Introduction

The growth of organised forms of criminality in Southern Africa since the end of the Cold War and the transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy in South Africa is often remarked upon, but little understood. Indeed, given the apparent scale of the problem, little research attention has been given to its scope and causes. In no case is this clearer than in the involvement of West African criminal organisations in Southern Africa. While commentators, analysts and police officers alike, point to Southern African’s resident West African population – and by West African they generally mean ‘the Nigerian problem’ – as the source of lawless activity, there have been few attempts to trace the causes and growth of West African criminal networks. Such analysis is particularly important given apparent strongly held xenophobic views among ordinary South Africans for people from West Africa.1

The lack of academic research on West African networks is, however, not confined to Southern Africa and while media reports and law enforcement information provide some coverage there is no single academic study in North America and Europe, where the penetration of West African criminal groups is by all accounts high, providing some insight into their activities, nature and growth. The issue is, however, of some importance in Southern and particularly South Africa – while West African criminal networks are active throughout the world, the costs of their activity here may be higher by virtue of both the degree of their penetration and the weakness of state institutions to counter the threat.

The difficulties of conducting research into criminal networks are significant. The nature and extent of the problem is difficult to ascertain for the law enforcement community with its higher levels of resourcing, and thus even more so for academic researchers. The dynamic nature of West African criminal networks, their close association with tight ethnic and clan groups – the use of languages that few outside particular communities in West Africa know, for instance, is a significant disadvantage to interception of communications – and the multiple activities in which they are engaged make an overall understanding difficult.

Nevertheless, academic analysis in the area has two significant advantages. First, is an ability to conduct the research and make contact with a wide variety of actors involved in a non-threatening way, or at least without the threat of arrest and prosecution. In the context of this study, for example, many people involved in criminal networks were eager to talk; partly because in their own minds their activities were not criminal, but business transactions that the other party entered freely into. Second, by its nature, academic research in the field requires literally a lower standard of proof than law enforcement officials preparing cases for the scrutiny of a court. Fragments of information can therefore be pieced together and conclusions and trends identified.

It is worth adding here that much of the information available on West African organised crime is dominated by powerful external actors whose view of the problem is slanted by a focus on Africa as a transit point for drugs and are thus often more concerned with the interests of consumer countries than with the detailed operation of criminal networks within the African context itself.2 Researching the problem of the growth and nature of West African criminal networks as they operate in Africa (or at least its Southern portion) therefore constitutes an important challenge – the sub-continent is not only a transit point for the movement of illegal commodities, but also a growing consumer of these products. In addition, growing commercial, cultural and other ties with West Africa, the intersection between West African criminal groups and local criminal organisations and the degree to which many West Africans criminal networks now consider Southern Africa a permanent base of operation suggests that, unlike elsewhere, this must be considered a domestic problem, not confined to blocking the flow of drugs from some far off portion of the conflict with weak law enforcement capacities.

The purpose of this study then is to assess the available information on West African criminal networks in Southern Africa. The research process included the collection of as much material as possible on the nature and activities of West African criminal groups as well as interviews with a range of relevant role-players, including many involved in criminal activities themselves. The result is only a partial picture of the nature and development of West African organised crime in Southern Africa. Critical to the exercise is also to point to significant areas where more research effort is required.

The development of West African criminal groups, however, cannot be understood in a vacuum. The end of the Cold War and the weakening of state power in various parts of the world have ensured higher levels of transnational criminal activity. The expansion of criminal activity from West Africa is also consistent with these developments, although the context in which it occurred and the reasons for its expansion are different. These issues, as well as a short explanation as to the key characteristics of post-Cold War organised crime serve as an introduction to the specific problems of Southern Africa.

Understanding criminal networks

The growth of a powerful global criminal economy since the dramatic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War has been the focus of much academic study and debate.3 Conditioned by definitions and explanations of organised crime which sought clear hierarchies – lines of command (starting from a ‘godfather’ figure at the apex of the criminal organisation) – academic explanations have only more recently begun to view organised criminal activity as a network of individuals or small organisations, rather than a clearly structured and easily understood pyramid.4 By defining criminal organisations as networks, bound together by trust or family and ethnic links, a clearer picture of the dynamic nature and durability of criminal enterprises is provided. When individuals or small groups are removed from a network, they can be replaced, and when necessary specific skills (for example in the legal or accounting field, but also in the business of killing) are required, they can be simply ‘contracted in’.

Much like legitimate businesses, the criminal network is bound together by a single desire – that of making profit with the minimum of risk. In a global environment where technological change and cross-border economic activity have become the defining features of commercial activity, criminal enterprises seek activities, usually the trade or barter of illegal or counterfeit goods, where maximum profits can be obtained. Thus, apart from the enormous profits to be obtained from the trade in illegal narcotics, criminal enterprises engage in other illegal trade where there is a demand for products, be they illegal fauna and flora, stolen goods available at a cheaper price, or people themselves. The result is two-fold. First, criminal enterprises engage in more than one activity to maximise profits; smuggling routes, for example, used for one illegal commodity can often easily be used for others. Second, co-operation with others engaging in the underground economy including the bartering of illicit commodities between criminal groups where special skills exist for the disposal of some goods or where specific requirements (for example, the desire for weaponry) are met.

One key element in reducing risk and facilitating illegal transactions is the extensive use of corruption, specifically, but not exclusively, of state functionaries such as border guards, customs officials and police. This eases the route for the transfer of illicit commodities and implicates state officials in illegal activity, a powerful tool (quite apart from financial reward) to ensure their loyalty. This corrupting of the regulatory tools of governments is matched by a corruption of the legitimate economy itself, whether it be through the application of violence (or more often the threat thereof) to distort the normal functioning of the market for some goods or services. At the same time, legitimate business activities serve as an important arena for the investment or laundering of funds obtained through illicit activities. Through these and other mechanisms the criminal economy has powerful interconnections with legitimate economic activity. In impoverished communities flagrant displays of wealth (and often of generosity) blur the lines between illegal and legal wealth acquisition, and individuals are held up as having made it ‘in business’, even if this is from often shady activities.

Rapid technology change has facilitated the activities of illegal economic activity in two ways. First, it has ensured a range of new commodities, which because they are highly sought after, offer a market for criminal opportunity. Mobile phones, for example, provide huge opportunities for fraud and organised theft and resale in Southern Africa. The internet opens new opportunities for fraud. At the same time the technological revolution ensures that communication between groups and individuals in the criminal economy is facilitated. In the same way as technological change has altered the way people work in the formal economy, so too is it having a similar effect in the illegal economy. Individual or small groups of operators are better placed both to ‘market’ their skills and also to communicate with other individuals and small groups, smoothing the flow of transactions in the illicit economic sphere. These developments encourage the development of networks of criminal enterprise, and undercut hierarchical operations, particularly in criminal enterprises (such as those made up of West Africans) that are comparatively new and have few traditions of operation and engagement.

While, clearly, criminal enterprises can be understood in economic terms, as maximisers of profit, the market for illicit goods and the consumers who constitute it, must be understood differently. In most cases, the power of consumers in the criminal economy is weak.

Limiting consumer choice is often the key to maximising profits for criminal groups, be this through eliminating potential competition (for example, on a taxi route) or selling drugs at a fixed price. Because they operate outside of the boundaries of the formal economy, ‘consumers’ have little recourse if transactions go wrong and are in most cases themselves implicated in the crime. This fact alone makes ‘consumers’ in the criminal economy vulnerable to exploitation, a fact well illustrated below in the specific cases of advanced fee fraud.

The role of particular ethnic minorities in criminal activity remains an area of some controversy given that the high crime rates among specific groups has been used as an excuse for victimisation. But while the costs of such an association with organised crime are high (this is nowhere clearer now than with Nigerians, Russian or Turkish nationals who are often stereotyped as criminals, making, among other things, travel and business transactions difficult), it has been shown that the close links and hostile view of an external world among some ethnic communities facilitates the formation of tight networks, difficult for outsiders to penetrate. Such relations are critical for the effective operation of criminal networks.5

All of these factors are essential to understanding the nature of West African criminal networks and their specific characteristics will be highlighted at various points throughout the paper. None of the above overview should, however, be read to imply that criminal enterprises are uniform in nature. While they display similar characteristics their histories and contexts serve as important defining features in shaping how, from when and where they operate. Even criminal groups which are often lumped together, such as West African criminal enterprises throughout the world, may have significantly different approaches, depending on their origin and the conditions in which they operate. The emergence of West African criminal groups in Southern Africa serve as a useful illustration of this principle.

State collapse and criminal expansion

What is perhaps most remarkable about the emergence of West African criminal networks is how quickly they have established themselves, dominating particular sectors of the illicit economy. Most importantly, the origins of criminal networks from West Africa directly parallels the decline and economic crisis of the Nigerian state in the 1980s. In contrast, the period before the decline of the country was marked by the degree to which the country’s relative wealth allowed Nigerians to travel, study and acquire interests abroad, in some cases establishing the seeds of the criminal networks that were to develop in the later crisis years. Economic mismanagement, a failed structural adjustment programme, continuous political contestation and on-going and harsh periods of military rule marked the decline of the Nigerian state.6

Why should Nigeria and Nigerians be singled out immediately in a study, the focus of which is organised crime that originates in West Africa? The extent of economic decline in the country, the size of her population (with 125 million people, the most populous state on the continent – one in five Africans is a Nigerian), the degree to which oil wealth ensured an educated elite, well travelled and interconnected to the rest of the world, are all contributing factors. While, as will be suggested later, other West Africans have also become deeply involved in criminal networks in Southern Africa (some of whom claim to be Nigerians or are identified by the police as such when they are not), the most significant early trend was the involvement of Nigerian nationals.

A detailed study of the origins of West African criminal groups must still be conducted. In fact, while most analyses of events in Nigeria refer to the criminalisation of the state, few explore the extent to which Nigeria became an important exporter of criminal activity. From 1985 the unprecedented diversion of revenues depleted resources, aggravated the debt burden and alienated important external creditors. In this period overtly illegal activities became a major portion of Nigeria’s shadow economy with more than a thousand million dollars annually (about 15% of government revenues) flowing through criminal networks, often with the connivance of the country’s elite.7 While much has been staked on the civilian government that took power in 1999, significant problems remain and the country is currently estimated to have the largest ‘shadow’ economy (although, of course, not all of this can be attributed to illegal activities) in the world.8

While these figures suggest the astonishing extent of economic activity outside of the ‘formal’ economic sector, they provide little indication of how criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, were spawned in the context of a declining state. Law enforcement explanations also provide little insight. Given the lack of available literature it is remarkable how often a United States (US) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) briefing paper on the topic is replicated. This is to the effect that Nigerian naval officers undergoing training in India during the 1980s began trafficking heroin through Nigerian student networks to Europe and the US.

“When these students realised the potential profits to be earned from heroine trafficking, they started their own operations and heroine trafficking was gradually introduced to most Nigerian traders.”9

Of course, while such developments may certainly have occurred, the reality of the rise of West African criminal networks is much more complex.

The dramatic increase in oil revenues after 1973 ensured the influx of millions of petro-dollars that while bringing great wealth to the Nigerian state, had important consequences for the development of criminal enterprises in the 1980s. The sudden generation of wealth unsurprisingly led to disagreements (which have yet to be resolved) about who is entitled to spend it. This was exemplified by the fact that the oil wells were situated along the coast in the south, and the country has largely been ruled by military governments based in the north.10 Such disputes encourage a strong sense of entitlement and little compunction for citizens to steal from the state, because the state has stolen from them.

Such social dislocation has been accompanied by rapid economic decline. While the oil windfall brought great wealth to Nigeria (although it was concentrated in few hands) its dominance has ensured that the economy is dependent on fluctuations of the oil price and the country, like Angola, suffers from the classic effect of ‘Dutch disease’, where distortions are introduced given the value of a single and dominant commodity to an economy. The petroleum sector produces about 40% of the countries gross domestic product (GDP) and accounts for 96% of recorded exports.11 The presence of oil has created multiple opportunities for corruption and has ensured that control of the state is key to the accumulation of wealth. Economic decline in particular was accentuated during the Second Republic (1977–1983) – the period immediately before the first increases in Nigerian involvement in illicit activities were noted by law enforcement agencies around the world.12

The result by the early 1990s was a highly unstable and corrupt state with significant disaffected minorities. Nigeria, and West Africa more generally, developed into the hub of the worldwide drug trafficking web, spanning almost every part of the globe, including Southern Africa.13

The issue of ethnic alienation appears to be closely related to the development of criminal networks originating from Nigeria. The presence of the alienated Igbo ethnic group in south-eastern Nigeria and their close involvement in organised criminal activities, is a strong theme.14 Stemming from deep resentments around the Biafran War (1967–1970), the conflict resulted in the marginalisation of Igbos from the various post-war military regimes. While the details of the war are not of concern here, it was in effect an attempt by eastern parts of the country to break away from the federation and achieve independence. The war, however, generated a strong ethnic persecution complex among Igbo-speaking people and an alienation from the institutions of governance.15

This dominance of Igbo’s in criminal networks was raised in interviews in Southern Africa, particular reference being made to their ‘business’ or ‘commercial’ skills.16 Yet it is also possible to exaggerate their involvement according to some informants. Economic and political decline have had the impact of marginalising and impoverishing larger numbers of Nigerians than just those that live in the south-east. And, multiple ethnic identities and tight community and familial networks ensure that the problem of illicit activities is not confined (at least not now) to a single ethnic group.

It is worth noting in the context of this discussion on the growth of organised criminal networks originating from Nigeria, that many Nigerians hold the West responsible for the decline of the country. That for many has provided justification for their involvement in criminal activities, often mentioned in interviews, for example, with Nigerian citizens in Johannesburg. Engagement in crime is considered justifiable to redistribute wealth back from those who have ‘stolen’ it. Interestingly, any social controls in respect of the prevention of criminal activity are internally rather than externally focused. Thus, many informants mentioned that Nigerians themselves seldom consumed their ‘own product’ (meaning cocaine) as they saw it as introducing unneeded dependency in a commodity used exclusively for the purpose of gaining profit.17

The crisis of governance that affected Nigeria has now spread throughout West Africa having important impact in countries such as Liberia, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Ghana. In particular, the involvement of Ghanaians and Liberians in enterprise-type crime in Southern Africa has mirrored economic decline in both societies.18 While given fewer numbers, other West Africans are unlikely to dominate in the way of the Nigerian networks, interview evidence suggests that they have developed specific criminal specialisations of their own.

Informants were adamant, however, that the police over-estimated the extent of Nigerian involvement simply because all people from West Africa were labelled as Nigerians with little attempt being made to differentiate particular nationalities. Such ethnic labelling was also common among ordinary South Africans.

The role of West Africans in criminal networks from the mid-1980s onwards, however, cannot be explained simply by the collapse of governance and economic opportunity in their home countries. Powerful pull factors, such as the growing demand for illegal narcotics in North America and Europe, forced up the price of illegal narcotics (and therefore the profitability) of drug smuggling.

In turn, West African ethnic communities which had not been assimilated into the societies in which they lived, concentrated in various North American and European cities, provided a secure network for local distribution.19

The weakening and criminalisation of the state – in particular West African countries, notably Nigeria, Liberia and Ghana – resulted in the heavy involvement of state actors themselves in criminal activities.20 Paradoxically, this process of state capture and collapse was central, as we have seen, in forcing some people to leave in search of new (and often criminal) opportunities given limited and declining economic opportunities at home, while ensuring that the instruments of the state – such as the police, the diplomatic service and various agencies responsible for the issuing of identity and travel documents – become heavily involved in criminal activity. The net result was often that the activities of the state and that of criminal groups became indistinguishable.21

The movement of West African nationals and the beginnings of the activities of West African criminal networks impacted upon Southern Africa later than it did elsewhere. While Nigerian networks, in particular, had begun to traffick heroine from East Asia to the developed world, using established networks of Nigerians living in Europe and North America, on-going instability in South and Southern Africa retarded (although did not stop) the movement of people and thus of criminal networks southwards.22 That was to change in the early 1990s.

Moving south

South African Police reports at the time suggest that Nigerians nationals involved in low-level drug trafficking first came to the attention of the authorities in the mid- to late 1980s.

The problem appears to have been relatively small. Given that the attention of the police at the time was primarily focused on quelling political dissent it is possible (as indeed some interview respondents have claimed) that the presence of Nigerian nationals and the beginning of criminal networks were already more established than has previously been thought the case. This is reinforced by interview material from surrounding jurisdictions, most notably Lesotho, where apparently early contacts were made with South African nationals, many of whom were living in exile.

What is clear, however, is that the influx of people from West Africa into South and Southern African coincided closely with the ending of apartheid and moves towards the negotiation of a political settlement in the country. What is perhaps most interesting is police information at the time that this movement of people, beginning in 1992, coincided with the immediate introduction of high-quality cocaine into the country, with the result that cocaine prices, which had been high given the small quantity then available, dropped dramatically in a short space of time.23 The speed at which these developments occurred appears to have come as some surprise to the South African authorities, who in any event were heavily engaged in policing the volatile final days of white rule.

The influx of Nigerians into South and Southern Africa increased sharply with the return of military rule there in 1993 and continued economic decline and state corruption. Increased political turmoil in Nigeria and the election of a democratic government in South Africa ensured even larger numbers of new arrivals from West Africa. This process was facilitated at the time by the possibility of obtaining permanent resident status by applying for political asylum. Interestingly, however, the largest applications for asylum in the period 1994 to 1997 were not in fact Nigerians (of which there 2862 applications) but Angolans (4026 applications), given the on-going civil war in that country.24

That raises the important question of why Nigerians became more heavily involved in crime than other groups. The answer is not clear, but interviews suggest that in fact many asylum seekers did not (contrary to popular public and police belief in South Africa) become involved in criminal activity. In fact, evidence suggests that while such people may have become involved at some later stage when pressure to find employment became intense, their original intention was in fact to escape political instability at home. Again, while the evidence is far from clear, interviews in Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, in particular, suggest that individuals with the intention of engaging in illegal activities entered through neighbouring states, and did not necessarily report their presence to the South African authorities. And, in contrast to Angolan nationals, by the mid-1990s Nigerians had already established themselves as significant players in particular criminal markets and South Africa was an attractive proposition for a number of inter-connected reasons.

The military government in Nigeria, eager to secure acceptance from the international community, implemented a series of harsh anti-crime measures. While their overall impact is perhaps questionable given the condition of Nigerian law enforcement agencies and their involvement in corruption and criminal enterprise, there is little doubt that a concentration on issues such as asset forfeiture made crime ‘barons’ question their long-term prospects in Nigeria.25

As important as harsher state responses at home, was a growing perception across the globe that Nigerians were involved in criminal activity. That made it much more difficult to operate from Nigeria itself, and travelling under a Nigerian passport often meant long waits and extensive searches. That provided the incentive to look elsewhere for alternatives, particularly when transport links to and from South Africa had expanded dramatically in the immediate post-apartheid period and South Africans were more likely to be welcomed than treated with the suspicion of their Nigerian counterparts.

South Africa also presented both a source of, and a market for, illicit commodities. While in comparison to the European and North American markets the number of ‘consumers’ in South Africa was comparatively small, the country had a reputation for conspicuous wealth, at least among the white minority.

While perhaps these factors were not as clearly articulated as they appear now on paper, interviews suggest that these issues, acting in combination, were important in shifting the focus of operations elsewhere. Some care must be taken, however, to assume that criminal networks engaged in a strategic exercise to map out their futures, but rather a complex inter-mingling of push and pull factors ensured a shift in focus and activities. This has important conclusions for Southern Africa, although particularly South Africa, as it suggests that the country was considered as a long-term base for West African criminal networks.

Indeed, while the presence of West African criminal networks is to be found in most of the countries of the Southern African region, the focus of their activities, given its comparative wealth, is almost exclusively aimed at South Africa. Thus, surrounding states are used as a conduit for the smuggling of illicit narcotics to South Africa and, in turn, stolen goods from South Africa are smuggled out of the country both for regional markets but also for destinations further afield. South Africa then, while serving now as a potential base of operations, is also both a market for as well as a source of illicit goods.

The regional criminal network

Given this focus on South Africa it is necessary before proceeding further to examine the regional distribution of West African criminal networks, outside of South Africa, and of their activities.

While their focus is generally on South Africa, individual countries in the region play a specific role – some are entry and exit points for illegal narcotics in or out of the region, others are transit points for the entry of West Africans into South Africa, while still others are corridors through which illicit goods from South Africa can easily move. A simplified version of the major regional trafficking routes is illustrated in Figure 1.

Lesotho and Swaziland – the two landlocked kingdoms on the north-eastern side of South Africa – play an important role in West African criminal activities given both their proximity to the industrial and financial heartland of Gauteng and their relatively porous borders. Thus, interviews with both police and Nigerian nationals in Swaziland suggest that the country is a significant trafficking route for drugs into South Africa and for stolen goods leaving the Republic. In turn, the country provides a convenient host for criminal networks operating into South Africa. While the number of West African nationals in Swaziland remains small (estimated at between 1000 and 2000) few appear to have settled directly from West Africa, the majority moving from South Africa or other Southern African countries in 1993 or 1994.

For a number of similar reasons, Lesotho also plays an important role in regional West African criminal networks. The border with South Africa is relatively porous and many vehicles and people cross into South Africa without being searched. The local currency is fixed to the South African rand and thus serves as an attractive base for operations into South Africa, without the problems of complex (and potentially loss making) currency conversions. Since 1994, Lesotho has become an important transit country for West Africans, particularly Nigerians, who wish to enter South Africa, to participate in both the licit and illicit economies.

Interviews conducted in Lesotho with West African nationals suggested that this is because there are few difficulties in entering the country, and once in Lesotho it is a comparatively simple matter to journey to South Africa. Lesotho, like Swaziland, therefore serves as an important transit point for drugs entering South Africa and illicit goods leaving. In addition, cannabis is grown in both Lesotho and Swaziland is smuggled to South Africa, and then on to Europe.

Interviews conducted in Mozambique suggest that the country has become a significant source of criminal activity, and West African groups are key operators here. Mozambique has three main ports and relatively porous borders. The country has become an important transit zone for drugs on their way to both South African and European markets, with the trafficking being controlled by Pakistani, Nigerian and local Mozambican criminal networks. Nigerians are said to dominate the cocaine trade through Mozambique while also engaging in the trafficking of heroine. In the case of the latter, however, there is stiffer competition with Tanzanian and Pakistani criminal networks heavily engaged in the movement of these drugs. While not a key item in their inventory, Nigerian networks have also sourced mandrax in Mozambique and moved it to South Africa.

Like Mozambique, Angola is increasingly an important trans-shipment point for drugs bound for South Africa as well as further afield. Historical and language connections with Brazil, through which cocaine is sourced, have facilitated the movement of the drug across the Atlantic. In addition, Colombian shipping lines make use of the port of Luanda. Infrastructure at ports and airports is often weak and borders between Angola and her neighbours porous. While interviews conducted in Luanda suggest that one of the key hindrances to the further expansion of trafficking is the uncertainties engendered by the on-going civil war, the conflict also ensures that money can be easily laundered for commodities such as diamonds, which then can be smuggled out of the country. There is growing evidence to suggest that corruption is widespread in respect of the trade in narcotics through the country, with suggestions that seized drugs are sold back to West African traffickers – recorded figures for drug seizures, for example, often indicate lesser amounts than were actually discovered.

Cocaine from Luanda is transported, largely by road, through Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe. While Namibia and Botswana have on current evidence largely avoided significant penetration by West African criminal groups, the case of Zimbabwe is of interest, as it indicates clearly the degree to which profit impacts upon the geographic location of West African criminal networks.

Given its relatively sophisticated economy and pockets of wealth, Zimbabwe has not escaped the activities of West African criminal groups. Cases of advanced fee fraud (see the next section for details) were reported from 1990. However, political instability, economic decline and the resultant weakness of the Zimbabwe dollar (which are now difficult to exchange for ‘hard’ foreign currency) has made the operation of such scams unattractive. It is probably also fair to say that the Zimbabwean police have been more active in confronting the ‘Nigerian problem’ than most other police agencies in the region, with major operations specifically targeting West Africans being initiated from 1990. While Zimbabwe has in the past been characterised by a small consumer market for drugs, economic austerity has shrunk this market. Now the country remains a transit point for drugs moving southwards as well as stolen goods (most notably cellular phones and motor vehicles) moving northwards.

Zambia shows the presence of some West Africans, and the country is also a trans-shipment point in the drug trade, but not to the same extent as those bordering South Africa more closely. The activities of West African criminal groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo is more difficult to ascertain. Barriers of language, on-going instability and well established indigenous smuggling networks may have limited any activities, and further research is required. Malawi is dominated by other criminal groups, such as Tanzanians, Lebanese and Pakistanis, who are engaged in the movement of cannabis to Europe and elsewhere, and thus the penetration of West African criminal activities appears to have been checked.

This overview of the regional distribution of West African groups and smuggling networks suggests some important early conclusions:

War and instability have had a profound impact on the strength and areas of operation of West African (as well as other) criminal networks. In particular, continuing instability in Angola and the difficulties experienced by post-conflict Mozambique have made these states vulnerable as transit points for West African traffickers. In contrast, political instability and economic decline in Zimbabwe in the recent past appears to have weakened some aspects (mainly related to fraud) of West African criminal operations.



The illicit trade in the region is not one-way – that is, the smuggling of illegal commodities such as drugs to the South African market only. There is an important reverse flow of stolen goods back into the region and then further afield. West African criminal networks are involved in both aspects of the trade in illegal goods. There is in some cases a direct connection between the two flows, with inward and outward flowing commodities being bartered in exchange for each other (for example, weapons and motor vehicles for drugs).



The degree to which inter-state boundaries are porous is significantly accentuated by the involvement of West African criminal networks in the procuring of illegal documentation, such as passports and identity documents, in countries across the region. The acquisition of such documentation, as well as the use by West African criminal groups of local couriers, makes it difficult to determine the overall extent of their involvement in various illegal activities. The direct involvement of state officials in the acquisition of such travel and identity documentation for payment is a key component of the problem.



The strength and convertibility of local currencies as well as the extent to which the US dollar is openly used as legal tender (as, for example, in Angola or Mozambique) is of critical importance to the profit margins of any criminal activity, as well as the ease at which money can be transferred elsewhere. In particular, advanced fee fraud operations are only viable in South Africa where adequate profits can be made (hence the decline in their usage in Zimbabwe). Outside of South Africa, fraud schemes focus on operations that either target South Africans or on activities which generate foreign exchange (for example, fraud involving travellers’ cheques).



Small and weak states closely integrated into stronger neighbouring economies, and which subsequently act as conduits and bases of operation, into these are critical to understanding the operations of cross-border criminal networks. The small states of Swaziland and Lesotho perform this role in Southern Africa.

The above discussion has largely focused on trafficking routes for drugs and stolen goods and has not sketched in any detail the full extent of illicit activities. This is done so in the following section. This first provides an overview of the structure of West African syndicates and then details their involvement in a range of criminal activities.

Organisation and activities

The nature of networked criminal activities has already been discussed above, with the suggestion that clearly structured criminal hierarchies are the exception rather than the norm. West African criminal groups, which have no specific corporate structure or hierarchy, are classic examples of criminal networks. In part this is also a reflection of the activities in which they are engaged in – these are many, interconnected and overlap with each other.

While individuals may rise to significance as a crime or drug ‘baron’ this in most cases does not imply that a carefully and clearly structured organisation acts under his orders. In Southern Africa, for example, despite the presence of an extensive network of West African criminal activity, there is no name (or list of names) which is referred to often in the public realm. The ‘Nigerian problem’ is essentially a faceless one. This reflects the fact that individuals are involved in the network for profit not publicity, as well as the shifting and essentially fluid nature of the networks themselves.

Interviews with Nigerian citizens in Johannesburg, for example, suggest that loose and often temporary alliances or associations may be formed around specific ‘projects’. Individuals or small groups of people are best described as nodal points in a larger web of criminal activity.26

None of this explanation should imply, however, that such a loose network is not the most effective means of doing illegal business. With a flat structure, instant communications between members (the cell phone has, of course, brought a revolution to both legal and illegal business in this regard) and a keen eye on the profit to be made in any deal, such organisations, loose and seemingly unstructured as they are, are very effective, literally in delivering the goods. The added advantage too is that tracing the operations of such criminal networks by law enforcement agencies is extremely difficult, and when individuals are targeted and identified, the network can quickly reform itself using new players.

People who emerge as prominent in any criminal network are often those who have specific skills, cultivated important contacts (for example, with a state official) or who have themselves taken the initiative in bringing together a small group of people to run an illicit business operation. Such small groups may, however, allocate responsibility for specific tasks to individual members. Such tasks may relate to the provision of security (that can also be ‘contracted out’), the identification and management of storage facilities, the cultivation of contacts and, of course, the distribution and sale of the commodity. This division of tasks may be fluid or some individuals may acquire specific expertise in it, thus being approached by others to complete a ‘job’ for them.

Such fluid associations, while seldom allowing outsiders to slot into their ranks, do make contact with external criminal groups. Interview evidence suggests, for example, that West African networks are willing to buy cell phones (for export to Zimbabwe) from local gangs involved in mugging. More sinister is apparent contacts with organised South African syndicates engaged in cash-in-transit heists – interesting in this regard is that the West Africans are less interested in the cash, than in acquiring credit cards and cheques for purposes of fraud (see below).

It is worth emphasising that while such networks of crime appear fluid, they are extremely difficult to penetrate. Relationships are built on trust or long association and it is almost unknown for individual West Africans to serve as a witness for the state. Ironically, interviews suggest that high levels of xenophobia among ordinary South Africans have worsened this situation, as West Africans (both by themselves and the locals) are considered unwanted and marginalised communities. While allegiances may form with South Africans or other groups, hard cash seems to fuel these relationships, and social intermingling outside the world of ‘business’ appears to be limited.

Anxious not to attract attention to themselves, there is little evidence that could be gathered in Southern Africa of West Africans openly engaging in violence. Interviews simply suggested that informal internal dispute resolution mechanisms manage most fall-outs within the networks themselves. Those who would not co-operate are simply shunned – effectively meaning exclusion from the network, and thus presumably from the profits that could be accrued from operating within it. What has been reported a number of times is that violence is ‘contracted-out’ to local gangsters who are only too willing and able to fulfill the role. Despite this, however, there is significant evidence that West African criminal groups are engaged in the trade in stolen and illegal firearms.

One outcome of these patterns of operation and approach to structure is that apart from the explanation above, it is difficult to construct a clear structural model of a West African criminal network. Attempts made in the course of this project have, to date, proved unsuccessful. One issue of some interest in this regard, however, is the degree to which local networks in South and Southern Africa have extensive lines of communication back to West Africa. In the earlier part of the paper, for example, mention was made of the emergence of a series of ‘drug barons’ in Lagos, suggesting at least some degree of organisational linkages between West Africa and smuggling and fraud networks elsewhere.

The evidence in this regard appears in fact to be inconclusive and (perhaps surprisingly so) West African criminal networks appear to operate in Southern Africa with an apparently high level of independence. If this is true, it has critical implications for law enforcement in Southern Africa as it suggests that local criminal operations have a degree of permanence here. One illustration of the fact that there is some separation between West Africa and West African networks in Southern Africa, is that individuals are often tricked into coming south (as opposed being sent here on the orders of some criminal master) on the promise of a legitimate job. The nature of the connections between West Africa and West African criminal networks operating in South Africa, however, requires more detailed information.

The above discussion provides at least some insight into the structure and activities of West African criminal networks. Primarily, it is clear that extensive structures are not established for their own sake but that there is a coalescence between loose grouping and various criminal activities. Understanding these activities then, and how they link together, gives important insight into the dynamics of West African crime in Southern Africa. Figure 2 provides a schematic overview of the involvement of West African criminal networks in various criminal activities. The section that follows explores briefly, details around each and the inter-connections between them.

As figure 2 illustrates there are two critical components which facilitate other activities. The first of these is the production or securing of false documentation, essential for almost all activities. The second is the trafficking in illegal narcotics, the source of significant resources which can be channelled into other criminal operations or legitimate businesses.

A range of other criminal activities, more reliant on these two components, are also considered. These are: advanced fee fraud, cheque and credit card fraud, dealing in stolen goods and the trafficking in human beings. A range of sub-activities such as armed robbery, kidnapping and the use of the internet for criminal purposes are also referred to.

False documentation

Across the Southern African region, West African criminal groups are involved in the theft and forgery of travel and identity documentation. In every Southern African country examined in the context of this study, serious problems were reported in this regard. In almost all cases, as has already been noted, this involves the co-operation and payment of state officials.

The ability to travel under multiple identities and nationalities, facilitates the illegal cross-border trade and the involvement in a range of other criminal activities such as advanced fee fraud.

Drug trafficking

West African drug traffickers are central players in the illicit drug market in Southern Africa.27 South Africa is by far the largest market for illegal narcotics entering the region. Nevertheless the regional drug market is reasonably complex. At the risk of oversimplification, West African (and then largely Nigerian) criminal networks are involved in four areas:

The primary drug trafficked into Southern Africa by West African criminal networks is cocaine, and its derivative ‘crack’. The drug is brought from South America either directly to South Africa or through Angola or Mozambique. While a portion is used to satisfy domestic consumption, largely in South Africa, the rest is trans-shipped to destinations in Europe.



Heroin is sourced in East Asia and trafficked either directly to South Africa or through East Africa and Mozambique. West African criminal networks, while important, do not dominate the trade to the same extent as in the case of cocaine, with significant competition from Asian, Indian and Pakistani groups.



Cannabis is sourced by West African criminal groups from within Southern Africa, largely from South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, and trafficked to European destinations.



In response to demand in South Africa, West African criminal networks source other drugs, such as mandrax and ecstasy, where there is local demand.

Drugs are moved in and out of South Africa and other Southern African countries through a variety of means, the most common being the use of couriers, often recruited locally. Ex-couriers interviewed in the course of the project suggested that they would be paid around R20 000 for a successful delivery as well as having their expenses paid. Payment is also made for the recruitment of other couriers. As documented elsewhere, a variety of diversionary tactics are used, such as sending a large number of couriers on one flight, potentially sacrificing some while ensuring that the majority get through, or ensuring suspicious but drug-free individuals distract the attention of customs officials. Interviews suggest that holders of European Union passports (which includes many white South Africans with dual citizenship) are targeted for recruitment given that they attract less attention when arriving in Europe.

While the overall network of transportation and storage of drugs brought into the country is difficult to trace fully, there appear to be a number of common features. Drugs brought from Johannesburg airport, for example, are transported to a variety of places, including specific hotels in the inner city. Distribution to selling points across the country take place in a variety of ways, one method being the use of luxury cross-country buses. Key to the transportation process, and to some extent the storage process, is that even if drugs are seized they cannot be linked to any individual. Thus, bags transported on the luxury bus lines would not be labelled and consequently cannot be linked to any passenger. Contacts with the long distance taxi industry are also useful in the process of drug distribution.

Once delivered to their point of distribution, drugs are dispersed through a dealer network. Street dealers, it should be noted, are ultimately at the mercy of those who supply the drugs. Interviews with South African dealers suggest that they had been pushed aside when their supplies were ended and their position taken by West Africans themselves. Whatever the details of drug transactions on the street, however, there is little doubt that the mass influx of drugs brought by West African criminal groups have dramatically changed the inner city of, most notably, Johannesburg. The enormous profits generated from the sale of drugs and the consequent social implications (including the link to prostitution) in inner city areas in Durban and Johannesburg have been documented elsewhere.28 Money made from dealing in drugs is also used for other activities – both licit and illicit – and it was suggested by at least one dealer that significant property investments were being made.

Advanced fee fraud

If there is one activity for which West African crime groups are most well known, it is advanced fee fraud. Unlike in the case of drugs, its manifestation in Southern Africa has received little analytical attention and so deserves a more extensive examination here.29 Essentially, the process involves the creation of bogus business proposals which promise the recipients substantial financial reward for participating. Once the victim agrees to be involved in the deal, the initiating party requests the payment of various ‘advance fees’ (for example, for banking charges or as a bribe to ‘smooth the way’). The collection of these fees is the object of the scam – once a victim is ‘hooked’, further requests for payment are made.

The quality of approaches in advanced fee frauds vary from the impressive to the ludicrous. In all cases, however, the victim receives a letter explaining the proposal and requesting an urgent response. Business owners and managers are identified through trade journals and directories as well as from searching the internet. The approach is generally to send out a large number of letters, a response from even one or two people make the scam profitable.

Once an individual has responded to the letter the scammers embark on an often extensive ruse, which may even, according to one informant, involve the renting of office space. In Southern Africa an array of ‘419 letters’ (so-called after the number of the Nigerian penal code which prohibits the practice) have been sent and most businesses have received them. Those who have been victimised in the scam seldom report it to the police, given that by agreeing to participate they themselves (if the scam had in fact been real) were committing a criminal offence, by agreeing to accept money which was – and here the options on offer are almost endless – overpaid on a contract or the property of a dead politician bequeathed to the sender.

Two other variations common in Southern Africa are worth noting. The first, often but not always targeted at poor people, is the ‘black dollar scam’ – essentially a con trick where the victim is persuaded to provide money to buy a special cleaning fluid in order to ‘clean’ the money, blackened, or so one variant of the story goes, by the US government in order to transport it safely. The second, also known as ‘trade fraud’, entails persuading a company to send samples of their products for sale (usually in Nigeria). This will be followed by small orders, all of which will be paid for. When the time is ‘ripe’ and the confidence of the victim won, an urgent and large order will be made placed to ‘fulfill’ a lucrative contract. The goods will be sent before payment is confirmed (a fake bank draft may be provided) and the goods are effectively stolen with little recourse available to the victim.

A review of the now substantial record of such schemes and attempts at them highlight the ingenious nature of many. Two factors of importance to Southern Africa, however, are relevant to note in regard to advanced fee fraud:

419 scams and their variants have now become so common that the majority of letter recipients simply ignore them. One reason that they have lost credibility, however, is because they are seen to have originated from Nigeria itself. Thus, the sender is generally always a Nigerian and the return address is in Nigeria. Given these constraints the scams, in their old format, are said to be nowhere near as profitable as before.



The internet has provided a wealth of opportunity to 419 scammers. It provides a powerful search tool to identify potential victims and, more importantly, short circuits the process of sending letters by distributing literary thousands of e-mails. Again, only one victim has to respond, and the scam is in business. Also, interception of the letters before they arrive at the victim (they usually have identifiable characteristics, such as fake stamps) as a crime prevention measure is much more difficult with electronic mail.

An effective way to get around the first problem is, of course, not send the letters from Nigeria, but from a more reputable location – such as Southern Africa, but specifically South Africa. Letters have thus appeared on the South African Reserve Bank letterhead as well as attributed to a range of ‘dummy’ South African companies, for example the ‘South African Mining Corporation’.

Kidnapping

Although it occurs in Southern Africa on a relatively limited scale, foreign businessmen lured to South Africa through the operation of 419 scams have been kidnapped. Kidnapping is said to be the final stage of the scam when it is clear that the game is up and the victim demands his money back, and travels to South Africa in search of his erstwhile business partners. It is possible that some such cases are not reported to the police and the ransom quietly paid.

Cheque and credit card fraud

West African criminal groups pay for stolen credit cards and cheque books which are used in an array of fraudulent activities. Contacts at banks and hotels are also used to acquire credit card details (including copies of signatures) which are then used for fraudulent purposes. As already noted, it is alleged that Nigerian criminal networks have paid for credit cards acquired through armed robbery, including cash-in-transit heists.

Dealing in stolen goods

As already indicated, West African criminal groups are involved in the purchase of stolen goods, largely from South Africa, and their resale further afield, mainly in Southern and central Africa. The primary examples of this trade is that of motor vehicles, cell phones and firearms.

Trafficking in human beings

Women from some African countries (most notably Angola) are lured by West African (as well as Angolan and Congolese) criminal groups into travel to South Africa with the promise of a job in the ‘hospitality industry’.30 Heavily reliant on those who brought them to South Africa and often having incurred financial obligations for ‘transport costs’, the women – who have generally entered the country illegally or have had their travel documents confiscated – have few alternatives. Such women are used either to traffic drugs or to work in the sex industry. As already noted above, interviews also suggested that at least some West African men are also lured to South Africa with the promise of work, and then find little alternative to becoming active members of the criminal economy, heavily reliant on those who brought them south.

This brief description of the range of illicit activities that West African criminal networks are engaged in underscores the importance of better understanding the nature and scope of the phenomenon. Significant challenges for research remain. Among the most important of these is to determine the balance between planning and opportunism in the choice of criminal projects as well as to how the relationship between profit and risk is calculated before decisions are taken as to which avenues for criminal profit are pursued.

At the heart of these questions lies the need to understand the element of choice in the network decision-making process. It is possible, and indeed this is suggested by the loose network structure of West African groups, that the multiple activities that are pursued and the inter-linkages between them are a function less of careful planning and long-term strategy than the activities of multiple and innovative individuals and groups, who because of their connections, loyalties and allegiances, pursue various avenues of criminal profit which often themselves interconnect and overlap.

Conclusion

The growth of West African criminal networks in Southern Africa has been remarkably rapid. Beginning in the early 1990s, along with the first significant numbers of West African nationals settling in Southern Africa, the problem has now assumed serious proportions. Two key defining features characterise West African criminal formations. The first is that they are highly fluid, resembling less an organised criminal hierarchy than the complex interactions of a network of individuals and small groups. The second defining feature is that they engage in multiple criminal activities, all of which are closely connected to each other.

These two factors acting together suggest that both the nature and impact of West African criminal networks is difficult to understand. Key drawbacks hinder the process of information collection and analysis – the most notable being accessibility to those who make up the networks – and so any research exercise is by definition limited. Yet academic research can play an important role in working to provide a fuller understanding of West African criminal networks – not least of which is to provide an independent and strategic overview of developments and the identification of trends.

One striking although tentative conclusion is the increased permanence of West African criminal networks in Southern Africa. It is said that individuals have invested in property in the suburbs, well away from the inner city areas where drugs are sold, and send their children to private schools in Johannesburg. The evidence too suggests that West African networks operating in South Africa, while having global networks, do not answer to anybody but themselves. Advanced fee fraud operations, for instance, are clearly now run from the region, with ‘business proposals’ purporting to come from South Africans.

The use by West African criminal groups of technology is also of significance as it is altering the nature of their operations. While cellular phones provide both a means of communication as well as a marketable product, of perhaps more significance is the use of the internet to engage in fraudulent activities. This includes at least three dimensions: the researching of potential victims for advanced fee fraud; the use of e-mail to send out large numbers of 419 letters; and the use of false credit card data for purchases through the internet. This trend is likely to continue, and while countering it will be part of a broader programme of understanding how technology impacts upon criminal opportunity, West African criminal networks given their experience of fraudulent scams will be important players in this criminal market.31

These factors suggest the possibility that well funded and permanent West African criminal networks, which are increasingly able to exploit technology for criminal profit, will continue as important players in Southern Africa. Questions should, however, also be asked about the development of other criminal networks. If war, state collapse and economic decline have been key in driving West Africans into the criminal market, does the same not apply to other nationalities, most notably Angolans and Congolese. While these criminal networks are less active than those from West Africa, the fact that their home countries are situated in Southern Africa itself holds significant implications for what activities they engage in and how quickly their networks can expand.

The development of further foreign criminal networks in South Africa (which is, of course, not to say that South Africans themselves do not engage in crime) is likely to tap into increasing feelings of hostility for foreigners from elsewhere on the continent in the country. That will be unfortunate, because as war and instability have created criminal networks, so too have they forced people to flee their homes, settling elsewhere in search of safety and a better life. One of the key challenges confronting governments in Southern Africa is therefore not only countering West African criminal networks, but doing so in a way in which feelings of xenophobia are not heightened. How, for example, can West African communities be engaged, not as law-breakers, but as potential partners in undercutting the threat posed by criminal networks which emanate from their communities?

This important question underlines the fact that there is no easy solution to the problem of West African criminal networks in Southern Africa and that a number of strategies are required, including engaging with resident West African communities themselves. To emphasise again, perhaps the most important drawback currently is the lack of understanding both of the phenomenon, but also of how it can be confronted. What is clear, however, is the degree of dynamism of the criminal network and its ability to change rapidly to accommodate new opportunities and counter or avoid new threats. Understanding not only the nature of the current activities of West African criminal networks, but also potential factors that will impact upon this in future, is critical.

Notes

* The interview material referred to in the article is contained in a commissioned report on the subject: West African crime syndicates operating in South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, Report produced by Injobo Nebandla for the South African Institute of International Affairs, June 2001.

Human Rights Committee of South Africa, Xenophobia – the new racism, 2001. This is also documented in interviews with people from West Africa living in inner city Johannesburg, see Alan Morris, Bleakness & light: Inner-city transition in Hillbrow, Johannesburg, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1999, pp. 307-328.



This argument is powerfully made by Chris Allen, Africa & and the drugs trade, Review of African Political Economy, 79, 1999, pp. 5-7. Congressional hearing and testimony in particular takes such an approach, see, Nigerian organisations and white collar crime, Testimony provided by US Officials before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International Relations Committee, Transnational Organised Crime, 3(2), Summer 1997.



For an interesting overview of the subject in the context of global change after the Cold War see Manuel Castells, The information age: Economy society and culture – Volume III: End of millennium, London: Blackwell, 1998.



For a fuller review of the subject see Phil Williams, Organising transnational crime: Networks, markets and hierarchies, in Williams and Dimitri Vlassis, Combating transnational crime: Concepts, activities and responses, London: Frank Cass, 2001. Also, MK Sparrow, The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An assessment of the prospects, Social Networks, 13(3), Autumn 1991, and Williams, The nature of drug trafficking networks, Current History, April 1998.



See Frank Bovenkerk, Organised crime and ethnic minorities: Is there a link?, in Williams and Vlassis, op cit.



For a detailed overview see Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled giant: Nigeria since independence, London: Hurst, 1998.



Peter Lewis, From prebendalism to predation: The political economy of decline in Nigeria, Journal of Modern African Studies, 34(1), 1996, p. 97.



Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste, Shadow economies around the world: Size, cause and consequences, International Monetary Fund Working Paper, WP/00/26, p. 6.



Europe, Asia, Africa Unit: Strategic Intelligence Section, Drug Enforcement Administration, Nigeria, Nigerian criminals and the drug trade, United States Department of Justice, October 1996, pp. 1-2.



Given that oil is produced in 12 of the 36 states, the country’s constitution sets out a formula for how the wealth should be divided. Such intra-state divisions point to the fragility of the federation itself. For an overview of recent tensions see Africa Confidential, 42, 15-27 July 2001.



Background information: Nigeria, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, <http://www.fco.gov. uk>



See for example, Combating international crime in Africa: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, 15 July 1998.



See the map drawn from the US government’s International crime threat assessment completed for President Clinton in 2000, p. 102. Available from <http://www.terrorism.com/documents/ pub45270/736502.gif>



See for example Jean-François Bayert, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, The criminalisation of the African state, Oxford: James Currey, 1999, p. 10.



This was encouraged by the presentation of the war in the east as “a genocidal one waged by the Muslims of Northern Nigeria who had declared a jihad to exterminate Igbos from the face of the earth”. This, Osaghae concludes, is not without credence given “the massacres of Igbos in the north and the strategies of economic blockade and starvation pursued throughout the war”. Osaghae, op cit, p. 66.



This is confirmed by earlier research in South Africa, see Ted Leggett, The sleazy hotel syndrome: Housing vice in Durban and Johannesburg, Crime and Conflict, 18, Summer 1999, pp. 15-16.



It would be difficult, however, to avoid problems of drug consumption that afflict all transit centres for illegal narcotics. See Axel Klein, Trapped in the traffick: Growing problems of drug consumption in Lagos, Journal of Modern African Studies, 32(4), 1994.



For the case of Ghana, see Henry Bernstein, Ghana’s drug economy: Some preliminary data, in Review of African Political Economy, 79, 1999.



Axel Klein, Nigeria and the drugs war, Review of African Political Economy, 79, 1999, p. 57.



For example, the involvement of the Liberian government in drug trafficking is explored by Stephen Ellis, The mask of anarchy: The destruction of Liberia and the religious dimensions of an African civil war, New York: New York University Press, 2001, pp. 169-172.



Phil Williams and Douglas Brooks, Captured, criminal and contested states: Organised crime in Africa, South African Journal of International Affairs, 6(2), Winter 1999.



Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence Division, Drug Intelligence Brief, The price dynamic of Southeast Asian heroin, February 2001.



C.J.D. Venter, Drug abuse and drug smuggling in South Africa, in Robert Gelbart and Greg Mills (eds), War and crime in Southern Africa, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998, p. 194.



Morris, op cit, p. 310.



See Klien, op cit.



Peter Gastrow, The network of Nigerian criminal groups in South Africa, unpublished paper, Institute for Security Studies, Cape Town, November 1999.



For an overview see The illegal drug trade in Southern Africa; International dimensions to a local crisis, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1998.



Leggett, op cit ; Leggett and Kevin Burton, Now selling in the Point: Talking to Durban’s drug syndicates, Crime and Conflict, 16, Winter 1999. Paul Thulare; and, “Welcome to Hellbrow” Talking to Johannesburg’s drug syndicates, Crime and Conflict, 16, Winter 1999.



There is a large amount of literature covering advanced-fee fraud in other jurisdictions. See for example, Russel G Smith, Michael N Holmes and Philip Kaufmann, Nigerian advanced fee fraud, Australian Institute of Criminology, Trends and Issues, 212, July 1999. One website is devoted entirely to the topic (<http://hom.rica.net>) and has extensive coverage of individual cases and on-going trends. Both the US Secret Service and the State Department’s Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement have published advisories and information on the topic.



See the report of the Cape Town–based non-governmental organisation Molo Songololo, The trafficking of women into the South African sex industry, 2000.



The impact of advances in technology on criminal opportunity are seen as key issues for future attention. See National Criminal Intelligence Service, 2001 UK threat assessment, <http://www.ncis.co.uk> Also International crime threat assessment, op cit.