The EU, northern Uganda and the prevention of violent conflict

INTRODUCTION

Governments, international donors and aid agencies have often carried out wide-ranging development programmes only to have hard-won improvements destroyed by violent conflict. In some cases, the programmes themselves have entrenched inequities, increased the risks of violent conflict and contributed to their own downfall. As a result, donors have begun to address the need for an effective conflict prevention element to be integrated into development projects.

NEW EU APPROACH

The European Union (EU), in particular, has recognised the huge human and material costs of violent conflict, and now requires development assistance to be targeted at addressing its root causes. It has made a general commitment to peacebuilding and conflict prevention, the substance of which has been included in the recently signed Cotonou Agreement, the successor to the Lomé Convention. It has issued a number of policy documents raising important conflict prevention issues. In general, it can be said that the EU has revised its approach in favour of one which emphasises structural stability, under which support for good governance, human rights and a representative civil society is enhanced.

Although the EU is undoubtedly paying greater attention to conflict prevention issues, there is still a significant gap between policy and implementation. This lack of coherence is due, in part, to its poor ability to learn from previous mistakes, and to apply knowledge acquired in the field in the design of new programmes. Crucially, the EU has not yet adequately assessed the impact of past and present development co-operation on the risks of violent conflict, and the ability of development programmes to prevent conflict has not improved as it might have done. Currently, the EU also lacks the institutional capacity and expertise required to undertake such assistance, and to implement its own conflict prevention policies effectively.

Over the past two years, Saferworld has been looking closely into the impact of EU engagement on the risks of violent conflict in the Horn of Africa. This has included the joint production by Saferworld and the Inter-Africa Group1 of four case studies,2 one of which investigates the re-emergence of conflict following the demobilisation of former combatants in northern Uganda.3 The study examines the impact of the 1992-95 demobilisation and reintegration programme and assesses the extent to which it supported peacebuilding in the Acholi subregion. It then attempts to identify how more effective support for demobilisation and reintegration can maximise conflict prevention and peacebuilding at local, national and Horn-wide levels.

THE HISTORY OF POVERTY AND CONFLICT IN THE ACHOLI SUBREGION

While the growth of Uganda’s economy has been impressive in recent years, with gross domestic product (GDP) increasing at around 5%, the benefits of macroeconomic stability have not been evenly distributed, and unequal regional growth continues to foster instability in many areas. In particular, the high level of poverty in rural parts of northern Uganda continues to be exacerbated by small arms proliferation, frequent rebel incursions and human rights abuses.

The districts of Gulu and Kitgum, comprising the Acholi subregion, are historically the poorest in the country and are subject to high levels of food scarcity, increased mortality rates, and a lack of access to health and education facilities. Ongoing violent conflict in Acholi has increased the economic and political marginalisation of the people, frustrating attempts to generate long-lasting improvements in economic, human and social development.

CROSSBORDER CONFLICT AND LOCAL BANDITRY

Since the early 1990s, the Ugandan army has been fighting a low-level war in the north against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Many LRA raids have been launched from bases inside the Sudan, leading the Ugandan government to accuse the Sudan of backing the LRA in a proxy war against the Sudan People’s Liberation Amy (SPLA). The Sudanese, in turn, have accused Uganda of providing support to the SPLA, creating a high degree of distrust between the two states and undermining regional peace agreements. This has led to the perception that a resolution of the conflict in northern Uganda will not be found until there is a ‘normalising’ of relations between the two governments. There is, however, new hope for the restoration of diplomatic relations following the signing of an agreement in Nairobi in December 1999, and a meeting held in July 2000 where presidents agreed to a plan of implementation.

This border conflict has boosted the demand for small arms in the region, in turn facilitating an increase in banditry and other violent crime. The Acholi people have also been the victims of armed raids and cattle-rustling from other districts and, in particular, from neighbouring Karimoja. Indeed, in the early 1990s, the Ugandan government armed the Karimojong Warriors in order to resist external raids by the Turkana and Pokot from Kenya, and has so far failed to disarm the warriors and remove the weapons from circulation.

IMPACT ON THE ACHOLI PEOPLE

The impact of conflict on the Acholi has been devastating. There has been widespread loss of life, many people have lost their homes, property and productive assets, and are now wholly dependent on handouts. Both the LRA and the Karimojong have deprived the Acholi of their livestock, preventing them from working the land and leading to chronic food shortages. Furthermore, the breakdown of transport and communication along the major routes into the region has disrupted the remaining trade, severely restricting their ability to generate income.

In an attempt to guard the population against rebel incursions, the government has established a number of ‘protected villages.’ However, they have proved ineffective, have restricted the Acholi’s access to their own land, and have led to a growing dependence on food aid and the military. The failure to provide adequate protection even within the camps has added to the belief among the Acholi that the government lacks sufficient political will to bring lasting peace to the region. This belief has been further entrenched by the actions of a corrupt and ineffective security sector, and the absence of any coherent plan for economic and social development in the area.

It is of paramount importance that the EU and its member states devise policies and programmes that would make a positive contribution to peacebuilding in the Acholi subregion, and avoid increasing the existing risks of violent conflict. Unfortunately, the EU-supported 1992-95 demobilisation and reintegration programme in Uganda failed to achieve these aims satisfactorily.

THE 1992-95 DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME IN UGANDA

In 1986, the National Resistance Army (NRA) captured power with 15 000 soldiers. Following the takeover, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government relied heavily on the army to maintain general law and order and to control the volatile security situation in the north and east. It also attempted to create a unified national army by integrating the soldiers of previous regimes into the government forces. Consequently, the armed forces grew steadily over the next six years and by the end of the period totalled some 80 000 members.

By 1992, the government had managed to establish order in most parts of the country and it was agreed that the armed forces should be reduced to a more appropriate size. From the standing army, 50 000 soldiers were to be taken out of service, and the primary role of the army shifted to that of national defence. The exercise aimed to maintain a well-trained, educated and disciplined army to protect the country’s democratic development; and to reduce defence expenditure, thus releasing funds that could be used for social development.

The 1992-95 demobilisation and reintegration programme attempted to demobilise 35 000 of these soldiers and reintegrate them into Ugandan civil society. External donors provided more than US $40 million to the programme (out of a total of US $44.8 million). Of this, 70% was provided by the EU and its member states. It should be noted that, although the EU was the major financial contributor to the demobilisation and reintegration programme, it assumed only a minor policy development role.

The programme consisted of three main phases: demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration. The purpose of the demobilisation and resettlement exercises was to discharge, transport home and support veterans and their families for a period of six months and facilitate their re-entry into civilian life. Following this, it was hoped that reintegration assistance would allow the demobilised to become productive, working members of Acholi society, and make a lasting contribution to peacebuilding in the region.

LIMITED REINTEGRATION ASSISTANCE

Although soldiers received their demobilisation and resettlement packages, the demobilisation and reintegration programme did not provide adequate assistance in the reintegration phase and for many of the demobilised effective reintegration did not take place. This has not proved problematic in the more stable and prosperous south, but in northern regions the attempted reassimilation of former soldiers into their communities has largely failed, increasing tensions and heightening the risks of violent conflict.

The lack of reintegration support, the fear of rebel reprisals and an absence of profitable employment opportunities in the Acholi subregion have combined to deter many veterans from returning home. Of those who attempted a return, many could only find work using their military skills in private security firms, while others rejoined the army as the government tried to improve security in the north. Consequently, many soldiers were only temporarily taken out of military service, bringing into question the effectiveness of the demobilisation and reintegration programme in making a significant, long-term reduction in Uganda’s burdensome military budget.

VETERANS FORM THE 'NEW POOR'

For many of those former combatants who attempted genuine social reintegration, the difficulties of securing non-military employment and being fully accepted as members of poor, war-torn communities have proved insurmountable. The veterans have not been considered suitable beneficiaries of civil development programmes in the area, since it has been widely held that they were adequately provided for by the demobilisation and reintegration programme. This lack of access to alternative development assistance, coupled with donor reluctance to support reintegration, have meant that, as their demobilisation packages have dwindled, they have become further marginalised, with no stable income and no access to relief aid. Consequently, former combatants and their dependants now form a new core of the poor, and often revert to banditry, cattle-rustling and other criminal activities in order to support themselves.

The extent to which the demobilisation and reintegration programme has contributed to peacebuilding in Acholi is questionable. The reintroduction of large numbers of demobilised soldiers into a poor, volatile region without adequate reintegration support has only added to insecurity in the area. This has exacerbated the social and political marginalisation of the Acholi, and reduced the prospects for long-lasting economic development in the subregion.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCED CONFLICT PREVENTION

The case study details a number of recommendations for future EU engagement in the Horn, which were further developed at seminars jointly co-ordinated by Saferworld and Inter-Africa in Nairobi and Brussels in May and July 2000.4 There are several proposals relating specifically to the work in Uganda and demobilisation and reintegration issues, while other crosscutting themes can be applied to a wider spectrum of the EU’s engagement in the Horn of Africa.

IMPROVEMENT IN DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES

FULL SUPPORT TO REINTEGRAITON

Clearly, it is essential that the EU, its member states and other international donors provide full support to reintegration efforts, rather than concentrating predominantly on the demobilisation phase. Demobilisation and reintegration programmes have tended to be viewed solely as part of financial reform processes, and have concentrated on reducing military budgets. While there is an urgent need to reduce military expenditure in many post-conflict situations, this should not be the sole priority of external aid to the security sector, and sufficient funds must be made available to create the secure environment required for long-term economic and social development.

LOCAL ENGAGEMENT IN DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

To ensure that reintegration support is not provided in isolation and takes adequate account of the wider social, economic and political context,. demobilisation and reintegration programmes will need to be home-grown rather than predominantly donor-driven. They should be developed locally with significant input by civil society, district governments, veterans and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and presented to donors for response and support. Local engagement would be facilitated by the adoption of an area-based approach to demobilisation and reintegration programmes, targeted to benefit affected communities, as opposed to directing the bulk of external assistance through central government. To this end, the EU could usefully engage in building the capacity of local government, and developing more direct channels for financing civil society organisations.

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OF DEMOBILISTAION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES

Since insecurity in northern Uganda is in part a consequence of conflict in neighbouring countries, the regional context of all assistance to demobilisation and reintegration must be considered. There is a pressing need for the EU to support a regional action plan for arms control, with the emphasis placed on developing mechanisms to combat the spread of small arms. The easy availability of weaponry and the lack of mechanisms to police borders effectively need to be addressed at regional level and should receive the full support of donors.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Demobilisation and reintegration programmes are just one component of the wider security sector reform agenda. To bring widespread benefit, demobilisation and reintegration need to be considered alongside judicial and police reform, and also include the establishment of equitable representation within national security forces. The EU is yet to develop a coherent policy on security sector reform and will need to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the issue, strengthening its institutional expertise and capacity both in Brussels and within country delegations.

INTEGRATING CONFLICT PREVENTION WITHIN SECTORAL POLICIES

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF EU POLICIES

If the EU is to improve the ability of its development assistance to prevent violent conflict, it must begin to evaluate the impact of previous programmes. Indicators to gauge the success of EU-supported demobilisation and reintegration programmes could be devised and monitored by beneficiaries and, for example, could include lower crime rates and higher employment. Similarly, the participation of civil society in the development and implementation of donor policies and programmes that affect their daily lives is essential if external engagement is to contribute successfully to sustainable development in Uganda.

COHERENCE AND CO-ORDINATION

There is a clear need for improved coherence between EU institutions, between the EU and its member states, and between the EU and other international donors, such as the World Bank. Poor co-ordination between donors has on occasion resulted in EU engagement undermining efforts specifically targeted to address the underlying causes of conflict. Effective peacebuilding and conflict prevention will also require improved coherence between the full range of EU external policy instruments, not just those of development co-operation. It is important that the EU builds on efforts to improve coherence between aid, trade, investment and diplomatic assistance in order to fulfil its potential to support the prevention of violent conflict in the Horn of Africa.

At the recent Inter-Africa Group/ Saferworld seminar in Nairobi, Karl Harbo, Head of the European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia said:

"We have had to admit at times to our shame that well-meaning development projects actually increased conflict in certain regions. And while we are now focusing more attention on the impact of specific projects, we are still far from mainstreaming the peacebuilding and conflict prevention approach into all our development projects."