Section I
INTRODUCTION

0101
The international community may respond to complex emergencies by deploying assets to crisis zones that have multiple functions. Such crisis response operations are generally described as peace support operations (PSOs) and may be co-ordinated under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), or the Organisation of Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Europe. Initial engagement with the host nation may be limited to development and relief agencies. Such development and relief agencies may be UN bodies, such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), or independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Save the Children and CARE, or international and intergovernmental organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). However, should the crisis develop and further political engagement become necessary, the situation may demand military intervention. Military engagement may be conducted by a UN commanded force or, in the case of more high risk operations requiring a robust command and control infrastructure, by a regional organisation, or military alliance such as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) or NATO, or a coalition of willing member states. This chapter describes the broad international environment in which PSOs may occur and the various political bodies and humanitarian organisations which may also be involved.

Section II
THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

0102
The security of African nations remains subject to a variety of military and non-military risks that are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. While the potential for interstate disputes has not diminished, the last ten years have seen the appearance of complex new risks to peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organised international crime. When crises arise they are increasingly multiparty and contain conflict elements which may be interstate, intrastate and/or transnational in nature and involve the crossborder movement of refugees, internally displaced people, migrants and widespread human rights abuses. Such intrastate and transnational conflicts are generally fought by substate actors or ‘warlords’, militias, criminal elements and armed civilians and not by regular armies. As a result, social cohesion and state institutions collapse, law and order break down, banditry and chaos prevail and the civilian population flees the conflict region or the country. Efforts by the international community to respond to such crises and to restore and create a self-sustaining peace must address both the underlying causes, as well as the symptoms of the crisis or conflict-related disaster. A crisis response or PSO will therefore generally include political, diplomatic, military, and humanitarian efforts to control any conflict and to promote reconciliation, the re-establishment of effective government and a self-sustaining peace.

0103
Complex crises involving conflict and a humanitarian disaster tend to engage a wide range of political bodies. Recent operations have variously involved not only the UN, but also regional and subregional organisations such as the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, etc., as well as international financial institutions like the World Bank and other regional and ad hoc political bodies. It is at this political level that the mandate for an operation is developed with advice from national capitals. The political mandate should define the political objective of the operation, appoint a head of mission (HoM) or strategic commander (SC), establish the relationship between the military and political elements of the operation, assign areas of responsibility and, as far as, possible establish mechanisms to integrate the activities of all involved parties and organisations. The HoM will generally be a respected and senior statesman. It then becomes the appointed HoM’s responsibility, with the assistance of all the major involved bodies, including those of the host nation when appropriate, to develop the political/military mission plan for the operation. In a large and complex operation involving major civilian elements and a civilian political head of mission, called a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in UN-led operations, the military campaign plan or operational plan (OPLAN) will be but one of several functional lines of operation in the wider multifunctional mission plan. The reality is that many civilian agencies, typically NGOs, will be engaged in development and other humanitarian projects sometime before any major military engagement, and this will require the development of an entry strategy which co-ordinates the military engagement with those civilian activities already under way within the operational area.

Section III
LEGAL ASPECTS
Legal basis

0104
PSOs normally involve the sending of military personnel and equipment of one or more sovereign nations into, or over the territory of another sovereign nation. Whatever the circumstances, a PSO must be conducted upon an appropriate legal basis, within the context of the UN Charter and according to the Law of Armed Conflict. Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, PSOs are conducted with the consent of the recognised government (where one exists) and all involved parties. This principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII that may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace or security and/or to prevent genocide. Enforcement operations that do not require the designation of an enemy and the achievement of military victory, but which are rather designed to create a secure environment without favour or prejudice to any party, are categorised as peace enforcement operations under the rubric of PSOs.

Rules of engagement

0105
Rules of engagement (ROE) provide political direction, within legal parameters, and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) will assess the threat in his designated Joint Operations Area (JOA) and submit specific ROE requests for approval to the authorising political body. Higher military and political authorities should anticipate and authorise the release of ROE required for the conduct of operations in line with the operational requirement. This should be in sufficient time to allow interpretation to be clarified and for deploying forces to be trained. If this is not possible, a risk assessment should be conducted and an impact statement briefed to those responsible. The JFC will also need to take account of the different emphases that national contingents may apply when interpreting and applying ROE.

Section IV
UNITED NATIONS
UN Charter

0106
The UN Charter provides the terms of reference for the various elements of the UN, and for regional arrangements and agencies in fulfilling this responsibility. Although the Charter makes no specific reference to PSOs, the three chapters which most relate to PSOs are:

Chapter VI, that deals with the pacific settlement of disputes;



Chapter VII, that refers to such actions by air sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security; and



Chapter VIII, that deals with regional arrangements (see Appendix 1-A).

Establishment of a mission

0107
Within the UN, the Security Council (UNSC) is the body responsible for maintaining international peace and security. UN mandated PSOs are established through resolutions of the UNSC. In certain circumstances, however, the General Assembly may establish a consent-based peacekeeping operation. Support of, or involvement in PSOs should be within the context of the UN Charter and will be negotiated between the UNSC, the OAU and national capitals.

Mission planning

0108
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has undergone a number of significant changes in the way it performs peacekeeping and, more broadly, PSOs. Moving from predominantly unarmed or lightly armed observer and peacekeeping missions, the more complex challenges presented by the new strategic environment have caused the UN to expand its role in promoting peace and stability and to deploy multidimensional, multinational forces. Experiences over the past several years have resulted in a review of methods and capabilities. Additionally, the UN recognises, in line with Chapter VIII of its Charter, that it may need to seek the assistance of regional or other organisations, or ad hoc alliances, with specific PSO capabilities. At the strategic level, the Secretary-General’s Peace and Security Executive Committee, consisting of the Under Secretaries- General for Political Affairs and Peacekeeping, the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC) and the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), meet as required to review crises. The key elements of any UN response to a crisis will generally consist of elements from the following departments

Department of Peacekeeping Operations: The DPKO is the operational arm of the Secretary-General and is responsible for the planning, preparation, conduct and direction of all UN PSOs. The DPKO is based in New York and headed by an Under Secretary-General (USG).



Department of Political Affairs: The DPA provides advice and support on all political matters to the Secretary-General. It is based in New York and headed by an Under Secretary-General.



Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC): The ERC is the UN’s principal policy advisor, co-ordinator and advocate on humanitarian issues. The mission of the ERC is to mobilise and co-ordinate the collective efforts of the international community to meet the needs of those exposed to suffering in disasters and emergencies, and to ensure that the response is rapid, effective and integrated. The ERC and his office, the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are also responsible for interagency mechanisms and are the UN focus for all mine and munitions-related matters.



High Commissioner for Human Rights: The UNHCHR is based in Geneva and is the focal point for human rights and the co-ordination of those issues within the entire UN system. The HCHR is likely to be increasingly involved in PSOs, and the scale of human rights abuses may justify a separate functional line of operations in the political mission plan of the HoM or SRSG.

Section V
THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)
The role of regional organisations

0109
One of the most important innovations in the management of international security in the post-Cold War era is the concept of shared responsibility between the UN and some regional organisations for the effective management of conflicts within the regions of the world. Africa is the first region where extensive efforts have been made recently to formalise the relationship between the UN and the regional organisation, in this case the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with the specific objective of enhancing the management of conflicts in the region.

0110
The deterioration of security in Africa, especially the rise in the number and intensity of internal conflicts, led to a reopening of the debate on the need for an OAU security agenda. The OAU agreed to institute the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. The OAU Mechanism provides for a central decision-making body, the Central Organ, consisting of about sixteen member states (the current chair, the past chair and the incoming chair of the organisation, and selected states representing the subregions in Africa). The Central Organ meets at three levels: heads of state, ministerial and ambassadorial. It also provides for a Division of Conflict Management within the OAU Secretariat, the agency responsible for the implementation and secretarial functions of the Mechanism.

0111
Among other functions, the OAU Mechanism is meant to augment the capacity of the OAU Secretariat and the political leadership to manage conflicts in Africa more effectively. The Mechanism should enable the Secretary-General to initiate action in the management of conflicts in the region and to mobilise resources, both within Africa and from the international system, for effective conflict management in the region.

Political control and guidance

0112
The overall political control of a PSO should normally be the responsibility of a single, internationally recognised, political organisation, for example the UN or OAU. The senior executive body of the responsible organisation will appoint a high-level representative strategic co-ordinator who may be designated the SRSG in a UN operation but will more normally be called the HoM under regional arrangements. The executive body should also provide a clear written mandate specifying the mission and its various multifunctional military and civilian strategic objectives, authority, expected duration, and terms of reference.

0113
The high-level co-ordinator or HoM will act on behalf of the international mandating authority in all matters related to the assigned mission. The responsible international organisation, if appropriate, will request support for the conduct of the mission from regional organisations and/or the OAU.

Mandate development

0114
Specific guidance should be provided by the authorising political body, on the development of a political mandate. The mandate should establish:

legitimacy of the operation;

nature of the operation;

freedoms, constraints and restraints;

strategic objectives and political endstate;

duration; and

international co-ordination architecture for the operation to include the HoM

Political primacy

0115
As PSOs are authorised by a political mandate, the overall authority will be political. Should the OAU be involved in such a PSO, the Central Organ should define the political parameters within which military forces will operate, and will be responsible for issuing political direction and strategic guidance to the Joint Force Commander (JFC), after co-ordination with the SRSG or HoM as necessary. In the conduct of PSOs, all military commanders should be aware of the political influences and restraints upon the conduct of military operations.

Objective

0116
The military strategic objective of a PSO should be defined in the mandate as clearly as possible, and in relation to the other functional objectives, identified in the HoM’s political/military mission plan. The mandating authority should establish each functional strategic objective with the specific political ‘endstate’ in mind.

0117
It is important that implementing authorities translate the mandate into clear and achievable tasks that could form the basis for terms of reference for all parties involved in a PSO, and for the JFC to develop the military campaign or OPLAN. Commanders should understand the strategic goals within the political/military mission plan in order for appropriate military objectives to be set and to ensure that they contribute to unity of effort amongst all contingents and participating civilian agencies.

Composite response

0118
Complex emergencies require a response which co-ordinates the actions of military, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies involved, to include international, governmental, and private voluntary organisations, and NGOs. As the PSO is multidimensional in tasks and participation, co-operation between all participating elements and co-ordination of all agencies are essential to achieve the strategic objectives and political endstate specified in the mandate.

0119
Such a composite response should be designed to control, contain and redress the immediate and underlying causes and symptoms of the problem such that the operation can progress towards a lasting settlement. Civil-military mechanisms should be established at all levels in order to provide a forum that will enable the military and political authorities to express and implement their intentions.

Co-ordinating mechanisms

0120
Having specified the political endstate, strategic functional objectives and main effort, the mission plan should establish mechanisms to synchronise functional lines of operation. This should include those mechanisms required for detailed co-ordination, such as the establishment of conferences and committees, and communication and liaison networks. Within this framework, military forces will co-operate with civil authorities.

OAU strengths

0121
Over the years, the OAU has established and maintained impressive and unique political and military structures designed to control and ameliorate crises in Africa. These same structures can be valuable assets for PSOs and have been found to be adaptable. Among other considerations, the OAU should consider support to those missions where its capabilities could make a substantial contribution to their success.

Subregional organisations

0122
The OAU has hitherto recognised five main subregions in Africa, and prioritised one corresponding organisation for each area:

Inter-Governmental Developmental Authority (IGAD) in the east;

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the west;

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in the north;

Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the south; and

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa.

Section VI
ECOWAS

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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is perhaps the best known of the African subregional organisations, having gained international recognition through its massive peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and more recently in Sierra Leone.

0124
ECOWAS was initially designed in 1975 through a joint initiative by Nigeria and Togo to promote economic and social co-operation within the West African region. Neither in the aims of the Community nor in the modalities for achieving them is there any mention of interposition of force, armed or unarmed. This is not to say that the Community cannot address political or security issues that could affect economic stability within the region. In Africa, the dominance of security issues and concerns in regional politics make it more imperative that economic relations are harnessed on a sound political and security foundation, as the collapse of law and order render the pursuit of the objectives of economic integration difficult, if not impossible.

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The convergence between economic and political matters informed the signing in 1978 of the Protocol on Non-Aggression, adopted at the Third Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS held in Dakar, Senegal on 22 April 1978, as well as the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence adopted in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1981. The Protocol on Non-Aggression states that the Community "cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Member States." It affirms the non-use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and respect for the sovereignty of each member state. The Protocol however adds that "[e]ach member state shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other member state." At the same time member states are "to prevent non-resident foreigners from using its territory as a base for committing (these) acts."

0126
While the 1978 Protocol upholds the principle of non-intervention, it neither rules out the right of individual or collective self-defence, nor the possibility of enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although valuable, the Protocol was limited only to address aggression between member states. It made no reference to aggression coming from outside the Community or the problem of internal conflicts. The Protocol subsequently became supplemented by the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, which dealt with these omissions. Here member states "firmly resolve to safeguard and consolidate the independence and sovereignty of member states against foreign intervention." Members also declared that any "armed threat or aggression" directed against fellow members shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community. In the case of "internal armed conflict within any member state engineered and supported from the outside", and which is "likely to endanger the peace and security" in the region, the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to initiate armed or collective intervention.

0127
Where armed intervention (Article 9) is to occur, the Protocol empowers the authority (heads of state of ECOWAS) to decade on the expediency of military action (Article 6(3)). If necessary, the authority shall interpose the Allied Armed Force of the Community between the troops engaged in the conflict. (Article 17). Article 13(1 and 2) allows for the creation of a Community army made up of troops earmarked from national units.

0128
In reaction to the civil war which erupted in Liberia during late 1989, and under the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence, an ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) was established for the purpose of keeping the peace, restoring law and order, and ensuring respect for the cease-fire in that country.

0129
ECOMOG is deployed and operates under the directives of the authority of the heads of state of ECOWAS. This authority is usually exercised on behalf of other heads of state by the head of state who has been elected by his colleagues as the current chairperson of the Community. Day-to-day political directives and political-related issues are handled by the ECOWAS Secretariat, which is headed by an Executive Secretary. Military operations are entrusted in the hands of the Force Commander.

0130
There are two other supervisory political structures. These are the Defence Council and the Defence Commission. The Defence Council consists of the ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member states and is headed by the current chairperson of the Community. It is this Council that examines the situation on the ground, decides the strategy to be adopted and the means of intervention to be used. The Defence Commission consists of chiefs of defence staff of the armed forces of member states. It is a purely technical committee that advises on Military operations.

Section VII
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

0131
The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC signed by the SADC heads of state and government in Windhoek in 1992 expressed confidence that recent developments such as the independence of Namibia and the transition in South Africa "... will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of co-operation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development ..." The Declaration called, among others, for "... a framework of co-operation which provides for ... strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony ... The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security." The subsequent establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security has given some effect to these intentions.

0132
Some of the pertinent security objectives of the SADC Organ are to:

protect the people and safeguard the development of the region, against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and external aggression;



co-operate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention management and resolution;



mediate in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts;



where conflict does occur, to seek to end this as quickly as possible through diplomatic means. Only where such means fail, would the Organ recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures. These responses would be agreed in a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution;



promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;



develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere on the continent;



co-ordinate the participation of member states in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and



address extraregional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa.

0133
The following guidelines pertaining to the institutional framework for the Organ were included in the communiqué of the 28 June 1996 SADC Summit:

the Organ shall operate at the Summit level, and shall function independently of other SADC structures;



the Organ shall also operate at Ministerial and technical levels;



the chairperson of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and on a troika basis;



the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) shall be one of the institutions of the Organ; and



the Organ may establish other structures as the need arises.

0134
At present, the Organ operates predominantly at the level of the SADC heads of state and at the level of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The ISDSC is composed of a ministerial council with three subcommittees each on defence, security and intelligence. Below the level of the three subcommittees there are three functional committees: the Operations Subcommittee, the Standing Maritime Committee and the Standing Aviation Committee. Although the ISDSC has no permanent structure, it is making a marked contribution in building confidence among the various member countries, meeting on a rotational basis in the various SADC countries.

Section VIII
INTERNATIONAL AND GOVERNMENT DONORS

0135
Governments are by far the greatest source of funding for humanitarian assistance and PSOs. Governments provide support for the military response elements through their defence budgets, and channel humanitarian aid (development and emergency) to a large number of other PSO elements through their donor agencies. This may be via national donor agencies or via an international body such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

Donor channels

0136
Channels chosen by donors are changing. Government to government aid, which once amounted to the bulk of bilateral emergency aid, now only represents a small fraction of the total flow. Governments may still be an important channel, but in complex emergencies when there is political instability, and the government infrastructure may be ineffective, multinational channels such as the UN, EU, World Bank and NGOs are increasingly favoured.

Nature of donor operations

0137
Donor operations are most often of a facilitating kind. For example, donors may become involved in organising logistics and setting up communication systems and information centres. Recent operations have been designed to create employment and civil development.

Section IX
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

0138
NGOs are legally different from UN agencies and international bodies such as the ICRC. NGO is an official term used in Article 71 of the UN Charter to describe a wide range of primarily non-profit organisations generally motivated by humanitarian and religious values. They are usually independent of governments, and commercial sectors. The NGO sector is extremely diverse and includes thousands of very different organisations, differentiated by size, maturity, expertise, quality and mission. Increasingly, NGOs are willing to work together with national and international donors as effective but non-political responses to humanitarian crises.

Missions and values

0139
NGO missions might range from a general remit to ‘alleviate poverty’ to a specific mission to ‘support health care services in communities affected by conflict’. An NGO’s mission is usually underwritten by values or principles that guide its conduct and which may be expressed in terms of human rights, emphasising that its work promotes rights to life, food, water, health and freedom of expression, for example.

NGO co-ordination and liaison

0140
The proliferation of NGOs in humanitarian crises means that co-ordination and the harmonisation of activities are complex and time-consuming. In the early part of a crisis, and before the deployment of a UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC), NGOs generally form some kind of ad hoc network or umbrella group or consortium to facilitate their own co-ordination. As emergencies escalate and the number of NGOs and the amount of donor funding increase, there is a commensurate increase in the need for co-ordination and accountability to donors. This has the potential to develop into competition for funding and other resources, which can distort relationships and cause friction. The need to counteract such negative pressures places an emphasis on regular liaison and communication at all levels.

Relationships with the military

0141
In the past, both the military and NGOs have tended to assume antagonistic stereotypes of one another. However, an increasing incidence of shared operational experiences has enhanced mutual understanding and contributed to more positive and constructive relationships. While the military should accept that NGOs may be working to their own agenda, military and NGO objectives will often be mutually reinforcing and therefore require harmonisation and co-ordination, if only to delineate areas of responsibility and rationalise potential areas of friction. Effective co-operation will have a major impact on the success of a mission.

Section X
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

0142
There are many UN, international and intergovernmental organisations, which may be engaged in a PSO. The following list is purely illustrative.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

0143
The ICRC was founded in 1863 by five citizens of Geneva as the International Committee for Relief of Wounded. The ICRC is financed by voluntary contributions by governments (85%), the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (10%) and private sources (5%).

0144
The ICRC, which is the founding body, effectively consists of three constituent but independent parts: the ICRC itself, the National Societies, and the Federation. Each has its own individual status.

ICRC: The mission of the ICRC is, on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, to protect and assist victims of international or non-international armed conflict and those affected by internal disturbances or tension.



The National Societies: In its own country, a national Red Cross society serves as an auxiliary to the public authorities in humanitarian matters. Its primary task is to back up the military medical services in times of conflict.



The Federation: The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies provides support for the humanitarian activities carried out by national societies. By co-ordinating international relief operations in natural disaster situations and encouraging development aid, it endeavours to prevent and alleviate human suffering.

0145
ICRC principles: In addition to international humanitarian law treaties, the ICRC’s duty is to uphold seven fundamental principles: humanity; impartiality; neutrality; independence; voluntary service; unity; and universality.

0146
Field operations to assist and protect victims: The following are mandated missions:

visit and interview, without witnesses, prisoners of war and detained or interned civilians;



provide aid to the populations of occupied territories;



search for missing persons and transmit messages to prisoners of war and to detained civilians;



offer services for the establishment of hospital zones and localities, and security zones;



receive requests for aid from protected persons; and



exercise its right of initiative to pursue the above tasks and, in internal disputes, to offer its services to the parties to the conflict.

International organisation for migration (IOM)

0147
The IOM is an intergovernmental organisation currently with 59 member states and 41 observer states. Although established outside the UN, the IOM holds observer status in the UN General Assembly. The IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. It acts with its partners such as UNHCR to:

assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration;

advance understanding of migration issues;

encourage social and economic development through migration; and

work towards effective respect of the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

Amnesty International

0148
Subscriptions and donations from its world-wide membership finance Amnesty International. No funds are sought or accepted from governments. To safeguard the independence of the organisation, all contributions are strictly controlled by guidelines established by its governing International Council. Amnesty International has formal links with various UN and other regional bodies. It works to prevent violations by governments of people’s fundamental human rights, and its main tasks to:

free all prisoners of conscience who are detained anywhere for their beliefs, or because of their ethnic origin, sex, colour or language and who have not used or advocated violence;



ensure fair and prompt trials for political prisoners;



abolish the death penalty, torture and other cruel treatment of prisoners; and



end extrajudicial executions and ‘disappearances’.

Section XI
THE CORPORATE AND CIVIL SECTOR

0149
The Corporate and Civil Sector is the term generally used to describe multinational business, finance institutions, civil sector companies and business interests which might be operating in the environment of a complex emergency, or whose staff might be persuaded to engage in post-conflict reconstruction activities. Should the economy of a host nation be dependent on a particular natural resource, as well as on the farming and marketing of that resource by a multinational or large national company, that company should be consulted and its advice sought on the economic implications of the development of the mission plan. Likewise, the establishment of a working economy will almost certainly require the involvement of financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their involvement should help create the financial environment into which private or civil sector companies may invest and support any reconstruction and rebuilding programmes. The involvement of national companies and investment in a complex environment may require that they are involved in the development of the mission plan. In addition, the civil sector may provide support and security services to the military force and NGOs and, by the use of local employment, support the development of the local economy.