Feature

SADC: TOWARDS A SECURITY COMMUNITY?

---

Naison Ngoma
Senior Researcher in the Defence Sector Programme at the ISS

Published in African Security Review Vol 12 No 3, 2003

The Southern African sub-region has had a long history of conflict as well as efforts to create some sort of inter-state institutional arrangements designed to mitigate conflicts and enhance collaboration on a wide range of socio-political and economic dimensions. Although this road has been long and hard, indications thus far show a concerted effort to create a viable collaborative security arrangement. The vibrant discussions at the summit level, establishments of protocols as well as the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ and the draft Mutual Defence Pact are evidence of this. This paper concludes that the SADC region is indeed moving towards a security community.

Introduction

The establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security represents an ambitious effort on the part of the Southern African sub-region to integrate national political institutions, and to harmonise their values and practices at political level.¹ However, the conflict in the DRC may have tolled the death-knell for diplomatic unity within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and has considerably darkened the future chances of this promising regional cooperation organisation.² Such have been some views on the sub-region. However, upon closer inspection, the evidence suggests a somewhat different conclusion.

Peace, security and development are terms that have been associated with every state in the world—developed and developing—since time immemorial.³ The significance of these terms to the Southern African Development Community is not only a given, but historical too. Arising from a period of intense insecurity during the apartheid regime when states in the sub-region were polarised into two groups—the so-called ‘black’ and ‘white’ blocs⁴—the sub-region vigorously attempted to attain security, peace and development. After the demise of Apartheid, these issues continued to be on the agenda of all the states in the sub-region and took on a new dimension with the desire to hasten the harmonisation of policies.

Around the world, people have sought to remove insecurity and encourage peace, tranquillity and improved standards of living through regional bodies such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), both of which are regarded as moving towards the attainment of a security community.⁵ In this context, this paper examines SADC’s efforts to attain peace, security and development. The paper takes cognisance of earlier work by Van Aardt on “whether the region is moving towards the development of a security regime or a security community”.⁶

This contrasts with Mwesiga Baregu’s thesis, which argues from the point of view of a centralised group. Such a group is regarded as more homogeneous than heterogeneous and has low linkage politics. Its members are seen as autonomous both as individuals and in a collective and share similar perspectives and capacities. They are also seen as having a high confidence level. Applying this thesis to the Southern African region, Baregu concludes that the region is not a centralised group, but is instead heterogeneous, with high issue linkages, and whose members are not autonomous since they are “all exposed to external international influences”. He also argues that the states in the sub-region do not share threat perceptions and that the states’ structural relationship is essentially characterised by inequality. Furthermore, Baregu stipulates that mutual confidence is very low, especially “between the could-be hegemony and the rest of the region”.⁷ Clearly Mwesiga Baregu could not have regarded South Africa as one such ‘could-be hegemony’, since there is no disagreement as to its relative superiority especially in the economic and military arena. He probably has Zimbabwe in mind given its ‘eclipse’ in the sub-regional leadership role since the onset of South Africa as a democratic state⁸.

Analysing SADC using the security community paradigm may itself seem to be rather obvious at one level in view of the fact that the sub-region regards itself as a community, and at another level less so, in view of the ‘technical’ understanding of the concept of a security community. The paper analyses the Southern African sub-region using the security community paradigm, based on Adler and Barnett’s formulation.⁹ In applying the theoretical framework to the sub-region, the paper examines SADC summits, protocols, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, and the proposed Mutual Defence Pact as fundamental indicators of the direction the sub-region is moving in.

Projecting the theoretical question

A sustainable peace and security order across Africa requires the establishment of a security community in Africa, that is, a community that transcends international boundaries in which the settlement of disputes by anything other than peaceful means is unthinkable. This is more than an inter-state order that formally outlaws aggression and other forms of conflict, and amounts to a complex inter-relationship between all branches of government, civil society, the private sector, and citizens themselves.¹⁰

Russet et al. quote Karl Deutsch (the person most associated with the concept of security community):

A security community is a group of people, which has become “integrated”. By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of security” and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure…dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief…that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”.¹¹

Russet et al. also stipulate that in the security community, being a product of social integration, emphasis is on tranquil change and the ability to move with the times but projecting a desire to “reap mutual rewards”. Consequently, they visualise a “positive peace” in an environment where the actual or potential application of force as a means of resolving conflicts is not a distinct possibility, but at the same time acknowledging the existence of conflicts of interest.¹²

Asberg and Wallensteen complement Karl Deutsch’s definition, characterising a security community as an agreement by states, which share values, including democracy.¹³ They also observe that changes in attitude, which bring about such cooperation among states, tend to take place over a period of time, around two to three generations. In a region where the formation of states is a recent phenomenon, the stipulation of this time period is of significance as it may suggest that such a phenomenon may not yet be a possibility.

Furthermore, Asberg and Wallensteen note that the survival of the state and sovereignty constitutes the core value of a security community and the state regarded as the provider of security. It is nevertheless pertinent to observe that the relationship among states in a security community is sees as “reasonably equal and symmetrical”.¹⁴ However, while Asberg and Wallensteen see the security community concept as being primarily concerned with security for the state, they nevertheless consider other values such as human rights, national unity, markets, the international system and the environment as relevant factors.

It may be argued that the Southern African sub-region has such states, insufficiently developed as they may be in terms of all these factors. It is after all the ‘community’ nature of the security community paradigm that recognises the value in numbers and consequently the need to seek structural stability to enhance it. The evolvement of structures such as the Frontline States, Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and so forth, may have been due to this realisation. Asberg and Wallensteen’s recognition of the state as a core value and security provider as well as being primarily concerned with structural stability and attitudinal change, fits the sub-region, where states have been dominant.

The security community paradigm is therefore a socially based phenomenon, which is premised on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment. The paradigm, according to Adler and Barnett, interrogates the role of identity, norms and the social basis of global politics and they, like Asberg and Wallensteen, identify the “existence of common values as the wellspring for close security cooperation”.¹⁵ According to them, this deepens shared values and transnational linkages. These linkages, such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and physical communication facilities, are in fact indicators of the growth of human communities. While Adler and Barnett regard communication as the “cement of social groups in general and political communities in particular”¹⁶ that enables a group “to think together, to see together and to act together”,¹⁷ Baylis and Rengger regard it as the “creator” of communities, and therefore, by extension, security communities. The common cultural and social affinities, historical experiences, problems and aspirations, are a means of maintaining a community of states which Peter Vale sees as an intention to develop “among all the countries and peoples of Southern Africa, a vision of a shared future, a future within a regional community”.¹⁸

This framework places the emergence of security communities in three tiers. The first tier relates to causal factors, such as technology, demography, economics and the environment. These are considered to be among the motivating factors that lead to the formation of security communities. The second tier comprises factors that facilitate the development of mutual trust and collective identity as a result of “shared meanings and understanding”. Adler and Barnett identify core states that are expected to act as the centre around which the rest of the states in the region coalesce. Aside from this structural dimension there is also a process, which includes communication between the states in the region, and the identification of organisations and institutions through which trust and collective identity may develop.

The third tier reflects the actual development of trust and collective identity with two end states: loosely-coupled and tightly-coupled security communities. The former relates to partial identification as one people, ability by people to restrain states while also empowering states to act on the global level and joint issues. The latter has a membership that conforms strictly to the community’s identity and norms. In this community there is a complete corporate identity in which states’ behaviour is synonymous with that of the region. In what respect this reflects the Southern African region will be considered by this article as it traces the developments in the sub-region.

A club of dictators?

The extent to which the Heads of States and Governments’ meetings contribute to the development of peace and security in the sub-region requires careful analysis. These meetings have at times been referred to, at best, as mere clubs of political leaders and at worst, as clubs of dictators.¹⁹ It may therefore be argued that these summits are of little value. Between 1976 and 1990 alone, a total of 59 summits were held. Taking into account that these summits looked at such issues as the resolution of the Rhodesian question, which brought about an independent Zimbabwe in 1980, and the creation of the SADCC, it may be argued that the summits played an important role in conflict resolution and in trying to co-ordinate states’ activities. Closer examination shows that in 1976 the states in the ‘black’ bloc took a joint decision to support the Joint Military Commission for Zimbabwean liberation movements. In 1977, the summits deliberated the defence of Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. The summit reports also show further joint foreign and security policy approaches among the ‘black’ bloc.

It has, however, been the summits in the post-1994 era that appear to be particularly significant to the development of peace and security in the sub-region. Most significant of these was the June 1996 meeting in Gaborone, Botswana during which SADC ministers of defence, security and foreign affairs launched the Organ for Peace, Defence and Security (OPDS). The OPDS was clearly premised on a collaborative security arrangement, which sought solidarity and “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation and arbitration” through the application of “common political value systems and institutions (and) …a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest”.²⁰

Subsequent summits continued to reflect this spirit. It is nevertheless notable that the Protocol on the Free Movement of SADC Persons, which sought to “enable citizens to seek to cooperate across national boundaries”,²¹ is yet to be signed. This indicates an apparent lack of homogeneity in the sub-region. However, continuing collaborative action underscores the sub-region’s growing homogeneity. The 1998 summit in Mauritius further stressed the homogeneity of the sub-region by its ability to peer-review its own members’ election disputes and bridging over serious differences, even political ones. The reaction to the unstable situation in Lesotho also shows that the states in the sub-region regarded themselves as having mutually compatible political values. This characterises a security community.

Yet another indication of closeness among the states within the sub-region was shown at the 1999 summit in Mozambique. The establishment of the SADC Parliamentary Forum was a move away from state sovereignty to sub-regional sovereignty; thereby showing that socio-political and security issues are better established in a collaborative arrangement. Other structures that serve a wider arrangement than a state focus include the SADC Electoral Forum; the SADC Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and the SADC Lawyers Association. The mandate of the SADC Chair to “present a SADC position on the reform of the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) initiative to make it more accessible to debt-stressed SADC countries”²² signifies a heightening of trust within the sub-region. Rather than poverty being a divisive element within the sub-region, it has evidently been a rallying point.

Another point has been the institutionalisation of a mechanism for disaster preparedness and management within the sub-region. An extraordinary SADC summit was held in March 2000 in Mozambique to review the impact of floods caused by Cyclone Eline. In the midst of natural disasters, institutional arrangements have emerged that leave the divisive nature of state sovereignty at the margin, demanding instead its shared form in the hands of sub-regional structures. Related to this is the development of a regional strategy on food, discussed at the August 2001 summit held in Malawi, which called for “shar(ing) strategies and experiences with a view to adopting common approaches and strategies”.²³

Further summits have also shown a bias towards collaborative arrangements. In May 2000, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was signed, followed in March 2001 by a report reviewing SADC’s operations. There was also an agreement on a Common Agenda, focusing on areas such as equitable economic growth, common political values and the consolidation of democracy, peace and security. It would therefore seem that the political leaders in the sub-region have anticipated that their vision has to be premised on shared knowledge, mutual predictability of behaviour and mutual responsiveness.²⁴ The March summit also recognised the differences in states’ resources in the sub-region in its call for a formula to respond to financial contributions. In this way, the sub-region is moving towards eliminating areas of future conflict, which may end up making a collaborative arrangement difficult or even impossible.

An examination of some of the summits in 2001, 2002 and 2003 shows that the sub-region, despite having some areas of conflict, has acted in a manner that suggests the increasing harmonisation of policies. The establishment of a Ministerial Task Force to continue engaging the conflict in Zimbabwe signified that internal domestic affairs were no longer completely excluded as states in the sub-region had seriously begun to share some sovereignty.²⁵ It nevertheless has to be said that notwithstanding the stress on the governments in the sub-region to act unilaterally on the Zimbabwe issue, they have (as can be seen from the decision to set up the SADC Task Force on Zimbabwe) maintained a sub-regional stance of ‘quiet diplomacy’. In the end, the Zimbabwe issue has not broken up the unity or solidarity among the states. The same may be said of the manner in which SADC resolved the differences that had arisen following the action taken by the ‘SADC’ Allies over the conflict in the DRC referred to earlier²⁶.

The SADC Extraordinary Summit of March 2001 was a turning point in the development of a regional security structure for SADC. The summit undertook to complete the restructuring of all SADC institutions, including the OPDS, with a particular focus on the needs of smaller SADC members. In a security community, smaller states would theoretically not have security concerns since conflict between member states in the community would be unlikely. This does not, however, preclude the possibility of conflict over other areas such as economic arrangements. The massive economic differences between the states, shown in Figure 1²⁷, reflect the almost unbridgeable gap that would be resolved by poverty alleviation or eradication.

Estimates of GDP in SADC



In conformity with the security community approach, the common agenda reflects the promotion of common political values through “democratic, legitimate and effective” institutions as well as the “consolidation and maintenance of democracy, peace and security”.²⁸ The sceptic’s view would be that since the sub-region’s institutions are still in the process of development (and can therefore not be defined as democratic, sufficiently legitimate and effective), the agenda is merely a declaration of intent. A more positive reading is that the states in the sub-region acknowledge the existence of common values. The political map of the sub-region shows that most of the area has adopted multiparty constitutions.

Closely connected to summit communiqués are the protocols. While the summit communiqués have tended to cover a variety of issues very briefly, protocols have addressed specific issues in a more detailed manner.

Proof of the pudding

If summit communiqués are a means of confirming the extent to which states in the sub-region relate to one another, legal instruments produce the proof of that relationship. Therefore, the extent to which the sub-region conforms to the security community paradigm may be seen in the nature of the protocols developed. Given that the prime characteristic of a security community is that states do not target each other militarily, it would be a notable factor if SADC protocols were to suggest the possibility of such a development.

To date the SADC sub-region has signed 22 protocols, which cover the entire spectrum of human security. Directly focusing on security are protocols on illicit drug trafficking; the control of firearms, ammunition and other related materials; mutual legal assistance in criminal matters; shared watercourse systems; tribunals; and politics, defence and security co-operation. It is the last that has provided the most significant input into the idea of a SADC security community.

The adoption of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation at the SADC Summit, in August 2001 in Blantyre, signifies a transition towards an improved regional security development through the changing of the guard.²⁹

The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation was a product of this restructuring exercise and has undoubtedly been one of the greatest successes in the development of the region’s security arrangement. Signed by 13 of the 14 heads of state (Angola did not sign for administrative reasons), the Protocol operationalised the OPDS by addressing a number of earlier concerns that had polarised the region. The near unanimous adoption of the Protocol suggests a unity of purpose among the SADC leaders (characteristic of a security community) as well as a preference for collective leadership. In theory, this translates into a conflict-free environment among member states. Objectives of the new-look OPDS’s structure and objectives attest to this.

The nature of the OPDS leadership (the troika) exhibits institutionalism of democracy at this high level of political leadership and therefore ensures some stability in the leadership of the institution and arguably in the leadership of the region itself. The region will be less involved in bickering and more in a harmonious relationship given the existence of compatible values and predictable interests. The nature of the relationships in the region is not only affected by the OPDS leadership, (critical as it obviously is) but also by other structures such as the OPDS Ministerial Committee. Charged with the task of co-ordinating the work of the Organ and its structures as well as the implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISP), one of the biggest challenges of this institution will be balancing intra-regional political dynamics and external influence.

Yet another issue that is likely to have an impact on the development of a security community for the region is co-operation with non-governmental structures and international organisations. Political, defence and security issues go beyond national borders. Article 10 of the Protocol stipulates that agreements between relevant parties will be acceptable as long as they are not “inconsistent with the objectives and other provisions of the Treaty and (the) Protocol (or) impose obligations upon a State Party that is not a party to such co-operation agreement and impede a State Party from fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty and its Protocol”.³⁰ This provision appears to be premised on states in the region having bilateral and multilateral agreements with other parties. The Protocol stipulates such agreements have to be approved by the Summit.

Of all the Articles in the Protocol, the most critical is Article 11 under the heading ‘Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’. This addresses the most contentious issues that have bedevilled the OPDS. Stipulating the obligations of the organ under international law, the Article provides direction on when the use of force is permissible, while stressing the importance of using peaceful means. Notable is the attempt by the region to bridge some of the differences between the ‘Zimbabwe-led’ and ‘South African-led’ debates on the OPDS. However, the provision stipulating that the Organ “shall seek to ensure that the State parties adhere to and enforce all sanctions and arms embargoes imposed on any party by the United Nations Security Council” assumes that SADC would always agree with the Security Council.

As regards the jurisdiction of the organ—which Article 11 stipulates as resolution of conflicts over territorial boundaries, natural resources and conflicts likely to bring about insecurity to the entire region—the OPDS now has a legal instrument with which to meet a variety of challenges effectively. Given the prevalence of territorial boundaries that cut across ethnic communities, and the unequal distribution of natural resources, there is no shortage of challenges.

Article 11 (on the jurisdiction of the Organ) provides for a relationship between the SADC Organ, the UN Security Council and the Central Organ of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. This paves the way for SADC to participate in peacekeeping operations on the African continent in the spirit of the African Union, and as a member of the world community in missions outside the continent. To operationalise regional conflict prevention, management and resolution, the OPDS will seek “arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal”.³¹ The Protocol also provides for a modus operandi should resolving a conflict be unsuccessful. To meet external military threats to the region, the Protocol refers to a future collective security arrangement through a Mutual Defence Pact. Before analysing the mutual defence pact—a stage that would effectively epitomise the development of a security community in the sub-region—it is necessary that to study the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). It is the SIPO that provides the foundation for the mutual defence pact.

Setting the stage

The major challenge facing the sub-region is the restructuring of SADC and all its structures, including the OPDS, to “operationalise protocols and harmonise policies”.³² The exercise is expected to lead to a better functioning sub-regional body capable of delivering the economic, social, political and security goals of the sub-region. While the value of the SIPO to the development of peace and security in the sub-region may be deduced from its repeated re-evaluation, in this article, the extent to which the SIPO provides an understanding of development in terms of a security community approach is more important. The preamble to the Third Gaborone Draft commences with an unambiguous stress on a “shared future”, language that is consistent with the security community approach.

The political sector

The political sector indicates the SIPO’s bias towards a security community. For instance, the document’s acceptance of democratic elections and consultations designed to improve democratic culture and the acknowledgement of “good political co-operation” sits well with early phases of security community development. What may be contested is the degree to which elections in the sub-region have been democratic. Holding regular elections in the sub-region, holding former political leaders accountable, and participation by sub-regional institutions in these processes are all indicative of efforts to improve governance. Further solidifying this position is the Gaborone Draft’s assertion that the sub-region has established institutions designed to “deepen co-operation and mutual trust among Member States, one such institution [being] the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee”.³³ This relates to the first and second tiers of the emergence of security communities.
Central to the political section of the Gaborone Draft is the heightening of current common values and culture, which is expected to lead to the transcending of boundaries. Acknowledging these values entails an acknowledgement that the peoples in the sub-region share a common past, present and future. While the document reflects this common identity, it nevertheless (and in line with the tenets of the security community paradigm) acknowledges the state and regional project: “The process of building the nation-state is taking place in tandem with the process of building the SADC community”.³⁴ Strategies and activities in the document reflect factors that project unity across state boundaries, such as establishing common electoral standards and enhancing the regional capacity to meet disasters. Even more significant in the Gaborone Draft is the apparent determination by the sub-region to “develop a common foreign policy approach on issues of mutual concern and advance such policies collectively in international fora”.³⁵

The defence sector

The defence sector reflects similar aspects, namely the need for people to be protected from interstate and intrastate conflicts and aggression, and the need to harmonise policies. The draft document’s acknowledgement of “regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and [the] establish[ment] [of] appropriate mechanisms to this end” and the need to take this further to “the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external military threats” shows the sub-region’s evolution of a security community from the nascent through the ascendant to the mature phase.³⁶

The document’s strategy of developing a sub-regional operational capacity through member states’ standby arrangements, and the enhancement of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) based in Zimbabwe, indicate recognition of the value of a sub-regional approach and the weaknesses of a state-driven project. Utilisation of some of the states’ forces in the sub-regional standby arrangement, irrespective of the size or quality of their forces, reduces the problems that would arise from feelings of exclusion that might ignite the sensitivity of state sovereignty. Since the standby arrangement project would imply forces that may not necessarily have had identical training and operational experience working together, standardisation is an important requirement. The inclusion in the Gaborone Draft of the promotion of inter-operability of military equipment and joint multinational exercises aims to develop co-ordination and cooperation among the forces. A consequence of this would be a reduction of fear and an increase in trust—another characteristic of the ascendant phase of a security community.

However, the financing of the RPTC, including the possible use of foreign partners, poses some political difficulties. One difficulty may arise from allowing states to contribute according to their capacity. Since this would imply that South Africa, and other economically advanced and militarily superior states, would play a dominant role in the activities of the RPTC (as indeed they would in the overall sub-regional structures), it would not be unrealistic to deduce that this would reopen the old fear and hostility which characterised the pre-1994 era.

The other difficulty with foreign partners is that this may be regarded as ‘surrendering’ some sovereignty to states outside the sub-region. The sensitivity with which the states in the sub-region handle matters of the SADC Organ would suggest an unwillingness to surrender regional sovereignty. The sensitivity has been extended to local non-state institutions, possibly indicative of the their closeness to foreign institutions. Yet the Gaborone Draft calls for “identify(ing) areas of intervention that could be funded by co-operating partners”.³⁷ This is indicative of a reduction in sensitivity over regional sovereignty.

The security sector

The Gaborone Draft shows some signs of a collaborative approach to handling security, which, in part, is because of a realisation of some of the challenges facing the sub-region. The document recognises that the challenges—which include the transnational nature of crime, terrorism, HIV/AIDS, limited resources, food security and the protection of maritime resources—would best be faced in a co-operative arrangement. Therefore, strategies of the security sector include the need for an “exchange of information of common interest…[and] hamonis[ation] [of] intelligence systems.

If any of the sectors could be regarded as critical (without which the entire collaborative enterprise would be at risk) then it would be the security sector. Sharing of information and intelligence, generally considered to be closely guarded because of the pivotal role of security in the survival of the state itself, are activities that can only be viewed as a maturing of the relationship among states.

The public security sector

The Gaborone Draft’s coverage of the public security sector shows a situation of “increased co-operation and collaboration between various services responsible for law enforcement and public security”.³⁸ Co-operation in immigration, customs, and policing is said to be comprehensive but nevertheless challenged by a number of issues such as “transnational criminal activities and organized criminal syndicates, … the negative effects of globalization such as the growing vulnerability of national borders [and] scarcity of resources”.³⁹ SARPCCO; the development of protocols on firearms, ammunition and other related materials; extradition; corruption; and mutual legal assistance are evidence of the depth of this co-operation.

The Gaborone Draft envisages that the public security sectors will establish common approaches to their work. The strategies of “develop[ing] a database for law enforcement agencies,…harmonis[ing] and consolidat[ing] immigration procedures and control mechanisms to facilitate the movement of people amongst Member States” are indicative of a plan to develop a collaborative arrangement for the sub-region.⁴⁰

The SIPO evidently provides a ‘road map’ to the attainment of a shared future in the Southern African region. Insofar as the evolvement of a security community is concerned, the attainment of a mutual defence pact is the ultimate achievement, which would equate to the mature level in Adler and Barnett’s formulation of a security community.

When the rubber meets the road

A Mutual Defence Pact, which is closely associated with a non-aggression treaty and regarded as a collective defence strategy is viewed as, firstly, having the ability to stop member states from promoting hostile activities from each other’s territories, and secondly, encouraging coming to each other’s support in such an eventuality.⁴¹ The SADC Mutual Defence Pact supports this issue, thereby giving the view that the Pact may be nothing short of a strategy for states to protect one another; specifically, for state elites to keep one another in power. However, read in conjunction with Article 7 on non-interference in one another’s internal affairs, the Pact also stipulates that the SADC Summit would act differently should it consider it necessary to intervene.

The very existence of the Mutual Defence Pact suggests that the regional grouping genuinely desires to work as one on matters of defence and security. Articles on defence co-operation and collective defence as well as on the settlement of disputes show the determination to create a suitable environment for peaceful co-existence. While the Pact provides for training, joint technological enhancement and the exchange of military intelligence, and in this way creates a close working environment and trust among the members of the different defence forces, it also provides for timely help to needy state parties. States conforming to these articles hold compatible values and similar interests: both essential factors for a security community. Article 13 (which covers the settlement of disputes among member states) assures that member states would no longer target each other militarily—a critical indicator of a security community.

However the Pact is not without elements that may inhibit the development of a security community. For a start, although there would be a swift response to an armed attack on a member state, Article 6(2) insists on the SADC Summit’s sanction (which can only lead to delay when attending to an emergency situation) and consequently may become a source of differences among member states. The provision requiring that the AU and Security Council of the UN be notified soon after such an attack, instead of the earlier requirement that no such intervention take place without the UN’s approval, is also significant. This implies that there would be no undue delay in reacting to emergencies.

Notwithstanding some of the articles viewed as retrogressive to the attainment of a security community, the SADC Pact continually stresses some factors that point towards a peaceful collaborative arrangement. The Pact continues to make states and people its dominant units. It also takes cognizance of collective defence and the preservation of peace and stability as well as other provisions on defence co-operation. Together with other aspects, which include bilateral consultation and the settlement of disputes through democratic institutions such as the SADC Tribunal, the Pact reflects an unmistakable intention by its members to establish a security community.

Conclusion

This article has focused on the major instruments that have brought about the most fundamental changes to the development of the Southern African regional structure. The one major common theme has been the desire by states to enhance their solidarity with one another. Therefore featuring prominently in their programmes is the need to promote common values, which they regard as the result of their common history. The heads of state regard themselves as having the same threat perception and developmental agenda.

Of all the summits, the SADC Extraordinary Summit of March 2001 was most critical in the development of security structures for the sub-region, through its remodelling of SADC institutions. Prominent among issues tackled were the development of an OPDS Troika and an Integrated Committee of Ministers to look at core areas of integration. Another critical area covered by the summit was the re-examination of the SADC common agenda.

The numerous protocols signify an improved relationship among states even if they may not reflect adequate implementation. The most significant of these protocols in the development of security arrangements for the sub-region is the one on politics, defence and security co-operation, which brought in a new OPDS with a revision of the objectives and institutional structure. While some of the new objectives promote common political and foreign policy values, which could be interpreted as a movement towards a security community, the dominance of the state continues to be the norm. There was also a concerted effort by the regional structure to be actively involved in international issues, instead of taking the passive role of the past. Following from this more aggressive posture, the OPDS entertained the possibility of enforcement action instead of preventive diplomacy.

The institutional changes brought about by the Protocol resolved the problem of the ‘old’ OPDS, which, in the main, led to the paralysis of the institution. The Protocol also addressed conflict prevention, management and resolution, and the issue of military intervention.

This article has also analysed the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, which guides the process of implementing the protocols and synchronising policies in the sub-region, one of its most important results being the Mutual Defence Pact. The Mutual Defence Pact, which by definition represents the final development in a regional security structure, could be seen as the most important indicator of a security community. Looked at from the viewpoint of Adler and Barnett’s tiers, it may be deduced that there are firm indications that the sub-region, although not yet the tight security community associated with the third tier, is evolving into a security community.

The challenges facing the Southern African sub-region are indeed enormous. However Baregu’s thesis is overly pessimistic. The SADC summits, protocols and the (draft) mutual defence pact are indicative of states in the region having more than just a momentary relationship with one another. It is obvious that problems among the states in the sub-region exist, but not to the extent that Mwesiga’s thesis indicates. The very existence of the political-cum-security dynamism can be seen in the determination to work as an entity at the political level and in close co-operation at the security level. This not only places such pessimism on the periphery, but points towards the development of a viable collaborative security arrangement. A worthy conclusion is the acknowledgement of “a large gap between SADC’s stated regional development and integration goals and economic policies in the region”.⁴² But, as this article argues, that gap is narrowing. Therefore, the modus vivendi of the restructured SADC may also be cynically stated (to borrow a fitting line from Lisa Thompson that “united we stand, divided we beg”) as ‘united we fight, and divided we run!’

It is also apparent that the developments in the sub-region, applied loosely to Karl Deutsch’s framework, point toward efforts to develop a security community. However, it is through Adler and Barnett’s schema of three tiers that the extent of this development is clear. The SADC summits, the creation of protocols, and the subsequent development of the SIPO and the draft Mutual Defence Pact show a unity of purpose that makes a final conclusion possible. Although the sub-region has yet to attain the level of a security community (as defined by Karl Deutsch), developments indicate that that the sub-region is moving towards a security community having met the conditions of Adler and Barnett’s first tier to a significant level and some of the conditions of the second and third tiers.

Notes