Section I
PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Selection and application

0301
The principles of war apply to the conduct of PSOs as to any other military operation. However, the distinct nature of PSOs requires the consideration of the extra principles defined in this chapter, and that the principles of war are given a particular interpretation and/or emphasis. The following list is a compilation of these principles and their relevance to the conduct of PSOs. The judgement of those responsible for planning and executing a PSO will temper the weight and the application of each one.

Objective

0302
Every military operation must be directed towards an attainable objective or endstate. In a joint and multinational PSO of long duration, involving many civilian organisations and agencies, military strategic objectives may be milestones along the way in achieving the political endstate or an actual element of that end-state. Military activities may be designed to assist the further development of the PSO by other civilian agencies. Such complex issues must be addressed in the formulation of the mandate and mission plan in order to achieve both unity of effort and purpose among all military and civilian organisations and agencies involved in the PSO. In the context of a PSO, the principle of objective relates directly to the other principles of unity of effort, co-operation, civil-military co-operation and liaison, and indirectly to mutual respect, transparency and credibility.

Perseverance

0303
The achievement of the political endstate in PSOs will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives. Protracted development plans may curtail the military aspiration to achieve operational tempo, and lead to military impatience and frustration. However, the pursuit of short-term military success, at the expense of long-term social, economic and political gains should be resisted. The principle of perseverance relates directly to the objective, sustainment, economy of effort, and all other principles addressing the interaction with the civilian agencies in the mission.

Unity of effort

0304
The complexity of any likely PSO, and the necessity for continual military interaction with a large number of international organisations, NGOs and private voluntary organisations will probably make co-ordination with their activities one of the most difficult challenges. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents, and between the military and civilian components of any operation.

0305
Unity of effort also acknowledges that co-ordination with civilian agencies can usually only be achieved through dialogue and consensus and not by command. It can best be achieved through the development of a political/military mission plan. The SRSG or HoM will have prime responsibility for the co-ordination and achievement of unity of effort. To achieve unity of effort at the strategic level requires close liaison between the authorising political body and national political bodies and, at the operational and tactical levels, close and early liaison between the military and civilian components of the operation. Effective liaison at all levels and regular conferences and meetings involving all agencies and parties will be essential in achieving unity of effort.

Flexibility

0306
The multi-agency environment in which PSOs are conducted, and the multifunctional nature of the challenges to be confronted, require commanders at all levels to place a premium on initiative and flexibility. Detailed orders will often be overly prescriptive for the management of a PSO environment; hence, the requirement to be fully aware of superior intent and the political context of the PSO, and the practice of mission analysis and the adoption of a manoeuvrist approach. The principle of flexibility relates directly to that of the freedom of military movement.

0307
The successful management of PSOs involves the management of change and the transition to peace. Within the constraints of the mandate, and thus their ROE, forces should be able to adapt and move from one activity to another at short notice and with the minimum outside assistance. A PSF should be balanced and independent in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment and logistics. Arrangements to facilitate the speedy availability of reserves should also be considered.

0308
Thus, flexibility is vital to the successful conduct of PSOs and, in particular, peace enforcement that has to be capable of dealing with an escalation of military activity. As a consequence, ROE and the mechanism for their amendment have to be flexible, responsive and designed to cope with likely changes in the operational environment and the PSO force structure. ROE should be designed, however, so that they provide the maximum flexibility to the military commanders to perform their missions in a changing environment.

Restraint and the use of force

0309
Political considerations and the need to work with a wide range of civilian agencies will require that all military actions, and in particular the use of force, are restrained and balanced against the long-term requirements of peacebuilding.

0310
The management of the consequences of the use of force and the achievement of objectives is one of the most important considerations with which the SRSG, HoM or JFC must deal. It affects every aspect of the mission and requires continual review to balance security and mission accomplishment. The JFC should make the final determination regarding force capability requirements after reviewing the situation, mandate and operational constraints. Appropriate, supporting ROE should be requested by him and submitted for approval. In all cases, the use of force in any PSO shall be in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, the rules of international (humanitarian) law and the politically approved ROE. Only the minimum necessary force should ever be used, but this does not exclude the use of sufficient force to overwhelm, should it be necessary to do so and where collateral damage can be strictly controlled.

0311
In all PSOs, the use of force is permitted for self-defence. Within a multinational force, self-defence needs careful definition within the ROE to reconcile national differences and to prevent misinterpretation. Any further use of force, such as to guarantee freedom of movement and to enforce compliance, must be authorised explicitly by the mandate. The precise amount of force to be used, is a tactical decision by the local commander. This should be based on the threat situation and authorised ROE, and balanced against potential strategic, operational and tactical consequences.

0312
When used, force should be precise, timely, appropriate and proportionate. However, any recourse to force should be designed to resolve and defuse a crisis, and prevent further escalation. The unnecessary, or irrational use of force may provoke a hostile reaction throughout the JOA and adversely affect the perceived impartiality and credibility of the PSF, leading potentially to a loss of consent and the possible failure of the mission.

0313
Options other than the use of force, e.g. negotiations, may be adequate, and must always be considered and used if possible and appropriate. ROE cannot cover every situation and cannot substitute for the sound judgement of those involved.

Legitimacy

0314
The greater the perceived legitimacy of the PSO, the greater will be its support within the international community, contributing nations, and the involved parties, including the civil community in the JOA. Legal issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Security

0315
Self-defence is an inherent right and force protection a command responsibility in all military operations. In its mandate and political and military directive, the PSF may also be given specific responsibilities for the protection of any civilian components of the operation. This will have to be taken into account when planning the size and composition of the force and when drawing up military orders and ROE.

0316
On occasion, aid agencies may employ local civilians or expatriates as guards and escorts. When they do, their security status, precise responsibilities and operating procedures will require co-ordination with the activities of the PSF. This interaction must be regularly reviewed by the JFC.

0317
All military personnel involved in an operation must be trained and equipped in such a manner as to maximise their safety while carrying out their tasks. While they cannot be forced to do so, civil agencies operating within a mandated military JOA should be encouraged to make their personnel appropriately aware of the risks and dangers they may face.

Promotion of co-operation and consent

0318
The promotion of co-operation and consent and the willing and active involvement of all parties and the local people will be fundamental in achieving a lasting and self-sustaining peace in all PSOs. The wider support of the international community will also play a part in sustaining the operation. Any force activities that may result in a loss of consent should therefore be balanced against this requirement.

0319
A general loss of consent by a PSF resourced and configured for peacekeeping alone, may have grave consequences. Any loss of consent for a PSF prepared for peace enforcement should be manageable, but will eventually need to be recovered if the operation is to progress towards the desired endstate.

Impartiality

0320
PSOs must be conducted impartially without favour or prejudice to any party and in accordance with the mandate. This is essential to retain their trust and confidence. At some stage in a campaign, a PSF may be accused of being partial and this may have a negative effect on the credibility of the PSF and its ability to accomplish its mission. Whenever possible, such accusations should be refuted and all actions taken to demonstrate and convey the impartial status of the PSF. Effective communications and transparency of operations are key in maintaining at least the perception of impartiality with the parties.

0321
The actions of all the parties will be judged in accordance with the mandate and international humanitarian law. This intent and the consequences of their actions should be conveyed in a clear and unambiguous manner to the parties, and any infractions of international humanitarian law and/or the mandate should be dealt with swiftly and decisively by the PSF, irrespective of the party concerned.

Credibility

0322
For the PSF to be effective, it must be credible and perceived as such. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the assessment by the parties of the force’s capability to accomplish the mission. Establishing credibility will also create confidence in the operation, not just among the local parties, but also with the international community. A co-ordinated plan will be important in achieving this. While the PSF should not appear to pose a direct threat to any of the parties if they remain compliant, there should be no doubt that it is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and is supported by the political will to do so. Therefore, the national military components must be well-equipped and self-sufficient, as well as prepared and trained for their mission.

0323
The PSF must demonstrate its effectiveness with the initial deployment to the JOA. The PSF must be employed with a sound concept of operations and adequate ROE, based upon the mandate, to guarantee mission success, even in the face of attempts by the parties to either gain an advantage or to undermine the mission. The force must respond with professional bearing and swift, effective, impartial actions to incidents. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of disciplined, controlled and professional behaviour, both on and off duty.

Mutual respect

0324
The respect in which the PSF is held, will be a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the parties and the local population. Through status of forces agreements (SOFAs) or other special agreements, the PSF enjoys certain immunities related to its duties. Notwithstanding this, its members must respect the laws and customs of the host nation and must be seen to be doing so. The PSF will also acknowledge the de facto status and position of the parties to the conflict and will usually not act to change them, except as agreed to by all parties. Commanders should also ensure that the same principles are recognised and implemented among the different national, cultural and ethnic elements within the formations that make up the PSF.

Transparency of operations

0325
The PSF’s mission and concept of operations must be easily understood and obvious to all parties. They must be fully aware of what the mandate demands of them and what the consequences will be of not complying. Likewise, they should also be made aware of the advantages to be gained by compliance. Failure to achieve common understanding may lead to suspicion, distrust or even hostility. Information should be gathered and communicated through open sources wherever possible.

0326
While transparency of operations should be the general rule, this must be balanced against the need to ensure the security of the mission and its members. The requirements of force protection, especially in the conduct of peace enforcement, may render transparency inappropriate.

Freedom of military movement

0327
Freedom of movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any PSO and should be covered by the mandate. The PSF should at all times be free to perform its duties throughout the designated mission area.

0328
Experience indicates that parties will often try to impose local restrictions on freedom of movement. These restrictions must be resolutely and swiftly resolved through negotiations, and if these do not achieve success, more vigorous and resolute action, including the use of force, may be needed.

Civil-military co-operation and liaison

0329
Ideally, all implementing agencies, both military and civilian will be involved in the development of the mission plan. At the tactical level, the timely and effective harmonisation and co-ordination of military activities with those of the civilian agencies are essential for success. Co-ordination should encompass all involved political, military, diplomatic, administrative and humanitarian government organisations and agencies, and NGOs. Ultimately, co-ordination can only be achieved through consultation as these agencies have permanent mandates and agendas that may compete with each other and be different to those of the military force.

0330
Co-operation arrangements should be supported by the establishment of committees, action groups and extensive liaison with all the agencies and organisations involved. Relations between the military component of an operation and non-military agencies should be based on mutual respect, communication and the standardisation of support to ensure that unnecessary overlap is avoided and that unity of effort is concentrated on the fulfilment of the mandate.

Section II
THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS UNDERPINNING PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0331
The conduct of PSOs requires an understanding of the complex concepts of consent and impartiality, and how they will constrain and guide the conduct of military activities, in particular the use of force. An understanding of the interaction between these fundamentals is essential for the management of civil-military interaction and the achievement of the political endstate in PSOs.

Consent

0332
The nature of consent: It is helpful if consent is viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, it is seen as a determinant of the conduct of the PSF itself — the emphasis that the PSF gives to the promotion and maintenance of consent — and secondly, from the perception of the parties and the indigenous population. Judgements concerning the level of consent should be made with reference to time and space — time as in the permanence or fragility of consent, and space, both horizontally across all elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict. The consent of the parties will usually derive from local events and prevailing popular opinion. While there may be consent at the strategic level, (by virtue of national or party commitments to a peace agreement), there may be renegade local groups at the tactical level who disagree violently with their strategic leaders, and who may be hostile to the PSO. This may result in non-compliance by (para)military elements of one or more of the parties and attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of the PSF. In the aftermath of an interstate conflict the degree of consent should be relatively clearcut and agreed to in a peace plan by the disputing states. In the event of an intrastate conflict or civil war, the warring factions may be difficult to differentiate from the general population, making any judgements concerning consent highly problematic. Consent from the warring factions may be no more than partial and amount to nothing more than a phoney tolerance of the operation, while the rest of the population may be desperate for intervention and assistance. Should the level of consent be uncertain, and the potential for opposition exist, it would be prudent to deploy a peace enforcement force capable of enforcing compliance and promoting consent from the outset.

0333
The significance of consent: The promotion of co-operation and consent is fundamental in achieving the political endstate in all PSOs. Without the active co-operation and consent of the parties and the indigenous population there can only be subservience and a dependency culture, not a self-sustaining peace. The need to promote co-operation and consent and the long-term demands of peace will constrain the use of all military techniques and not just the use of force. This should not be confused with a minimalist approach, but is the basis of a philosophical approach to the use of force which limits its application to that necessary to achieve the desired outcome. This is also a legal principle that is enshrined in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

0334
Compliance, justice and consent: Closely linked to consent are assessments concerning the projected levels of compliance with the PSO. Compliance may already exist or may need to be encouraged by inducements and rewards, or enforced by coercion. The enforcement of compliance may be a necessary precursor or adjunct to the promotion of co-operation and consent. Coercive compliance is not an option for a lightly armed peacekeeping force. A generally compliant environment allows the PSF to fix recalcitrant elements and create the operational space necessary to promote co-operation among the remaining elements of the population. In the conduct of PSOs, if the immediate military object is to bring an end to any fighting, commanders must talk to the leaders of those engaged in the fighting. However, this tends to leave the victims of violence and those who already wish to live in peace voiceless, and almost inevitably means that those involved in the fighting determine the terms of any settlement. In this way, crimes against humanity and violations of the fundamentals of international law may be rewarded. In such circumstances, peace with impunity and without justice is unlikely to receive the consent and wide support which is necessary for its continuation. Thus, the creation of self-sustaining peace requires that commanders do not focus their activities exclusively on those involved in the fighting, but work to promote the co-operation and consent of those already engaged in peaceful activities.

0335
Consequences of a general loss of consent and non-compliance: There are various ways that a PSF might lose consent. A belligerent faction may simply decide to remove consent and compliance unilaterally. Consent may also be lost if a PSF is perceived as taking sides, or if it uses excessive force in what is considered an inappropriate or illegal manner. Credibility, linked to consent, may also be lost if the PSF does not respond to breaches of the mandate to enforce international laws and take action to control major abuses to basic human rights such as ethnic cleansing. A loss of consent and non-compliance may result in an escalation of violence, sustained opposition to the PSF and a possible loss of control. In such circumstances, a PSF may find it necessary to divert its efforts to force protection tasks rather than the accomplishment of the mission.

0336
The management of consent: In addition to the promotion of the co-operation of the local people, much of the conduct of a PSF will be designed to manipulate the threshold of consent, in order to create more operational space and greater freedom of action. This can best be achieved by the deployment of a PSF with sufficient capability to deter hostile actions, or by the judicious application of force to demonstrate and reinforce credibility. When force is used, it will be necessary to have a keen feeling for the impact that actions may have, not just on local consent, but also on the consent for the operation as a whole. When general consent is in doubt, its stabilisation and promotion should be a priority task, but when it is more certain, it may be possible to use more robust methods in confined areas without affecting the overall level of consent and the accomplishment of the mission. At all levels, political leverage, sanctions and the threat of credible force or its judicious use, may be sufficient to deter or persuade the parties and individuals to consent to an operation and comply with the wishes of the authorising body.

0337
Transmission of consent: Experience has shown the need for continued effort, not only to expand areas of general consent, but also to transmit consent up and down a party’s chain of command. For example, if a JFC has secured the agreement of a leader to a particular course of action, he should try to ensure that the terms of that agreement are promptly and accurately passed on to those party members facing his subordinate commanders, thereby limiting misinterpretation and non-compliance. Liaison officers with faction headquarters can help to monitor the passage of orders and agreements and, if necessary, assist with their transmission.

0338
Co-operative ventures: Consent will be further promoted if it can be shown to the parties that their status and authority will increase if they are successful in resolving their own dispute. If the people and parties can be made shareholders in the peace process, their motivation to co-operate will be greatly increased. At the tactical level, this possibility can be pursued by creating incentive-based opportunities to co-operate in jointly carrying out certain tasks. Such action might be risky and difficult, but deserves consideration.

Impartiality

0339
The significance of impartiality: The significance of impartiality is that, if it is discarded, or the PSF is perceived as being partial by any of the parties to the conflict, it will have a negative effect on their consent for the operation and thus make the conduct of the operation more difficult. In practice, no matter how impartial the PSF tries to be, virtually every action that it takes, will be more to the advantage or disadvantage of one party or another. Accusations of partiality can be expected at some stage in the conduct of all PSOs. Such accusations must be refuted and this can be enhanced if PSF actions are transparent to all. In the conduct of peace enforcement a perceived loss of impartiality and consent is of less significance than in the conduct of peacekeeping. Should impartiality be discarded, the PSF will become a party to the conflict and the operation will cease to be a PSO and, in effect, become an armed conflict.

0340
The nature of impartiality: An aid in understanding impartiality is to view it, like consent, from two associated perspectives: as a determinant of the conduct of the PSF, and from the perception of the belligerent parties. The conduct of a PSF should always be impartial and even-handed, and should force be used against a particular party, it will only be because of what that party is doing, or not doing, in relation to the mandate, rather than who they are. This may be described as principled impartiality that contrasts strongly with that of a neutral stance. The use of force, even when applied in an even-handed and impartial manner, is unlikely to be perceived as such, especially by any party that persistently transgresses. However, for a PSF capable of combat, the perception of the parties will be of less immediate concern than for a peacekeeping force. An analogy can help to relate impartiality to the conduct of operations. The impartial status of a legal system is not compromised because it only punishes the guilty, though that may not be the perception of a persistent criminal.

0341
Impartiality and the conduct of operations: Circumstances leading up to deployment may have already created a biased agenda and compromised the impartial status of the PSF. In such a case, every effort should be made by the PSF to redress this perception and to promote the impartial status of the mandate and the intended impartial conduct of the PSO, both internationally and in the theatre of operations. Great care must be exercised, at all levels, before and during the conduct of a PSO not to compromise the impartial nature of the operation.

0342
Impartiality and transparency: It is more difficult to challenge the impartial status of a mission if the parties are made aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions and likely techniques to be used by the force. This will place a premium on the requirement for an active information strategy, reinforced by the civil-military co-operation programme and an effective liaison system. A failure to communicate could foster suspicion and may prevent the development of the trust and confidence upon which the long-term success of the operation may depend. However, the requirements of force protection, especially in the conduct of peace enforcement, may render transparency inappropriate.

0343
Impartiality versus neutrality: Impartiality should not be confused with neutrality. To do so limits the potential to exercise initiative and flexibility, promotes passivity and, as a consequence, limits the development of the mission. Impartiality, perhaps better described as principled impartiality, requires a degree of judgement against a set of principles, or the mandate, or both, while the notion of neutrality does not. The conduct of PSOs will be impartial to the parties, but never neutral in the execution of the mission.

0344
Consequences of a loss of impartiality: A perceived loss of impartiality may have serious consequences. It can result in a loss of trust and the confidence of the local factions and cause them to withdraw consent, and thus limit the options that may be available to the PSF. At worst, a perception of partiality and a consequent loss of consent could lead to widespread non-compliance and unrestrained violence, resulting in heavy military and civilian casualties and the failure of the mission.

Minimum necessary force

0345
The principle of minimum necessary force controls the use of overwhelming force to only those circumstances where it is necessary and then places tight constraints upon collateral damage. A misuse of force may have a negative effect on the consent for an operation and thus the ability of a PSF to achieve its long-term goal of peacebuilding. Any use of force therefore should be carefully managed. In a PSO involving parties with a working infrastructure, including good communications, the negative effects of any use of force may be more difficult to contain and control. However, in a situation of chaos, or where the parties are unco-ordinated and independent, considerably more force can generally be used, as long as incidents remain isolated. In peace enforcement, the capability and willingness to use force are primary characteristics, but when force is used, it should be applied prudently and all positive measures should be taken to avoid civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage. Nevertheless, in peace enforcement, all necessary force, including overwhelming force, may have to be used when challenged, to have an immediate impact, deter further acts of non-compliance and maintain credibility. Whatever the circumstances, the use of force should be seen as a tool to set the conditions for the development of peace in the long term, rather than the means of defeating a designated enemy. The details of how and when force can be used will be specified in military orders and ROE.

0346
The use of force and self-defence: Military forces should not confuse the wider use of force with the inherent right of self-defence. The right to use reasonable force in self-defence is enshrined in international and national law. However, what constitutes self-defence needs careful and precise definition in terms of hostile acts or intentions and defence of oneself, of other members of the military force, military equipment and facilities, civilian members of the wider operation and civilian equipment and facilities. There are two broad conceptual views of the use of force in self-defence:

The broader interpretation is that a force that is threatened during the conduct of its mission, can use force in self-defence and in defence of its purposes. For example, should a PSF, with ROE limited to self-defence, witness an attack by one party on another, the only way the PSF can use force to defend the party being attacked is to intervene and put itself in the line of fire. Thus, the peacekeeping force may be able to use force within the definition of self-defence.



The narrow interpretation of self-defence would suggest that the PSF should not deploy if there is a risk that the use of force may be necessary. However, not to intervene when confronted by widespread abuses of basic human rights and ethnic cleansing, may be regarded as a dereliction of military duty. At least, this is likely to be the perception of the international media. A narrow and neutral concept of operations which limits itself to observation and reporting, will not be appropriate in circumstances of widespread violations of basic human rights and ethnic cleansing, even if it does reduce the risk of casualties to the PSF. To take the narrow approach may undermine the credibility of the PSF, not just with the wider international community and the parties to the conflict, but also with aid agencies that operate unarmed and generally unprotected.

0347
The UN’s interpretation of self-defence: The UN’s interpretation of the use of force in self-defence is ambiguous. peacekeeping has traditionally been described as a non-coercive instrument. Yet, since 1973, the guidelines approved by the Security Council for each peacekeeping force have stipulated that self-defence is deemed to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping force from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. This is a broad conception of self-defence, which could only be implemented by a PSF capable of combat. In both the mandate and its directive to the SRSG, HoM or JFC, the UN should clearly define the circumstances when and how force can be used. This direction should be commensurate with the nature of the mission (peacekeeping, peace enforcement or other), its operational objectives, and the combat power of the PSF in relation to that of the parties.

0348
Consent and the use of force: In PSOs, the need to build or preserve consent may restrain, but does not foreclose the use of force, especially in a state of chaos associated with a complex emergency. In cases of clear breaches of the mandate, the flaunting of international law and the abuse of human rights, the use of force may serve to enhance the credibility of the force and the consent for the operation, nationally and internationally. It may be that the force loses local consent, but if this can be isolated, wider consent may be promoted. In certain circumstances, consent may serve to marginalise opposition and render it vulnerable to the use of force. If general, consent for the operation can be promoted to such a degree that it reduces armed opposition to the status of maverick banditry, then the use of force, which is within the prescribed limits of the ROE, may enhance consent for the PSO. In such circumstances, consent can thus facilitate, not hinder the use of force. A clear communication of the requirements of the mandate and the principles underpinning the PSO, with an explanation of the rewards for compliance and penalties for non-compliance, may serve to rationalise PSO actions, refute accusations of partiality and enhance credibility and consent.

0349
The use of force and linkage: The use of force by a peacekeeping force will usually be confined to self-defence. The use of force by a peace enforcement force is not so constrained. Having established its credibility, however, it will be unusual for a peace enforcement force to initiate the use of force without first trying other methods of deterrence and coercion. The use of force by a peace enforcement force will generally be in response to an act of non-compliance or an offensive action initiated by one or more of the parties. When a response does require the use of force, the negative effects on the overall conduct of the operation will be minimised if the response can be linked directly to the threat, and is demonstrably designed to eliminate that threat and no more. This does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of an immediate follow-up as a response to an incident. However, a follow-up must be seen to be legal, proportionate, politically justified and linked irrefutably to the aggression that triggered the response. The more this is in doubt, the greater the political risk of escalation.

0350
Other options: There are other approaches and techniques that can be used to gain and maintain the initiative when the use of force is not appropriate. These techniques are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. At the political, strategic and operational levels, it may be possible to apply political leverage, to employ the use of sanctions and embargoes or to manoeuvre another element of the PSO into a position of influence. At the tactical level, other agencies, such as human rights monitors and the ICRC, may provide an effective appropriate response. Those techniques that may prove useful when the use of force is not appropriate are listed below:

deterrence, warnings, threats, demonstrations;



information operations, including command and control warfare (C2W) techniques, when appropriate;



civil-military co-operation (CIMIC);



the use of non-lethal military technologies, but always linked to the effective use of lethal force;



negotiation and mediation;



observation and monitoring, supervision and enforcement of the mandate, interposition and other control measures;



rewards and penalties;



protection;



liaison, and communication and information systems; and



intelligence operations.

0351
Guidelines: Should force have to be used in PSOs, its application should be determined by the above considerations and the following guidelines:

Minimum necessary force: Minimum necessary force is defined as the measured and proportionate application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific objective and confined in effect to the legitimate target intended.



Observe legal limits: The mandate, ROE, international, domestic and, in peacekeeping, host nation law will establish authoritative limits on the ways and means in which force may be used.



Warning: When appropriate, the use of force may be preceded by clear warnings, overt manoeuvres, and the use of smoke or non-lethal rounds, warning shots and other demonstrations of resolve and capability.

0352
Rules of engagement: ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force may be used. ROE will reflect legal and political restraints, but will always authorise self-defence and should never inhibit a commander’s ability to take all necessary action to protect his force. While it is highly desirable that national contingents within the same force harmonise their ROE, national laws may often override UN and force ROE.

0353
Doctrinal requirement: PSO doctrine emphasises, therefore, that the consequences of using force reach far beyond the immediate tactical situation. Many aspects require consideration besides ROE. The doctrine requires that the use of force take account of its effects on the conduct of not just military activities, but also the conduct of those other agencies working towards the same long-term goal.

Section III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF OPERATIONS

0354
To understand the complex multifunctional and multidimensional nature of PSOs requires a conceptual vision that not only focuses on the here and now, but also provides a framework to conceptualise many diverse activities in time and space. Such a conceptual framework will help to visualise and therefore synchronise the various functional areas of activity, achieve unity of effort and purpose, and direct all military and civilian activities towards strategic objectives and the political endstate. Such an approach is necessary at all levels of operation and to ensure coherence between strategic and tactical activities of activity. For example, media and peace support psychological activities targeted at international and local perceptions should be designed to reinforce, and be reinforced by tactical level military activities, such as those designed to enhance community relations through the conduct of civil-military projects. At the tactical level, the management of an incident will generally require the close control of the immediate environment around the incident, while some form of leverage to resolve the crisis, e.g. in the form of negotiation, is applied elsewhere in another dimension. For example, the removal of a roadblock and the subsequent management of a local area of operations may best be achieved by negotiation with a local civic or religious leader rather than the application of force. In this way, a multidimensional framework of understanding can provide the necessary basis for both the successful conduct of the overall mission and the guidance for the resolution of specific incidents at the tactical level. A useful means of managing this multidimensional and multifunctional framework is to distinguish between the immediate and close environment and that which may be distant in time, space, distance and function.

0355
Immediate environment: In the immediate or close environment, it will be necessary to conduct those activities that involve the intimate management and control of the operational environment. Such activities in PSOs rely on a combination of tactical techniques designed to enforce compliance and control local events, and activities designed to promote general co-operation and consent. Typical examples of close operations designed to enforce compliance are the stopping, boarding and searching of shipping, the imposition or denial of specified flying conditions, the (temporary) use of roadblocks and checkpoints, and crowd and riot control. Such operations have to be timely to be effective.

0356
Distant shaping environment: This is the environment in which the shaping of operations will generally be directed at the perceptions of the parties, and in which operations are designed to pre-empt future potential problems, or set the conditions for their successful resolution. At the strategic and operational levels, such operations will be directed at the leadership of the parties, states contributing or potentially contributing to the mission, and world opinion in general. The early deployment of significant maritime and air forces may be used to support political signals of intent and act to persuade disputing parties to desist from a particular course of action. At the operational level, such operations generally focus on local political, humanitarian and human rights issues. At the tactical level, shaping operations may involve military manoeuvres to deter, compel or coerce, or possibly the conduct of negotiations at a higher level of the parties’ chain of command from the site of any incident. In PSOs, shaping operations will be designed to ensure compliance, promote co-operation and consent and may thus require a protracted period of time. It is in this environment that functional areas of activity, other than the military, may prove most useful in achieving objectives.

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Supporting environment: It is in this environment that most supporting functions take place. It may be displaced from the immediate environment by time, space, distance and function, or be an integral part of it. Supporting operations may concern maintaining the support of the international community and of the home base for the PSO, training, and the maintenance and sustainment of the force, involving host nation support when appropriate. Force protection activities may also be viewed as taking place in this environment. Force protection activities may range from anti-piracy operations to keep maritime lines of communications open; the provision of defence works at strategic airfields; mine awareness; and measures to reduce casualties caused by traffic accidents. Force protection, maintenance and sustainment activities are inherent in all military operations. However, in PSOs, these functions may need to be extended to include support to other agencies, including NGOs, PVOs, and other PSO-related activities being conducted in the JOA by (unarmed) observers and humanitarian relief workers.

Section IV
CORE FUNCTIONS

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There are certain functions that would appear to be fundamental to and core in the management of the conceptual and multidimensional framework described above. At its simplest, there are two core functions that broadly relate to the immediate environment and the displaced and more distant environment described above. The first core function area embraces those techniques designed to shape and control the operational environment, and the second describes those techniques designed to achieve resolution. In certain military doctrine, and when addressing combat operations, these functions may be described as ‘fixing’ and ‘striking’. Implicit in both is the need for good intelligence to understand the environment and to identify the causes and solutions of the crisis. In the conduct of PSOs, military forces and civilian agencies from the emergency response or aid community will more normally address the immediate causes of suffering or the symptoms of a conflict in order to create a secure, stable and less dire environment in which the activities of other development agencies may address and resolve the underlying causes of the crisis.

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Intelligence: At the operational level and in its simplest form, sound intelligence may involve the identification of the causes of the emergency and where the main effort should be applied to resolve the conflict. At the operational and tactical levels, producing detailed intelligence on the local community, the location of refugees and all the factions, is necessary for any mission to succeed. For example, it is needed to target aid to where it is most needed and to prevent any element of the PSF from being outmanoeuvred and surprised either physically or in negotiations.

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Shaping and controlling: At the operational level, this function may refer to deterrent operations, in general, or could more specifically include naval embargoes and air interdiction operations. Other fixing functions may include such activities as the separation of forces, impounding of weapons, the provision of aid and the ending of human rights violations.

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Resolution or striking: The ultimate achievement of the mission in a PSO will require the application of the most appropriate techniques to enforce or reward compliance, enhance reconciliation, restore peace, resolve the conflict and attack or redress the underlying causes of the complex emergency. In the conduct of PSOs, ‘striking’ will not refer to the application of force, in the first instance, but could refer to the strategic delivery and tactical distribution of emergency food supplies or civil development programmes in unsecured areas.

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Sustaining the operation: The PSF has to sustain its operations until the envisaged endstate has been achieved, by means of a harmonised and effective system of the rotation of units and individuals, and by means of a harmonised and effective logistic support effort.

Section V
THE MISSION PLAN

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The mission plan is the mechanism used to translate the multifunctional and multidimensional conceptual framework described above into practice. It is designed to synchronise, co-ordinate and direct the various lines of military and civilian operations towards strategic objectives and the achievement of the political endstate. The mission plan is usually drafted by the SRSG or HoM, albeit with the advice of the PSF commander. In a mission plan, there may be multiple, concurrent and sequential lines of activity. Some of these will be single-agency, others multi-agency and all will be interlinked and require crossreference and co-ordination. In such a mission plan, co-ordination may be difficult because some component agencies, not being under operational command, may work to their own agendas and perceive any association with the military force as being counterproductive to the conduct of their own operations. The military campaign or OPLAN will represent the military line of operation in the mission plan.

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The mission plan should designate the operation’s main effort. At the strategic level, this may be to demonstrate the unity and determination of the international community to bring the parties to the conference table. At the operational level, this could be supported by joint operations, the enforcement of maritime embargoes or blockades and air exclusion zones. At the tactical level, this could involve the creation of a secure environment free from human rights violations in which civilian agencies can start to redress the symptoms and underlying causes of the conflict. As the situation stabilises, the main effort at the operational level could switch to local elections, the re-imposition of a legal system and finally reconstruction activities, including justice reconstruction that will have been a subordinate line of activity throughout.

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Set in its wider context, the mission plan can be seen as a multidimensional construct that provides commanders with an intellectual rationale for multidimensional operations, and the allocation of resources and the designation of main effort to their respective lines of operation, in accordance with the intent of the higher commander. The mission plan is not prescriptive, but will require commanders to revisit their estimates with every significant change in circumstance and allow them to modify their OPLANs accordingly. A manoeuvrist approach to operations, which tells commanders what they are to achieve, rather than a more prescriptive approach, which tells commanders in detail how they are to achieve their missions, provides the prerequisite flexibility for the execution of a complex political, military mission plan.

Section VI
THE MAOEUVRIST APPROACH

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The practitioner of a manoeuvrist approach accepts chaos and disorder, and turns it to advantage. He seeks to gain and maintain a position of advantage. Such a position may be legal, or moral — the mandate or ROE may indicate this, the prevention of ethnic cleansing for example; it may be physical — the possession of vital life saving supplies; or the possession of a greater means of coercion than the parties. A manoeuvrist approach therefore has its focus on the intangible, as well as the tangible, and attends to will and cohesion. An approach which focuses exclusively on the material, rather than the perceptions and attitudes of the parties is unlikely to persuade the parties that their best interests lie in peace and thus to achieve the reconciliation necessary for a lasting settlement. The application of the manoeuvrist approach should allow the PSF the ability to retain its own freedom of action in time and space and to control the tempo of the operation. Manoeuvre theory would therefore suggest that the successful conduct of the military phase of a PSO will require that time and resources are devoted to perception management activities. PSO techniques are dealt with in detail in Chapter 5

Section VII
MISSION COMMAND

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The manoeuvrist approach to the conduct of PSOs is best achieved by adopting mission command. Mission command describes what is to be achieved (the what), the commander’s intent (the why), specifies a timeframe (the when) and the allocation of the necessary resources (the with what). It does not dictate how the objectives should be achieved, but allows subordinate commanders the initiative to develop the mission in a coherent and positive manner. In PSOs, such a flexible and responsive method of command is best able to manage the interactions of the many involved agencies and to ensure that the mission develops coherently towards the achievement of the conditions defining the endstate. Mission development should be encouraged, as opposed to mission creep that should not. Mission creep is a term used to describe taking on new tasks beyond the original intent without the necessary prior rigorous analysis, or allocating them without the necessary resources. Mission creep normally results from incoherent political direction. Changes of mission can be erroneously made when the full breadth of implied tasks is not properly appreciated in the estimate process. While highly desirable, not all national military contingents may be familiar with the concept of mission command, and multinational force commanders may need to develop command mechanisms which take into account the normal practices of their subordinate national contingents. Timely and detailed situation reports (SITREPS) to higher headquarters should help to offset the desire that some commanders may have to ‘micro-manage’ operations.

Section VIII
THE CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION

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Engagement in a PSO by the international community, individual nations and NGOs may be incremental, ad hoc and multifunctional. Many donor-funded agencies may be engaged in development and other programmes, possibly involving military elements before the deployment of a military force. The deployment and conduct of a military force, however, will generally cover the phases listed below. Allowances are required within each phase for changes in the mandate, the nature of the operational environment and other activities. It may prove necessary to deploy a number of national contingents as part of a UN or other military force each under a national contingent commander. These contingents may be joint in nature and have a national support element to serve as a co-ordinating headquarters for the reception, staging, and onward movement of personnel and material as well as the sustainment of the force.

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Preparation: The preparation phase covers all activities prior to departure, including warning, reconnaissance, planning, liaison, assembly, administration and training. The preparation phase of a PSO is a national responsibility, giving guidance on the standards of training, equipment and personnel strengths to be achieved.

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Deployment: The deployment phase starts with the departure of the national contingents of a PSF from their home bases and ends with their arrival in the designated JOA. The deployment phase is basically a national responsibility, and the JFC having a co-ordinating and overview role.

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Operations: The operational phase begins with the arrival of the elements of the PSF in the JOA, and covers their reception, move to base camps, preparatory measures, their tactical deployment forward into their respective areas of operations, and the subsequent conduct of operations. Establishing the PSF’s security and self-sufficiency will be prime planning considerations in the early stages of an operation. Other initial and preparatory activities will include briefings, reconnaissance, liaison visits, training and administration. If taking over from another PSF (e.g. hand-over from a peace enforcement force to a peacekeeping force), the PSF’s tactical forward deployment may be conducted as a relief in place operation.

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Redeployment: Any redeployment phase starts with a cessation or handing over of operational tasks. The nature of any redeployment may vary from emergency extraction to planned withdrawal, routine roulement or, in the case of a peace enforcement operation, the hand-over to a peacekeeping force. When appropriate, redeployment will cover the transfer of operational and administrative activities to relieving troops, international relief agencies or civilian authorities. Post-operational activities will embrace all after-action activity, including post-operational reports, the submission of lessons learned information and national administration.

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Transfer of responsibility: Multinational and multi-agency PSOs will normally require the hand-over or take-over of tactical areas of operation or responsibilities to other military forces or even civilian agencies. Such action should be preplanned, and carefully co-ordinated and managed. Considerations concerning the subsequent conduct of activities or functions, and the nature of the agency to which these responsibilities will be transferred, should condition the immediate conduct of operations. Any divergence or discrepancies in transfers of responsibility may be exploited by the parties.