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UN peace missions are widely perceived to be in a state of crisis in terms of finances, doctrine, co-ordination, and quality troop contributions. According to UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan:

"The United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under present conditions, ad hoc Member States coalitions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the escalation or spread of an ongoing conflict ... The Organisation still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations. Troops for peacekeeping missions are in some cases not made available by Member States or made available under conditions which constrain effective response. Peacemaking and human rights operations, as well as peacekeeping operations, also lack a secure financial footing, which has a serious impact on the viability of such operations." (UN Report on Reform, 16 July 1997)

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Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for regional bodies such as the OAU, NATO or ECOWAS to participate in peace missions in their respective regions on the basis of their own initiative. The only proviso is that such missions should fall within the area of regional jurisdiction of the regional body and should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. Moreover, any involvement in peace enforcement operations must receive prior authorisation from the UN Security Council.

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There is presently a clear trend towards the deployment of an increasing number of non-UN peace missions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Substantial and forceful missions have been conducted, since 1990, by ECOWAS in West Africa; and since July 1992, by Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. However, it is since the 40 000-strong NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) took over from the over-extended UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia at the end of 1995, that the idea of regional peace operations has steadily gained ground.

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The turning point for the OAU, in terms of a role in the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, came in 1993. The Cairo Declaration established the OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In establishing the Mechanism, the African heads of state and government emphasised that the UN, with its cumulative experience, expertise and greater resources than the OAU, should clearly remain the pre-eminent international authority with the responsibility for dealing with international peace and security — including internal crises which threaten regional stability in Africa.

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However, it was also realised that regional and subregional organisations, on the one hand, and the UN system, on the other, should endeavour to share the burden relating to the maintenance of world-wide peace, security and stability proportionately. Moreover, the OAU realised the need for it to take the primary ownership of its own problems, especially those relating to issues of peace, security and stability. Paragraph 15 of the Cairo Declaration states that:

"In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be the Mechanism’s responsibility to undertake peace making and peace building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed."

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Since 1993, conflict resolution has been handled by the OAU, mainly through the concept of preventive diplomacy which has taken many forms, including the use of the good offices of the Secretary General, the use of Eminent Persons, the use of Special Envoys, Representatives of the Secretary General, direct contacts between the OAU and the government of the country concerned, as well as missions from the general secretariat to the country in question.

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The OAU has also mandated and funded the deployment of military observers to assist with conflict resolution in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and the Comoros. While the OAU recognises the fact that the bulk of activities within the realm of conflict management should be in the field of prevention, the Organisation has realised that Africa must also be prepared to take some degree of responsibility for broader PSOs, in collaboration with external friends and operational partners. In addition to the efforts being deployed by the OAU, extracontinental powers have become increasingly involved in attempts to enhance African capabilities for the conduct of peace operations.

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Since the OAU only has a permanent secretariat and no permanent ambassadorial presence from different states (unlike the UN Security Council and the General Assembly), the communication of the intentions and concerns of member states are mainly channelled through the Secretary General via either the ambassadors in Addis Ababa, or personally by the minister of Foreign Affairs or the heads of state. No formal mechanism exists to secure the speedy approval for the deployment of a peace mission, except in those cases where the Summit of Foreign Ministers of the OAU Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution is summoned to lend its approval. This can be requested by any OAU member state.

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Unlike the UN Charter, the OAU Charter does not provide for a mechanism to control or enforce the implementation of the Organisation’s decisions. Rather, under the auspices of the Mechanism, the OAU is mandated to co-ordinate its activities closely with African regional and subregional organisations, and to co-operate, as appropriate, with neighbouring countries with respect to conflicts arising in the different parts of the continent.

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The OAU encourages subregional organisations to initiate preventive diplomacy efforts. In this instance, the OAU Secretary General is kept abreast of all initiatives and, in turn, maintains contact with the OAU chairperson, as well as with the UN Secretary-General. He or she has the Summit’s mandate to despatch special envoys and observer missions and to initiate related efforts to establish the relevant facts on the ground.