|
Security Brief
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:
BOZIZÉ REPLACES PATASSÉ
On the afternoon of Saturday 15 March 2002,
about 1,000 rebel troops loyal to erstwhile
chief of staff General François Bozizé entered
Bangui, the capital of the Central African
Republic, virtually unopposed and seized control
of the airport and presidential palace
before securing the entire city. President
Patassé, returning from a regional summit in
Niger, learned of his predicament when his
aircraft was fired upon as it approached
Bangui. The pilot diverted to Cameroon,
where Patassé was given refuge.
On local radio on Sunday night General
Bozizé was introduced to listeners as the new
head of state. He announced that he was suspending
the constitution and dissolving parliament.
A ten-day overnight curfew was
introduced and all security forces ordered to
return to barracks. Bozizé claimed that his
forces had taken power “because of the mismanagement
of the country and its inability
to carry out its domestic responsibilities”. The
new government, he said, was one “of peace
and national reconciliation”. He assured his
audience that he would attempt a quick reconstruction
of the country, to which end he
would approach the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for postconflict
assistance. He also noted a need to
reconcile elements within the armed forces
and to overhaul government bureaucracy.
International condemnation of Bozizé’s
seizure of power was swift in coming, though it
lacked passion and, with few exceptions,
seemed to be more part of the ritual deemed
mandatory in such circumstances. There were
many reasons why the leaders of the Central
African region had little cause to appreciate the
deposed leader, his domestic policies or his
taste in friends and allies. This was especially so
once President Patassé chose to become
dependent for his security upon a narrowlybased
presidential guard and, increasingly, on
the forces of his ally Libya and the Congolese
rebel movement of Jean-Pierre Bemba. This
alienated most of the other leaders of the
region as well as virtually the entire domestic
military establishment.
Indeed, Chad, which many saw as supporting
the rebellion, was quick to respond to
Bozizé’s request for soldiers to assist in curbing
the widespread looting in the capital and,
remarkably, in disarming all his own rebels
but his personal protection unit. The African
Union’s public disapproval of the ‘coup’
notwithstanding, delegates shortly began to
arrive from a number of other governments in
the region, eager to engage with the country’s
new ruler.
The former colonial power, France, had
long become disillusioned with Patassé, and
though it dispatched a force of 300 troops to
Bangui, their mandate was only to protect
those foreign nationals wishing to leave, and
to restore the peace rather than the fortunes of
a discredited leader.
Bozizé’s initial moves have demonstrated a
steady hand. He has appointed as prime minister
the respected veteran politician Dr Abel
Goumba, and has included in the cabinet and
the institutions established to guide the transition
to democracy prominent figures of all
political persuasions, including moderate supporters
of the man he replaced.
All this bodes well for the present, and the
question now among interested observers is
how long this can last. Will General Bozizé
maintain his role as arbiter over the construction
of a new democratic polity, or will he be
tempted as so many soldiers before him, to
assume a more permanent position at the
head of national affairs? He will be constrained
by his need to marshal international
financial assistance, because not the least of
his predecessor’s problems was the government’s
inability to pay the salaries of its
employees, civil and military.
At the moment he has the goodwill of the
Central African region, happy at the discomfiture
of Libya and of Jean-Pierre Bemba.
Whether he can retain his evident popularity
in Bangui may depend on how quickly he can
fulfil some of the expectations of a turn
around in the nation’s fortunes.
Certainly, suspension from the organs of
the African Union will be the least of Bozizé’s
immediate problems, though the popular
reception given this irregular change of power
may give that organisation pause for thought
about contextualising issues of principle. For
good or ill, political situation s which develop
on the African continent, rarely conform in
their configuration to the absolutes in which
principled pronouncements are couched. — RC
MOZAMBIQUE CONTRIBUTES
TO THE AFRICAN MISSION IN
BURUNDI
Foreign policy decisions, particularly those
involving the deployment of troops in peacekeeping
operations, are rarely the product of
one single factor. Mozambique’s decision to
contribute one infantry company to the
African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) is no
exception. This mission, the first peacekeep
ing operation under the aegis of the recently
created African Union (AU), will see the
deployment of a 3,500-strong contingent of
South African, Ethiopian and Mozambican
troops in Burundi for an initial period of one
year. The mandate and objectives of this mission
were outlined on 2 April 2003 at the
ninety-first ambassadorial session of the AU’s
Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution.
This session followed the recommendations
of the 3 February 2003 session of the AU’s
Central Organ (at the level of Heads of State
and Government), where the deployment of
an African peacekeeping mission to Burundi
was approved.
The AMIB is expected to stay in Burundi
for an initial period of one year subject to
renewal and pending the deployment of a
United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping force, as
foreseen in the 7 October 2002 and 2 December
2002 ceasefire agreements between the belligerents
in Burundi. Its mandate includes:
overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire
agreements; supporting disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration initiatives; ensuring
that conditions favourable for the establishment
of a United Nations’ peacekeeping operation
(envisaged in the ceasefire agreements)
will be in place and, finally, contributing to
political and economic stability in Burundi.
South Africa has been appointed lead nation
and entrusted with the responsibility of planning
the deployment of the force, whose core
will largely be South African. Operational
planning for the mission has already begun (as
of 10 April 2003), with a visit to Bujumbura by
a 50-strong planning team under South Africa’s
Maj-Gen Sipho Binda, who has been appointed
commander of the AMIB.
Mozambique’s involvement in this mission
has been regarded as an ingenious foreign
policy move to increase its continental prestige,
at a time when its responsibilities in (and
engagement with) Africa will steadily increase.
In a domain where perceptions are so important,
Mozambique’s contribution of only 200
infantry soldiers will certainly produce results
far exceeding this nominal, often referred to
as ‘token’, contribution. After all, compared
with Ethiopia’s deployment of one battalion
plus two additional companies (between 950
and 1,000 peacekeepers) and South Africa’s
contribution of one battalion, Mozambique’s
participation may seem, at first sight, insignificant.
In addition, because the AMIB will
gradually incorporate South Africa’s
Protection Support Detachment currently in
Bujumbura with a mandate to protect Hutu
political leaders taking part in the transitional
government, South Africa’s contribution will
reach the combined force level of two battalions
(approximately 1,500 troops). What real
difference can a company make?
There are several reasons for Mozambique’s
involvement in the AMIB. By deciding
to send troops to Burundi, President
Joaquim Chissano will strengthen his credibility
in the eyes of his African counterparts,
smoothing the way for his chairmanship of
the AU to follow the Maputo summit in July
2003. Active participation in the AMIB will
demonstrate President Chissano’s historically
strong endorsement of continental cooperation
in matters of defence and security, backing
it up with concrete action. This will
undoubtedly give him added confidence,
legitimacy and clout to speak to (and on
behalf of) his African counterparts. After all,
Mozambique is often considered Africa’s
most successful case of peacemaking, postconflict
reconstruction and development and
sees its own experience as a valuable asset to
be used in the resolution of current African
conflicts. Keen to share this experience, postwar
Mozambique has become an active player
in regional diplomacy and peacemaking,
most notably in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Angola and the Great Lakes.
Symbolically, Chissano hopes that active participation
in the AMIB will assure his African
peers that he too can match the prolific diplomatic
activity of his South African counterpart,
current chair of the AU, President Thabo
Mbeki.
ozambique’s foreign policy has been
strongly guided by the need to strengthen its
presence in the international scene, particularly
within the Southern African context, where
priority has been given to integration within
the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). Mozambique’s trading
links with SADC countries, particularly with
South Africa and Zimbabwe, have steadily
increased. Its main trading partner, South
Africa, now accounts for over a quarter of
Mozambique’s exports and over half of its
total imports. Relations with Pretoria are
therefore vital, and Mozambique has often
backed President Thabo Mbeki’s pursuit of
negotiation in regional conflicts. During
March 2001, strategic regional concerns
underpinned Mozambique’s support to other
SADC countries in removing Robert Mugabe,
Zimbabwe’s President, from his position as
head of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence
and Security. However, even though Maputo
has expressed its concern that Mugabe’s policies
may seriously affect the whole region,
Chissano has closely mimicked Mbeki’s quiet
diplomacy approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe,
refraining from outright criticism. As
the current Chair of SADC’s Organ on
Politics, Defence and Security, Mozambique
has been consistent with this approach, deviating
little from Pretoria’s stance.
Active participation in the AMIB will also
strengthen Mozambique’s position and credibility
vis-à-vis the outside world, and in particular
towards the G8, with whom the AU
will have thorny and difficult negotiations to
kick-start the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD). Increasingly considered
the AU’s vehicle for economic development
in Africa, NEPAD entails a
commitment by African leaders to African
people and the international community to
place Africa on a path of sustainable growth,
accelerated by the integration of the continent
into the global economy. In practice,
NEPAD’s purpose is to attract foreign direct
investment and development assistance by
making Africa an attractive investment opportunity.
And in this regard, Mozambique has a
particular interest, and it is likely that
Chissano’s tenure as Chair of the AU will concentrate
on NEPAD. Mozambique’s economy
is highly dependent on foreign direct investment
(FDI), which since the late 1990’s has
displaced development assistance as the principal
motor of the Mozambican economy. In
fact, Mozambique ranked 7th in sub-Saharan
Africa as a destination of FDI during 2000. As reported by the Economist Intelligence Unit
in 2001, Mozambique saw new FDI projects
valued at some $ 1 billion USD approved
with an additional $ 84 million under study.
Finally, and following from the above, the
decision to contribute to the AMIB and the
expected foreign policy benefits that Mozambique
expects to reap, may also be a reflection
of President Chissano’s internal political
motivations. Close to reaching the end of his
second and last mandate, at the top end of
Joaquim Chissano’s internal agenda is the
concern that Frelimo, the ruling party, wins
the October 2003 municipal elections as well
as the crucial Presidential and legislative elections
at the end of 2004. Frelimo has gradually
lost its popularity, as evidenced by its
marginal victory in the Presidential elections
of 5–6 December 1999. Against Chissano’s
52.3% of the Presidential vote, Afonso
Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo, won 47.7%
of the vote. And, although most analysts consider
that in the upcoming elections a victory
by Renamo is highly unlikely, largely because
of its organisational weakness, Frelimo has
been under considerable pressure internally
and externally. There is a growing concern in
the international community that Mozambique’s
recovery may be hampered by governance
issues including corruption in the
banking sector, allegations of senior government
officials’ involvement in organised criminal
networks and inefficiency in the justice
sector. The election of Armando Guebuza as
Frelimo’s Secretary-General and likely
Presidential candidate in the coming 2004
elections has also raised fears that the conservative
faction within the party will reverse the
deepening of democratisation in Mozambique,
jeopardising this country’s spectacular
but still evolving recovery from years of civil
war.
A small contribution to a regional peacekeeping
force such as the AMIB is of course,
and if seen in isolation, a miniscule step as
foreign policy decision-making goes.
Militarily, it does not constitute a significant
commitment for Mozambique’s 5,000–6,000
strong Armed Forces for the Defence of
Mozambique (FADM), even if Mozambique
will need to find international financial sponsorship for this deployment. As reported by
the EIU, much of the FADM’s budget (US$87
million in 2000) is believed to be earmarked
for pensions and other benefits for the large
number of retired officers and war veterans. In
terms of strategic doctrine, such deployment
will be consistent with Mozambique’s postwar
defence policy by which the FADM do
not become engaged in internal security
issues. Nevertheless, as part of a strategic and
coherent approach to diplomacy in the continent,
with the ultimate aim of benefiting the
economic and social development of
Mozambique, the contribution to the AMIB
will undoubtedly, and perhaps disproportionately
(when compared with costs incurred),
bear fruit. This would hold whatever the outcome
of the mission; another case proving
that in foreign policy, perception is paramount.
— JP
POLITICAL TRANSITION IN
BURUNDI
The beginning of May 2003 marks a critical date
in Burundi. Under a power-sharing agreement,
the current Burundian president, Pierre Buyoya,
a Tutsi, is scheduled to hand over to the vicepresident,
Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu.
What is certain though, is that Burundians
desperately need peace. Not only have an estimated
300,000 Burundians lost their lives
since the beginning of the crisis in 1993, the
social and economic development of the
country has also been seriously disrupted.
Government military and rebel groups alike
have coerced men, women and children into
transporting goods, they have raped women,
pillaged and burned homes, and violated the
ceasefire by continuing to enlist combatants,
many of them children.
The humanitarian situation in Burundi is
very fragile. Since the beginning of the year
living conditions have deteriorated steadily
and the ceasefire has been violated daily. The
sense of insecurity is pervasive. International
humanitarian organisations report regular
ambushes and the looting of aid supplies by
rebels, as well as sporadic fighting between
government and rebel forces, resulting in civilian
deaths and the displacement of people on
a scale not seen for many years. By February
2003 it was reported that as many as 100,000
people were being displaced internally every
month, moving from hill-top to hill-top in an
attempt to escape the violence.
By mid-April some 525,000 people were
displaced within Burundi, three-quarters of
them living in 226 camps. Additional pressure
on already overstretched food-aid resources is
caused by a period of abnormally dry weather
that has led to a massive drop in the level of
food stocks in most parts of the country. The
marked decline in the production of beans,
the main source of protein for most
Burundians, is particularly worrying. Under
the current circumstances there is great concern
about the prospects for the next harvest,
as the scarcity of basic commodities, coupled
with depreciation of the local currency, has
increased the likelihood of people being
reduced to eating the seeds needed for planting.
Over and above this, relief agencies
remain short of funds because donors are
reluctant to resume major aid programs until
an effective cease-fire is in place and the transitional
government has begun to implement
the reforms in the Arusha Agreement.
More than 840,000 Burundians live as
refugees in the region. Most of them are in
Tanzania and some 470,000 of these are integrated
with the local population and do not
receive UNHCR assistance. In March 2002
the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) implemented
a voluntary repatriation program for
the return of refugees from Tanzania. Tensions
have increased amid accusations that camps
have served as a base for FDD rebels (Conseil
National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces
de Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD-FDD).
There is also growing resentment in local
Tanzanian communities who have borne the
brunt of the social, environmental and economic
impact of sharing scarce resources with
the refugees.
Several thousand refugees, hoping that the
agreements signed at the end of 2002 might
bring peace, returned to Burundi to assess the
situation only to head back to Tanzania in disillusionment.
Continued fighting in 2003 sent
new waves of refugees into Tanzania, where
the UNHCR has had to make contingency
plans for as many as 60,000 newcomers.
The refugees are in an invidious position:
even if an improved security situation opened
the way for their return, there is the real fear
that their return could derail the peace process
because of the lack of absorptive capacity
within Burundi. Not only are general conditions
not conducive, but also a major obstacle
to a long-term solution for Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees is the
scarcity of land, with disputes over land worsening
considerably in recent years. Population
density in the country is over 240 per square
kilometre, the second most dense in Africa
after Rwanda, and 766 per sq km of arable
land with 90% of the population dependent
on subsistence farming.
Access to health care is limited throughout
Burundi, and services are generally sub-standard.
Malaria is the leading cause of death;
Hepatitis A, Typhoid, Yellow fever, Cholera
and Meningitis are all prevalent. HIV presents
in over 10% of the adult population. Life
expectancy in 2000 was an average of 40.6
years.
Future prospects
The general mood in Burundi is not optimistic.
The impending transfer of power to a
Hutu president appears to be the main catalyst
for increased political and military
manoeuvring, with all sides re-evaluating their
positions, and trying to increase areas under
their control. The transitional government is
trying to implement change under enormous
pressure—urged by the international community
to meet the set deadlines while the political
situation remains seriously fragmented.
Although international donors have been
making substantial aid commitments since
2000, disbursements have lagged far behind
and this will continue until a comprehensive
ceasefire is in place.
Until the political situation improves,
fighting is contained and different elements of
the ceasefire implemented, the humanitarian
situation will continue to deteriorate. At the
same time, the humanitarian conditions are
impacting negatively on the political situation: continuing degradation of the socio-economic
situation increases social tension, the
failure to respond to humanitarian needs is
causes a deepening sense of despair.
Burundians are desperate for resources.
Neglect of the structural problems that continue
to fuel tensions has created an environment
in which peace seems continuously out
of reach. Recognising that donors can play an
essential role in building peace and that they
need to support positive developments to
push for change, donors are urging that a transition
should take place while continuing to
withhold support until true peace is achieved.
International aid has been reduced to a third
of the levels prevailing from 1981 to 1995.
The resulting civilian suffering appears to not
have been sufficiently anticipated, or was
merely considered inevitable in a region
engulfed in conflict. It is questionable
whether withholding the aid has been productive.
Recently the German donor, GTZ,
promised food aid for FDD rebels on the
understanding that they could be confined to
the cantonment areas to stop them preying on
civilians. However, the FDD rebels have
proved unwilling to co-operate and there
seems no possibility of achieving encampment
by 1 May. The two main parties have
now also called for sanctions against the Front
National de Liberation (FNL) rebels, so they
too will be less inclined to lay down arms.
There is some hope that the African Union’s
3,500-strong peacekeeping force, due to be
active by the beginning of June, will be effective.
The deployment of a peacekeeping force
is indispensable to the process of encampment
and the introduction of a true ceasefire.
Nevertheless, political insecurity is likely to
be aggravated further by the fragility of the
current regional situation. Demobilization
and reintegration of returning forces from
DRC has the potential to exacerbate insecurity;
this is against a backdrop of concerns over
how the reform and integration of the government
and rebels armed forces will be handled.
Political developments over the coming
months will continue to be a major factor in
determining levels of security. A critical issue
is that of who will be appointed as Vice-
African Security Review 12(2) • 2003
President and what his relationship will be
with the Hutu President to be appointed.
There is the potential for government institutions
to be paralysed by an uncooperative
relationship that feeds into and aggravates
divisions. Given the depth of poverty, the
prevalence of violent conflict, and the scale of
human rights violations, the humanitarian situation
will not improve unless and until the
government upholds human rights, ends
impunity, protects civilians and the displaced,
improves the justice system, and the international
community develops an integrated
approach to working in support of such government
actions. However, so long as political
agendas continue to be determined by elites
jostling for power and not working towards
peace, the absence of peace, and thus also of
funds, will continue to destabilise the state of
Burundi. — JC
WESTERN SAHARA:
OIL ON TROUBLED WATERS
Oil fields found off the coast of the of Western
Sahara have raised the profile of this disputed
territory. Among the first indications of this
was the United Nations Security Council vote
in March to extend by two months the mandate
of Minurso, its mission in Western Sahara.
Until the game was changed by the discovery
of oil, the UN was keeping this 12-year-old
mission only just alive by extending its mandate
a month at a time.
The Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara has to all intents and purposes
completed its task of drawing up a roll of
the 200,000 Saharawis eligible to vote in the
envisaged referendum on the future of the territory.
Morocco has occupied it in defiance of
the UN since 1975. The UN force also polices
a ceasefire that has held since 1991, whereby
the Moroccan forces remain behind a sand
wall in the West of the occupied territory. The
Saharawi fighters of the Polisario Front move
freely about the rest of the zone.
The bulk of the Saharawis (about 160,000
people) live in refugee camps in Algeria. They
survive on the grace and favour of the UN
and a range of mainly European humanitarian
organisations. King Mohamed VI of Morocco
confessed earlier this year that Morocco’s
promise eventually to go along with the UN
peace process in Western Sahara amounted to
little more than a stalling tactic. Meanwhile,
thorough work by Minurso in compiling the
voters’ roll has foiled Rabat’s attempt to
manipulate the process by pouring Moroccan
settlers into the occupied territory and registering
them as voters. Moroccans are, however,
well aware that the Saharawis under their
heel in the occupied territory would vote with
their refugee compatriots in the camps, and
they have no intention of going through with
the referendum, which was proposed by the
UN Security Council, let alone accepting its
outcome.
Morocco’s defiant stand on Western Sahara
has exacerbated its relations with neighbouring
Algeria, which supports and shelters the
Saharawis and has paralysed the Maghreb
Arab Union comprising Mauritania,
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.
Morocco has, however, staked everything on
France and the United States managing to
strong-arm the Saharawis into accepting less
than complete independence. The Saharawis,
with the consistent support of Algeria, reject
any notion of a partial or conditional independence
should the people opt for
Morocco’s departure. Herein lies the deadlock:
Morocco cannot risk withdrawing its
troops from the occupied territory and have
them return to a kingdom that has unemployment
approaching 40%, because it fears that
idle soldiers would only contribute to the
seething discontent over the new king’s failure
to deliver promised reforms.
Until now both France and the United
States have concurred with this analysis. They
have supported a so-called third way proposed
by former United States secretary of state,
James Baker, acting as special envoy for UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. After failing
three times to get UN Security Council
approval of what become known as the Baker
Plan, Annan attempted a pressure play and
threatened that the withdrawal of Minurso was
one of four options. The second option was to
implement the 1998 peace plan, which would
mean holding the election. The other options
were to discuss a division of the territory and
to revise the Baker plan.
Baker has no illusions that Morocco will
ever agree to any plan that could result in its
having to quit the territory. His new proposal
thus still amounts to a Moroccan wish list and
is unlikely to have any more success on a
Security Council that currently includes
Spain. Madrid has recently had something of
a crisis of conscience about abandoning its
former colony in 1975. In addition, Spanish
relations with Morocco hit an all-time low last
year when Moroccan soldiers had to be ejected
from the Spanish Mediterranean island of
Persil. Morocco’s vigorous opposition to the
Iraq war has, moreover, soured its relations
with Washington.
Support for the SADR
Not surprisingly, Baker Plan II met with a
decided thumbs down from the Saharawis
and their supporters. The Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR) is a member of
the African Union and can count the vast
majority of African states among its supporters.
South Africa has given de facto recognition
to the SADR, which has an ambassador in
Pretoria. The Saharawis continue to press
Pretoria to fulfil written promises made by former
President Nelson Mandela and Foreign
Minister Nkosazana Zuma to establish formal
ties between the two countries. President
Thabo Mbeki, who is under pressure from
Washington, Paris and Annan to maintain the
status quo, has said he is waiting for an opportune
time to do this. In addition to its advocates
in Africa, the Saharawis enjoy significant
moral support from political parties in Europe
and the Americas.
When the Australian-based Fusion Oil &
Gas Company was looking to explore off the
Western Sahara coast, it was pointed to the
SADR government by British civil servants.
Fusion struck a deal with the SADR that
allowed drilling now and getting first option
after independence to pump any oil it found.
Morocco’s state-owned oil company Onarep,
meanwhile, gave exploration rights in the disputed
territory to multinational oil companies
Kerr-McGee and TotalFinaElf. This prompted
the Security Council to seek an opinion from
UN legal counsel Hans Corel, who found that
Morocco’s illegal occupation of the territory
did not give it any jurisdiction—and certainly
no right to issue licences over its mineral
resources.
The Norwegian company TGS-NOPEC
has subsequently stopped its seismic exploration
on behalf of the Onarep licensees and
admitted that it was imprudent to have operated
in the occupied territory. TotalFinaElf
and Kerr-McGee have held their fire, insisting
that the Onarep licence is for exploration not
exploitation. The need to achieve a political
solution becomes more pressing as the oilrigs
move in and money blurs the issues.
The UN’s very survival has been thrown
into the balance by the attack of US-led coalition
on forces loyal to Saddam Hussein.
Another crisis of credibility would lead yet
more people to question the usefulness of the
UN. However, this is exactly what Morocco
threatens. The Western Sahara peace plan that
was approved by the Security Council is still
on the table. Morocco, having repeatedly
promised to implement it, remains unconvinced.
|
|