severe identity crisis” since there was no longer a “common enemy”.¹⁷ However, the multiplicity of new security threats such as poor governance and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which were taken on board by the FLS as new challenges, would appear to have mitigated the identity crisis. The prevalence of other dimensions of security evidently provided the FLS with common threats that entailed a need to maintain solidarity among the states in the region. But it was evident that the changes in the new political landscape exhibited by a post-apartheid South Africa ‘demanded’ a restructuring of the region’s security structure.

Another set of factors which may be regarded as the genesis of the period of transition is when South Africa’s State President FW de Klerk on 2 February 1990 signalled the South African state’s willingness to make a fundamental political change from the apartheid system, a factor

that led to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The CODESA talks, amongst other things, laid the basis for attitudes by some states in the region towards post-apartheid South Africa. This period has also been regarded as one which provided an early indication of the character of the future state of South Africa. Ibbo Mandaza argues that the failure by South Africa's nationalist movements—the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)—to contest the 1994 general elections as one entity was because the ANC was “intent on an unholy alliance with the South African state”, contrary to the FLS strategy.¹⁸

The FLS had insisted upon the two leading nationalist movements in Rhodesia—ZAPU and ZANU—going into the 1980 elections as a ‘Patriotic Front’. However, this did not take place at the time, but only later when a variant, ZANU-PF, was formed from the absorption of ZAPU by ZANU. While the ANC's relationship with the South African government at the time may explain the absence of the PAC from the Government of National Unity (GNU) formed after the 1994 elections, it offers an understanding of the reluctance by some member countries in the region, particularly Zimbabwe, to trust a South African government that still employed members of the SADF, who would only recently have been employed by the apartheid regime. Nevertheless, the view by some regional actors that CODESA was indeed an indication that apartheid had ‘died’, albeit not buried, was seen in the likes of President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia who fêted President de Klerk. Angola and Mozambique's move to seek membership of the South African Customs Union (SACU), as argued by Mandaza, is indicative of CODESA as the commencement of a post-apartheid period: “CODESA will have already conveyed the impression to many in the international community—and even in the Frontline States—that the new dispensation had arrived.”¹⁹

However the central issue of states in the region was whether South Africa, having obtained a ‘black’-led government, would actually undergo a complete change from one which exported violence, to one which would live in harmony and utilise its economic dominance to improve the general economic levels of the region. The value of the demise of the apartheid regime has been regarded by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk as contributing to the “region's peace, stability and development”.²⁰ Nonetheless, the question arose as to whether this new government would shed the past South Africa's role and become an accepted and trusted member of the Southern African region. Antonio Gumende in *The bully on the bloc* argues that the transition period

appeared to reveal a South Africa turned to regional interests in preference to its own specific interests and which had retained much of the “the old guard” in its public service. Gumende also mentions the apparent naiveté of former ‘black’ nationalists and some anti-apartheid leaders who forged a unity government. Cases to underlie this naiveté include the SADF commemoration of the raids into Cassinga in southern Angola where hundreds of Namibians were killed, during the ministerial tenure of a former nationalist guerrilla leader. The late South African Defence Minister, Joe Modise, apologised following a strong protest by the Namibian government. Other cases include an aggressive migration policy which seemed to be conflictual at government level. Gumende argues that Home Affairs Minister Buthelezi’s heavy-handed policy on illegal immigrants was found to be at variance with statements by President Nelson Mandela, who proclaimed a “hands off my illegal aliens” policy.²¹

Moreover, Gumende criticises the “hastiness” with which the South African government “concluded agreements on areas where it had vested interests”. Some of these include the Southern African Power Pool in which Eskom, the South African electricity utility, appeared to prompt the government into “tap[ping] the hydro-electrical potential of the Inga scheme in Zaire”, a factor which may have led to Pretoria’s support of Zaire’s SADC membership after several previous failures. Other notable agreements include the “swift conclusion and signing of the protocol on shared resources, without going through the consultation process to which other arrangements were subject”.²² All this made Simba Makoni, the former executive secretary of SADC and former Zimbabwean Minister of Finance, conclude: “South Africa’s tactics resemble the divide and rule strategies of the former apartheid regime”.²³

In any event, the new South Africa was considered to be exhibiting a hostility towards a part of the region in much the same manner as the previous regime.²⁴ Proof of this was said to be South Africa’s unhappiness in its role as an equal member of the regional body, preferring instead “a position to call the tune”, and its consideration of the regional body as in “dire need of reform” at best, or the dissolution of the entire SADC.²⁵ These deductions conform to the reasoning that South Africa, having played leading roles in the past, would have expected to be the region’s ‘natural’ leader, a position further bolstered by its military and economic superiority in Southern Africa and indeed in Africa. Patrick Ncube who does not see a self-appointed ‘regional power, however, argues that South Africa ought to reject hegemonic ambitions in the region.

It thus has to be argued that the ability of South Africa to influence events positively in the region requires caution; we cannot assume that just because the country was considered the economic source of power for growth and development in Southern Africa that it would play a positive role both because of its domestic challenges and the high level of political instability in the region “stemming from fundamental inequalities between and within the countries of the region”.²⁶

Apartheid left South Africa with a severely unequal society, with the majority largely heavily impoverished despite the general wealth of the country. The new government was clearly faced with massive demands for employment, housing and other socio-economic requirements.²⁷ It only needs to be mentioned that even as apartheid was removed from the statute books by the enactment of the new Constitution of South Africa,²⁸ events in Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola and Zambia, as argued in the first chapter, show that the region was nevertheless still troubled by a high level of instability.

The period of transition was clearly rocky given the high expectations, both in South Africa and the region, for the inclusion of South Africa in the Southern African community and the credibility gap that existed between government intentions and applications which arose due to the desire by the new government to accommodate its severely divided community. It would consequently not be unexpected to see these challenges continue in the post-apartheid era, something Ivor Richard Fung regarded as imminent in the mid-1990s:

There seems to be emerging consensus on the vital need to revise the mandate, structure and composition of the Frontline States Alliance and to examine the effective ways and means of establishing an inter-state committee for defence and security questions in the sub region which would complement, in the security field, the efforts of a revamped Southern African Development Community (SADC).²⁹

NEW NOTIONS OF REGIONAL SECURITY

The attempts to find a replacement for the FLS were not, as Martin Rupiya has argued, “eclipsed by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa”, but rather intertwined with these events.³⁰ However, he is correct to argue that “influential forces” were responsible and have continued to be responsible for the “several conundrums” that have characterised the search for an appropriate

model for security in Southern Africa. The search for an appropriate security model has been explained by Willie Breytenbach as involving “three building blocks: limited and often bilateral interstate initiatives; policy advocacy by academics aimed at more comprehensive security arrangements; and SADC attempts since 1994”.³¹

Breytenbach is of course correct in highlighting the seriousness with which efforts at securing a formula for the region’s security was concerned but incorrect in the choice of such efforts. For instance, provided as the first building block were the following security interstate security pacts: the New York Accord signed between Angola, Cuba and South Africa on 22 December 1988 to facilitate the withdrawal by South Africa from southern Angola in return for Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola, which South Africa considered a threaten to the security of South West Africa (which it regarded as its own territory). Angola, for its part, was to gain its peace through a weakened UNITA and South African-supported insurgents.

The other military pact considered by Breytenbach as relating to the first building block is the Nkomati Accord of 1984, signed by South Africa and Mozambique to remove the presumed sources of insecurity from each other other’s territories—denying military support for Renamo, the insurgent against the Mozambican government, and denying use of Mozambique by the ANC, then fighting a liberation war against apartheid South Africa. Both these pacts could hardly be considered security arrangements upon which other states in the region could build due to the failure to bring peace to Angola and Mozambique following the signing of the ‘security’ pacts. The pacts did not constitute security arrangements, but rather an exhibition of insecurity, which, as is later shown, was worthless.

At this juncture, the aim is to itemise and analyse the various discussions, meetings and conferences which have been undertaken at a variety of levels, which may be collapsed into two categories: governmental and non-governmental levels. Collective security ideas analysed are those covering the transitional period up to 27 April 1994 when the new South African government came into office, and from 1994 to 1996, when the OPDS was officially established as the sub-regional security structure for SADC.

It will be shown that although a number of ideas about how to develop the region’s security structure evolved, a number fell by the wayside whilst others later re-emerged to become a part of the post-1996 era.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IDEAS

The end of apartheid and the demise of the Soviet Union signalled the new collective security era. Taking the form of gatherings of politicians, other 'non-political' activists in areas of governance and human rights, academics and researchers, regional multilateral institutions, regional governments, as well as foreign governments and institutions, ideas about a new regional security structure for Southern Africa were born in an environment in which plural politics was once again beginning to take root.

Zambia made history in 1991 by becoming the first state in the region in which a previously one-party regime (under the long-serving President Kenneth Kaunda) lost elections to a new leader (in this case, Frederick Chiluba) in a multiparty election. To follow was the long reign of Dr Kamuzu Banda in Malawi. This may be said to have added the dimension of a democratic dispensation that went beyond the desire by the region to rid itself of apartheid by cleansing itself of all forms of 'undemocratic' governance. Included in the environment of plural politics, which had a significant influence on the region in respect of collective security, were deliberations at the continental level with the Kampala Proposals of the Africa Leadership Forum in 1991. The proposals were on a Conference for Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) designed to enhance the OAU's Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.³² Other deliberations took place at the OAU Summits in 1992 in Dakar and 1993 in Cairo. Both of these summits endorsed conflict resolution mechanisms designed to develop multilateral regional collective security arrangements.

The genesis of the avalanche of ideas which was to characterise the period from the SADCC to 1996 when SADC created the OPDS, was itself the decision by regional leaders to move from mere development co-ordination to development integration. Arising from the "experiences of both the FLS and the SADCC", Ibbo Mandaza suggested the creation of a Federation of the Southern African Economic Community (FSAEC).³³ The experiences which implied a community feeling within the region were reinforced by Carlos Cardoso, who indicated that the critics who argued that Europe was in any case "going ethnic" and therefore held the view that engaging in a discussion about a Southern African Federation was therefore a futile debate, were being Eurocentric. His view was that although there were some ethnic tendencies in the region, these could "be accommodated in a stronger

regionalism” which Southern Africa exhibited.³⁴ This would be common historical experiences; common problems and aspirations; common cultural and social affinities, which in totality implied the existence of a foundation for common actions and therefore a clear indication of a shared future.³⁵ The fact that these tendencies are both a reflection of the constructivism and the security community paradigms is not lost in the analysis.

Although Ibbo Mandaza’s and Carlos Cardoso’s federal proposals did not attract much attention, the Declaration, Treaty and Protocol establishing SADC from the SADCC on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia was made in the spirit of economic integration. SADC was larger than the envisaged Southern African Federation. The new body, although generally concerned about economic integration, was nevertheless determined to have a considerable influence on political and security influence, as can be seen in the treaty.

In Chapter 7, article 21(3), the areas of co-operation are itemised as “food security, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; industry; trade, investment and finance; human resource development, science and technology; natural resources and environment; social welfare, information and culture; and politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security”.³⁶

Peter Vale augments this when he observes that the attempt to “expand areas of co-operation and integration beyond economics and towards politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security” would consequently bring about the “creation of an institutional framework to address the region’s security concerns”:³⁷ “The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security”.³⁸ However, Vale has since argued that the region hardly exhibits any sense of community at all:

There is very little real sense of community between Southern Africa’s states. This may again sound ... well, mischievous: after all the region’s states claim to be joined in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and a treaty, protocols, a sense of renewal and even a few buildings attest to their commitment.³⁹

Other parts of the SADC Treaty which have reflected the interwoven relationship of the socio-economic, political and security aspects of the region include Chapter 3, article 4 which itemises the region’s principles

and article 5 on its objectives. The SADC Treaty and Protocol of the Southern African Development Community adopted at the Summit in August 1992 in Windhoek signifies the intent to develop a regional structure that is best explained by a constructivism theoretical paradigm (see Appendix A).

By its very name, declared in the preamble of the SADC 1993 document: "Having regard to the objectives set forth in 'Towards a Southern African Development Community—A Declaration made by the Heads of State or Government of Southern Africa at Windhoek, 1992', which affirms our commitment to establish a Development Community in the Region", the Heads of State and Government of the region were unambiguously intent on establishing such a security community. Making reference to the region's "common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations", as well as an intention to develop "a vision of a shared future" and solidarity on issues of peace and security, appears to be indicative of elements that relate to some important core claims of a security community and constructivism as discussed in previous chapters.⁴⁰ It has, however, been argued that the states in the region have politically not had similar histories and cultures, save for the period during the 1970s and 1980s when the struggle against 'white' minority rule was most intensive.⁴¹

Although colonialism divided the region into English- and Portuguese-speaking areas,⁴² the intertwined histories of the peoples in the region, as observed from the migrations of the peoples in the region due in part to ethnic conflicts and incursions by 'white' settler communities, show that the histories and cultures of the peoples in the region are nevertheless common. The SADC contention of a people bound by a common history is therefore not inaccurate and consequently the probability of sharing a common future not unlikely.

To support this seeming change of heart, Peter Vale argues that constructivist theory holds the view that what binds a community is "the subjective idea of a feeling part of a community", not structural elements like physical infrastructures, treaties and protocols *per se*.⁴³ He is correct in arguing that a community feeling is crucial in the development of the region because without the people themselves taking an active part in its creation then a community in reality does not exist. What may, however, be contested is whether in fact the people in the SADC region have a community feeling, and even more critical is how best to determine whether in fact such a community feeling is inherent in the region. It would be fair to presume that the existence of such structures as treaties,

protocols and buildings associated with a community (and in this case, SADC) would be a useful, albeit not always accurate, way of exhibiting a community feeling. It would also be accurate to state that constructivism, although laying emphasis on the subjective ideas of a community feeling, does not dismiss structural elements as inconsequential.

The adoption of the SADC Treaty and Protocol in August 1992 remains a landmark in that in a very concrete manner the states in the region committed themselves to the formation of a security community, even though it did not provide an elaboration of its structure. However, what the states in the region may have lacked in a coherent regional structure, they appeared to make up for in good inter-state relationships.

A subsequent series of seminars intent on finding such a regional structure characterised the period 1993 to 1996. On the whole, the flurry was confined to the region and took the following dimensions:

- *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and a Southern African Institute* covered means of reducing distrust and promoting a harmonious relationship among the countries in the region following years of hatred and distrust. The February and May 1993 conferences also discussed the establishment of a regional institute to undertake research into the region's security development.
- *The Inter-State Committee for Defence and Security* of May 1993 was intended to be the nucleus of military co-operation in the region and closely linked to other regional and continental initiatives; and in a sense an improvement on the ISDSC.
- *The Peacekeeping Advisory Group and Settlement of Disputes* in May 1993 discussed the need to enhance the peacekeeping role of the region through a mechanism involving regional linkages, regional NGO participation in the general area of governance as well as an ombudsman for settling disputes as part of the SADC structures. The meeting also suggested the use of 'wise' persons from the military and non-military sectors to articulate the security challenges at hand and of SADC as playing the co-ordinating role in arms control policies.
- *Constituency Building and Mobilisation* issues were discussed in July 1993, dealing with a non-offensive approach to conflicts and the need for extensive participation by people in resolving broadly defined security challenges.

- *The CSCE Model and Forum for Mediation and Arbitration* dealt with an August 1993 recommendation for a European model that had integrated multifaceted approaches, and espoused Western values. The model also placed emphasis on the security of people and a general reduction of military expenditure.
- *The SADC Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security* of July 1994 is a formation of a regional structure that is designed to undertake the challenges of a post-1994 and post-FLS era, which nevertheless continues to reflect much of the past characteristic of informality.
- *The Association for Southern African States* formed in August 1994 reflects a compromise designed to remove the tensions between SADC and the FLS over flexibility and informality with the objective of merging the best of the two models.
- *Policy Advocacy to Technical Guidance* reflected the participation of academics, researchers and military personnel in issues of regional security in general and resolution of the South African question in particular.

CSBMS AND A SOUTHERN AFRICAN INSTITUTE

The UN Office of Disarmaments hosted a seminar in February 1993 in Windhoek, Namibia, on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) as a means of fostering peace and security in a region, which was, in the main, emerging from a long history of hatred and distrust between the 'black' bloc and the 'white' bloc, as well as intra-state conflicts. However, the seminar acknowledged that the region, with the exception of South Africa, had "a rich history of CSBMs in the military sphere", which could in particular be observed among the members of the FLS.⁴⁴ This was probably due to the relationship the states in the FLS had within the ISDSC.

At a later seminar in May 1993, Hans-Joachim Spanger and Peter Vale proposed that the initial step to take in confidence-building and security-enhancing measures was to agree on a document for such measures, which would be "aimed at laying the ground for more ambitious and intrusive measures in the field of military co-operation".⁴⁵ Both the February and May seminars included as part of the CSBMs increasing

mutual transparency, exchange of information, regular visits between military units, joint military education and operations among the states. Some such factors played a particularly vital role in co-ordinating the operations of the national liberation movements in the region.

However, the most difficult area for states to drop their guard is in the intelligence sphere—an area generally referred to as the ‘crown jewel’ by states. During the May 1993 seminar on confidence and security-enhancing measures, a two-track approach to government operations was proposed as a way of creating the required confidence and security among states. The twin approach entails that “[p]ublic accountability through control at the Parliamentary level where rules and parameters might be established” as well as increased co-operation between relevant state agencies in the region “premised on the assumption that this may contribute to easing mistrust and constrain thinking in worst-case scenarios”.⁴⁶ Although the oversight role by parliament is a factor that is generally associated with the intra-state situations, it nevertheless also provides a measure of easing inter-state tensions, since by definition the function of parliament is an open activity. During the era of the May conference and before it, defence and security matters were rarely subjected to parliamentary debate let alone approval; the prime reason given being the existing insecurity posed by some external enemies—particularly the South African state.

Interrogated in the seminar at great length “was whether South Africa’s military capacity represented a threat to the region or not”. It was concluded that in the main the threats to the region “were internal and had been generated by political and economic problems”.⁴⁷ South Africa was the major focus because of the various perceptions discussed earlier; and if therefore South Africa was going to play a meaningful role in the region’s development, it was necessary that a process of learning⁴⁸ or rather re-learning about each other commenced to facilitate shared understandings and expectations.⁴⁹ The internal nature of the conflicts in the region as identified at the seminar underlined the need for states to come to a new understanding of sovereignty—that theirs was an entity that called for the sharing of sovereignty. Coming after the inauguration of SADC, it can be assumed that there was a genuine undertaking by the states that, in their declaration of state sovereignty, there was a commitment to making the community spirit work.

The February seminar in Namibia also proposed the establishment a regional institute designed to “strengthen regional expertise”. The Southern African Institute for Security and Development Studies

(SAISDS) was to be involved in “researching and publicising areas of concern in the field of security”, organising regular conferences, and publishing a journal.⁵⁰

INTER-STATE COMMITTEE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY

One of the most important outputs of the May 1993 conference on ‘Security, Development and Co-operation in Southern Africa’ at Windhoek, Namibia at which for the first time high-ranking military people participated in academic debates was the proposal for an Inter-State Committee for Defence and Security (ISCDS) (*not* to be confused with the ISDSC mentioned earlier).

Considered to be the core of military co-operation in the region, and structured with such other structures as the OAU’s Defence Commission, the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence and what Spanger and Vale refer to as “the fruitful experience of a similar body” in the region, which had “lost its clout and ... become rather ceremonial”, the ISCDS was designed to go beyond defence co-ordination and was therefore in fact a ‘rejuvenated’ ISDSC.⁵¹ Its structure was to comprise senior military officials who were to meet regularly or in case of emergencies, as and when required. Provision was also made for various experts to meet on particular issues.

The ISCDS was also to have a “small secretariat” with “its own system of communication” and was to be funded and supported by the UN but guided by protocols established by the SADC on such issues as:

- the regular exchanges of information on military expenditures, force levels, weapons acquisitions, training of armed forces and military activities on an agreed format;
- the sharing of information and expertise on common concerns, such as demobilisation, integration of regular and guerrilla forces, and civil-military relations;
- the elaboration and supervision of protocols and annual calendars on military exchanges between the member states;
- the formulation and implementation of common positions in the field of arms control and military confidence-building;

- consultation on unusual military activities;
- the planning and supervision of joint military operations;
- the harmonisation of standard operational procedures and co-ordination of weapons procurement.⁵²

The ISCDS was evidently designed to create and maintain a close relationship between the SADC member states and therefore make a military conflict among them ‘impossible’ and in that respect conform to the critical requirement, according to Karl Deutsch’s perception of a security community, that requires that states should not target each other militarily. However, with respect to the proposal that the UN provide the necessary financing and support for the ISCDS, the attempt to avoid an ECOWAS situation where Nigeria—considered the regional hegemon—has had to meet the bulk of the finances required, whilst understandable, would have been inevitable due to the economic disparities in the region. Moreover, the fear of the “perpetuation of existing asymmetries in Southern Africa” if South Africa was to provide most of the needed finances was premised on the failure by SADC member states to find a suitable formula to redress the existing asymmetries.⁵³

An argument may be made that with the end of the apartheid situation there would no longer be an external enemy *per se*, therefore rendering unnecessary the need to maintain a collaborative security arrangement. However the fear of South African aggression appears to have continued to exist in some quarters, as Spanger and Vale have attested. However, Richard Ivor Fung maintains the need for a collaborative security arrangement in the region. He sees the necessity in the “establishment of a new security order and enduring structures”, notwithstanding the change of the political dynamics in the region.⁵⁴ The seeming lack of an external enemy does not preclude the possibility of entrenched hostile interests, which may have survived the new political dispensation in the ‘new’ South Africa as well as such other, more nuanced security threats as those posed by international terrorism.

The value of the ISCDS as a means of contributing to a peaceful region founded on a community spirit cannot be doubted, but the ever-present possibility of external influence on the region—an influence that is not necessarily positive—must also be considered. Hans-Joachim Spanger and Peter Vale argued during the May 1993 seminar that in order for SADC to “reduce its reliance on foreign involvement”, it was

necessary to develop a capacity to resolve its conflicts by way of “joint peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations”.⁵⁵ The two academics appear to have held the view that the region needed to be decisive in its actions to ensure peace and security, even if it meant employing aggressive peacekeeping methods.

PEACEKEEPING ADVISORY GROUP AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Yet another idea proposed during the May 1993 seminar was the creation of an advisory group composed of academics as well as military and other officials in the security sector. Spanger and Vale intended the advisory group “to advise governments and regional institutions on the pitfalls and promises of both peace-keeping in the region and the region’s role in wider peace-keeping efforts”.⁵⁶ With hindsight the value of such advice would certainly have been immeasurable in the peacekeeping missions that have since followed. The political problems that the chapters that follow discuss will show the difficulties between states over issues of peacekeeping that may have benefited from such inputs as visualised in the mid-1990s.

Considered as the prerequisite for military stability, the May 1993 seminar on the arms control issue offered some proposals, which included an agreement on the “level commensurate with the requirements of both national and regional security”. The duo also recommended unilateral arms reduction and saw SADC as acting as “co-ordinator of the arms-control policies of its member states”, conforming to the demands of a security community.⁵⁷

Spanger and Vale also argued that in order to be able to accomplish peacekeeping challenges, it was necessary to have a distinct Mechanism for the Settlement of Disputes and Conflicts (MSDC). The idea of such a mechanism was that, as a component of the SADC structure, it would be charged with the responsibility for interrogating security issues and would be the sole authority for any joint action such as fact-finding missions or peacekeeping operations. To commence its work, however, the MSDC needed to be guided by a protocol in the SADC Treaty. It was also proposed that, for the MSDC to operate effectively, this would require three other structures: a permanent committee of wise persons; an office of a regional ombudsman; and a standing committee on governance.

The Permanent Committee of Wise Persons (PCWP), acquired rather informally, was to play a mediator or arbitrator role and would be available for assignments at relatively short notice, while the Office of a

Regional Ombudsman was to be the first court of petition in the resolution of conflict and was to be representative of all people in the region. To support the regional ombudsman was to be the Standing Conference on Governance, Democracy and Development (SCGDD). It was located in the NGO sector rather than in governmental structures. The SCGDD's aim was "spreading the democratic ideal throughout the region by linking with established institutions of this kind at the national and continental level".⁵⁸ In this way, it conformed with the tenets of a security community.

CONSTITUENCY BUILDING AND MOBILISATION CAMPAIGN

SADC leaders through the Constituency Building and Mobilisation Campaign (CBMC) launched a further attempt by SADC to operationalise a non-offensive approach in Harare in July 1993. The leaders agreed with the "wide cross-section of constituencies in the region" that the SADC governments:

- demonstrate their political commitment to involve people in the process of building the Community by providing practical support to and consultation with non-governmental constituencies;
- provide an enabling political environment through the active promotion of human rights, democracy and economic empowerment of the region's populace; and
- promote contacts among residents of the Community by facilitating the free movement of people and factors of production in the region.

The desire by the governments and non-governmental institutions was evidently characteristic of the 1993 efforts to find a formula to the regional security challenges facing the SADC region.

THE CSCE MODEL AND FORUM FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION

Further to these, in August 1993 in Harare, Zimbabwe, at an event co-sponsored by the UN and the New York-based Institute for International Education under the theme 'Southern Africa: A framework and strategy for building the community', there was a proposal for a new approach to security using the CSCE model discussed earlier. This was described

by Gavin Cawthra as “integrated multi-faceted approaches” in that they relate to “three main sections or ‘baskets’ relating to security, economic co-operation and human rights”—closely akin to the Western values which have now become accepted international norms and used as a checklist for adherence to good governance.⁵⁹

The SADC Programme of Action for 1993 also proposed strategies cited by Laurie Nathan and Joao Honwana in the August 1993 seminar that conform to some of these aspects: that regional security strategies ought to adopt the new approach to security which emphasises the security of people and non-military dimensions of security; the creation of a Forum for Mediation and Arbitration which is akin to the MSDC associated with the May 1993 conference; a reduction of force levels and military expenditure; the introduction of confidence and security-building measures; and non-offensive defence doctrines.⁶⁰

SADC SECTOR ON POLITICS, DIPLOMACY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Recommended in July 1994 at the Foreign Affairs ministerial workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security, the SADC Sector on Defence and Security inspired by the FLS⁶¹ was approved by the SADC Heads of States and Governments at the Summit meeting in August 1994.⁶² The development of the sector could not have been unaffected by the political conflict gathering in intensity in Lesotho, as Abdilla Omari noted: the FLS “threatened to send a regional force into Lesotho in late January 1994” followed by an ultimatum to the Lesotho king, who had dismissed the country’s prime minister, to “restore the dismissed democratically-elected government”.⁶³

The SADC standpoint in this conflict, in respect of an intervention in or the threat from Lesotho, was that it could only be in such a country—“small and weak compared with the regional giants”—thereby suggesting that if it were a bigger and stronger state such as Zimbabwe, no such intervention would have been forthcoming.

SADC’s intention to enforce stability in the region was further reinforced by the FLS-applied pressure in October in 1994 on Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the *Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana* (Renamo) to “participate, face reality, and accept the results of the Mozambican elections”. Omari explains that the FLS wanted to “avoid the so-called ‘Savimbi’ syndrome which implied that ‘elections can only be considered free and fair if I win’”.⁶⁴

The intention of the regional leaders appeared to be focused on a structure that was concerned with more than just defence and security, as reflected in the approval of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security. With the FLS disbanding following the fulfilment of its aim, the FLS Summit in Windhoek in July 1994 proposed to adopt a new name and become the “political and security wing” of SADC.⁶⁵ The new structure was therefore to function like the FLS—a close-knit organisation with an informal *modus operandi*—a preferred structure by several states in the region.⁶⁶ South Africa’s position during the 1994 deliberations was one which preferred a structure with a flexible approach, fearing a proliferation of structures, while some views were that a “more formal structure were needed to call countries to account and protect weaker states”. It should be noted too that another very important issue discussed by the 1994 meeting of foreign affairs ministers which was to have a significant effect on a future structure was on “whether political and security functions should be combined with the economic tasks of the SADC”.⁶⁷

The flexibility argument prevailed, leading the foreign affairs ministers at the March meeting to recommend the adoption of the Association for Southern African States (ASAS). The recommendation for the ASAS to succeed the FLS would appear to indicate that the former was to be nothing but a continuation of the latter. Peter Vale argued that the ASAS was designed to “preserve the key features of the FLS arrangements: informality, flexibility and unimpeded access to the SADC Heads of State”.⁶⁸ It is therefore on the ASAS that attention ought to be focused because it was probably the most significant proposal for a regional security structure after the establishment of the FLS.

ASSOCIATION FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES (ASAS)

Although the actual establishment of the ASAS may be traced to its endorsement at the August 1994 Summit, when the idea really evolved is less clear. All the members of the FLS (i.e. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and South Africa became members of the ASAS, while Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland were invited to join as well.⁶⁹ While the workshop of foreign affairs ministers in the region in Windhoek in July 1994 resolved to recommend to the August 1994 summit that the ASAS should be considered as the replacement of the FLS, a regional ministerial meeting in April 1995 in Harare discussing “the old tensions between SADC and

the FLS” reached a compromise that the ASAS should become the “political arm of SADC” to deal “with conflict, management and resolution in Southern Africa”.⁷⁰ Two significant aspects of this development are that the FLS and then SADC had obviously not reached finality regarding the nature of the ASAS despite its approval in August 1994, and that there was a firm separation between the management of political and non-political (developmental) issues.

ASAS continued to be a matter of debate, as was the decision by the summit to merge it with the SADC sector on politics, diplomacy, international relations, defence and security, peace, conflict prevention, management and resolution. The issues that arose in the idea of the merger, and that subsequently became contentious in future efforts at charting a viable regional security structure, are whether the structure should be formal, under the SADC Secretariat such as the CSCE discussed earlier, or whether it ought to be informal, working outside the SADC Secretariat but co-operating closely with it.⁷¹ As indicated earlier, the ASAS followed the informal model, characterised by a structure independent of the SADC Secretariat but nevertheless reporting directly to the SADC Summit.⁷² According to Joseph Garba and Jean Herskovits, a number of security and military personnel in the region preferred a mechanism in which the ISDSC operated in an ASAS arrangement whose success story was “the flexibility and informality”⁷³ that had made FLS operational and indeed assisted in the management of the Lesotho crisis”.⁷⁴

Arguing for an informal arrangement, Peter Vale stated that a formal arrangement is inhibited in achieving transnational security at the regional level by such factors as “finance, weak national institutions, fear of larger states (i.e. South Africa), disjuncture between national and regional priorities and primarily, the reluctance of ministries concerned with defence and foreign policy to surrender sovereignty”.⁷⁵ It is notable that Vale does not stress the advantages of informal arrangements such as the political flexibility they provide. This is, however, recognised by Hussein Solomon and Jackie Cilliers, who regard these as facilitating diplomacy, but argue that such an arrangement would not be advantageous to less powerful states, because they would not have the ‘protection’ of legally binding arrangements. They further argue that informal arrangements fail to “regulate inter-state behaviour in an agreed and predictable fashion, and as they are not binding, they tend to break down in crisis”. The achievements of the FLS would appear to be more inclined towards disproving this hypothesis. Their assertion that it

is nevertheless possible to “incorporate an adequate measure of flexibility into formal conflict resolution procedures” would seem to be the way of bridging the differences between the proponents of formal and informal models, and is what the FLS and SADC models project.⁷⁶

In addition to the merger issue, the ASAS-ISDSC relationship was reflected by the summit meeting of April 1995 at which the foreign ministers in the region recommended that the ISDSC, which had until then been a component of the FLS, become a sub-committee of the ASAS under an expanded structure, to focus on training, intelligence and early warning.⁷⁷ Peter Vale, however, observes that the allocation of roles between ISDSC and ASAS as well as their linkage to the SADC system was not “hard and fast in practice and may well bring about further confusion”.⁷⁸ Vale was certainly not an advocate of the informal model and therefore did not expect informality to bring about order.

To correctly analyse the nature of ASAS and ISDSC, it is necessary to look at the principles and objectives of the former.

The structure of the ASAS was tailored along the lines of Chapter 7, article 21(3)(g) of the SADC Treaty, which focuses on the requirement for co-operation in politics, diplomacy, international relations, and peace and security areas, and some pertinent sections of the OAU Charter and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR).⁷⁹ The ASAS was premised on a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and closely associated with the CFSP of the European Union (EU). The latter may have in fact inspired the FLS and SADC states. This is also implicit in the FLS meetings, which explains why members of the FLS had a harmonious relationship and uniform foreign policy especially in relation to the Southern African region. An examination of the tasks of the ISDSC and the principles of the ASAS reflects this factor.

Lieutenant General Ronnie Shikapwashya (Zambia’s former Airforce Commander and presently the country’s Foreign Minister) itemised the ISDSC tasks as follows:

- a. Prevention of aggression from within the region and from outside the region.
- b. Prevention of coups d’etat.
- c. Management and resolution of conflicts.
- d. Promotion of regional stability.
- e. Promotion of regional peace.
- f. Promotion and enhancement of regional development.

The principles of ASAS included sovereign equality of all member states, no removal of ‘democratic governments’ by ‘undemocratic’ means and the avoidance of military intervention without adherence to the OAU and UN charters. The ASAS objectives are as follows:

- a. To protect people in the region against any instability.
- b. To participate in the security and defence of the region.
- c. To support all organs and institutions of SADC.
- d. To promote good governance in conformity with the OAU and UN Charters and conventions and development in member states.
- e. To mediate in inter-state disputes and conflicts.
- f. To co-ordinate and harmonise policy on international issues.
- g. To promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices in the grouping as well as adherence to universal human rights.⁸⁰

There is clearly some overlap in the roles of the ISDSC and the ASAS, but given that the former is subordinate to the latter, it should not have necessarily brought about any confusion. However, as far as the linkages between the two with SADC go, the relationship generally lies with the locus of power. By nature of the means of power, the ISDSC provided the raw power and the ASAS the locus of that power. It therefore follows that leadership of the ASAS was crucial as it provided control of SADC itself. It was inevitable, therefore, that there would be disagreements, primarily over its leadership, which led to its demise.

POLICY ADVOCACY TO TECHNOCRATIC GUIDANCE

Several ideas about how to develop the region’s security structure continued to evolve. Notable about these meetings was what Willie Breytenbach observed as the transition by academics and military officials from a “policy advocacy mode” to one of “technocratic guidance” which had characterised some of the conferences already discussed above. Breytenbach described several brainstorming meetings attended by academics, researchers, and military personnel, including those of the ANC’s liberation army, Umkhonto we Sizwe.⁸¹ The Centre for Southern African Studies at the University of the Western Cape, the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town, the Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)-based Centre for Foreign Relations and South Africa’s Defence Force were among the participants in some of these events.

STREAMLINING SECURITY POLICY INTO PRACTICE: THE LIMITS OF CO-OPERATION?

What had seemed to be a viable security regional structure in ASAS appeared to have been abandoned after the SADC Summit in Harare on 28 August 1995, over what Martin Rupiya identifies as two issues: ASAS leadership, particularly the chairmanship of the new regional security structure, and its expected relationship with SADC, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for East and Southern Africa and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), seen in the broad spectrum of inseparable security and development challenges as well as the unified nature of the people of the region.⁸²

The chairmanship problem, or more precisely the refusal by other members of SADC to adopt the FLS tradition of letting the longest-serving Head of State and in this regard, the last chairperson of FLS, become leader of the ASAS, contributed in a major way to the demise of the latter.

Providing another dimension to the problem, which suggested an inter-state friction centred on the character of an individual, Jakkie Cilliers comments as follows:

... commentators saw the reason for delaying the creation of ASAS in a disgruntled Prime Minister Robert Mugabe who felt that Zimbabwe had a right to a commanding position in any new grouping ... and was piqued at the increased dominance of South Africa.⁸³

The nature of the abandonment of the ASAS idea is, however, unclear in that the 1995 summit made no direct mention of ASAS, a factor which Gavin Cawthra interprets as indicative of the demise of ASAS. Whilst it is true that the ASAS was not directly referred to, regional security was nevertheless a matter that did not fail to attract the summit's attention, in that paragraph 16 of the SADC communiqué "reviewed its decision of Gaborone in August 1994, to establish the sector on Political Co-operation, Democracy, Peace and Security", preferring instead to adopt the foreign ministers' recommendation that no single state be given the responsibility of the sector and that instead more consultation between ministers of defence and security be undertaken "on the structures, terms of reference, and operational procedures".⁸⁴ As later events will indicate, this did not necessarily imply that the idea of ASAS had been dropped *per se*, but rather that it was poised for reconfiguration. The problem of inadequate communication or, more precisely, the lack

thereof among the ministries of defence, intelligence and police institutions, clearly strengthens Martin Rupiya's position.

Horace Campbell, like others, considers the August 1995 summit (which according to him only made reference to the need to honour the treaties and agreements signed by the pre-27 April 1994 South African governments in "the spirit of regional co-operation") as significant in the demise of ASAS but gives different reasons for it. His view is that it had to do with protracted "discussions on the future of the ISDSC and the relationship to the different sectors of the SADC secretariat".⁸⁵ However, the creation of the OPDS in 1996, as will soon be evident, has not only many characteristics of ASAS, but also dimensions which were designed to address issues that had been raised about ASAS itself. These included an organisation that would function independently from SADC, a structure with a sharper military focus, and one whose tradition entailed the continuation of a leadership system similar to that of the FLS, which therefore meant the continued dominance of Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe as the most senior member of the sub-region.⁸⁶ Critical in the transition from ASAS to the OPDS was the intention to provide political leadership to the ISDSC, taking cognisance of other members of the sub-region who were not members of the ISDSC such as Malawi.⁸⁷ In this respect, the OPDS was not as it were 'ASAS revisited' but rather the latter's outgrowth, in that the changes demanded were not effected into the ASAS *per se* but rather into the latter. Together with the new ideas, the OPDS also inherited many of the difficulties.

Other ideas that survived the trials of the times include those of confidence and security-building measures, which were a component of the ISDSC and therefore of the region's approach to issues of security at the sub-regional level and beyond. Such military exercises as Exercise Blue Hungwe and Blue Crane, which involve the participation of NGOs in peacekeeping operations, have been focused on this goal. Exercise Blue Hungwe was held in April 1997 in Zimbabwe, involving 1,500 troops from SADC, and was designed to enhance co-operation in peacekeeping operations.⁸⁸ Exercise Blue Crane took place in South Africa in April 1999, involving over 4,000 troops from 13 SADC countries. Unlike Exercise Blue Hungwe, it also involved a significant number of NGOs.

However, what continues to be an issue, albeit in a benign form, is the characterisation of South Africa. While clearly not an enemy in the sense it was prior to 1994, suspicion of the South African state and its policies, particularly those of an external nature, means that, as the issue of ASAS

has shown and will again be highlighted later, South Africa continues to be at the epicentre of security developments in the region.

Two other ideas that were proposed in the search for a viable regional security structure but have since not been developed further are the creation of a Peacekeeping Advisory Group and the establishment of the SAISDS. Instead, what has developed is a proliferation of ‘think tanks’ to interrogate these issues and the continued appearance of similar themes on the curricula of universities across the sub-region. Whether the existence of these institutions has contributed to regional security may not be in doubt, but what seems to be true—but is negative to the creation of a community spirit in the fostering of a security community—is the polarisation of views of some of these institutions.⁸⁹ What does seem evident has been the determination to seek an improved security structure for the sub-region.

The establishment of the OPDS in 1996 affirms SADC’s desire to properly structure the region’s security arrangements, which have already been seen to have a symbiotic relationship with development challenges facing the region. A number of questions have been raised regarding the OPDS, such as whether it should, *inter alia*, be a structure under SADC or whether it ought instead to be reminiscent of the FLS before it. Other questions have surrounded its suitability as a structure for the region’s security needs, not to mention the variety of debates between—principally—the South African viewpoint of the operation of the OPDS and that of Zimbabwe, which has caused stormy academic debates that have more than likely entered the corridors of governments beyond those of South Africa and Zimbabwe.⁹⁰ Although all these issues are important in understanding the dynamics in the region, of primary concern to this study is the extent to which the OPDS conforms to the progression of the region as a security community and, that being the case, we will choose not to join the debate, which was accurately described by Malan as at times “acrimonious”, beyond analysing its relevance in determining its contribution to the development of a security community.⁹¹ In respect of the SADC region it would not be inaccurate to challenge the old realist adage that “ideas will prostrate themselves before interests every time”.⁹²

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that the Southern African region has been searching for a suitable security structure since the onset of political independence among the former colonies, including the period after the

changing of the guard in South Africa in 1994. In a recent vote of thanks after the budget speech for 2003, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs noted "we can state without any fear of contradiction, that in less than one decade, we have transformed our country from being an international pariah, a negative force in favour of racism globally, reactionary, destabilization, aggression and war, to an important international player for democracy, social progress, national independence and equality, and peace". The various models that were actively considered, including a Federation of Southern Africa, the CSCE, ASAS and OPDS, all had a common denominator—a relative compatibility of values and interests, particularly among the elites.

The chapter discussed a number of differences among states and other political commentators which were likely to cause difficulties in the development of a security arrangement for the region, particularly for those that would conform to the tenets of a security community. It was shown that South Africa, dominant in the region's events in the pre-1994 era, continued to be so in the post-1994 period as questions were raised about whether the country was a genuine member of the Southern African community or for that matter if it even wanted to be a member of it.

The movement from a 'co-ordination conference' to a 'community', as exhibited by the SADCC and SADC respectively, nevertheless shows the value that states in the region placed on the evolution of a security community through the development of common political values, systems and institutions as well as the promotion and defence of peace and security. Notwithstanding the differences among states in the nature of the regional security institutional framework, SADC provides hope for the positive development of a regional security community.

NOTES

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- 78 Vale, op cit, p 17.
- 79 Mandaza, 1994.
- 80 Ibid; ISS, op cit.
- 81 Breytenbach, op cit.
- 82 Rupiya, op cit.
- 83 Garba & Herskovits, op cit, p 25.
- 84 *SADC Communiqué*, op cit, pp 52-53.
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- 86 For details see Zacarias, op cit; H Campbell, *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation*, Africa World Press, New York, 2003.
- 87 Interview with Rupiya, op cit.
- 88 See also EG Berman & KE Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and culpabilities*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Institute for Security Studies, Geneva and Pretoria, 2000.

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91 Malan, op cit.

92 Jurgen Habermas quoted in Vale, op cit.