Chapter 5

OPERATIONAL MISSIONS AND TASKS


Published in Peace Support Operations: A working Draft Manual for African Military Practitioners, DWM 1-2000 February 2000



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There is no internationally agreed list of PSO missions and tasks. Certain tasks such as observation may not only describe the mission, but also the principal technique that will be used to accomplish the mission, for example, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The military missions and tasks listed below should not therefore be regarded as exhaustive. Neither is there any attempt to describe those tasks which are designed primarily for combat operations, even though they may have an essential part to play in peace enforcement tasks. This chapter is designed to describe those missions and tasks that are additional to the core military activity of combat.

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Essentially, there are four broad mission types: conflict prevention/military support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian relief/peacebuilding operations. Each mission type can subsequently be related to military (operational) tasks and, in some cases, subtasks. These tasks and subtasks are discussed in detail in the paragraphs that follow in this chapter. Those tasks categorised as peacekeeping will also form an element of most peace enforcement operations.

Section I
SPECIFIC MILITARY SUPPORT TO DIPLOMACY/CONFLICT PREVENTION


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Military tasks are generally integral to and in support of diplomatic activities. This may include intelligence operations, an early engagement in civil-military co-ordination, training and security sector reform programmes or deterrent and conflict prevention deployments. However, in the conduct of PSOs, political influences will have special primacy and will permeate all military considerations and actions. This concept is enshrined in the choice of the term peace support operation, rather than having a separate category of military operation called ‘military support to diplomacy’. The precise nature of the operation and the tasks to be accomplished will be identified in the political estimate conducted by the political authority and defined in the concept of operations, and refined in the operational reconnaissance. Military assistance to support diplomatic strategies to prevent and pre-empt conflict are generally categorised as preventive deployment tasks. Many of these tasks may also play an essential role in post-conflict peacebuilding activities.

Preventive deployment subtasks


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Conflict prevention is primarily a diplomatic activity, however, preventive deployments and other military activities will play an essential role in supporting diplomatic activities to prevent, contain or control conflict. At the tactical level, and working on the principle that ‘prevention is better than cure’, activities to pre-empt conflict, or at least prevent its spread, will usually be a prime consideration in all military activities. There are five principal subtasks as part of a preventive deployment, which may all overlap, that contribute to the prevention of conflict.
  1. Early warning: By identifying the threat of an outbreak of violence, early warning will buy time for a range of preventive diplomatic, humanitarian and military actions to be put into place. As a consequence, commanders at all levels should focus their intelligence and information-gathering assets on any potential crisis within their areas of interest.

  2. Surveillance: The presence of widespread surveillance in an area of operations will help to deter breaches of the peace by any party. Surveillance can also provide the means for attribution of culpability. Effective surveillance is therefore a major conflict prevention technique.

  3. Stabilising measures: Stabilising and confidence-building measures, supported by civil-military peacebuilding programmes, may contribute to the lowering of tension in an area and may represent the first step towards the restoration of law and order, and negotiations for a political settlement. They may take several forms:

    * the establishment of an effective liaison and communication network between all parties;

    * mutual and balanced reductions in personnel and equipment;

    * the separation of forces;

    * zonal restrictions on the deployment of weapons and military personnel, including the enforcement of no-fly zones;

    * advance reporting of military activities or exercises; and

    * joint inspections of disputed areas.

  4. Training assistance programmes: Training and assistance to indigenous efforts to reform the defence and security sector will be designed to enhance democratic accountability and transparency, and ensure that security resources are used to support the legitimate aspirations of the country as a whole. Specifically, education and training programmes will be designed to enhance the understanding of human rights issues and promote democratisation efforts within all elements of military and security forces.

  5. Restoration of law and order: The creation of a secure environment and the provision of assistance to local civic authorities to restore the rule of law will often be a task for a PSF. In such an operation, tasks may range from counterinsurgency and counterterrorist tasks to the specific protection of human rights, the detailed recording and collection of evidence of violations, and the arrest of designated war criminals. A peace enforcement operation to end widespread human rights abuses and restore the rule of law may well be the precursor to handing the operation to a UN peacekeeping force, CIVPOL or host nation authorities.

Section II
PEACEKEEPING TASKS
Observation and monitoring


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In PSOs, strategic and operational level observation and monitoring may be conducted by maritime and air assets, including satellites, but will ultimately rely heavily on the human factor, i.e. the observations of troops on the ground and in proximity to the parties and indigenous population. Traditionally, individual observer teams have acted as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the UNSC and their presence has often been sufficient to deter breaches of cease-fires and peace agreements. Their up-to-date reports provide useful evidence to counter claims put forward by partisan interests at UNSC discussions. Observers may be employed individually or in small multinational joint teams to observe, monitor, verify, and report and, where possible, to use confidence-building measures to defuse situations of potential conflict. Specific tasks may be to provide early warning to trigger political initiatives, to observe a withdrawal or to monitor the movement of refugees and other displaced persons. Subsidiary tasks could be to provide liaison, investigation and negotiation, although unarmed observers would normally take no executive action with regard to violations. Observers are generally unarmed and have traditionally relied on their impartial status for protection and personal security. However, in an intrastate conflict, involving irresponsible substate actors and warlords, the concept of impartiality may have little meaning and worth.

Supervision of truces and cease-fires


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Military forces may be deployed to supervise any commitments agreed to by the parties as part of a truce, cease-fire or other peace plan. This may include operational level joint force deployments. Tasks will generally be agreed and specified in the detail of the agreement or treaty. These might include the following:
  1. the separation, containment, disarmament and demobilisation of forces;

  2. the execution of the details of the agreement, such as the exchange of prisoners and bodies, the conduct of elections and arms control agreements;

  3. liaison between the parties and all elements of the force, both military and civilian;

  4. negotiation and mediation on behalf of all parties to the dispute;

  5. the investigation of complaints and violations of the details of the agreement or treaty.

  6. the movement of refugees and displaced persons; and

  7. assistance to UN and other CIVPOL in those areas with mixed populations that may be located outside buffer zones and in areas of potential hostile territory.

Interposition


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A PSF can deploy as an interpositional force, as a form of trip-wire either when consent exists or when consent is fragile, if supported by a credible external deterrent power or stand-off force. Troops involved in interposition operations are generally deployed to pre-empt conflict. As such, these operations take place in areas of recent or potential, rather than actual conflict, either between states or within a state where tension is rising between parties. Although there would be consent for the operation, at least from the host state, a peace plan or formal cease-fire may not have been agreed to, and the situation may be characterised by sporadic outbreaks of violence. Interposition operations will generally take the form of the establishment of a buffer zone, or where the communities are intermingled, to establish areas of separation wherever the communities are physically mixed. Should one of the parties not consent to the operation and it is judged that enforcement may become necessary, a force capable from the outset of escalation should conduct the operation.

Transition assistance


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Transition assistance refers to all forms of military assistance to a civil authority or community rendered as part of a wider diplomatic, humanitarian and economic strategy to support a return or transition to peace and stability. In the aftermath of an intrastate conflict, and in the absence of effective government, transition assistance may initially take the form of direct help to civil communities, before efforts can be made to rebuild a more effective government infrastructure. Transition assistance operations are generally a post-conflict activity; however, their chance of success will be enhanced if reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts are conducted as a subsidiary line of operation throughout the duration of the PSO. Military tasks in a transition assistance operation cover a broad range of activities, but for ease of definition, can be grouped under the following headings, reflecting the purpose for which such tasks might be undertaken.

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Supervision: Important supervisory tasks might includes a transition of authority; reforming local security forces, the relocation and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons.

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Administration: Tasks might range from liaison to support for the establishment of an interim government. In between tasks could include the supply of power, water, public transport, communications and hygiene services, i.e. all those public services that form an essential part of the daily life of a community.

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Protection: The creation of a secure environment may be extended to include the protection of basic human rights and the safeguarding of individuals, communities and installations. In areas where consent is fragile, and there is a measure of opposition to the operation as a whole, protective tasks are more effectively accomplished by a peace enforcement force.

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Response: The ability of military forces to respond to fresh incidents is essential to retain control and keep the initiative. In all military operations commanders should have reserves and contingency plans prepared for such situations. In peacekeeping, responses may consist of other techniques, other than the use of force. Techniques are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

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Control: In any transition assistance operation, a commander may be called upon to support collective control measures. These may range from economic sanctions to local curfews. As with other dealings with the parties to the conflict, prohibitions and restrictions have to be proportionate, legal and applied impartially. Otherwise the PSF will risk losing local co-operation and consent.

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Co-ordination: In all larger scale and complex PSOs, there will be a requirement to co-ordinate the activities of a large number of agencies, e.g. NGOs, PVOs and other. Military forces are likely to be tasked to assist with this co-ordination.

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Law and order: Military assistance operations will contribute to the overall aim of maintaining law and order, a responsibility that rests ultimately with the police and civil authorities. If the situation is degenerating, military enforcement operations may be necessary to restore the peace and to provide direct support to the police. Military operations of this nature will tend to be a post-conflict activity.

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Support to the electoral process: The re-establishment of law and order and the creation of a secure environment are essential prerequisites to the successful conduct of elections. Without some guarantee of protection and security, individuals will not have the confidence to vote and the electoral process will lack credibility. Military support for the electoral process may take many forms but will generally consist of the establishment and protection of voting centres and the secure transportation of ballot boxes and electoral staff.

Disarmament, demobilisation and integration


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Disarmament and demobilisation operations will be only one phase of a wider and longer term transition operation designed to reform the indigenous security sector and to (re)integrate those military personnel, considered surplus to military requirements, back into society. All such operations will invariably involve many civil and military agencies in a fully integrated plan. A process of de-criminalisation and concerns over child soldiers will be a major effort throughout. Without a rudimentary security framework, there is little or no chance of armed forces agreeing to disarm or demobilise. Financial inducements and an offer of future employment may encourage disarmament and demobilisation. However, unless armed forces can see a sustainable future for themselves and those they represent, development programmes and the creation of a self-sustaining peace will remain highly problematic. The tendency to revert to violence to achieve objectives will remain high until an alternate, guaranteed and economically viable form of employment can be provided. Forcible disarmament may be considered, but over a wide area would be very manpower intensive and in certain cultures impossible to accomplish. The final military phase of a demobilisation and disarmament operation may be the handing over of security tasks to legally and trained constituted local forces. The creation and training of such a force may be a prerequisite for longer term success and a task for elements of the PSF.

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Sequence of disarmament and demobilisation: Disarmament and demobilisation operations may follow the sequence described below.

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Securing agreement: Agreement to any disarmament and demobilisation process should be voluntary, but could be secured through sheer exhaustion, truce, or as the result of a successful peace enforcement operation. Disarmament and demobilisation operations, which occur as a consequence of enforcement, will be difficult to manage. Details in the agreement should include arrangements for the separation of forces, procedures for the handing in, storage and destruction of weapons, and the cantonment, training and demobilisation of forces.

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Establishing and managing a cease-fire:
  1. Scope: Cease-fires normally depend on a clear geographical delineation and an agreed time-scale for their implementation. However, in more volatile circumstances, and when forces are intermingled, the best that may be achieved could be a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal to camp.

  2. Delineated cease-fires: In geographical terms, a cease-fire may be delineated by:

    cease-fire line;
    zone of separation;
    control zone; and
    area cease-fire.

  3. Management of cease-fires: The effective management of a cease-fire will require close supervision on both sides of the line, with radio communications between them, by observers and patrols on the ground and in the air, and possibly at sea. The cease-fire document should contain procedures and responsibilities for:

    investigation;
    arbitration;
    attribution; and
    penalties and rewards.

  4. Responses: A prompt and firm response to breaches of cease-fire agreements is essential. Delayed and inappropriate responses will prejudice the credibility of the cease-fire and risk a degeneration of the overall security situation.
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Withdrawal and assembly of former warring factions: Following a cease-fire or peace agreement, demobilisation operations may require the co-ordinated disengagement and withdrawal of forces into prescribed assembly areas or cantonment sites. For security reasons, such actions are best conducted simultaneously and tied to specific times and dates, throughout the whole JOA. Suitable reception arrangements and efficient administrative and logistic support plans are essential for success. Should the local authorities be incapable of performing these tasks, they may fall to the PSF.

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Disarming former warring factions: Successful disarmament is dependent upon the confidence that the parties have in the demobilisation process as a whole. Critically, it hinges on their trust in the PSF to keep the peace. Disarmament may need to be mutually phased and encouraged by a series of rewards. Besides collecting weapons from former combatants, disarmament may include the collection of war supplies from any stockpiles and depots or even weapons in transit. The safe custody and accurate accounting for weapons and material are essential. The destruction of weapons and other warlike materials must be planned in an ecologically sound manner.

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Demobilisation: Having completed disarmament, the next step in the process is to select those individuals or units that are to be retained and trained and those considered surplus to military and other security (police) requirements and discharged. The size and shape of any future defence and security force should be the result of a comprehensive review that balances requirements with resources. Military forces who wish to transfer to the police service will need comprehensive retraining, and those being discharged will have to be educated and trained with a view to civilian employment.

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Rehabilitation of former warring factions: Having selected those who can be trained for a future security force, support measures will need to be created for the dispersal and rehabilitation of the remainder of the parties. This stage is principally the responsibility of the civil authorities and will be carried out in conjunction with the reconstitution of the other means of government and state control, and the provision of alternate forms of employment. This will inevitably be an expensive and long-term aspiration that will be conditional upon the development of a viable state economy. In many cases, the military will include those who were responsible for the perpetration of many of the human rights abuses and war crimes, even against their own people. Issues of culpability and justice may need to be addressed as part of the reconciliation process and as a precursor to the recreating of trust in the security and defence sector.

Section III
PEACE ENFORCEMENT TASKS
Restoration of law and order operations


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Just as operations to contain a conflict or forcibly to separate belligerent parties may be a necessary precursor to operations designed to restore law and order, so operations to enforce the rule of law may be a necessary precursor to a peacekeeping operation. Thus, from a peace enforcement perspective, PSO tasks may be seen as a seamless spectrum leading to a peaceful settlement. The restoration of law and order will generally be a task for the police or local authorities. However, operations to restore the rule of law will inevitably be required in the circumstances of chaos associated with a complex crisis, and when there are no coherent parties, or the parties are ill-disciplined and indistinguishable from the criminal elements of the local society. In such circumstances, military operations may be designed to counter insurgent, terrorist or criminal activities and enforce the terms specified in the mandate. The successful re-imposition of the rule of law may be dependent upon separating and protecting the general population from the protagonists while gradually subverting or eliminating any who obstruct the restoration of the rule of law. The creation of a relatively secure environment will be necessary to allow civilian agencies the freedom of movement necessary to conduct their operations.

The protection of humanitarian operations and human rights


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Should the situation be such that humanitarian operations require widespread protection and human rights abuses are endemic, then a peace enforcement profile will be more appropriate. The foremost task for the military force may be to restore the peace and create a stable and secure environment in which aid can run freely and human rights abuses are curtailed. Specific protection tasks may include non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) but will more normally apply to the protection of convoys, depots, equipment and those workers responsible for their operation. Conditions of widespread banditry and genocide may exist, and when aid operations are being consistently interrupted, there may be a requirement to use force in large measure to prevent the genocide and achieve the mission. Such activities will need the closest co-operation and co-ordination between military forces, aid agencies and human rights groups, not least to maintain the independent status of the aid agencies. When violations of human rights have occurred, or are still occurring, it is essential that all evidence, and, in particular, details of those involved, are systematically and accurately recorded for future war crime investigations. When military protection is not available, aid agencies may need to use local personnel or civilian firms for guards and protection. The use of such persons and companies for these duties is the responsibility of the agencies, but may in itself a create a security problem that may need to be carefully managed.

Conflict containment


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Conflict containment operations are designed to intervene into areas of actual or potential conflict and to use or threaten force in order to prevent any further hostile acts and enforce a cessation of hostilities. The aim of conflict containment is to prevent the spread of the conflict to neighbouring areas and states. Consequently, actions should be designed to stabilise the situation and create an environment in which means other than the use of force, such as negotiation, will be used to resolve differences. Conflict containment operations may require the forcible separation of belligerent parties.

The forcible separation of belligerent parties


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Peoples and states have an inherent right to use force in self-defence and when they believe their primary interests are threatened. In such circumstances, international intervention may be considered imperious and inappropriate. Should political pressures fail to achieve separation and forcible military separation is the only option, the achievement of the mission may require the exercise of a large degree of force. In an intrastate conflict, the forcible separation of parties who are determined to continue fighting, may require the deployment of overwhelming force. Military commanders given a mission in which the desired endstate is not the defeat of any of the warring parties, but to force their separation and disengagement, should conduct operations in an even-handed and impartial manner. As a commander develops the situation, he should redeploy his forces and adjust the tempo of activity so that the belligerent parties have an option to disengage and withdraw. If they do not do so, then the alternative is to pursue a military operation more vigorously. However, diplomatic activities should continue to run parallel with military operations and every pause in any enforcement campaign should be viewed as an opportunity for further diplomatic initiatives.

The establishment and supervision of protected or safe areas


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Requirement: The requirement to establish and supervise a protected or safe area can arise when any community is at risk from persistent attack. However, unless those within the safe area are disarmed, it may be used as a base from which to sally out and conduct raids. Clear guidance should be given, therefore, about what is demanded of any force that is tasked with establishing and supervising a protected or safe area. Inevitably, efforts will be needed to counter the accusations from those within and outside the safe area that the operation is designed to assist the other side. Having received guidance on the required nature of the operation, other tactical questions need to be resolved, such as the nature of the threat from which the area is to be protected. Whether the threat is from small arms, artillery or other indirect weapons, including air or sea launched weapons, it will have a significant effect on the force profile.

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Conduct: Areas to be protected or made safe may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons and substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the belligerent forces. Forces may be charged with the establishment and supervision of such areas and to provide support and assistance to other organisations within the safe area. The first stage in any PSO designed to protect or make an area safe, is to demilitarise that area. This, in itself, may require enforcement actions. Having accomplished that, and taken all necessary measures to defend the area, other specific military tasks may include:
  1. establishing, monitoring and enforcing weapon exclusion zones;
  2. establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon holding areas and sites;
  3. holding ground;
  4. dominating approaches;
  5. conducting patrols and searches;
  6. manning checkpoints and other control measures;
  7. developing reinforcement and extraction plans; and
  8. controlling the air.

Guarantee and denial of movement


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These operations guarantee or deny movement by air, land or sea and thus are jointly undertaken and generally conducted at the operational level. Operations that guarantee or deny movement will not be credible if they rely on the consent of the parties to the conflict for success. Such operations will therefore need to be conducted by a peace enforcement force capable of escalation. Examples might include the enforcement of a maritime exclusion zone or no-fly zone to prevent the harassment of an unprotected population, or the creation of a safe corridor to allow for the free and unmolested movement of aid and refugees, and the protection of own forces.

Enforcement of sanctions


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The enforcement of sanctions may be synonymous with operations designed to deny movement. Sanctions concern the denial of supplies, diplomatic, economic and other trading privileges, and the freedom of movement of those living in the area of sanctions. Operations to enforce sanctions will be joint and conducted at the operational level. Sanctions may be conducted partially against a specific party or impartially over a wider area embracing all parties. Partial operations can compromise any subsequent PSO.

Section IV
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF


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Humanitarian operations, in the narrow sense of the provision of aid, are principally the preserve of humanitarian or aid agencies, whether UN, government, including host government where one exists, NGOs and the civil sector. In cases of dire emergency, military forces may be required to conduct relief operations. However, military relief operations should be co-ordinated with other ongoing and pending emergency aid and development programmes. More normally, military forces work to create the conditions in which these other agencies can operate more freely and effectively.

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Human rights issues: Humanitarian relief operations, in the wider sense, include the protection of human rights, the recording of violations, justice and the introduction of a self-sustaining improvement in the human rights situation throughout the theatre of operations. In the case of widespread violations, this must be addressed in the mandate, the mission and the military tasks. While the monitoring and protection of human rights, and the recording of violations is the principal role of organisations such as Amnesty International and the ICRC, a PSF has inherent human rights responsibilities under international law and, in addition, may be called upon to fulfil a variety of supporting functions in close co-ordination with specialist agencies and civilian police. Close liaison with human rights officers and the civilian police will provide commanders with essential pre-deployment planning details and assist in the conduct of operations and the achievement of the political endstate. The prevention of systematic and widespread violations of human rights and, in particular, the apprehension of the perpetrators of war crimes will generally require the deployment of a peace enforcement force supported by specialist war crimes investigators, and other civilian enforcement agencies. However, the accurate recording of war crimes, such as the prevention of the delivery of aid or the indiscriminate shelling of civilians by all forces may be used to support subsequent investigations.

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Strategic co-ordination: Most humanitarian relief operations involve a large variety of international aid and development agencies, human rights groups and civil sector companies. When appropriate, military planners should seek their advice before military involvement. Strategic co-ordination and operational planning can be improved by contingency planning meetings and the harmonisation of doctrine and procedures. When many agencies are involved, the establishment of a lead aid agency can more easily achieve co-ordination.

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Subjects of humanitarian relief: The abuse of human rights and the forced migration of displaced persons (those forced to leave their homes) and refugees (those forced to leave their home states) are a common feature of crisis. The numbers of such people needing help can range from individuals to entire ethnic groups. In the first instance, support to displaced persons and refugees should be left to specialist agencies, such as the ICRC and the UNHCR. However, the scale of the problem may be so huge that it requires the assistance of military forces.

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Conduct of humanitarian relief operations: Military relief operations may be designed to provide emergency relief, the delivery of aid supplies, the prevention of human rights violations, or longer term reconstruction assistance to aid agencies and the civil sector, including local communities. Relief operations should be conducted impartially. However, aid to one party, even when it is based on a perception of need, will invariably be seen as partial by other parties, and relief supplies will inevitably filter through to belligerent forces. In much the same way, the administration of justice against those responsible for violations of the mandate and international humanitarian law will be perceived as being partial by those in receipt of the enforcement actions. In neither case should this dissuade the PSF from taking the necessary enforcement actions. However, every effort should be made to explain what actions are and are not acceptable and their consequences, to demonstrate and reinforce the impartial status of the force and to support the independent and impartial position of the aid agencies.

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Emergency relief: Emergency relief concerns the sustainment of the means to safeguard life. The protection of human life should be an inherent responsibility of a PSF and should, when necessary, be specified in the mandate. Where large-scale and widespread abuses of human rights are occurring, protection can only be provided by a peace enforcement force.

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Reconstruction activities: Longer-term assistance concerns the reconstruction of a life support infrastructure capable of providing facilities such as food, water, fuel and other means of self-support, sustainment and the guarantee of human rights. Typically, such operations could involve the digging of wells, the reconnection of water and electricity grid systems (where they exist) and the rebuilding of schools, hospitals and a communication network. A speedy and effective response to requests for assistance will enhance the credibility of the PSF. In the conduct of reconstruction activities, care must be taken to ensure that military activities do not create a dependency culture that will hinder a return to normality. Irrespective of the success of other reconstruction activities, without justice and an effective legal system that guarantees human rights, peace is unlikely to endure and to be self-sustaining. The recreation of such a system is therefore vital to the long-term success of the mission and resources should be allocated accordingly. Civil-military co-ordination staff will help to facilitate reconstruction activities and a dedicated budgetary officer will normally be needed to deal with the proportionally large nature of engineering expenditure. Longer term reconstruction activities will be the responsibility of civilian agencies

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Operational co-ordination: In order to make the best use of scarce resources and to pre-empt potential sources of friction, it is essential that military and civilian agencies co-ordinate their activities and co-operate fully to achieve unity of effort. Civil-military co-ordination and liaison are the responsibility of the CIMIC J9 staff, but in close liaison with other staff branches, especially J3. It is a J9 responsibility to ensure that decisions that affect military activities and the conduct of humanitarian relief operations are fully co-ordinated and briefed to commanders. CIMIC staff may be increased through the establishment of civil-military co-ordination centres. These provide a place of liaison with aid agencies, the local government and communities, and can react to requests for assistance and complaints against the parties or the PSF. It is important, however, that the local population does not develop a reliance on the military force to resolve all their problems. CIMIC centres should be regarded as referral centres and should ideally be located away from the main military force and in a position of maximum accessibility to the aid agencies and the local population. When appropriate, CIMIC centres may contain a media operations section.

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Protection of humanitarian assistance operations: A peacekeeping force may be tasked with specific protective tasks for a humanitarian operation. However, a peacekeeping force will not be able to ensure the protection and delivery of aid against widespread opposition. Activities designed to provide security and the protection of basic human rights can only be achieved by a peace enforcement force. In circumstances where aid agencies employ local guards, or protection is provided by companies from the civil sector, it is important that their activities are also co-ordinated within the wider operational approach.

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Negative effects of humanitarian aid: Security, for both recipients and donors, must be a precursor for a humanitarian operation to provide long-term relief from suffering. Humanitarian operations, while relieving suffering in the short term, if not carefully managed, can actually sustain the conflict and prolong the suffering. By taking the responsibility of care and feeding of their own people from the parties, humanitarian relief operations can encourage intransigence and actually sustain the will and means to fight, rather than the will to make peace. In effect, it can take the blame for the disaster away from those responsible and allow them to challenge the intention, status and impartial nature of the operation. In these circumstances, the selective but impartial delivery of aid can be used to refute such allegations and accusations of partiality.

Explosive ordnance (mine) clearance


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Hazards: Explosive ordnance, especially mines, pose a significant threat to all people, equipment and animals, during and after the termination of a conflict, both at sea and on land. With the exception of mines in international waters, unexploded ordnance and minefields in combat zones are the responsibility of the party who laid them. In theory, they remain part of their obstacle plan should the PSF withdraw. If the PSF wishes to retain its impartial status, it is obliged not to reveal the location of one party’s minefields to the other, although it should try and ensure that they are discreetly and adequately marked. Unless the mandate specifies otherwise, a PSF is not permitted to lift a party’s unexploded ordnance or minefields, except when those munitions prevent the force from carrying out its mission, or offer a hazard along tracks and sea-lanes in use by international shipping or other non-involved parties.

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Tasks: While unexploded ordnance and mine clearance operations are the responsibility of the party who laid them, the PSF can be employed to mark, isolate and clear mines and unexploded ordnance where they present a direct threat to life. They can also be employed to train local forces to do the same. They will generally seek to identify areas of hazard. This information will usually be produced on a master map which is available for dissemination to all elements of the operation. Non-military personnel who consider that they may be about to venture into an area at risk from mines and unexploded ordnance would be advised to check with local military units first. Within the UN, the DHA is the focus for all mine related and mine clearance operations. There is a growing trend to employ civilian companies to undertake mine clearance operations.