Introduction

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For a lightly armed peacekeeping force, the techniques which it can employ, will be limited by the need to retain consent for the operation. However, many techniques will be common to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but may require different emphases. For example, just as the use of combat techniques may be required in peacekeeping, but limited to self-defence, so techniques designed to promote co-operation and consent will be required to achieve a long-term settlement in peace enforcement. A thorough knowledge of the techniques available allows commanders the flexibility to select the most appropriate techniques in order to gain and maintain the initiative, especially when the use of force is not available, appropriate, or is restricted. The key to success will lie in the selection and application of a combination of techniques, either designed to promote co-operation and consent by persuasion and influence (peacekeeping) or to control, compel and coerce by enforcement (peace enforcement).

Categorisation of techniques

0602
Techniques fall broadly into two categories: they are designed either to promote co-operation and consent, or to control the operational environment. Consent-promoting techniques address attitudes and perceptions directly and are of critical importance in peacekeeping, and for the long-term success of all PSOs. Control techniques may include a variety of techniques designed to coerce inducement but may include combat.

Force structures

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Force structures required to employ these techniques will vary. In peacekeeping, small groups of unarmed or lightly armed service personnel may suffice. However, in peace enforcement, balanced, joint forces, with appropriate reinforcements may be required to develop the operation towards achievement of the mandate. A PSO force has to be task-organised and with the potential to escalate or de-escalate activities to match whatever opposition may be offered by the parties.

Involvement of the host nation and parties to the conflict

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The surest way of consolidating peace will be the involvement of the host nation and the parties themselves in any peace process. If parties can be given responsibilities which actively involve them in the successful outcome of the operation — if they can be made shareholders, in effect, in the peace process — then their willingness to co-operate could be greatly increased. Whenever possible, parties to the conflict should be given opportunities to co-operate in providing specific services that contribute to the resolution of the conflict. Such opportunities should be linked to incentives and reinforced with appropriate rewards and penalties. Involvement in this way is not without risk, however, and will require close supervision.

Section I
CONSENT-PROMOTING TECHNIQUES
Information operations

0605
General: Information operations is a term used to cover both psychological operations (PSYOPS) and media operations. PSYOPS are addressed to the population of the state or people receiving the mission, its neighbours in the subregion and, indirectly, the military contingents and civilian agencies involved in the operation. Media operations are designed to inform the press more accurately, both from the operational area and those with a particular interest in it, such as shared ethnic or cultural ties with the host population, and the international community at large, especially those from nations contributing military forces and other resources to the operation. Information operations should be fully co-ordinated with other activities and operations of the PSO force, in order to reinforce the overall message that the commander wishes to portray in a credible, reasonable and consistent way. Information operations will be among the most potent weapon that the commander possesses and, as such, will require his personal direction. In an African context, information operations may prove particularly testing due to the size of potential operational areas, limited communication infrastructures, including access to communication means (radio and television) and illiteracy. Communications to remote areas to reach village elders and to inform them of the nature of any operation will greatly enhance good public relations between the PSF and the local population.

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PSYOPS: The aim of a PSYOPS in PSOs is to reassure, persuade and influence the local community or communities within the operational area and local region to consent to the PSO and to work with the PSO force for peace. The population may have been subject to propaganda by the belligerent parties and is likely to be in urgent need of objective, factual, truthful and credible information. Many people in the operational area will be ruled by fear and sound communications will be needed to penetrate that fear. The core message explaining the objectives and role of the PSF should be propagated in advance of the arrival of the force and updated in a consistent manner on a regular basis. Any gap in information is likely to be filled with the propaganda of the belligerent parties. PSYOPS attempt, by emphasising the responsibility of various local groups, to persuade them to resolve their own differences. Additionally, it may undertake the more specific function of broadcasting warnings, the future intentions of the controlling authorities and any details of agreements reached between opposing parties. How best to do this will depend on local circumstances and culture. The use of handouts and leaflets, or a radio and TV station manned by members of the force should be included in all PSOs and be put into use as soon as possible. Such operations may require electronic warfare assets to locate and target information operations, to secure own use of the electromagnetic spectrum and to reduce the usage of any party that may oppose or threaten the operation. This may also require the PSF to provide electronic protective measures for the NGO community who may be particularly vulnerable to targeting. Information activity planning should start early and form an integral element of deep operations within the overall campaign plan.

0607
Media operations: PSOs are likely to attract intense public scrutiny from the international and local media. The aim of media operations is to inform the media more accurately in order to create a more reasonable and balanced understanding of the mission and objectives, and what it can be expected to achieve. The media will require sophisticated and professional handling from the start of the mission, and are best served by a consistent and transparent information policy that recognises the pressures imposed by the ‘real time’ reporting of electronic media. To achieve a consistent and credible message, the ‘line to take’ should be passed immediately to all contingent commanders and subordinate headquarters. Media reports may restrict or promote the freedom of action for a PSF. Likewise, the timely introduction of press reporters to the scene of an incident may also serve to restrict belligerent action and forestall atrocities. An effective media service is an essential element in the conduct of PSO and requires the personal attention of commanders. Media staff should be fully integrated into the chain of command in order to ensure that public information activities, PSYOPS and civil affairs are all closely co-ordinated

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Principles of information operations: The following general principles should govern the conduct of any information programme:

Impartiality: The impartiality of the PSO force, when appropriate, has to be stressed repeatedly. This will require giving equal ‘air time’ to each tribal language. In PSOs, nothing should be communicated that might prejudice any perceptions concerning the impartiality of the PSO force. However, that should not exclude statements concerning culpability when evidence is irrefutable. The real enemies in PSOs are anarchy, atrocity and starvation.



Timeliness: To be effective, information operations must be timely. All activities and operations should be analysed from the perspectives of the media in the host nation and parties to the conflict so that appropriate responses are prepared. These responses, briefings or press releases should be designed to inform more accurately and, when necessary, pre-empt any potentially adverse publicity or misinformation that may be propagated by the parties to the conflict for their own partisan purposes.



Cultural knowledge: A thorough understanding of local culture, including reactions to the PSF, NGOs and the acceptable role of women, is vital. Every effort should be made to gain this understanding. Socio-cultural studies and opinion surveys need to be conducted to identify prevailing attitudes and expose any misconceptions and misunderstandings that can subsequently be addressed through an information programme.



Harmonisation: As activities that determine and influence perceptions, information projects have to be centrally co-ordinated with other activities that seek similar goals. These will include military intelligence, civil-military projects and community relations projects.



Honesty: Unless the information promulgated is believed, information operations will serve no purpose. Lies that are exposed, or obvious attempts at propaganda will impose serious damage to the long-term credibility and viability of any operation. On certain occasions, however, force security considerations may limit the degree of openness and transparency of operations to potentially hostile factions.



Style: Information material should be presented in the most appropriate and culturally acceptable manner to the local population and should avoid appearing to be patronising, arrogant or blatantly manipulative.

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Extra principles of media operations: The principles described above apply to all information operations. The following are additional principles that should govern media operations:

Accreditation: Media representatives should normally be accredited in order to gain eligibility for official public information support. The accreditation should require the representatives to abide by a clear set of rules that protect the operational security of the PSO force. If the rules are violated, consideration should be given to exclude those representatives from access to further official public information services.



Transparency: Open and independent reporting should be the norm. In most situations, unrestricted access shouldbe allowed to accredited media representatives. Warnings of dangers specific to certain areas should be given, but should not preclude media access. Threats to personal security are an occupational hazard of media representatives. They are ultimately responsible for the consequences of the risks they take.



Liaison: Given the potential for political repercussions, commanders should be kept informed of all significant developments of potential media interest. Public information staff should be available for detachment to incidents at short notice when this is necessary.



Quality of service: Public information support should be prompt, accurate, balanced and consistent. High quality officers with a proper understanding of the operation and the military capabilities involved, should assist media personnel where necessary.

Military-civil affairs and CIMIC

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General: The term military-civil affairs is used to describe military activities more usually conducted by civilians, which may not require detailed civil-military co-ordination, such as a ‘stand-alone’ military well-digging project, those tasks conducted jointly with civilian agencies and which require detailed civil-military co-ordination, CIMIC and civil-military community relations. CIMIC is concerned with the harmonisation of civilian and military relations within a theatre of operations. It is also concerned with co-ordinating and maximising the use of resources designed to redress the deprivation and suffering of the populace, concurrently with reconstruction activities. CIMIC is further designed to enhance the credibility of the PSO force, to promote co-operation and consent for the operation, and to persuade the parties to the conflict and the uncommitted members of the host nation that their best interests lie in peace. The immediate aim is to co-ordinate civilian and military activities fully to support humanitarian projects and to achieve the maximum support for the operation, at the expense of any opposition. The longer term aim of generating sufficient stability and self-dependency is directly linked to the desired endstate and exit strategy. This activity should reduce overall dependency on external aid. Civil-military considerations should play a significant role in a commander’s estimate and planning process, both to identify tasks and operational constraints. It is a J5 staff responsibility to advise the commander on all aspects of civil affairs and to manage the civil military interface.

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An integrated approach: Whenever possible and appropriate, military operations should be co-ordinated with those of the host government or local community, and aid agencies. In certain circumstances, however, some aid agencies may be working to a separate agenda and may not wish to co-operate with the military. Should this be the case, it might prove counterproductive to attempt to draw them in. International civil aid programmes are usually co-ordinated by a designated lead aid agency. Whichever the lead agency, it is vital that the civil-military programme is fully integrated into the overall mission plan and the day-to-day conduct of operations. This is the responsibility of the J5 staff branch that also provide the commander with the formal interface between the military force, the civilian population and aid agencies. Co-ordination is best achieved by establishing CIMIC centres at every appropriate level and ensuring that they are manned on a full-time basis. It is a J5 responsibility to ensure that tasks and requirements, identified by the military force within the overall aid and reconstruction programme, are given to the most appropriate agency, whether military or civilian or a combination of both. Co-ordination is also necessary to ensure that the civil-military programme reinforces and is, in turn, reinforced by information operations and those activities designed to foster healthy community relations. The less formal, but equally important role, of improving community relations with the local population is the responsibility of all members of the military force. A fully co-ordinated and positive civil-military programme will be a critical element in the success of any campaign.

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Civil-military projects: CIMIC projects provide the linkage between security, stability and peacebuilding and as a PSO develops towards the endstate, the emphasis will swing from relief to reconstruction and development. Within the guidelines and priorities established in the overall aid programme, projects in support of the local community may be conducted independently by the military, but will more often be conducted in conjunction with civilian agencies, utilising local firms and facilities. Civil-military projects may cover a wide range of activities within local communities and, as such, should be driven by local authorities. These could include medical and veterinary care, the provision and distribution of water, waste disposal, electrical power, the removal of unexploded ordnance, the restoration of public services, and the construction and development of schools and community centres. Such projects will often require assistance from military specialists, such as engineers, medical and veterinary officers, military police, military provost staff and special forces, and are likely to require extensive logistic support. Experience would indicate that such civil-military synergy would speed up the delivery of projects, make the most effective use of funds and, as a consequence, enhance the credibility of the national contribution. Before commencing with any such project, the advice of government, village elders and NGOs should be sought. If conducted in isolation and not in accordance to set priorities and direction, civil-military projects may lose their effectiveness, and short-term successes may prove counterproductive in the longer term. Projects that do not use local resources and manpower may create a long-term dependency culture that may prove damaging to peacebuilding plans. Priorities should therefore be co-ordinated at formation level and integrated into any theatre-wide plan. All elements of the PSF should support such programmes in a coherent and consistent way.

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Community relations: Healthy community relations are enshrined in the legitimate and impartial status of the operation and the conduct of the PSF. Community relations, as an element of both information operations and civil affairs programmes, refer to the deliberate fostering of social contact with the local population. The purpose of community relations is to create favourable perceptions locally and to encourage co-operative responses to PSF activities. It is a J5 responsibility to advise commanders on those actions that could have a negative effect on community relations, such as collateral damage or those that might cause cultural offence. Community relations may be developed through formally hosted events or informal meetings during the normal course of military operations. While community relation projects may be conducted by specialist teams, all service personnel should consider themselves as agents of the community relations programme. Every person’s behaviour and conduct will be fundamental to perceptions of the operation by the local population. As such, all service personnel should receive thorough and current briefings on the local cultural, ethnic, religious and moral issues to help in pre-empting unintentional or possibly even deliberate breaches of good community relations, caused by ignorance of local beliefs, customs or practices. Community relations activities require careful co-ordination to ensure that they are not perceived as being blatantly manipulative or conducted in a way that might prejudice the perceived impartiality of the PSO force.

Negotiation and mediation

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The significance of negotiation and mediation: Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter emphasises the importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as the most effective means of settling disputes. At the tactical level, negotiation and mediation should be considered the first immediate action drill. By negotiation and mediation, positive relationships between the factions and the PSF can be formed which enable agreements to be reached and promote the process of conciliation. Objective and effective negotiations that are created, controlled and fostered at every level by the PSF will develop a climate of mutual respect and co-operation necessary for the successful resolution of the conflict. In this context, negotiation and mediation and the associated activities of arbitration and conciliation may be described as follows:

Negotiation: This refers to direct dialogue between parties. In the conduct of negotiations, the PSF will usually have its own operational objectives.



Mediation: This describes the activities of a ‘go-between’ who connects parties to a dispute. In this role, the PSF representatives act as the means whereby opposing parties communicate with each other and are encouraged to identify and reach mutually agreed solutions.



Arbitration: In arbitration, an authoritative third party provides a judgement by considering the opposing positions and suggesting a settlement. There is initial scope for arbitration in most PSO environments. Arbitration requires a degree of control that may take some time to establish, and may not be within the capability of a peacekeeping force.



Conciliation: This describes the reconciling process that occurs as the result of agreements reached through successful negotiation, mediation and arbitration. At the tactical level, conciliation will normally result in compromises between the aims of the participants and the PSF.

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Aim: The aim of negotiation and mediation is to reach agreements to which all parties have concurred and which will help to contain, de-escalate and resolve the conflict.

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The wider context: Negotiation and mediation may be conducted independently, but will normally be conducted as an adjunct to other conflict resolution activities. It is a skill required at all stages of a PSO and will need to be exercised at every level. Consequently, all service personnel could be involved, from senior commanders meeting with faction leaders, to individual soldiers at isolated observation points who may find themselves trying to control an incident or arbitrating in a local dispute. Negotiation and mediation may be conducted as part of a deliberate process, or as an immediate response to a life-threatening incident. In an incident, it is important to remember that the commander of the PSF involved at the incident, is often perceived as part of the problem. In this case, the scene should be set for others to resolve, usually at the next level of the commander’s chain of command, and where one exists, of the chain of command of the belligerent party. When there is no chain of command, identifying other people of influence, such as the local mayor or religious leader, could be crucial in resolving the problem. Identifying and addressing the source of the incident and identifying the most appropriate level of authority to address it lies at the heart of preventing further incidents.

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Process: The selection of individuals or groups of individuals who are acceptable to the parties is fundamental to the successful conduct of negotiations. Essentially, there are three stages in the process of negotiation and mediation.

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Stage 1 — Preparation: Firstly, a clear aim should be defined to determine what is to be achieved. The identification of an aim will take many factors into account, including the objectives and capabilities of the belligerents, as well as a realistic appraisal of what is feasible. In practice, the initial aim may be no more than to get competing factions to meet, although it may well be subsequently refined during the meeting. Specific preparations will include researching the background and history of the issue to be discussed to help the negotiator or mediator to identify those arguments that the belligerent parties may employ. Options, limitations, minimum requirements and areas of common interest and possible compromise should be identified. If negotiating, the PSF representative should be clear on those points that must be won or protected, and those that may be used as bargaining chips. He should also make a thorough study of the participants who will attend the meeting. This should include their cultural origin, personality, authority, influence, habits and attitudes. If hosting the meeting, specific arrangements should take account of the following:

Location: In the conduct of formal negotiations or mediation, the site should be secure and neutral. In the control of an incident, those persons relevant in defusing the problem should be identified, and persuaded to conduct negotiations away from those more immediately involved in the incident.



Administration: Administrative organisation should include such items as arrival and departure arrangements, and the provision of parking, communications, meals and refreshment. The meeting should usually have an agenda, a seating plan and persons responsible for taking notes, perhaps supplemented with interpreters and other advisers on specialist subjects. Separate rooms will probably be required by each party to allow them to confer in private.



Attendance: Attendance should be at an appropriate and equal rank level. Offence may be caused if senior representatives from one faction are required to meet with junior representatives from another. To avoid unmanageable numbers attending, the size of each party, where possible, should be agreed beforehand. A policy on the carrying of weapons and the presence of bodyguards should be announced in advance. When appropriate, PSF commanders should also bring bodyguards. Attention to protocol and other courtesies should not be overlooked.

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Stage 2 — Conduct: In the case of mediation, parties to the conflict will confer with the go-between in separate locations. Negotiations, on the other hand, will be held openly in one location with all the participants present. Although it may be extremely difficult, the first item on any agenda should be for the participants to agree on the purpose of the meeting. If hosting the occasion, the PSF representative should offer the customary salutations and exchange of courtesies, and ensure that all parties are identified and have been introduced to each other. Refreshments should normally be proffered or received. Some introductory small talk is useful on such occasions to make everybody feel more at ease. The following negotiating ploys should be borne in mind:

Preserve options: The opposing sides should be encouraged to give their views first. This will enable the negotiator to reassess the viability of his own position. If possible, he should avoid taking an immediate stand and should be wary of making promises or admissions unless it is necessary to do so.



Restraint and control: Belligerent parties are often likely to prove deliberately inflexible. They may distort information and introduce red herrings to distract attention from discussions that might embarrass them. Nonetheless, visible frustration, impatience, a patronising manner, or anger at such antics may undermine the negotiator’s position. Cheap ‘point-scoring’ (even if valid) may achieve short-term gains. In the longer term, however, it is likely that such gains will invariably be paid for in terms of forfeited goodwill. Loss of face is likely to increase the belligerence of faction leaders. Face-saving measures by the controlling authority will probably serve the longer term interests of all parties. Whenever possible, respect should be shown for the negotiating positions of other parties. Speakers should normally not be interrupted; however, incorrect information and matters of principle should be corrected, if necessary with appropriate evidence. Facts should take preference over opinions. While remaining impartial, the negotiations should be conducted in a firm, fair and friendly manner.



Argument: If necessary, the negotiator should remind participants of previous agreements, arrangements, accepted practices and their own pronouncements. However, this should be done tactfully and accurately with regard to facts and detail. It may be appropriate to remind participants that they cannot change the past but, if they wish, they could have the power to change the future.



Compromise: Partial agreement or areas of consensus should be carefully explored for compromise solutions. Related common interests may offer answers to seemingly intractable differences.



Linkage: Linkage of a point of negotiation with their wider ambitions is a technique frequently used by parties. Linkage is to be anticipated if subsequent actions and negotiating positions are not to be compromised.



Closing summary: Negotiation and mediation should be finalised with a summary of what has been resolved. This summary has to be agreed to by all participants and, if possible, written down and signed by each party. A time and place for further negotiation should also be agreed.

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Stage 3 — Follow-up: Effective follow-up is as important as successful negotiation. Without follow-up, achievements gained through negotiation or mediation could be lost. The outcome of the negotiations or mediation has to be promulgated to all interested parties. Background files should be updated with all pertinent information, including personality profiles of the participants. Agreements have to be monitored, implemented or supervised as soon as possible. The immediate period following a negotiated agreement is likely to prove the most critical. To preserve the credibility of the negotiating process, what has been agreed to has to occur and any breach of agreement should be marked, at the very least, by an immediate protest.

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Languages: The ability to negotiate and mediate will place a premium on basic language skills. However, working through interpreters is currently more usual and should therefore be practised before deployment. However, working through locally recruited interpreters may provide a short-term solution, but reliance on such a source of linguistic support may bring disadvantages. In the longer term, the demands of PSOs and of the effective conduct of negotiations and mediation require that a greater emphasis is given to language training in general

Liaison

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Introduction: Conflict thrives on rumour, uncertainty and prejudice. The timely passage of accurate information, based on a trusting relationship, is a key method of combating uncertainty and promoting stability in a conflict region. Liaison is therefore a vital tool of a PSO force and key to the successful execution of operations. Failure to liaise, risks misunderstanding, friction, opposition and escalation of the conflict.

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Purpose: The purpose of liaison is to ensure the timely passing of information, to notify intentions, lodge protests, co-ordinate activity, manage crises and settle disputes. A liaison system is therefore required to link the PSO force, the communities, the civil authority (if it exists), the parties to the conflict, the aid agencies and the media. It should be established at every possible level, including formation, unit, subunit and sometimes below that. The specialist skills and background experience of liaison officers, if possible, should match those of the organisation with which they are to liaise. The most effective form of liaison is that of an individual who is permanently detached from his parent organisation to the group or faction with which the organisation is liaising. Alternative methods of liaison include patrols, regular or occasional meetings and visits.

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Requirements: Liaison officers are the eyes and ears of the commander and can be used to focus on issues of immediate or more general concern. Liaison officers or teams will require robust, reliable communications with an alternative back-up system. In situations of particular tension, consideration should be given to create ‘hot lines’ linking force command posts with that of opposing factions in order to facilitate the handling of crises. Liaison must be founded on friendly, working relationships. Team members should familiarise themselves with the names and responsibilities of the leaders they deal with. They should also assess attitudes and attempt to predict and anticipate the direction that events may take. Everything should be done to foster an atmosphere of trust. Daily meetings should be arranged (if necessary ‘off the record’) to develop relationships and keep open channels of communication.

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Priority: Opportunities for liaison should be explored and exploited by commanders as a priority at every level. It will normally be necessary for commanders to augment their establishments with additional officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs for liaison purposes. If liaison is interrupted for any reason, commanders should seek to re-establish it at the earliest opportunity.

Observation and monitoring

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Observation and monitoring are both fundamental techniques of PSOs and a category of PSOs tasks. As a technique, the purpose is to gather information, and monitor, verify and report adherence to agreements, thus deterring and providing evidence of breaches should they occur. Observation teams from a number of political authorities may be deployed into the same theatre of operations. As far as is politically possible, their efforts should be co-ordinated with those of the deployed PSO forces and their product shared. Examples of specific tasks include:

operational level observation and intelligence gathering by maritime and air assets — such operations will generally provide their own force protection;



observing buffer zones and cease-fire lines;



confirming the withdrawal of forces;



monitoring conditions in a potential conflict area for signs of war preparation or increased tension;



monitoring and reporting human rights abuses; and



inspecting industrial facilities to verify compliance with UNSC resolutions.

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Observation teams will depend partially for their security on their impartial status that will be considerably enhanced by a credible and professional performance. At times of low threat, observation may be carried out by unarmed personnel in small multinational teams, often including civilian representatives. At times of higher threat and when the requirements of credibility are paramount, observers may be armed and grouped in national military teams, possibly drawn from special forces. Effective liaison with all parties involved, is also a valuable supporting element of these methods. The success of observation activities depends largely on accurate, timely reporting, using reliable communications. By their nature, observation and monitoring teams are normally limited in the scope of any reactive action they may wish to take. However, they may act as a trigger for other more robust joint reaction forces.

Communication and information systems

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A communication and information system will need to be established, using existing equipment to commensurate with the mission and command and control requirements. Planning for such a system will require a detailed assessment, not only of national force requirements, but also of the requirements, equipment and practices of other national contingents, civilian agencies, parties to the conflict and other legitimate but non-involved users of the electromagnetic spectrum. Issues such as compatibility, interoperability and connectivity will be significant concerns, as will that of the wider problem of frequency management. The establishment of an effective communication and information system will involve technical means, as well as the use of supporting communication infrastructures and means, such as an effective liaison system or, at the political level, possibly an exchange of ambassadors.

Section II
CONTROL TECHNIQUES
Command and control warfare

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Command and control warfare (C2W) strategies are applicable across the spectrum of conflict and have an important role to play in PSOs. In the conduct of PSOs the commander’s C2W strategy should be linked to all political, civilian, media-related, civil affairs and NGO programmes associated with the mission. Efficient co-ordination of the use of all available military capabilities to protect the PSF’s command and control (C2) in support of the mission will be a high concern. C2 protection is vital to overall force protection and should incorporate an operational security (OPSEC) policy that specifically considers vulnerabilities in force communication and information systems, as well as other OPSEC areas. A C2W analysis of the parties subject to the PSO is invaluable in assigning military intelligence priorities and the prioritised use of electronic warfare (EW) and PSYOPS resources to support the mission. Continual analysis of belligerent parties’ media resources is important to ensure their objectivity and that they are not used as a C2 means to incite violence and opposition to the mission. C2W planning for PSOs will likely emphasise the use of PSYOPS to protect the force and influence the parties, by fostering co-operation and support for collaborative projects to develop the mission. In certain circumstances, the use of deception or physical destruction may be appropriate to deceive or destroy a hostile party’s C2 capability.

Electronic warfare

0630
Electronic warfare is essential to ensure the PSF’s ability to use the electronic spectrum, and for immediate threat warning and force protection. Although the term electronic warfare suggests that it applies only to combat, it has a crucial role to play in PSOs. Commanders at all levels should consider the employment of electronic warfare assets to support their overall objectives. All sides to a dispute may have sophisticated electronic systems capable of monitoring, threatening, or disrupting the activities of the PSO force and its partners. Electronic warfare can provide early warning that may prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflict and can support diplomatic activity by monitoring compliance with agreements and sanctions. Electronic warfare is a deterrent, especially if a potential belligerent knows that the PSO force can quickly locate and neutralise threats. If hostilities do occur, electronic warfare can reduce the threat posed by certain weapons systems and provide commanders with options other than the use of physical or lethal force.

Intelligence operations

0631
Terminology: The parties to a conflict in a PSO environment may be suspicious of all intelligence-related activities. They are likely to regard the gathering of intelligence itself as a hostile act. It is for this reason that intelligence operations in peacekeeping in the past have been termed ‘military information operations’. The use of such terminology was an attempt to accommodate both local sensitivities, as well as those that might exist within a multinational and multi-agency force itself. However, there is now general acceptance by all parties that the intelligence function is an integral part in the conduct of any operation, whether military or civilian, and will therefore be addressed as such.

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The intelligence process: Intelligence operations will drive the conduct of PSOs in much the same way as they drive other operations. As an operational function, military intelligence will represent a prime influence in directing and synchronising operations themselves. Intelligence operations work through a continuous cyclical process of direction, collection, interpretation, evaluation, collation and dissemination that must be controlled and co-ordinated in the intelligence management plan. The intelligence organisation in the conduct of PSOs must be flexible and task-organised and will probably require considerable augmentation to include specialists in a variety of fields.

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Intelligence requirements: The intelligence requirements of the commander in PSO are likely to be broader and more politically complex than those of normal combat operations. As well as requiring detailed assessments of the geopolitical situation, including historical and cultural influences, the commander will also require continuously updated assessments of the attitudes, capabilities, intentions and likely reactions of all local forces and their leaders, ethnic groupings and interested parties to the conflict, particularly those who are potentially hostile.

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Sources: Open source material including libraries, the media, multinational business corporations and commercial satellite services will provide some background information. All other sources of strategic and military intelligence will be available, including technical sources and assessments from higher formation, as well as those from national and regional authorities. At the tactical level, the primary source of intelligence will be human intelligence (HUMINT) often from CIMIC centres or in the form of reports and routine debriefings of observers, patrols and other elements of the force that pass through areas of interest and are in contact with the local population and human rights monitors. NGOs are particularly useful sources of information, but must be handled with care, because they will be sensitive to any compromise to their impartial, independent status. Liaison teams will have a key role in meeting the commanders’ intelligence requirements.

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Summary: A well-developed information system is vital to the effectiveness of PSOs. Military intelligence activities should be directed by the commander to meet clearly defined requirements to satisfy operational needs. In addition, military intelligence will meet a vital early warning requirement in monitoring and reporting those aspects that may destabilise or escalate the overall security situation.

Supervision and the enforcement of the mandate

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Scope: The supervision and enforcement of the conditions of the mandate are activities that will occur throughout all phases of PSO activities. Mission analysis by commanders at all levels will allow them to interpret diplomatic statements into the appropriate military actions. Many of the tasks and techniques already discussed, could be described as being supervisory in nature. Observation posts, patrols and reserves all have tasks that are supervisory in nature and, when appropriate, combat techniques may be required to contain and control any opposition and enforce compliance. Whenever possible, detailed supervisory tasks should be conducted by CIVPOL with the support of the PSF. Subsequently, it may also be possible to delegate certain supervisory tasks to the parties to a conflict. If linked to appropriate rewards and penalties, such offers could encourage their co-operation. Delegating supervisory tasks in this way is risky and would require tight control. However, if acceptable, it could contribute significantly towards the conciliation of the parties concerned.

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Enforcement and investigation: The detailed investigation of war crimes is a highly sensitive activity with political overtones that should be left to specialist teams of investigators generally working directly with the authorising political body. However, military forces have a moral and legal responsibility to prevent violations and, when they have occurred, to ensure that all details and evidence are accurately and systematically collected, recorded and reported for subsequent investigations. Military involvement in such investigations should be precisely defined in the military mission and closely co-ordinated within the mission plan with human rights agencies and officers. Violations of the mandate and breaches of international humanitarian law should be the subject of a formal protest, as well as a formal investigation.

Protest procedure: A protest is a formal notification of an act by one of the parties to a dispute, or by the PSO force, which the originator considers to be a violation of the ‘status quo’, or of international law. A protest indicates that the violation has been observed and that action to redress the grievance or an explanation is required as soon as possible. Protests may be communicated verbally, but have to be confirmed in writing. While the full details of the protest will be sent to the offending party, the other parties, if formal parties exist, will normally only be told that a protest has been made without further elaboration. This procedure is to reassure all parties that the PSF will not, in the first instance, betray confidences. However, if the violation is not redressed the PSF may pass details to the other parties. All protests have to be recorded in accordance with the PSF standing orders.



Enforcement and the investigation of violations: Every breach of the mandate, international humanitarian law or peace agreement which is witnessed by a PSF should be dealt with immediately in accordance with its mandate and mission statement. The failure by a PSO force to prevent violations will undermine its credibility and the effectiveness of the mission. Enforcement may require the arrest and disarmament of violators and their detainment until they can be handed over to an appropriate civil legal authority. ROE should be designed for such contingencies and should make legal provision for the PSF to use all necessary measures to enforce compliance. Such actions, which must be catered for in detail in the mission plan, may also require the deployment of reserves and reaction forces. Not all violations will be dealt with as official complaints. Those which are minor in nature can often be dealt with at an appropriate level, however, they should still be reported and recorded. Speed of reaction is also essential to secure evidence before it can be removed, and to question witnesses before interested parties coach them to adopt a particular line. The procedure for enforcement interventions, investigations and reporting will be detailed in the appropriate standing orders in accordance with the mandate.

Interposition

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Introduction: Whether at the operational level using maritime and air forces, or in the detailed conduct of operations on the ground, the interposition of forces between opposing parties remains one of the basic military techniques in PSOs. Traditionally, it has applied to the establishment and maintenance of cease-fires within the context of demobilisation operations. Interposition may be described as ‘separation of forces operations’. However, interposition operations in a civil war or multifaction dispute or conflict will be highly complex and will require peace enforcement. Whenever possible, interposition actions are preplanned with the consent of belligerent parties and normally follow (but could precede) the withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from a cease-fire line or a number of geographical areas. The interposition might be phased with advance groups deployed to provide a screen between withdrawing factions. Such groups might take the form of individual units, including ships, standing patrols or even single armoured vehicles. Interposition in such a situation should be accomplished as quickly as possible to forestall clashes that might lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire arrangements. Interposition forces may be required to protect the parties to a conflict from outside interference and attack, as well as taking action against the violators of cease-fires.

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Emergency response: Interposition may also be used as a short-term emergency response to forestall or manage a local crisis. As with a preplanned interposition, speed is a crucial factor in defusing such a situation. In the early stages of a crisis, it is advantageous if commanders can promptly insert leading elements of an interpositional force between the parties concerned, while concurrently conducting negotiations with the antagonists. While negotiations may continue to reduce tension, the advance elements of the interpositional force should be reinforced until it is sufficiently strong to regain control of the situation should negotiations fail. Care should be taken not to escalate crises by such action.

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Interpositional tactics: As in a preventive deployment, an interpositional force should have sufficient combat power available to match whatever might be offered. Whether the interposition force has separated the opposing forces through a peace agreement, cease-fire or enforcement, the geographical separation may be delineated in any environment by one, or a combination, of the following:

Cease-fire line: The cease-fire line marks the forward limit of the area or areas occupied by opposing factions. It is, by its nature, usually the subject of contention, particularly when it is part of significant tactical feature.



Buffer zone: A buffer zone is a neutral space or no-man’s land between cease-fire lines. The width of the buffer zone may be based on visual distances or weapon ranges. Out of visual sight is preferable as it reduces the temptation of ill-disciplined soldiers to take pot shots at one another. A buffer zone may contain residents, farmland or other assets that the force may need to patrol, monitor and protect. Access to buffer zones, and perhaps the air space above it, will usually be controlled and limited to the supervising authority. Any maritime zones should specify infringements to international shipping rights.



Control zones: Control zones are areas either side of a buffer zone, the forward limits of which will be the cease-fire line. In these zones, limits are set for numbers of personnel, tanks, artillery (by calibre) and missiles permitted at any one time, or during any particular period.

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Delineation procedures: The following procedures should be used when delineating a cease-fire line, buffer or control zone.

irrefutably mark the designated line or area on a common large-scale chart, map or aerial photograph;



if possible, ensure the line or area is physically identifiable;



provide an accurate and detailed description of any demarcation lines using agreed grid references;



survey and mark the lines on the ground or agree some form of maritime designation — if possible, any markers should be secured in a way that makes them difficult to remove;



agreed entry points to the zones should be clearly marked on the map and ground;



a record of the lines, signed by all sides, should be given to the parties concerned with the original retained by the PSO force — alterations should be signed and promulgated in the same way; and



as far as possible, keep designated control lines and areas under surveillance.

Control measures

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Introduction: Close control may be exercised directly by physical measures or indirectly, by deep perception management techniques. Perception management techniques have already been discussed in this chapter in the context of information operations. Close physical control can be exercised by the routine presence of service units and troops and the use of specific techniques and operations, such as cordon and search operations, or other combat operations. Overall, control is best achieved if it is co-ordinated with the activities of all the military, police, where they exist, host nation departments, and involved civilian agencies. This needs to be agreed in the mission plan and achieved within the theatre as a whole and then within sectors.

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Sectors: Control can be more effectively co-ordinated and executed if military sector boundaries can be harmonised with in-place aid agency structures and deployments, political and civil authority boundaries and the locations and deployments of belligerent forces. When possible, headquarters and troop locations should be positioned within sectors to demonstrate the impartial and even-handed approach of a PSF.

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Control measures: Within sectors, control measures may take several forms, detailed tactics and procedures for which are found elsewhere in service manuals and standing operational procedures (SOPs).

Restricted air and maritime zones, guards and checkpoints: Within the framework of sectors, military operations will usually require control to be established either to monitor, limit or deny access to many areas including:

air and maritime zones;
significant or sensitive terrain (such as cease-fire lines, buffer zones and control zones);
installations;
centres of population; and
stocks of war supplies.



This may be achieved by the use of guards and guard ships, air exclusion zones (for the restriction of war supplies, for example) and checkpoints, including vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) to monitor the movement of displaced persons or refugees. Duties, procedures and the required tactics will depend on the authority of the mandate, any SOFA, ROE and the PSF standing operational procedures. ROE have to clearly define the orders for opening fire. At the tactical level, guards and checkpoints may constitute a major interface between the contingent and local populace. It is therefore important that service personnel carrying out such duties should be aware of local customs, particularly in dealing with women.



Powers of search and arrest: The delegated powers of the PSF to search and arrest civilians will depend on the mandate and SOFA. The conduct of searches and arrests, especially of war criminals was covered in detail under supervision operations. Control may also need to be exerted over the passage of war supplies and preventive action needed to combat criminal activities and the smuggling of contraband items such as drugs, all of which may be indistinguishable from more politically motivated violations. In the early stages of a demobilisation operation, forces may be empowered to board shipping, confiscate items and arrest offenders. In any military assistance programme, civilians or faction members suspected of illegal activity should usually be handed over to the civil authorities. Checks on the personnel and vehicles of the PSF may also be allowed to demonstrate that the force itself is observing the law and to deter or detect any criminal activity among its own members.



Crowd control: In circumstances of widespread civil disobedience, the responsibility for the restoration of order and crowd control should rest, in the first instance, with the civil authorities and CIVPOL. Should the situation deteriorate to such a degree that a PSF is tasked with providing assistance, such a task will require a peace enforcement force. The same applies for other techniques such as patrolling, cordon and search, and other tactical measures designed to control the activities of populations in designated areas.



Weapon control measures: Weapon control measures may be agreed to, or enforced by a PSF. Such activities may include exclusion from, or restriction within a specific area, confiscation and destruction, or receipt and control of all weapons or certain weapon types, generally heavy weapons. Control of weapons may be restricted to ensure that those weapons are only used in self-defence.

Section III
INCIDENT CONTROL

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General: At the tactical level, where many hostile incidents are a reaction to a situation elsewhere, an understanding of the operational framework will guide those techniques that may be the most appropriate and where, within that framework, they can be the most effectively applied.

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Incident management: Faced with a situation of actual or threatened violence service personnel and military forces, in the first instance, should be capable of defending themselves, either by evasive manoeuvre, fire, or a combination of both. Having reduced the threat to a manageable level, the resolution of an incident will generally follow a particular sequence of steps.

Step 1: Attempts should be made to identify the cause of the problem and to establish accountability for any hostile actions. However, the belligerents involved and the weapons used, especially in the case of indirect fire, may not provide sufficient evidence to show at what level the incident was initiated and, therefore, at what level it should be resolved.



Step 2: The next step will usually require negotiations with the belligerents on the site of the incident in order to contain and defuse the situation. Typically, however, in PSOs, violent incidents cannot be resolved, but only controlled, at the level where they are initiated.



Step 3: If an immediate local accountability for actions cannot be established, or local negotiations fail to resolve the situation, but the belligerent forces have a coherent command and control infrastructure, the answer may lie in raising negotiations higher in the belligerent party’s chain of command. If the belligerent forces do not have a coherent system of command and control, a more robust response on the ground may be necessary from the outset.



Step 4: However, the resolution of the situation will often be beyond the immediate capability of service personnel or forces involved in the incident and require the application of other techniques elsewhere and at a more senior level. If negotiations have thus far failed, the key to resolution may lie in a combination of coercive measures of increasing intensity, and more substantive negotiations higher in the chain of command. Escalation may involve the use of threats, demonstrations, or the actual use of direct or indirect fire and longer range precision fire, should this be available.

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The resolution of every incident, at whatever level, should be viewed and judged within the wider context of the operation; hence, the significance of mission analysis, and the requirement for commanders to possess both lateral vision and perseverance.