

The notion of a 'security community' in the Southern African context

Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or class, of dominance or subordination, or rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future.¹

Whose security are these elites promoting—that of the population of the assumed security community in a broad sense, or that of the political regimes constituting the states participant to the assumed security community in question?²

In the introduction, it was shown that whilst a number of views regarding the nature of a security community exist, two major schools of thought have emerged as dominant—one by Karl Deutsch and the other by Adler and Barnett. The former, the security community's most revered architect, has described the concept as follows:

... real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way ... [States] retain the legal independence of separate governments—(have compatible core values from common institutions), ... a sense of we-ness, ... dependable expectations of peaceful change [whose] communication is the cement of social groups in general and political communities in particular.³

Charles Kupchan describes a security community as “a zone within which states have stable expectations of peaceful change—and those that

continue to play by more traditional rules of geopolitics".⁴ The initial emphasis, 'physical', reveals that states in such a relationship may sometimes have differences (even severe ones) without resorting to actually fighting with one another. The second stress, 'we-ness' suggests a common purpose among states, which would necessarily have some major compatible values nurtured by good interaction among the states and therefore a belief that change would be generally peaceful. Whether such a situation exists in the Southern African sub-region is a matter that the empirical parts of this book will endeavour to show. Other more recent works (which include that of the latter) include those by Morten Boas, Peter Wallensteen, Kjell-Ake Nordquist, Björn Hagelin and Erik Melander. Evidently Deutsch's work, although fundamental, is not sacrosanct but an important contribution to the body of knowledge that assists in understanding the Southern African sub-region in general and the Southern African region in particular. We should therefore not view the 'community' label on the region as a *fait accompli*. A point has nevertheless been made that "regional security communities exist in Africa because their members see themselves as part of such geographic-cum-security arrangements".⁵ However, it is significant that neither Mwanasali nor Baregu and Landsberg reflect the security community as a theoretical construct in terms of either the Deutsch or Adler and Barnett models.⁶

There are several challenges in the development of a security structure for the Southern African sub-region, as may be seen from the public attention given to SADC, and the OPDS or SADC Organ. In terms of the theoretical dimension, the literature has been shown to be state-centric in character. This state-centrism need not imply a lack of awareness of other important dimensions such as society and issues of human rights, or for that matter a robust approach to developmental agendas. Indeed, Deutsch's focus was not only preoccupied with matters of state survival as an important consideration for security, but also the creation of viable economic infrastructures that have in turn sustained developmental agendas.

However, what is found to be an anomaly in the discourse of the security community is the selectedness of its application, or more precisely, the reluctance to use it in analysing the African continent. Scholars such as Adler and Barnett have made important strides in the articulation of the security community paradigm and yet have failed to recognise its applicability to the African continent. Instead they have focused on Europe, South-East Asia, South America, the Gulf region,

Australia, and North America. Therefore, there is an analytical gap that needs to be filled in respect of work on the African continent in general, and the Southern African region in particular. It would, however, be an injustice not to state that both Adler and Barnett are aware of the incompleteness of their work. They in fact expect their work to provide an “intellectual inspiration for other scholars to use the concept of security communities for regions and dimensions that [they] do not cover”.⁷ This book takes up that challenge and this chapter lays the ground by providing the ‘road map’ for its applicability to the sub-region.

The chapter is organised in two sections: first, the conceptual viewpoint, determining the emergence of a security community and other related factors that point towards the existence or emergence of such a phenomenon. The conceptual section focuses on the models of Karl Deutsch, and Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, with a bias towards that of the latter. The second section of the chapter discusses the three tiers of the emergence of security communities and the types of communities that evolve, while the last section examines other theoretical issues that suggest the existence of such a community or its rise.

SECURITY COMMUNITIES: A CONCEPTUAL VIEWPOINT

DETERMINATION OF AN APPROPRIATE APPROACH AND THEORY

A security community presupposes a possibility of conflict or, at worst, war.⁸ The paradigm also implies recognition of the value of interdependence among the states in a community. International relations theories have in this regard been trying to develop an environment relatively free of war in order to achieve a sub-region, region and indeed a world free of conflict by developing theories that interrogate issues of peace and security.

In the previous chapter, it was argued that among such theories as realism/neo-realism, neo-liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism, society of states, the Kantian perspective⁹ and constructivism, it is the last one that best explains the development of a security community. Because constructivism is characterised by its views on global politics, the nature of the state and power, and argues that international relations methods should acknowledge the “social character of global politics” while stressing the relevance of “state identities and the sources of state interests”, it tends to explain more clearly than the rest what the security community paradigm is premised upon.¹⁰ Further to this, constructivism

recognises “cultural similarities among states” and regards international actors as “embedded in a structure that is both normative and material” and which can “generate shared identities and norms that are tied to a stable peace”.¹¹ This conforms well to Deutsch’s security community composed of sovereign states that, while placing high on the agenda the national interest, nevertheless maintain a co-operative relationship. The approach also argues that the use of power and its acceptability as socially legitimate is now generally questioned, and in this manner adopts the popular view of world citizenry.

It may be argued that the very character of the Southern African sub-region, in which states have come together, albeit in different groupings initially and later as a unified entity called SADC, reveals a recognition of the value of interdependence. The common history of the peoples of the region (including that of the ‘white population’ having settled in the sub-region from the mid-1600s onwards) would seem to indicate shared identities. Although the history shows the existence of war among the people of the region, including in the later period of interest to this study, as will be shown in the chapters that follow, the desire has always been that of achieving a stable peace, a phenomenon that the current SADC by both name and intent intends to achieve.

Deutsch’s security community—in which there is a recognition of state sovereignty and also a societal sense of togetherness—conforms to the major tenets of constructivism, including a combination of ‘national interest’, and a ‘co-operative relationship’ based on ‘shared identities’. To understand the nature of this paradigm and its applicability to regional security, there is a need to undertake an in-depth study of the model.¹²

SECURITY COMMUNITY MODELS

THE DEUTSCHEAN MODEL

Deutsch’s ‘security community’ has been mainly reproduced as a footnote to the history of security studies, a felicitous coinage that proved more attractive to later scholars for its label than its substance.¹³

The Deutschean security community approach has evidently not been without its critics, but it cannot be denied that the concept (initially suggested in the early 1950s by Richard van Wagenen) has had sufficient merit to invite attention by scholars and practitioners of inter-state security. Deutsch et al re-examined the concept through a theoretical

and empirical lens.¹⁴ Deutsch built upon his ideas on communities that Taylor defined as a community as a group with *shared identities, values, and meanings, with complex sustained interpersonal encounters*.¹⁵ Following from this, Deutsch regarded a security community as groups of countries, which “consist of people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of good and services”. Evidently Deutsch had in mind a harmonious relationship of people in such a region. It remains to be determined whether it can be said that the people of the sub-region have maintained a sufficiently close relationship with one another in a manner that goes beyond the desire for commerce. In relation to the substance of the paradigm, it is the elements of ‘communication’, social interaction and the desire to develop a cohesive entity beyond the confines of the state boundaries that influence the Deutschean model of a security community. Karl Deutsch describes this as follows:

A group of people, which has become ‘integrated’. By integration we mean the attainment of ‘a sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure ... dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief ... that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’.¹⁶

A security community according to Karl Deutsch is therefore one that has managed to evolve closeness at both the personal and structural level, with the ultimate objective of peaceful co-existence within society. The important question in this study is whether the Southern African sub-region has over the period of study ever achieved a level to warrant being referred to as a security community, especially when viewed in light of the region’s democratic credentials and level of peace and stability. A closer study of the paradigm may provide a better determination of its applicability to the sub-region.

The following factors have been identified as conducive to the development of the Deutschean model: mutual compatibility of values; strong economic links and expectation of more; multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions; growing number of institutionalised relationships; mutual responsiveness; greater mobility of people; and mutual predictability of behaviour.¹⁷ The sub-region’s history, as explained in the first chapter, can to some extent meet the criteria of commonality of values and large movements of people within the region.¹⁸ While such

factors as mutual responsiveness and joint reactions to issues may to some extent explain what has been taking place in the sub-region, others such as economic expectations are issues that appear to have been firmly on the sub-region's agenda throughout its history. However, other related factors are what Deutsch et al present as characteristics of a community upon which a security community may be built, namely compatibility of core values in common institutions and mutual responsiveness as a product of mutual identity and loyalty, which develops a "sense of we-ness". Other characteristics include good communication and the hope that there would be peaceful change.

The model is premised on good communication as the major factor that "cement[s] social groups in general and political communities in particular".¹⁹ Norbert Wiener explains that communication "alone enables a group to think together to see together, and to act together".²⁰ It is from this scenario—"interaction between society at the personal, economic and cultural levels"—that a security community arises.²¹ Padelford et al do state that communication in a security community is particularly between bureaucrats at "low echelons of government". In this respect, it may be argued that "hard decisions" may not be made and the agenda may be unlikely to include the critical issues that are needed for a security community to prevail. However, it is also logical and feasible to argue that discussions within the security community, whether or not at the "low echelons of government", may well be likened to 'grassroots' communication. The 'bottom-up' scenario may therefore actually strengthen rather than weaken the security community structure because it solidifies the foundation upon which the security community is built.

Deutsch also characterises security communities with a "high degree of economic interdependence" and cautions that their growth is not unlimited because the factors that initially led to their development could equally "lead to their dissolution".²² It may be this that makes neo-liberal institutionalism argue for a limit on the size of the co-operating group. Versions of the Deutschean model are the amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. The former is defined as the "formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation" of the likes of the US.²³ To take root, however, it is argued that certain conditions have to be met, such as the necessity of identical major values, as well as a characteristic way of life. The other conditions include sustainable social communication "geographically" between states and

between various “social strata”, a growing political elite, mobility of people (especially at the political level), and numerous communications and transactions.²⁴

In addition, the intended members of the community should anticipate benefiting prior to getting the possible load or ‘baggage’ such an association²⁵ would entail. However, a prime factor for the formation of the amalgamated security communities is what Dougherty and Pfaltzraff have described as “superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units and the development of so-called ‘core areas’²⁶ around which are grouped comparatively weaker areas”. Deutsch et al also visualise the need for improved “political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units”.²⁷

The latter, i.e. the pluralistic security community version of the Deutschean model, unlike the amalgamated version, reflects unified states, which remain under their own governments and therefore retain their legal independence.²⁸ The US–Canada and the France–Germany communities, which Padelford, Lincoln and Olvey refer to as “islands of peace”, are given as cases in point.²⁹ This looser form of association is characterised by a compatible core in common institutions and adequate flow of communication between the various social groups. In this regard, Dougherty and Pfaltzraff expect the decision makers in this association to have compatible values, and it is therefore likely that they would behave in a predictable manner.³⁰

The Deutschean models have not been without criticism. Zacarias discounts the applicability of the Deutschean model to the Southern African region because it involves “weak states in which communities are poorly integrated, domestically politically fragmented with weak institutions and a lack of financial resources”.³¹ Application of this approach to the Baltic region, whose states may be described in a like manner, discounts this fear. Adler and Barnett give a further vote of confidence. They find the pluralistic security community valuable as a focus of study and argue that this model is “theoretically and empirically closest to the developments that are currently unfolding in international politics and international relations theory”.³² Deutsch’s ‘security community’ is therefore not a mere ‘footnote’ in the numerous works on security studies; neither is it a comprehensive and compact definition which is valuable because of its ‘label’ rather than content.

Booth is probably one of the earliest commentators on the relevance of the security community concept to Southern Africa. He argues that the Deutschean model need not imply that in this region, “international

community-building could not become effective in its own terms” and that while it may not be possible to develop “the sort of comprehensive community”, this does not mean or translate into a lack of desire to create such a security community.³³ South Africa’s aggressive policies during the apartheid period and the relatively low score “in terms of value-compatibility, economic ties, level of transnational links, institutional-building, responsiveness and mutual predictability behavior”, which are some of the basic elements of the Deutschean security community model, are considered to have in the past contributed to the difficulty in developing such a community.³⁴ Laying emphasis on the issue of communication, Booth, despite his own reservations about its validity as a guarantee of community building, wonders whether in fact the region can qualify to be a community, let alone a security community in view of the “difficulties, cost and slowness of communication” across the region, which “result from a mixture of geographical, economic and political factors”. He, however, believes that increased cultural exchanges and the shared disasters of the region would serve to create an environment for such a development.

The lack of a significant regional threat in the “shape of the Soviet Union” which acted as a *casus belli* for Western Europe to form a security community is also considered to be a drawback in efforts to create such a security community for the region. The lack of such a threat for the North Atlantic countries in the light of the degraded threat in the region following the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) fails to support this argument in terms of the continued acceptance of the region as a security community. In any event the present threat posed by international terrorism poses a threat to all the regions of the world, including Southern Africa.

While holding a firm belief that a regional security community is the “only guarantee of the long-term security”, Booth and Vale hold the view that the litmus test for the existence of a security community is whether the states’ target involved each other militarily. They argue that since some of the states in the region target each other militarily, the region is not yet a security community. They regard the period up to 1995 as “hostile to the growth of such processes”, but are optimistic that a security community may one day be formed.³⁵ The fact that such a community in Western Europe evolved following the First and Second world wars, means that the Southern African region could follow suit, following “wars of destabilization”. Time is regarded as the ultimate healer, and “ambiguities” such as South Africa’s cancellation of Namibia’s

debt,³⁶ on the one hand, and refusal by South Africa's opposition party of the time, the National Party (NP), of a gesture designed to achieve "regional reconciliation", on the other hand, only serve as a frustration in the formation of the regional security community.

The major solution to the ambiguities is seen to lie in the "development of a common sense of purpose among the societies across the region" spurred on by "influential community-minded agents across the region", identified in this case as the "region's existing security arrangements" which "historically, [have] been agents only of insecurity". According to Booth and Vale, the post-Cold War and post-apartheid period led to a paradigm shift in critical security studies (CSS)³⁷ "which conceives of security holistically and sees regional security in terms of the extension of the notion of community".³⁸ However, the Deutschean model is not only analytically useful for the current period but also as a basis for the development of other models, hence the emergence of the Adler and Barnett model.

THE ADLER AND BARNETT MODEL

Adler and Barnett stretch the development of a security community to three phases, namely, the nascent, ascendant and mature phases. The first phase is the development stage of the security community, followed by a phase in which there are intensive dynamics between state institutions and organisations whose synergy culminates in the formation of the mature security community. A chronological study of the Adler and Barnett model begins with the nascent phase.

The nascent phase

Adler and Barnett's nascent phase of the security community does not exhibit an explicit search for a security community *per se* but rather a *desire to co-ordinate relations through increased exchanges and interactions*. It is also viewed as the establishment of structures that can observe whether the participating states are honouring their contracts and obligations. The prevalence of a mutual security threat and homogeneity at the cultural, political, social and ideological levels is regarded as the *casus belli*. Other contributory factors are a desire for a stable economic environment and the existence of states. Adler and Barnett stipulate that the role of powerful states or a coalition of states that are designed to provide leadership is core to the development of the nascent phase.

Evolving from this stage is a nascent security structure which evolves into a “strategic alliance” in which people in the member states are not necessarily expected to have a “shared identity or knowledge of each other” *per se* but will nevertheless be involved in modest co-ordination of security policies, the development of a more refined threat analysis, identification of possible friction areas in the execution of independent missions, and structuring of security programmes for mutual benefit.³⁹

Adler and Barnett argue that the “strategic alliance” structure essentially seeks “co-operative security” and also primarily focuses on developing mutual trust. They regard this in terms of the close relationship between military, economic, environmental, and human right issues and therefore envisage a situation where state elites and civil societies work together to develop “common understandings”.

This is akin to the concept of “common security”, which Robert Johansen defines as the management of the “pressing economic, military, and environmental problems that no national government can handle separately; an attempt to encompass the security of all nations and reduce the role of military power in international affairs generally”.⁴⁰ Another related concept is “collective security”, defined as the “strategies which have been adopted to co-operate in the prevention of war, usually by adopting a centralized security arrangement”, a case in point being the UN Security Council.⁴¹ Evidently, the relationship sought during the nascent phase is for developmental purposes and is concerned with highlighting the broadness of interdependence. The interdependence is later intensified to the extent that states and other structures deepen their earlier collaboration.

The ascendant phase

The second stage in Adler and Barnett’s model exhibits a rise in the development of security communities. Adler and Barnett see the ascendant phase as an intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states that is said to result in the emergence of various international institutions and organisations. Dense ‘friendly’ networks that continue to develop, development of structures that show increased military co-ordination and co-operation and/or a reduction of fear by members of the emerging community that other members represent a threat, characterise the phase. Further to this is the creation of structures that facilitate perception of issues. This is designed to promote concerted behaviour and consequently develop the “deepening of the

level of mutual respect and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change”.⁴²

Pursuing the matter further, Adler and Crawford argue that an increase in dynamic density⁴³ is probably the result of a uniformity of views regarding economic development and that security tends to coagulate around critical areas of common concern and can be best attained “only among members of the region”. The increased interactions, according to Adler and Barnett, influence the “development of new social institutions and organizational forms that reflect diffuse reciprocity, shared interests and even a collective identity (if not already present)”.⁴⁴

Further focusing on trust, Adler and Barnett argue that increased mutual trust and responsiveness not only institutionalise cognitive structures but are also a result of a variety of intertwined networks and increased relations within societies and organisations. Following from this mutual trust they note the militaries following similar missions and sharing intelligence and thereby reflecting their interdependence as well as the dismantling of organisations previously meant for verification and monitoring. Trust among the members of the states is therefore regarded as crucial in the development of a co-operative arrangement—a necessity for trust-building with social learning being viewed as catalytic.

Social learning has already been defined as a product of new knowledge which Adler argued to be the result of what is real, achievable and preferred.⁴⁵ It is also seen as “represent[ing] the capacity and motivation of social actors to manage and transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their identities”, which is generally attributable to “organizational settings and core powers”.⁴⁶

However, social learning also happens at the “mass level” and is considered to be the development of new social and political structures that are related to the emergence of a security community, a phenomenon that becomes inevitable in the mature phase of the development of security communities.

The mature phase

Adler and Barnett define the ‘mature’ phase as one where regional actors “share an identity” and a belief that peaceful change is inevitable, consequently paving the way for the existence of a security community which is typified in two versions: loosely coupled and tightly coupled security communities.

The loosely coupled security community is characterised by mutual respect and acknowledgement by the states that they lead the same way of life. The states are seen as having “an informal governance system” which is premised on “shared meanings and collective identity” regardless of having interests which are at odds with one another, disagreements and unequal bargaining practices, including the prevalence of multilateralism which is an acknowledgement that there is an acceptance that the critical challenges facing the world such as “environmental crises, international drug controls and terrorism ... cannot be handled by individual countries making their own policies, but must be dealt with by co-ordinated efforts and policies developed collectively by many nations”.⁴⁷

Adler and Barnett hold the view that the mechanism of making decisions, the resolution of conflicts and the actual manner in which conflicts are legally resolved, are more likely to be the product of agreement by all members than in other structures of an inter-state nature. Unfortified borders are regarded as an indicator of this type of security community. However, the absence of fortification along borders is mitigated by the retention of border checks and patrols in order to protect the state from “threats other than an organized military invasion”.⁴⁸ Changes in military planning on the assumption that no longer would members of the community target each other even when their relationships are severely strained, is also stressed as symptomatic of a loosely coupled security community.

Another indicator of the security community is its common definition of the threats facing the region, which would nevertheless depend on “the identification of core ‘personality’ features of those within the security community”.⁴⁹ In this regard, the perception of the core state tends to prevail. Last, but not least, is the nature of the discourse and language of the community in that the language of the states as well as their behaviour will tend to reflect what the community aspires to. It therefore follows that the community’s norms differ from those of non-members of the community.

In contrast to loosely coupled security communities, Adler and Barnett identify the following as features of the tightly coupled security community: because mutual aid becomes an accepted norm, common identity is identified through multilateral power changes that are conducted within the institutional context. Other features are the onus on the use of power no longer remaining the sole responsibility of the individual states but rather the preserve of the “collectivity of sovereign

states” and legitimate only when used in response to an extra-regional threat or on a fellow member who “defects from the core norms of the community”.⁵⁰ Other features identified in the tightly coupled model include the existence of collective security arrangements or even an integrated defence force, which could be used to thwart a threat or an actual military attack on the community by forces outside the region.

Symptomatic of the tightly coupled security community are co-operative and collective security. Adler and Barnett’s view is that this model moves from “reciprocal arms control and confidence building to ‘co-operative security’ with regard to security problems arising from within the community, and to ‘collective security’, with regard to threats arising outside the community”. Another indicator is the high level of military integration, which Adler and Barnett consider as a natural conclusion of shared identities and a high degree of trust and consequently the pooling of military resources. In this sense, the indicator “reflects not only high trust but also that security is viewed as interdependent”.⁵¹ Closely related to the integration of military forces is the attainment of co-ordination against ‘internal’ threats. Adler and Barnett state that this enhanced policy co-ordination takes the form of patrols and vigilance against commonly perceived threats.

Free movement of the population, internationalisation of authority and the ‘multiperspectival’⁵² policy is also considered indicative of tightly coupled security communities. Adler and Barnett also argue that having a multilateral policy, which promotes the free movement of people, indicates a narrowing of the “us vs. them” tendency, rendering unnecessary the use of visas as well as removing restrictions on routine movements within the community. This is viewed as an indication that states within the community “are no longer seen as a potential threat”.⁵³

Other indications of the tightly coupled community include the internationalisation of authority in which “shared and co-ordinated practices and public policies can further the creation of an informal system of rule”.⁵⁴ What this actually means, the duo fail to elucidate. They further assert that authority may be placed in international hands as opposed to the individual states, a situation which may lead to agendas being ‘foreign’ and unsuitable to the community. It is also a *fait accompli* that under the internationalisation of authority, state laws may be “co-ordinated and harmonized”, leading eventually to a single “enforcement mechanism”.

Mohammed et al refer to the tightly coupled security community as “a robust security community” which they describe as a mature stage of a

security community in which countries are tied “together in a far-ranging set of rule-bound relationships covering the common rights of citizens, trade, social and cultural exchanges, communication, and a shared set of values based on constitutional rule”.⁵⁵

Adler and Barnett’s model has also received comment from the Southern African region’s political scientists, among them Maxi Schoeman (previously Van Aardt) who describes the stages as “a continuum that implies or reflects an evolutionary pattern of development”.⁵⁶ However, these “imagined communities” do not necessarily follow the development of the nascent, ascendant and mature security communities. Schoeman refers to these as “social constructs” generated via “conscious human endeavor”. The explanation for this is in the nature of the development itself, in that “initial choices, often small and random, determine future historical trajectories”.⁵⁷

The evolution of security communities in regions is therefore a product of their own histories and not confined to the “growth-path model” suggested by the Adler and Barnett security community model. A community may even ‘leap frog’ from one stage to another, or experience a fusion of stages. Yet another critical issue is the view by Adler and Barnett that the development of a security community is essentially an “intra-community effort and process”, which Schoeman regards as inapplicable to Africa. Schoeman’s argument is that on the African continent the nature and magnitude of the threats confronting the continent demand external involvement for security communities to evolve. However, in view of Southern Africa’s security structures and regional security dynamics, in the remainder of this chapter and in those following it will be argued that Adler and Barnett’s characterisation of the development of security communities remains the most comprehensive manner in which such developments can be studied in the Southern African region.

DETERMINING THE EMERGENCE OF SECURITY COMMUNITIES

Adler and Barnett’s first tier identifies the causal factors that stimulate states to place themselves in such a manner that they become relevant to one another, thereby necessitating the co-ordination of their policies. The second tier identifies the factors that are conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity, while the third interrogates the development of trust and collective identity formation precipitated by a “dynamic positive and reciprocal relationship” between the variables ‘trust’ and ‘identity’.⁵⁸

FIRST TIER

In the first tier, Adler and Barnett identify a range of causal factors that ‘pull’ states in each other’s direction, thereby making it imperative that they synchronise their policies. These factors, which could be either exogenous or endogenous, tend to encourage states to form alliances which in the context of the theme under discussion would be the “desire to reduce mutual fear through security co-ordination”.⁵⁹ A case in point may be found in the 1970s in the Southern African region, when the emerging states of Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania sought safety in the FLS alliance designed to help them survive the aggressive policies of the settler colonies in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. Subsequent chapters will provide a detailed exposé of the formation, structure and activities of the FLS.⁶⁰

The pull factors include changes in technology, demography, economics and environment, which in the Southern African region entails the development of the political economy of the region from the arrival of white settlers in South Africa and the region, and mineral development and other economic enterprises which in turn have led to the massive movement of people across the region in search of new ‘fortunes’. The industrial development of the region has also brought in its wake not only demographic problems in the form of both intra- and inter-state migration but also environmental degradation on a scale demanding concerted effort by all the states in the region. The region in reaction to these causal factors initially established the SADCC and later SADC. Other causal factors identified by Adler and Barnett are the development of new interpretations of social reality and external threats. It may therefore be argued that the political economy of the Southern African region to a significant extent conforms to Adler and Barnett’s first tier.

SECOND TIER

Moving from causal factors that ‘nudge’ states together, which consequently makes the co-ordination of policies necessary in the first tier, the second tier involves factors that are conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity.

Placed in two dimensions, ‘structure’ and ‘process’, the factors ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ are arranged under the former dimension. Adler and Barnett consider power and knowledge to be the major foundation upon which a security community may be developed; and power, the more crucial of the two.

The structural dimension

The power factor

Karl Deutsch places the role of power fairly high in the formation of security communities. Deutsch argues that the geographical size of a country, its military and economic strength as well as its educational level play a pivotal role in the integrative process. In this regard, Adler and Barnett argue that core states therefore provide rallying points for the weaker state:

a community formed around a group of strong power creates the expectations that weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community.⁶¹

Adler and Barnett see the core states as not only having the capability to motivate the weaker states to become a part of the collective but even at times to “coerce others to maintain a collective stance”.⁶² This therefore appears to imply that core states provide the *sine qua non* for a successful development of a community in general and a security community in particular, and that they would act in the interest of the weaker states.

These are clearly issues that remain to be determined by the empirical component of this study, at least in relation to the development of a security community for the Southern African region, especially since not even NATO—generally regarded as a successful security community—is positively disposed in terms of the two points above. An important aspect to take note of, especially when the concept of ‘core states’ is applied to the analysis, is Adler and Barnett’s deduction that rather than the core states creating security, it is the “positive images of security or material progress that are associated with powerful and successful states”, that facilitate the growth of security communities around them.⁶³

With South Africa, although the wealthiest and militarily potentially the strongest in the SADC region, it is rather the non-aggressiveness it exhibits as well as its economic superiority, *ceteris paribus*, that would gain it acceptability as the centre of the development of the region’s security community.

In addition to the concept of power, the ‘we-feeling’ earlier alluded to, provides an alternative understanding of the power concept:

The authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the ‘we-feeling’ and practices of states and the conditions that confer, defer, or deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members.⁶⁴

This would seem to suggest the growth of such a community in spite of the absence of a core state. Instead there is an alliance of weak states—operating on the general thesis of ‘united we stand and divided we fall’. The FLS would seem to conform to this thesis.

The knowledge factor

The knowledge factor refers to the environment, including the political environment, and in this respect, Adler and Barnett’s concern is with uniformity of perception that would not only make political action “legitimate” but also enable practical action to be taken. In this respect, the “shared meanings and understanding” would facilitate practices that are tied to the development of mutual trust and identity, and analytically tied to conflict and conflict resolution, which would be valuable ingredients for the formation of a security community.⁶⁵

Adler and Barnett argue that scholars of international politics generally associate a security community with liberalism and democracy. Colin Kalh in an unpublished manuscript, ‘Constructing a separate peace: Constructivism, collective identity, and the democratic peace’, indicates that liberal ideas, as earlier indicated during the outline of conceptual viewpoints in respect of neo-liberal institutionalism, tend to accommodate the growth of “collective identity, mutual trust, and peaceful change”.⁶⁶

In this respect, in the search for knowledge on the emergence of security communities, some hypotheses have been mooted as follows:

- Liberal ideas may be better able to promote strong civil societies—and the networks of organized processes between them through the interpenetration of societies and the exchange of people, goods, and ideas;
- Liberal ideas are more prone to create a shared transnational civic culture, whose concepts of the role of government, tolerance, the duty of citizens, and the rule of law may shape the transnational identity of individuals of the community.⁶⁷

In a critique of Deutsch, Adler and Barnett argue that merely establishing a linkage “between liberal democracy, market values and the formation of the North Atlantic Community”, does not also “consider whether there might be other ideas that are compatible with the development of peaceful change”. They argue that security communities may be formed through a “shared developmentalist ideology” which has given rise to the development of such institutions in South-East Asia. They, however, fail to recognise the development of such institutions in Africa, and in the SADC region in particular. Among their important contributions to the issue of security communities is the stress that it is necessary to show a linkage between “a particular set of ideas and the development of security communities”.⁶⁸ In this respect it would be argued that such ideas in the Southern African region would serve the development of security communities. This is a matter that will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

The process dimension

Complementing the structural dimension, the other factors that are conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identities fall under the dimension of ‘process’, whose components include transactions, international organisations and institutions as well as social learning.

The transaction component

Defined by Charles Tilly as “bounded communication between one actor and another”,⁶⁹ the transaction component takes a variety of forms which have been identified by Adler and Barnett as “symbolic, economic, material, political [and] technological”.⁷⁰ Considered critical, however, is what John Ruggie calls “dynamic density”.⁷¹ He defines this as “the quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions that go on within society”. It is therefore the amount and nature of the transactions that determine the relationship between societies.

International organisations and institutions

Contributing to the process dimension, according to Adler and Barnett, are international organisations and institutions which play a part in the development of trust by security and non-security organisations through

the establishment of “norms of behavior, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to enforce those norms”.⁷² Economic institutions, in particular, are regarded as well-positioned to make a crucial contribution to the overall development of trust and therefore acquire “a security-related function and [become] instrumental to the development of a security community”.⁷³

The SADCC and SADC’s disposition towards the economic and welfare improvement of the members of the region can in this respect be reasonably argued to have contributed to the development of trust in the region. The participation of SADC in peace and security issues, especially its active participation in the management of regional politics, defence and security,⁷⁴ may appear to give credence to Adler and Barnett’s assertion. This is a subject of more intensive analysis in later chapters.

Yet another contribution of international structures in this regard is through using their position in which political actors socialise with one another and consequently enhance the trust-building process. The appropriateness of international organisations and institutions in this role is what Alexander Wendt calls “engineering” to which he refers to the conditions that breeds mutual trust and collective identities such as uniformity of destiny. Adler and Barnett refer to this as “cultural homogeneity” which they argue “foster[s] the creation of a regional ‘culture’ around commonly held attributes such as ... democracy, developmentalism, and human rights [which could result in] a common currency and/or generate and enhance norms and practices of self-restraint, such as ... mediation”.⁷⁵

The general view in respect of the Southern African region has been that the regional institutions have not performed well at the level of democracy and human rights in particular, thereby rendering the institutions mere ‘clubs’ for political leaders, which do little to enhance genuine peace and security on the ground! Although the legitimacy of the claim may not in question, its validity is something the chapters that follow will endeavour to discuss. It is nevertheless unquestionable that undemocratic tendencies and the poor human rights record in the region reflect poorly on the region but do not technically suggest that the region is not on the path of a security community. Cultural homogeneity and international structures are potentially an effective forum for providing an environment for the creation and development of security communities.

The approach thus far has been to assume that international organisations and institutions essentially play a constructive role, with Adler and Barnett recognising their “direct and indirect [contribution] to

the development of security communities”⁷⁶ and Alexander Wendt noting that “[t]heories of process explain how practices and interactions reproduce and/or transform structures and [are] as such ... essentially dynamic”.⁷⁷ However, interrelations theories have tended to regard these structures as “constraints on state actions”, while Wendt contends that theories of structure “explain how structures regulate and/or constitute practices and interactions, and as such are essentially static even if they reveal transformative possibilities within a structure”. Therefore, from this perspective it would be both theoretically and empirically valuable to learn what situation pertains in Southern Africa.

Social learning

The third component within the process dimension reflecting the factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity is social learning. This process is said to take place at all levels, but it is at the level of “policy makers and other political, economic, and intellectual elites” where it is crucial “for the development of new forms of social and political organization that are tied to the development of a security community”.⁷⁸

It is nevertheless the core powers that are regarded as critical to the process of social learning because while they are materially dominant, they are able to confer their moral authority, norms and practices, and “may also induce their political adoption and institutionalization”.⁷⁹ The drawback is naturally the perception of the sceptic who may interpret this as “power projection and even hegemony”, a situation that may result in rejection by some non-core members.⁸⁰

It does seem evident that non-core states are also important in the development of collective identity as some form of accommodation is sought between the core and non-core states. Alder and Barnett say of the power asymmetries:

That said even those asymmetrical relationships can involve a situation where ‘teachers’ and ‘students’ negotiate a new regional collective identity around consensus norms and mutual understandings.⁸¹

The typology of ‘teachers’ and ‘students’ is not necessarily accurate in every case. For instance, although South Africa is clearly a core state in the region, its short period of democratic governance and long history of destabilisation have tended to mitigate its effectiveness as a regional power.

THIRD TIER

The third and final tier is concerned with the development of trust and collective identity formation. In this case the evolution of a security community is the culmination of a vigorous and helpful relation among the variables in the second tier.

Focus on trust

Adler and Barnett regard trust as “believing despite uncertainty” and argue that there is a close relationship between trust and collective identity in that “there is a general tendency to trust on the basis of mutual identification”.⁸² Trust has therefore not been without major constraints. Barbara Mistzal makes the following observation:

Trust always involves an element of risk resulting from our inability to monitor other’s behavior, from our inability to have complete knowledge about other people’s motivations and generally, from the contingency of social reality. Consequently, one’s behavior is influenced by one’s belief about the likelihood of others behaving or not behaving in a certain way rather than solely by a cognitive understanding or by a firm and certain calculation.⁸³

It is then regarded that the formation of international organisations and structures for monitoring states is a state creation premised on the international relations theorists’ generalisation that “anarchy makes trust highly elusive if not impossible”.⁸⁴ They contend that the security community thesis, implying the “existence of dependable expectations of peaceful change”, is a negation of the dominant international relations dogma and a calculated undertaking that “states no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust but do so through knowledge and beliefs about the other”. The third tier focuses on two models of security communities, namely loosely and tightly coupled security communities which are themselves a reflection of levels of development of trust and collective identity formation.

Loosely coupled security communities

Loosely coupled security communities, regarded as a “social entity that generates a positive identification between peoples of member states”, are only able to partially identify themselves, but determine what

motivates the group.⁸⁵ The members of the group also limit the action of a state and “empower it to act in the world and contribute to the development of mutual responsiveness”.⁸⁶ The level of trust in this model is evidently low largely due to an inability to identify themselves with the community.

Tightly coupled security communities

The tightly coupled security community has acquired complete corporate identity in which the collective cognitive distance between members of the communities has shortened. This type of security community is characterised as follows:

- Members of the community adhere strictly to the community’s identity and norms.
- Member states derive their meaning, purpose and role from the community.
- The interest of the states as well as the identity of the citizens are interchangeable with those of the community.
- There is generally a fundamental change in the foreign policy of a state in respect to what it is and what it is designed to achieve; Adler and Barnett stress this position in the following manner:

The discourse of the state and the language of legitimation, moreover, also should reflect that the relevant community is no longer coterminous with the states’ territorial boundaries but rather within the region.⁸⁷

Peter Wallensteen, Kjell-Ake Nordquist, Björn Hagelin and Erik Melander stretch Adler and Barnett’s framework to five aspects. The first of the aspects is in terms of the *outside relations* states have with external actors. This means the “existence of a common military threat to the region or joint security co-operation extending beyond the region”; secondly, “*communality in major values* among the countries involved”; thirdly, the “ability to predict the behaviour of other states (*mutual responsiveness*)”; fourthly, “*the forms of behaviour among states and peoples*”, which entail providing a qualitatively better economic

condition for the people in the region; and fifthly, the value of “*common institutions* which at the same time respect and uphold the independence of the member states, and contribute to concerted actions in security matters”.⁸⁸

All the aspects in italics are associated with Karl Deutsch, except for the fifth, credited to Wallensteen et al. In a more recent work, Peter Wallensteen argues that a number of security communities have arisen from conflict situations. He refers to an increase in “experience in solving conflicts among members [which ends up] leading to shared values in conflict management”.⁸⁹ He also adds to the conditions for security communities such factors as economic co-operation, a reduction in military spending and “openness among the members, for instance in the form of democracy”.⁹⁰ He nevertheless acknowledges the existence of autocratic values in some security communities and gives South-East Asia as a case in point.

Russet et al contribute to these additional perspectives on security communities by adding “an ability and willingness to accommodate new demands and needs, not merely the maintenance of a status quo that may be unjust”.⁹¹ This would provide a response to volatile situations that may challenge the traditional interpretation of security. They add that the relationship in such a community is one that is “reasonably equal and symmetrical and in which they frequently harmonise their interests, compromise their differences, and reap mutual rewards” without the use or threat of force as a solution to any conflict situation; achieving what they refer to as a “positive peace”.⁹²

OTHER DIMENSIONS OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY

CREATION, ENLARGEMENT AND STABILITY OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY

Other critical dimensions that add value to the discussion of security community include the question of the creation, enlargement, and stability of security communities. Charles Kupchan addresses the matter of stability and enlargement of a security community given the onset of “a new balance of power” in global matters.⁹³ Although Kupchan had in mind the transatlantic relationship, the same scenario may be applied to the Southern African sub-region.

Given the sub-region being characterised as a security community prior to the entry of South Africa (an acknowledged regional ‘superpower’) into SADC in 1994, its becoming one of the family

members would be expected to affect the balance of power in the sub-regional grouping. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the inter-relationships among the states in the sub-region will be closely examined to 'play out' this scenario.

However, Deutsch's conditionality of a security community runs into serious analytical difficulties when an alliance no longer reflects a major conditionality. For instance, to argue as Deutsch does that "states enjoy unprecedented levels of trust and reciprocity ... [and] the Atlantic community are deeply rooted in the democratic character of its members and in the thick networks of institutions they have erected to regulate their relations", without considering the possibilities of changes in relation to the passage of time, is problematic.⁹⁴ For one thing, the creation of an alliance between the US, UK, Spain and some of the formerly Eastern bloc states against other members of the Transatlantic Alliance such as France and Germany over the Iraq crisis in 2003/04 is a case in point. Efforts by the alliance to resolve their differences following the violent change of the Iraq regime appear to conform to Wallensteen's observation that "the security community would ... be self-sustaining in the management of its own crises".⁹⁵

COMPOSITION AND NATURE OF SECURITY COMMUNITIES

Another element that has a significant effect on security communities is the nature of their composition. While neither Karl Deutsch nor Adler and Barnett's security communities make particular mention of the size of the states forming security communities, Wallensteen argues that often their composition is of smaller states which may not necessarily adhere to the "principles of peaceful co-operation [and] are likely to have difficulties in deterring hostile action from strong neighbours outside the community".⁹⁶ Whether this situation applies to the Southern African region is a matter that will be a subject of analysis in the chapters that follow.

Yet another element of the nature of security communities is that inevitably security communities ought to either be able to react to regional conflict issues or alternatively depend on the power of some states, a situation which implies that communities have chaperons. In this respect, Wallensteen refers to a US-led community or *Pax Americana*, whilst Baregu has made reference to the concept of a 'lead nation'. In the case of the Southern African region, mention has been made of a *Pax Pretoriana* in reference to South Africa's dominance in the

region. Wallensteen adds to the nature of security communities the involvement “on the international scene” of some of the members of the community as a result of “shared values ... likely to result in common understanding of international affairs”.⁹⁷ South Africa’s articulation of the region’s standpoint on the allied forces’ military invasion of Iraq is symptomatic of this point.

Other aspects of security communities include the sizes of states, responses to regional conflict issues, and their dependence on the power of some hegemonic states as well as the role on the international scene. William and Neumann add the question of a “democratic security community”.⁹⁸ Inadvertently, William and Neumann acknowledge the possibility of security communities that may not necessarily be democratic in character. Here lies the possibility of alliances of states that may not adhere to the ‘strict’ nature of Karl Deutsch’s characterisation of security communities, which head and shoulders above other factors would be ‘democratic’ states—the term democratic of course implying its liberal connotation. The concept ‘democracy’ has been a rather problematic one in ‘developing’ states, which, soon after attaining their independence from their colonial masters, sought to apply their own, home-grown systems of governance, which normally meant one-party political systems. Indeed, there is a valid argument that the ‘failure’ by the countries in the Southern African region to crystallise the principles of democracy as defined by Western standards, need not imply the impossibility of the region as a security community.

Abdul Mohammed, Paulos Tesfagiorgis and Alex de Waal articulate preconditions for a security community in Africa, providing an additional angle that may assist in determining the extent to which the Southern African sub-region may be considered a security community. The trio’s presentation of internal peace, regional power, democracy’s linkage to peace and security, and the “sequencing of establishing a security community” provides a more ‘local’ interpretation which is not in itself a contradiction of that of Adler and Barnett’s model, but rather its enrichment in that it is an attempt to seek a more environment-specific dimension.

On the issue of internal peace, the trio go beyond a consideration of mere inter-state security to include security within states themselves—“internal peace and inter-state security”—which, they argue, characterises the “interconnectedness of the African continent”.⁹⁹ Mere lack of conflict among states is not therefore regarded as the peaceful relationship that is projected by Deutsch, as well as by Adler and Barnett.

Equally relevant is the internal cohesion in states, something considered as a given by earlier assessments.

The hierarchy of state power has been regarded as yet another precondition for the evolution of a security community. In this regard, Mohammed et al see the necessity of dominant states in the development of security communities, a case in point being the role of France and Germany on the one hand, and that of the US on the other in NATO. In this regard, the presence of such states as Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt is regarded as positive in the growth of a security community in Africa. It may therefore be derived that the Southern African sub-region would need such states as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, irrespective of any tension that might exist among them.

In the same vein, the past history of South Africa as an apartheid state is unlikely to be totally erased from the memories of its past victims. Working from the premise that “sub-regionally hegemonic powers are a highly contentious issue within Africa”, the trio sees the solution in a formula that mitigates the powers and duties of the regional hegemons. They see such strategies as including smaller states combining or aligning with the more powerful ones with the hope of benefiting from “power and dynamism, or ... in the hope of influencing [their] policies”.¹⁰⁰ In this regard, they view the AU and NEPAD as providing such an environment as states become encapsulated by “a web of mutual obligations, shared tasks and common values, under the auspices of a regional organization”. These factors attributed to the regional structures can also be applied to the sub-regional level, and specifically to the Southern African region.

Yet another precondition that features fairly prominently in both Deutsch’s and Adler and Barnett’s model is that of democracy. Mohammed et al stipulate that, despite a less than democratic environment, authoritarian states are able to have a peaceful relationship with one another, thereby showing that a security community can indeed exist under such conditions. However, it may be debated how long such communities would be able to enjoy sustained peace and security. Placed as absolute essentials for security communities are such factors as “free expression, transparency and accountability, religious tolerance, rule of law, constitutional change in government, and peaceful co-operation with neighbours”, including “militarization of governance” which they identify as one of the major sources of conflict and the “tendency of states to centralize security policy in a small group of officers, for whom national security is narrowly defined in terms of military threats”.¹⁰¹ A

pluralistic approach in which civil society plays an active role is regarded as vital for the development of security communities.

Tackling the manner in which a security community has been established on the continent, Mohammed et al have isolated the 'solidarity' dimension as the major aspect that has knitted the states in the region. Unlike Deutsch, and Adler and Barnett as well, Mohammed et al argue that the implementation of a security community is not premised on political and economic interests but rather on the "faith of Africans in their common identity and common destiny".¹⁰² Therefore, in this sense, the AU is regarded as an "aspirational union" in that it projects this faith. At subsequent AU summits, as at the OAU summits as well as current SADC summits, the common denominator has been the need for "solidarity".

The sequencing of establishing a security community in the region is seen through the AU and NEPAD initiatives and processes and looked at in two levels. At the higher level the "interaction between states, cooperation in economic development and international partnership [which] promote common understanding, shared values" is seen as the route to a security community.¹⁰³

Constitutionalism is regarded as the other level where "the regional culture of respect" is manifested in the regional body's undertaking to recognise only governments that came to power through constitutional means. Being a microcosm of the region, the Southern African sub-region too can apply the same approach.

While largely using Adler and Barnett's approach to the development of security communities, the study takes cognisance of contributions to the theoretical body of knowledge with the intention of highlighting some unique aspects that may be peculiar to the African region.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF A REGIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY

Nolutshungu in his discussion of a regional security structure stipulates that the development of a security community for the Southern African region would be a reaction to severe security problems for which there is a requirement for a better solution and which in essence demands a comprehensive dimension.¹⁰⁴ Such an approach is regarded by Ohlson et al as one "including politics, economics, and military security [as well as] consider[ing] the linkages between sub-national, national, and regional levels".¹⁰⁵

As regards the study's focus on a security community, Booth and Vale ask whether the Southern African region, despite the optimism for one as a consequence of "deep insecurity" created by apartheid South Africa, can be considered a 'community', let alone a security community.¹⁰⁶ They wonder too whether it may not be more prudent to place Karl Deutsch "on his head" by regarding the region as a "community of insecurity" rather than a security community. The rationale for this argument appears to be that the motivation for the states in the sub-region to form some sort of regional structure is a reaction to their national rather than regional security concerns.

Yet another factor regarded by Booth and Vale as a hindrance to the development of a security community is the South African government's "wholly uncertain" regional policy.¹⁰⁷ They argue that the ANC ruling party does not regard South Africa as a "locomotive of regional development" but as one that seeks to share its resources with everybody else:

a democratic South Africa should therefore explicitly renounce all hegemonic ambitions in the region. It should resist all pressure to become the 'regional power' at the expense of the rest of the sub-continent; instead it should seek to become part of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence.¹⁰⁸

The ANC position had apparently earlier been 'prophesied' by Ncube who, when writing about the political party's views on a regional structure, argued that "the new regional relations should be based on co-operative principles ... principles which assume that there is no self-appointed regional power".¹⁰⁹ Whether this is in fact the position the ANC in government holds is unclear, as will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Booth and Vale also present a contrary perspective associated with South Africa's elites, which postulates that South Africa should use its relative strength to lead the region, especially in relation to strengthening the regional economy. In this view, South Africa would draw "the region towards economic prosperity".¹¹⁰ It may, however, be argued that an ambivalent posture by the South African government, discussed earlier, has manifested since 1994. It remains to be seen to what extent this has significant implications for the development of a security community.

Rugumamu has argued that following lessons from history, small states tend to resolve their fragility by forming alliances with others. The Conference for Security and Co-operation in Southern Africa (CSCSA), structured along the lines of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), has been discussed as a possible Southern African regional model. The CSCSA was a creation of the African Leadership Forum and designed to “constitute an inter-state security arrangement that would promote institutionalised non-violent forms of conflict resolution; oversee and guarantee an end to external involvement in domestic and regional conflicts; facilitate the reduction in military expenditure; switch to non-offensive defence and generally perform the task of confidence building and regional identity”.¹¹¹ Ohlson et al indicate that to make the CSCE model—which they explain is premised on “regional norms regarding transparency of military establishments and force levels, exchange of information, confidence building, [and] mutual trust”—applicable to the region would need expanding of the ‘baskets’, to deal with more than just economics, military security and non-military security.¹¹² The wide areas of co-operation itemised by the SADC Treaty seem to confirm this viewpoint.¹¹³ Ohlson et al further argue that increased resources for economic issues ought to be made available, and that the sectoral approach SADC is forging provides “a vision of long-term regional co-operation [as well as] short term policies and ... bilateral co-operation contribut[ing] incremental progress to regional security and development”.

Booth and Vale also point out that the development of a security community is hampered by the region’s failure to fulfil a prime condition for a security community, that of communication.¹¹⁴ They assert that communication in the region is both slow and costly, a consequence of a combination of “geographical, historical, economical and political factors”. This point does seem to ignore the fact that the entire Southern African sub-region has historically been interwoven in one entity, albeit with the central focal point being South Africa. However, contributing rather more positively to the development of a security community for the region are the “shared disasters and common enemies” which Booth and Vale argue create a sense of mutual obligation and mutual interest, including the existence of a dominant or hegemonic power to act as the “locomotive” for the region. They, however, stress that unlike the ‘friendly hegemon’ Europe had in the US, instead the Southern African region has had “extra-regional backers of

varying strength and commitment” providing limited and inadequate support to all parties in the region.¹¹⁵ It is a continuing point of analysis as to whether a post-apartheid government can or for that matter should act as the region’s ‘friendly hegemon’. This point of debate will be returned to in subsequent analysis.

Like Booth and Vale, Zacarias also argues that the conditions existing in Southern Africa do not allow for the development of a security community at this point in time, although such an objective is eventually attainable. He acknowledges that the region has since the commencement of the 20th century been attempting to build a security community. The necessary prerequisites (or variables) for building a security community include overcoming power instability, political fragmentation, economic imbalances and fear. Zacarias regards the states in the region as weak, and communities as being “poorly integrated, domestically, politically fragmented with weak institutions and a lack of financial resources”.¹¹⁶

However, Zacarias observes that the move towards building a security community in the region received a boost with the demise of the Cold War and the signing of the SADC Treaty in August 1992, which stipulated “existing cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations” as constituting their motivation to “promote regional welfare, collective self-reliance and integration in the spirit of equity and partnership”.¹¹⁷ However, despite the inclusion of a treaty, whose absence in the SADCC he, *inter alia*, blames for the failure of the regional security structure to develop into a security community, he nevertheless dismisses the SADC Treaty as mere “aspirations” and regards the foundations of the principles, goals, aspirations and interests supposedly of the peoples of the region, as “not laid on existing reality”.¹¹⁸ He argues that these values need to be confirmed in the individual states, some of which continue to be undemocratic.¹¹⁹

Another factor Zacarias observes is the continual issue of financial problems, which means that, like the SADCC, most SADC projects continue to rely on external financing. This external dependence by the states in the region, according to Nolutshungu, reflects the suspect autonomy of these states in devising their own defence, including their ability “in negotiating with the other dependent countries the terms of their common security”.¹²⁰ Ultimately, this dependency determines the role of external actors in national and regional security relations.

On a more positive note, in the creation of a security community, Zacarias notes that SADC has been making some progress in the area of

security with the eventual creation of the OPDS in 1996. He however notes that unless the policies at a regional level “reflect reality and [are] popular at domestic level”, the regional agenda will be meaningless. Thus, “[d]omestic integration must be ensured if the regional community is not going to be merely a community of governments”, to which Nolutshungu adds by cautioning that security arrangements in the region should not “protect tyrants or deprive people of their ultimate right of rebellion in the face of misgovernment and the insecurity it breeds”.¹²¹

Zacarias argues that being overly concerned about regional institutions as a means of constructing regional security may be perpetuating the notion of inter-state threats, which in turn implies an “outward orientation of the concept of security” and consequently “prioritiz[ing] the security of governments and states”. Instead, he believes that it would be more valuable to aim to “establish a ‘security society’ as the first stage of building the security community”.¹²² He explains that a security society permits the members to interpose officially in each other’s affairs whenever emergencies occur and does not imply an amalgamation or integration of the community but rather a situation in which the members are jointly for their relations with each other. Because of the continuation of the notions of power, fear, mutually supporting tendencies and political fragmentation, he holds the view that conditions conducive to the development of security communities do not yet exist. However, Nolutshungu argues that the development of such a community has been said to require close economic and political co-operation on an extensive dimension that requires a refocusing of the concept of national sovereignty.

Regional security structures in Southern Africa that have been subject to some study include the FLS, SADCC, SADC and the OPDS, formed in 1976, 1980, 1992 and 1996 respectively. These have evidently experienced a variety of challenges and will be the subject of intense study in respect to the possibility of the development of a security community for the region in the latter parts of the study. It would also be pertinent to indicate that subsequent political developments of notable significance, such as the evolution of the AU and NEPAD, which form part of political dynamics in the Southern African sub-region, are also included in this analysis as relevant to analysing the applicability of the security community approach to Southern Africa.

As already alluded to, more recent attempts at interrogating the concept of security community in respect of the Southern African region

have been undertaken by Maxi Schoeman (previously Van Aardt). Her studies provide useful indications of the application of the paradigm to the sub-region. She argues that with the institutionalisation of security co-operation in the sub-region there has been a definite move towards a security community instead of merely “focus[ing] on security through regional co-operation”, suggestive of a regime.¹²³ Schoeman regards the development of the OPDS from its inception on 28 June 1996 and other related events such as the SADC Framework and Strategy for Building Community in 1993 (which will be discussed at some length later in this study) as an indication of the development of a security community.¹²⁴

Like this study, the focus has been on the structure and nature of the sub-regional framework and places in the equation “the history of security relations in Southern Africa [which] influences and informs the approach to regional security both at the levels of the structure and the nature of co-operation”.¹²⁵ However, unlike this study, Schoeman does not take the inception of the OPDS as a significant point for determining the onset of a security community in the region, albeit the commencement of a more concerted effort to evolve one. In later work, Schoeman not only places in the equation nuances in the regional security arrangement such as the AU and NEPAD, but also makes an effort to apply Adler and Barnett’s typology of security communities to the African continent.¹²⁶ She concludes that the continental body conforms to an emerging security community, as discussed in the introductory chapter.¹²⁷ Like Maxi Schoeman, Abdul Mohammed and others submit that the creation of a security community is a distinct possibility largely because the AU is “an ‘aspirational union’, reflecting the faith of Africans in their common identity and common destiny”. It is therefore this “strong popular and political impulse towards unification, and also the settlement of wars that have plagued the continent” that has tended to propel the continent towards the creation of a security community.¹²⁸

CONCLUSION: A CASE FOR THE SECURITY COMMUNITY APPROACHES

This chapter gives flesh to the study of the Southern African region security community according to the security community approach. Theoretical models have been provided in the form of the Deutsch, and Adler and Barnett models.

The security community model provided by Deutsch et al has shown an intensive effort to develop a comprehensive analytical framework for the study of regional security. However, its restrictive conditions, such as

the requirement for a democratic and totally peaceful environment, would seem to have ruled out its application to a region still endemic with areas of war and political instability. It has, however, been argued that a lack of total conformity with the Deutschean model should not preclude the usage of the approach in other regions, especially since even in Western Europe, where the model is said to apply, strict observance would show areas of non-conformity. The model remains an important basis for applying the Adler and Barnett model, which further developed the earlier model and sought to apply it to areas outside Western Europe, such as South-East Asia, South America, Australia, and the US and Mexico. A notable absence, as earlier noted, is Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular. It is this gap that the present study aims to fill, and for this reason, the debates and discussions on the applicability and viability of the concept and approach have also been covered in this chapter to indicate what ground has been covered and which areas remain open for detailed analysis.

It may therefore be argued that by using the Adler and Barnett security community approach to study the Southern African security community, together with cognisance of small-state alliances, security complex and security regime approaches, would together constitute the claim for originality of this work. Contributions by Mohammed and others provide additional means of analysing the sub-region, using the security community paradigm. The framework for analysis having thus been constructed, it is to regional and continental dynamics that the next chapter now turns.

NOTES

- 1 RN Cox, Social forces, states and world order: Beyond international relations theory, in RO Keohane (ed), *Neorealism and its critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986: 207.
- 2 M Boas, Security communities: Whose security?, *Cooperation and Conflict* 35(3), 2000, p 311.
- 3 KW Deutsch et al, *Political community and the North Atlantic area: International organisation in the light of historical experience*, Princeton University Press, 1957, p 7, emphasis added.
- 4 CA Kupchan, Empires and geopolitical competition: Gone for good?, in CA Crocker, FO Hampson & P Aall (eds), *Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict*, United States Institute Press, Washington DC, 2001, p 41.
- 5 M Mwanasali, From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union,

- in M Baregu & C Landsberg (eds), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's evolving security challenges*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2002, p 206.
- 6 M Baregu & C Landsberg (eds), op cit.
 - 7 E Adler & M Barnett (eds), *Security communities*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 17.
 - 8 The terms 'conflict' and 'war' imply a non-peaceful environment. While on the one hand, the term 'conflict' is general in nature in that it could refer to political or economic tension, and does not suggest the magnitude of the problem, on the other hand, the term 'war' indicates the most devastating form of conflict involving all possible dimensions.
 - 9 See WM Doyle, *Ways of war and peace*, WW Norton and Co, New York, 1997; J Grieco, *Co-operation among nations: Europe, America and non-tariff barriers to trade*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990; T Hobbes, De Cure, *The English works of Thomas Hobbes*, J Bohn, London, 1847.
 - 10 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 12.
 - 11 Ibid, p 10.
 - 12 In existence are other models such as the 'small state alliance' popularised by Khadiagala, the security complex presented by Buzan, and the security regime template of Booth, which have made extensive analysis of the Southern African region. See MG Khadiagala, *Allies in adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African security 1975-1993*, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1994; B Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1991; K Booth, A security regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical considerations, *Southern African Perspectives*, Center for African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1994.
 - 13 B McSweeney, Security, identity and interest, *Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p 47.
 - 14 Deutsch et al, op cit.
 - 15 KW Deutsch, *Nationalism and social communication*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1953, p 91.
 - 16 Deutsch et al, op cit, p 5.
 - 17 Ibid.
 - 18 Movements across borders have been characteristic of the sub-region for reasons of commerce. South Africa has through history provided a source of employment and 'hope' for all categories of people—the educated and those with a humble education, if at all, in the mineral industry, in 'eGoli', the City of Gold, and other industries.
 - 19 Deutsch et al, op cit, p 7.
 - 20 N Wiener, *The nerves of government*, Free Press, New York, 1966, p 77.
 - 21 NJ Padelford, GA Lincoln & LD Olvey, *The dynamics of international politics*, Macmillan, New York, 1976, p 427.
 - 22 Ibid.
 - 23 Deutsch et al, op cit.
 - 24 Ibid; JE Dougherty & RL Pfaltzgraff, *Contending theories of international relations: A comprehensive survey*, Longman, New York, 1971.
 - 25 The term 'association' here is used loosely to mean a group of people joined

- together for a specific purpose with self-interest as the motivation, and characterised by “immediate reciprocity”. In contrast, the concept ‘community’ denies self-interest, rather espousing “diffuse reciprocity” which means that “the actor’s interests are interchangeable with those of the group”. See Adler & Barnett, *op cit*, pp 31-32.
- 26 Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, *op cit*, p 286. George Liska holds the view that the cohesiveness of alliances is related to the existence of a ‘core power’. It would then be argued that the ‘core areas’ stipulated by Deutsch et al would be undertaken by core powers. The fact that South Africa, an undisputed core power in the Southern African region, holds the economic portfolio in SADC may appear to conform to this thesis. See G Liska, *International equilibrium: A theoretical essay on politics and organisation of security*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957.
- 27 Deutsch et al, *op cit*, p 58.
- 28 Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, *op cit*.
- 29 Padelford, Lincoln & Olvey, *op cit*.
- 30 Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, *op cit*, pp 286-287.
- 31 A Zacarias, *Security and the state in Southern Africa*, Tauris Academic, London, 1999, p 161.
- 32 Adler & Barnett, *op cit*, p 5.
- 33 Booth, *op cit*, p 16.
- 34 *Ibid*, p 15.
- 35 K Booth & P Vale, Security in Southern Africa: After apartheid, beyond realism, *International Affairs* 71(2), 1995, p 290.
- 36 See, Namibia’s debt, *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 9 December 1994.
- 37 The critical security studies school uses such a post-positivist perspective as critical theory and constructivism and acknowledges change as possible because things are socially determined.
- 38 Booth & Vale, *op cit*, p 290.
- 39 Adler & Barnett, *op cit*, p 50.
- 40 Quoted in TM Klare & DC Thomas, *World security: Challenges for a new century*, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, p 373.
- 41 R Scruton, *A dictionary of political thought*, Macmillan, London, 1996, p 81.
- 42 Adler & Barnett, *op cit*, p 53.
- 43 Ruggie defines dynamic density as “the quantity, velocity and diversity of transactions that go on within the society”. See JG Ruggie (ed), *Multilateralism matters*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, p 148.
- 44 Adler & Barnett, *op cit*, p 53.
- 45 E Adler, Cognitive evolution: A dynamic approach for the study of international relations and their progress, in E Adler & B Crawford (eds), *Progress in post war international relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991.
- 46 Adler & Barnett, *op cit*, p 44.
- 47 D Robertson, *The Penguin dictionary of politics*, Penguin Books, London, 1993, p 327.
- 48 Adler & Barnett, *op cit*, p 55.
- 49 *Ibid*, p 56.

- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Ibid, pp 56-57.
- 52 Ruggie (1995) interprets the multiperspectival policy to mean shared rule at the national, transnational and supranational levels.
- 53 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 57.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 A Mohammed, P Tesfagiorgis & A de Waal, *Peace and security dimensions of the African Union*, ECA, Addis Ababa, 2002, p 3.
- 56 M Schoeman, Imagining a community: The African Union as an emerging security community, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 29(1), 2002, p 7.
- 57 S Krasner, Sovereignty: An institutional perspective', *Comparative Political Studies* 21(1), 1988, p 83.
- 58 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 29.
- 59 Ibid,p 38.
- 60 See Khadiagala, op cit.
- 61 Adler & Barnett, op cit, pp 39-40.
- 62 Ibid, p 39.
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- 64 Ibid.
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- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid, pp 40-41.
- 68 Ibid,p 41.
- 69 C Tilly, International communities, secure or otherwise, in Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 20.
- 70 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 41.
- 71 Ruggie, op cit, p 148.
- 72 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 42.
- 73 Ibid.
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- 76 Ibid, p 41.
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- 78 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 44.
- 79 Ibid, p 45.
- 80 JG Ikenberry & AC Kupchan, Socialization and hegemonic power, *International Organisation* 44, 1990, pp 283-315.
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- 84 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 46.
- 85 Ibid, p 47.
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- 90 P Wallensteen, *Understanding conflict resolution: War, peace and the global system*, Thousnd Oaks, London, 2002, p 217.
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- 109 Quoted by S Rugumamu, *Post-Cold War peace and security prospects in Southern Africa*, Occasional Paper Series 5, SAPES Books, Harare, 1993.
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- 112 Ohlson et al, op cit, p 282.
- 113 The SADC Treaty itemises the following areas: “food security, land, and agriculture; infrastructure and services; industry, trade, investment, and finance; human resources development and science and technology; natural

- resources and environment; social welfare, information, and culture; and politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace, and security". See Ohlson et al, op cit, pp 282-283.
- 114 Booth & Vale, op cit. See Deutsch et al, op cit; Adler & Barnett, op cit, who consider communication as the 'cement' of security community building. Further elaboration of the communication factor and other factors associated with security community will be discussed later in the study.
- 115 The FLS and the liberation movements received limited support from the Soviet Union, China and Cuba in terms of military equipment as well as ideological support and non-military assistance from European countries such as Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia, while South Africa received both ideological and material assistance from the US and various Western European countries. Booth & Vale, op cit, p 23.
- 116 Zacarias, op cit, p 161.
- 117 See, *Towards the Southern Development Community, A declaration by the Heads of State or Governments of Southern African states*, Windhoek, August 1992.
- 118 Zacarias, op cit, p 166.
- 119 Zacarias views Lesotho and Swaziland as largely unrepresentative.
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- 123 M van Aardt, The emerging security framework in Southern Africa: Regime or community?, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 19(1), 1997, p 1. See Krasner, op cit, p 1. He defines regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations".
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- 127 See also S Akinrinade, Democracy and security in Africa: Towards a framework of understanding, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 17(2), 2001; G Punungwe, *Prospects for the implementation of the declaration on denuclearization of Africa*, United Nations, New York, 1992.
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