



MOZAMBIQUE

Ana Leaõ, Institute for Security Studies¹

Introduction

Mozambique, which has a population of approximately 18.5 million is located on the south-eastern coast of Africa. It comprises a total land area of 784 090 sq. km and a coastline of 2 470 km. It borders South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania.

Previously a Portuguese colony, Mozambique gained its independence in 1974 following a ten year war of liberation. Shortly after being granted independence, Mozambique was engulfed by civil war between the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), which was ended in 1992 with signature of the General Peace Agreement (GPA). This was followed by a peace process supported by ONUMOZ (United Nations Operations in Mozambique), which remained in Mozambique until late 1994 when the first democratic elections took place.

During the civil war large quantities of small arms and light weapons were transferred into Mozambique. Accurate records of these weapons were not maintained, and arms control measures were either non-existent or ineffective.² The result is that following the peace agreement in 1992 neither the Mozambican authorities nor ONUMOZ could determine the nature and extent of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Mozambique. Over the past decade thousands of arms and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition have been collected and destroyed by the military and police (in collaboration with civil society groups and the South African security forces), however, an unknown quantity of arms and



ammunition remained in hidden caches in undisclosed locations throughout the country.

This chapter seeks to analyse the nature, extent and dynamics of the small arms and light weapons phenomena in Mozambique. In particular, it considers the size of the state and civilian firearms stockpile, the humanitarian impact of firearms use in Mozambique, firearms control and destruction measures.

Methodology

Reliable small arms related data in Mozambique is virtually non-existent, and in order for this data to be generated, considerable financial and personnel resources would be required. Given these constraints the following three research methods were adopted. First, interviews with relevant stakeholders were undertaken, including: representatives from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, and Customs and Excise; NGO staff; journalists, academics, and Mozambican citizens. Second, there was an analysis of firearms related legislation, policy and other documents. Third, a pilot research survey on the impact of firearms was undertaken in the town of Chimoio (central Mozambique).

A two-day workshop, which included representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Defence, and Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces, the Presidency, academic institutions and civil society organisations was held to discuss and debate the research results. The findings of the workshop are reflected in this chapter.

National Firearm Stockpiles

The current size of the military and police small arms and light weapons stockpile is unknown. The only information that is available is vague, speculative and anecdotal. What information that is available is outlined below.

It was reported that between 1992 and 1994 over 200 000 weapons were collected by ONUMOZ and the Mozambican authorities, of which only 24 000 were destroyed.³ The remaining 180 000 became the responsibility of the new Mozambican armed forces, which did not have the capacity to manage such a stockpile.⁴

Defence officials interviewed during the research process suggested that the Mozambican armed forces are over-armed, but were unable to provide further details as the manual weapons and equipment register was deemed to be inaccurate. During the consultative workshop, participants from the Forças armadas de Moçambique (Mozambique military) (FADM) acknowledged the need to compile an inventory of both stockpiles and storage facilities. The dilapidated barracks and warehouses of the FADM were a cause for concern for FADM leadership, particularly as there had been an explosion at an ammunition warehouse in Beira when it was struck by lightning.

According to the Strategic Plan of the Mozambican Police (PRM), the police “have enough armaments for current personnel, however, the characteristics of these armaments are not adequate to maintain law and order...”.⁵ The PRM is currently comprised of 20 000 personnel, which is a ratio of one police person per 1 089 inhabitants.⁶ Police personnel are issued with pistols during day patrols and automatic firearms for night duties.

Private security companies

There are currently 31 private security companies operating in Mozambique. They are all registered in Maputo, but some are active only in the rural provinces. There was no publicly available information on their firearms holdings.

The legal basis for the creation and operation of private security companies was established in 1990, through Decree 26/90, *Regulamento das empresas de Segurança Privada*. In terms of this legislation, the control of business firearms is the preserve of each private security company. However, the legislation requires private security companies to make their registers available for inspection by the Ministry of Interior. According to the commander responsible for firearms licencing in the Ministry of Interior, two police officers were assigned to conduct inspections of private security companies on a monthly basis. However, it is doubtful whether these two officers have the capacity to identify irregularities, particularly in the absence of baseline data. At present, private security guards are not required to prove that they can adequately handle and maintain the guns they use.

Civilian firearms

It has been estimated that during the civil war Frelimo and Renamo distributed close to a 1.5 million small arms to civilians. Records of these firearms were not maintained and licences for these weapons were not issued. The whereabouts of most of these weapons is currently unknown. An officer in the firearm licensing department of the Ministry of Interior in Maputo, estimated there were 7 000 registered legal owners of firearms in 2003.

Firearms Licence Procedure

If an individual seeks to acquire a licenced firearm, then this person must first purchase a firearm from a reputable source and then apply for a firearm licence from the Ministry of Interior. The relevant firearm legislation allows for civilians to own semi-automatic pistols of a calibre no larger than 7.65mm and a barrel not longer than 7.5 cm, and revolvers with calibre of less than 9 mm and barrel not longer than 10 cm.

There are no authorised dealers or manufacturers in Mozambique. Consequently individuals are entitled to import up to three firearms. The typical process for acquiring a licenced firearm is as follows:

The person seeking to acquire a firearm will travel to a neighbouring country where there are registered firearms dealers (usually South Africa), purchase the firearm and then obtain the necessary approval to transport the firearm to the border. At the border, the individual has to hand in the firearm and ammunition to the customs officials and apply for an import licence for both the firearm and ammunition. This application process must be handled by an authorised clearing agent, and the following information is captured on the application form: origin of the weapon/ammunition; brand name; model and manufacturer; characteristics; quantities of ammunition; the point of entry (airport, port or border post) and the customs division that will be responsible for clearing the firearm. While the application process is underway, the weapon is either kept by customs officials or transferred to the Ministry of Interior for safekeeping.

The individual then has to apply for a licence from the Ministry of Interior or police headquarters. In so doing, the applicant must fill out the relevant

licence application form and submit supporting documents, such as birth certificate and criminal record to the Ministry of Interior or police head quarters. The applicant must also receive clearance from their local police station. He or she must explain why the firearm is required. If the firearm is for personal security, then documentation justifying the need for protection must be provided. The relevant government institution then confers with the local police station, interviews the applicant and then decides whether the application will be accepted or rejected.

Prior to 2001, applications were judged on a case-by-case basis, and it took a considerable amount of time for applicants to receive a response from government. In 2001 a new streamlined application procedure was introduced by the PRM, as some government officials were concerned that the length of time it took to review a firearm licence application contravened the right of the citizen to a reply from the government. Applications are still analysed by a small committee, but once a month the committee meets to deliberate on firearm licence applications, and these decisions are communicated to the applicants. Although some cases still may take longer than one month to be decided, the time between the request and official reply has been significantly reduced.⁷

Since the introduction of this new system there has been a significant reduction in the number of firearm licence applications. Officers in the Ministry of Interior ascribe this to the high number of refusals of licence applications. When refusals were issued individually, Mozambicans generally did not get a true picture of how difficult it was to acquire a firearm licence, and applications were constantly made. Since the introduction of collective responses it has become clear to many Mozambicans that obtaining a firearm licence is difficult, and as a result, citizens are discouraged from applying for firearms licences.⁸

The Mozambican authorities are committed to reducing the number of firearms in the possession of civilians. Hence, the authorities usually reject applications for licences for pistols. Applications from retired people (who want a hunting rifle), from heads of family and from farmers (who are in remote areas, or wish to protect cattle) are regarded in a more positive light, and are more likely to be approved.

The Arms and Ammunition Act (Statute 1/73, January 1973) is outdated and the authorities find it difficult to enforce. Gun owners are supposed to report annually to their local police station to either update or confirm their residence details but this is seldom done. Firearm licences should also be renewed every two years. When a gun owner dies, the next of kin is required to report the death to the police station and hand in the weapon. Records should be updated for each of these procedures. Given the lack of infrastructure and difficulty in communication between police stations across Mozambique, it is unlikely that the system is effective.

Each PRM station or post is supposed to have a firearms register. As in the military, this is a handwritten ledger book. These records are required to be sent to the central command in Maputo “periodically”. No interviewees could say how often this happens, indicating that the system is dysfunctional. Officers interviewed in the Ministry of Interior and in the Police Force seemed to be aware of the difficulties of firearms control, and showed some embarrassment when discussing the shortcomings of the police in this regard.

Recently shooting-ranges have opened in Maputo. These premises function without any regulation. One shooting range visited by the research team lies on the outskirts of Maputo and is part of a restaurant complex. It appeared to be a popular venue and people were betting on each other’s shots. The Mozambican police are not opposed to the existence of such facilities, on the contrary, they agree that shooting ranges could be useful training facilities. However, they expressed concern at the lack of regulation.

Assessing the Demand for Firearms

Those individuals who seek to acquire licenced firearms usually do so because they want firearms for hunting, sports shooting and self-protection. As there are relatively small hunting and small sports shooting fraternities in Mozambique, it appears as though the major motivating factor for acquiring a licenced firearm is self-protection. This may be related to perceptions that armed crime is common place.

The crime rate has increased in Mozambique. Between 1994 and 1996, the number of reported crimes in Mozambique increased from 30 579 to

42 967 in 1996 (almost a 50% increase).⁹ In 1995 the Mozambican government acknowledged that large quantities of illegal weapons could be found in Mozambique, and announced a plan to address this problem. Special rapid reaction units were deployed along main roads and areas most affected by armed crime. Police district commands were re-established, and increased co-operation with police forces in neighbouring countries fostered.¹⁰ According to an official in the Ministry of Interior:

“Arms are occasionally used to commit crime, but not always. Most criminals are middle-aged, demobilised soldiers and unemployed. For instance the murderer of Siba Siba¹¹ was a former soldier with Casa Militar, trained by the Chinese. The guns used are mainly AKM and Makarov pistols – remains from the war, because some criminals are connected to people who, during the war, were assigned to arms caches. Other guns are leased from people who own them legally ... or have been purchased from the people guarding an arms cache... In Maputo there are two types of crime – organised crime and petty crime for economic reasons. They tend to use the same types of guns, only some organised crime [sic] use other tactics, mainly when the criminals are former soldiers (for instance, the case of Siba Siba). The former soldiers of Casa Militar, who guarantee security to the government, are known to organised crime bosses... Some demobilised soldiers prefer to say that they are unemployed.”

According to an officer of the Ministry of Interior in Mozambique, firearms used in urban crime are either being rented out by legal owners or were part of hidden arms caches.

The civilian survey in Chimoio

A pilot survey was carried out in the town of Chimoio between 22 and 30 April 2003, the purpose of which was to gather basic data about the perception of local communities about issues such as: security, police performance, and the presence of firearms in Mozambique. The survey was complemented by interviews with Mozambican and South African police officers, as well as officials of the Ministry of Interior in Mozambique.

Chimoio is a town in the province of Manica in northern Mozambique, which is dissected by the Beira corridor, the main rail and road connection

linking the east coast of Mozambique with the interior of southern and central Africa. It is a fertile agricultural region which produces maize, bananas, citrus, and cotton. It is also home to a range of industries, including textiles, sawmills, and cotton and sisal processing. Manica is a prosperous province relative to the rest of Mozambique.

The economic potential of the province and the transport corridor that crosses it made Manica province a region of strategic importance during both the liberation war and the civil war. Chimoio, the provincial capital, is a regional administrative, commercial, and transportation centre. According to the 1997 census, the population of Chimoio is 171 056.

The survey team randomly interviewed 34 stall owners and shoppers in the market at Chimoio. The respondents were asked questions about their personal security, their perceptions of the ability of the police to combat crime and their attitudes to firearms.¹²

Of the 34 people interviewed, 18 were male and 16 female. Their ages ranged from 16 to 70 years, with an average age of 27 years. All respondents had attended school or were still attending school. Most were employed in the informal sector.

The survey used in this research was translated from English into Portuguese and then from Portuguese into indigenous Mozambican languages. This meant that terms had to be defined by the researchers as, for example, in Portuguese the word for “car hijack” and “car theft” is the same. To overcome this constraint, the research team agreed on the following definitions:

home burglary - ‘when thieves come, or try to come, into the house whether you and/or your family are inside or not’.

stock theft - ‘when someone steals animals, such as sheep, cows, goats, or chickens, but not dogs or cats, belonging to you’.

crop theft - ‘when crops get stolen from your farm, be it from the barn or from the field’.

“car hijack” - ‘when your car is stolen while you are driving it or when you are parked and sitting in it; when you get pushed out and the person runs away with the car’.

“car theft” - ‘when your car or parts of your car disappear while you are not present. For instance, during the night, or while parked somewhere’.

“deliberate damage” - ‘when things belonging to you have been damaged on purpose for no apparent reason’.

“rural equipment” - ‘not only tractors or mechanised implements, but also hand tools such as hoes, machetes, etc’.

“violent assault” - ‘if you ever got beaten up’.

“robbery” - ‘when you are walking down the street or riding the bus and someone approaches you and threatens you unless you give something; or when you get home and you realise that your wallet is missing’.

“murder” - ‘when someone was killed by another person on purpose and not by accident’.

“sexual assault” - ‘not only violent rape, but also when a person has to submit to get the marks at school, for instance’.

Perceptions of Crime in Chimoio

Despite the general perception that Chimoio is among the safest centres in Mozambique, the respondents reported a surprisingly high number of incidents of crime. Half of the respondents said they had experienced home burglaries. People in Chimoio do not live in apartment buildings, so stealing a bicycle from a yard, for instance, was defined as home burglary. In fact, home burglaries and robberies (as defined in the survey) seemed so prevalent that people classified them as being “normal”.

On the other hand the respondents suggested that violent crime in Chimoio was unusual, as was the use of firearms. They associated firearms with war rather than crime. One of the reasons many people gave for not owning a gun was that it would not make sense to have one in a country which was in a state of peace.

Police efforts to control crime in Chimoio were often referred to and acknowledged by the respondents, yet few of those who had been victims of crime had reported it to the police.

Thirty-one out of the 34 respondents stated that the level of violence and crime in their residential areas had been on the increase. One respondent, a 16-year old woman, said that in her neighbourhood it was not safe for her to collect water after dark. One man said that incidents of violence in the area in which he lived were high due to use of drugs and alcohol by some of members of the community.

Crime and policing

With regard to policing, more than half of the respondents said they saw police on duty at least once a day. Twenty eight of the 34 respondents said they saw police patrolling their communities between once a day and once a week. However, most respondents complained about the quality of the patrols, and claimed they were irregular and non-existent during the night. Respondents felt that police efforts to control crime were “average” to “bad”. Consequently, respondents seemed more likely to report crimes to community leaders, the secretary of the neighbourhood,¹³ or local government representatives, than to the police.

To the question concerning who was guaranteeing security in the community if the police were not doing their job, the majority of respondents said that either nobody guarantees security in their community (13) or did not reply at all (9). A 37-year old man living in Textafrika told the team that a year previously the community organised a group of youth to protect the community at night. On one occasion, the youth patrol assaulted and murdered a drunkard, and as a result these youth patrols were cancelled.

Chimoio is currently testing a Community Policing pilot project in the neighbourhood of Fepom. According to the police in Chimoio, this project is being implemented with the support of the community and community leaders.

Attitudes towards self-protection

The survey questionnaire was designed to determine the steps which respondents take to protect themselves, and find out how they view

firearms. Respondents were asked as to what they use to protect their houses. Table 4.1 summarises the replies.

Table 4.1: What do you use to protect your house?

What do you use to protect your house?*	Respondents
Axe /sticks /clubs	13
Burglar bars	8
Dog	5
Others/no reply	6
Guard	3
Natural fencing (bush, wood)	1
Special locks	1
Razor wire / broken glass	1
Armed response	0
High wall	0
Alarm	0
Community patrols	0
Traditional methods	0
Gun	0

* Respondents could mention more than one type of protection

Respondents were asked what they thought the government of Mozambique could do to improve the security in their communities. Most respondents suggested that street lights, the creation of employment opportunities, an increase in police resources, and enhanced police patrolling would improve their personal security.

Attitudes towards firearms

The survey sought to determine to what extent firearms featured in community dynamics. The respondents were generally reluctant to answer questions relating to firearms. However, many of the respondents (21) said that firearms are used “sometimes to seldom” to commit crimes in their communities.

The survey also attempted to determine the availability of firearms. No respondent seemed comfortable replying to these questions. The majority said they did not have access to a firearm and would not want to own one. Fourteen respondents said they did not wish to own a gun, either because firearms brought violence into the community, or because they were afraid they might be tempted to use them. Some respondents said that weapons “bring disobedience”. According to them, if you have a weapon “you feel empowered to do more of what you want and less of what you have to.”

Assessing Firearm Controls

During the course of the research it became clear that the control of firearms should be seen within the wider context of national security. As an official from the Ministry of Interior remarked: “What is the point of investing so many resources in weapons destruction if we are unable to efficiently patrol our coastline?”¹⁴

The same feeling is expressed by Moose and Nyararai in an article called “Mozambique: a powder keg”, published in the IANSA newsletter of June 2003: “The authorities do not know who owns what arms, or how they get access to them. The government does not even know the quantity of arms used by the uniformed forces. If the government cannot control the movement and use of small arms within its jurisdiction, clearly it cannot control the illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms in the country.”¹⁵

Committee for the Prevention and Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Mozambique signed the SADC Protocol in August 2001 and ratified the agreement in September 2002. The Government of Mozambique has created Coprecal – Comissão para a Prevenção e Controlo de Armas Ligeiras (Committee for the Prevention and Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons) to oversee the implementation of the Protocol.

Coprecal, which falls under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for supervising the implementation of national legislation, international and regional agreements, co-ordinating research and disseminating information. It includes members from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the

Armed Forces, Customs and Migration, an academic institution, Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais, and two civil society organisations, PROPAZ and Christian Council in Mozambique (CCM) (through its project Transformação das Armas em Enxadas (TAE) - Arms for Tools. Each institution is responsible for selecting its own representatives to the Committee.

In 2003, Coprecal members participated in an ISS-organised workshop to assess small arms control in Mozambique. The goal of the workshop was to bring the stakeholders together to assess the capacity of their institutions to contribute to small arms control. During the preparation for the workshop it became clear that each institution had a different idea about Coprecal’s mission and objectives, and none had a clear idea of Coprecal’s role or function. It also became evident that the lack of a vision for the security sector in Mozambique posed a major constraint to small arms control.

Overlapping responsibilities, a lack of definition in the roles of the different institutions, widespread petty corruption, and lack of clarity regarding the role and scope of Coprecal were identified as major obstacles to policy development and implementation. Participants questioned the rationale of investing donor funds in destroying small arms and in measures to control their proliferation without equal investment in developing the capacity of institutions in the security sector. They also expressed concerns regarding the functioning of Coprecal as a committee composed of representatives from institutions with potentially competitive agendas and unequal capacities. The participants agreed that Coprecal should develop a vision and mission statement as a first priority, despite difficulties like lack of capacity, language problems, poor communication systems and manual firearm registration systems.

The workshop heard how Mozambique, with its 2 470 km coast and 14 000 km of inland borders, was difficult to secure. There are not enough border posts, and some of the border posts that do exist are barely functional. Customs officials had received support from donors, resulting in some improvements, but most border posts were remote and communication was difficult. Large stretches of the inland borders and coast remained unpatrolled. According to a customs officer interviewed, rail traffic was the most difficult to control.

Coprecal members expressed concern about the way records of small arms were being kept. The system was manual and vulnerable to “human interference”. Members stressed the need to know the quantity and the types of weapons stored in legal stockpiles. They said they would like to see more community awareness initiatives regarding firearms.

At the end of the workshop, participants had identified the following issues for Coprecal to address:

- Coprecal needed to develop a vision, thus creating a framework for further action.
- None of the participants knew who kept the records of arms given to the government by ONUMOZ. Some participants stressed the poor condition of most of the equipment that was handed over. Members insisted that it was important to gather information regarding all small arms in the security forces – not only those handed over by ONUMOZ.
- Once information on existing stockpiles had been gathered there will need to be an audit of the equipment. This information would enable Coprecal to compile a list of equipment to destroy and the costs involved.
- Participants acknowledged that there was a common perception that those small arms that were being used in crime came from stockpiles that were the responsibility of the security forces, rather than from arms caches. Participants suggested that a research project be undertaken to determine the origin of the small arms that were being used in crime, and to determine the extent of the problem.
- Participants stressed the importance of a single marking system for Mozambique.
- Participants said that firearms, which were still in good condition, should possibly not be destroyed, given that government had to replace its obsolete weapons. They were aware that this would not be popular with

donors or civil society, since the security forces were perceived to be incapable of managing the existing stockpiles under their supervision.

- Participants considered that the status of the security forces posed a major hindrance to arms control reform, and hence to donor support. They stressed the need for more training in transparency measures. They acknowledged this would be a slow and controversial process, but one which should not be dismissed as impossible to solve.
- The existing stockpiles of firearms needed to be assessed, but participants considered an assessment of the storage conditions of these stockpiles of equal importance. Coprecal, they said, should undertake an audit of the existing Criminal Police (PIC) warehouses, their conditions, necessary improvements, and related costs.
- Disarmament initiatives, such as Operation Rachel, were too dependent on South African resources and capacity. Participants agreed that Coprecal should make an effort to engage both donors and the private sector in disarmament initiatives.
- Arms control legislation was outdated. A working group in the Ministry of Justice was tasked to draft a proposal for a new firearm law, which would reflect the requirements of the SADC Protocol.

Operation Rachel

From the mid-1990s incidents of crime involving firearms in both South Africa and Mozambique noticeably increased. According to intelligence reports by the South African police, a substantial number of the firearms used to commit crime in South Africa had originated in from weapons caches in Mozambique. Consequently in 1995, the governments of Mozambique and South Africa established Operation Rachel, with the objective of destroying arms caches in Mozambique.

Operation Rachel has consisted of a number of phases in which teams of Mozambican and South African police personnel have travelled throughout Mozambique identifying and destroying arms caches. During the eight

operations between 1995 and 2003, over 600 arms caches were discovered and several tons of arms and ammunition were destroyed. Prior to the Rachel operations, the price of an AK-47 in Soweto was around R100; in 2003, the same weapon cost R3 000,¹⁶ indicating the decrease in firearm availability in South Africa since beginning of the operation.

Civil society initiatives

Parallel, but complementary to Operation Rachel, Mozambican civil society, through the Christian Council for Mozambique's TAE programme, has contributed to small arms and light weapons disarmament and destruction.

TAE has been in operation since 1995 and runs a voluntary weapons collection programme in which weapons can be exchanged for items such as building materials, agricultural implements, sewing machines and bicycles. Since its inception, TAE has been responsible for destroying approximately 7 000 small arms and light weapons.¹⁷

Recently there has been constructive interaction between and staff of TAE and Operation Rachel, largely due to sound communication and good leadership on both sides. For the police, the major advantage of this relationship is that TAE has provided them with key information about weapons caches in remote rural areas, or areas where people were suspicious of the police.

Conclusion

In Mozambique the police have been able to get support in the area of disarmament and arms control from a number of donors, ranging from technical assistance to the provision of equipment to capacity building. Most Mozambicans concede that there has been a noticeable shift in police attitudes towards the population, but much still needed to be done. Reform in the police is unlikely to succeed unless other government bodies also reform. Given the impact that a partly functioning security sector can have on development, more and more agencies and development workers have been shifting their attention to this sector.

Mozambique has two ongoing disarmament initiatives – Operation Rachel and the TAE project, which are both achieving a large measure of success. However, efforts to address regional security need much more than these two programmes. Disarmament efforts are unlikely to succeed unless the government undertakes to curb corruption within the security sector, and to develop an institutional culture guided by a common national vision.

The government of Mozambique faces a difficult challenge if it is to counter corruption within its structures, especially in the security sector. Corruption emerged as a major problem during interviews, group discussions and workshops. The widespread perception that institutions were vulnerable to corruption has an inevitable impact on how the international community views the government's commitment to reforming the security sector.

Endnotes

- 1 The author would like to thank the staff from TAE and PROPАЗ for their assistance in the conduct of the field research for this chapter.
- 2 Ana Leao, interview with FADM high officer in August 2003. This procedure was mentioned in several other conversations and by demobilised soldiers interviewed by ISS researchers, and by several members of both PROPАЗ and TAE.
- 3 "Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peacekeeping Operations" *Basic Papers*, April 1998, Number 25.
- 4 Vines, A. paper, "The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique", *Basic Papers*, Number 25, April 1998.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ministério do Interior, Plano Estratégico da Polícia da República de Moçambique – PEPRM, May 2003. A preferable ratio would be 1/350 to 1/450 inhabitants.
- 7 Ana Leao, electronic communication with Mozambican government officials, April 2004.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Chachiua, M. "The Status of Arms Flows in Mozambique," ISS, Monograph 34, 1999.
- 10 Vines, A. op cit.
- 11 Siba Siba Macuácuá was a young Mozambican economist auditing the accounts of BCM (a recently privatized bank in Mozambique), whose funds were depleted by a gang involving the son of President Chissano. Carlos Cardoso was investigating this case at the time of his death. Siba Siba "fell" from the 7th floor of the building and his death was firstly attributed to accident or suicide. His family is currently seeking to bring his murderer to justice.
- 12 For a detailed description of the methodology please see Leao, A. ISS Monograph No. 94, March 2004.
- 13 This is an administrative figure in Mozambique. Originally, they were the Frelimo's eyes and ears in the communities. Usually petty clerks who abused their authority. Today, although they are still associated with the Frelimo party, the secretary of the neighbourhood is respected and influential in the community.

- 14 Intervention during the ISS workshop, 17-20 September, 2003.
- 15 Magudu, M and Mosse, M. "Mozambique: a powder keg", *IANSAs newsletter*, June 2003.
- 16 Stott, N. "Operation Rachel: Lesson Drawing and the Potential for a Regional (SADC) Initiative", ISS, forthcoming, 2004.
- 17 "Exchanging Guns for Tools: The TAE Approach to Practical Disarmament: An Assessment of the TAE project in Mozambique", Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) report commissioned by WORLD VISION Germany, Second Draft February 2004.