Chapter 1

 The Multi-Headed Monster: Different Forms of Terrorism

Anneli Botha

Published in Monograph No 63, July 2001
Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa


Introduction

Given the number of definitions of terrorism available in academic resources, it is almost inconceivable that there should be a lack of any unified definition of terrorism. The following discussion will focus on the different dimensions of terrorism, in order to establish a framework of understanding.

Considering the basic elements of terrorism, Schmid and Jongman’s definition of terrorism seems to be the most comprehensive. They write:
"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political response, whereby — in contrast to assassinations — the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorists (organisations), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought."1
Apart from Schmid and Jongman’s definition, numerous other definitions of terrorism are useful. In terms of the present analysis, the following definition is particularly relevant:
"Terrorism is the deliberate employment of violence or the threat to use violence by sub-national groups and sovereign states to attain strategic and political objectives. Terrorists seek to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened. Acts of individual and collective terrorism committed in modern times have introduced a new breed of extralegal ‘warfare’ in terms of threats, technology, targets and impact."2
South Africa has, since 1994, adopted internationally acknowledged definitions and categories of terrorism. According to Schönteich, the South African government’s official policy on terrorism defines terrorism as:
"An incident of violence, or the threat thereof, against a person, a group of persons or property not necessarily related to the aim of the incident, to coerce a government or civil population to act or not to act according to certain principles."3
The draft anti-terrorism bill of 2000 defines terrorism as:
"Any act which does or may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of any person or persons, or causes or may cause damage to property and is calculated or intended to:
  • intimidate, coerce or induce any government or persons, the general public or any section thereof; or
  • disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
  • create unrest or general insurrection in any state."4

Elements of terrorism

Despite the numerous definitions of terrorism, the international community and academics have, to date, been unable to provide one definition of terrorism. Instead of deciding on a single definition, the following elements of terrorism are presented in the existing definitions:

Nature of the act

This usually takes the form of violence or the threat of violence; other criminal, unlawful, politically subversive, or anarchic acts; piracy; hijacking of aircraft; and taking of hostages. According to Crenshaw, terrorism is an attractive method to use because it is relatively inexpensive.5 This point is also discussed under modus operandi, below.

Perpetrators

Terrorism is a form of warfare and can be perpetrated either by individuals or by governments.6 Hanle differentiates between state terrorists (state terror to control the domestic population) and revolutionary terrorists (who seek nothing less than the total destruction of the targeted regime).7 These two groups may demand different levels of response to achieve their goals. Issue-motivated groups and criminal syndicates also use terrorism as their modus operandi, driven by the success of revolutionary terrorist groups.

Motivation

The best known motivational factors of terrorists include:

Rational motivation

The rational terrorist thinks through his goals and options, making a cost-benefit analysis. He seeks to determine whether there are less costly and more effective ways to achieve his objective than terrorism. To assess the risk, he weighs the target’s defensive capabilities against his own capabilities to attack. He measures his group’s capabilities to sustain the effort. The essential question is whether terrorism will work for the desired purpose, given societal conditions at the time.

Psychological motivation

Psychological motivation for terrorism derives from the terrorist’s personal dissatisfaction with his life and accomplishments. Terrorists tend to project their own antisocial motivations onto others, creating a polarised "we versus they" outlook. According to Mazrui, the "us versus them" confrontation is the most persistent theme in world-order perceptions. "There is a tendency in monotheism to divide the human race between believers and unbelievers, between the virtuous and the sinful, between good and evil, between ‘us’ and ‘them’."8

Culture and religion

Cultural differences create a feeling of belonging even across borders. Muslims all over the world, for example, belong to a universal ummah (Islamic community). "The ummah is not founded on race, nationality, locality, occupation, kinship or special interest. It does not take its name after the name of a leader or a founder or an event. It transcends national borders and political boundaries. The foundation of the community in Islam is the principle, which designates submission to the will of Allah, obedience to His law and commitment to His cause. What is required of the community at large is likewise required of every individual member."9

Terrorism in the name of religion can be especially violent. Like all terrorists, those who are religiously motivated view their acts with moral certainty, and religiously motivated terrorists even consider their acts to have divine sanction. What would otherwise be extraordinary acts of desperation, become a religious duty in the mind of the religiously motivated terrorist. This helps explain the high level of commitment and willingness to risk death among religious extremists.

Acts of religious terrorism are primarily committed in the belief that complete knowledge can be achieved (in the human world). Religiously motivated terrorist groups believe that they know which is the ‘good’ (or what is sanctioned by God or by their beliefs) and that this knowledge obligates them to destroy the evil and the unjust, according to their own perceptions of good and evil.

Religion has re-emerged as a major component in the understanding of contemporary political development, especially in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. The return to religious roots and the mobilisation of religious faith to reform societies is far from being limited to Third World countries. The manifestation of this phenomenon and its symbolism varies from religion to religion and culture to culture but there are some parallels in the organisation of religious groups and in the methods used by activists to arouse a popular response.10

Objectives

Most often fear, extortion and radical change are the objectives of terrorist acts. Terrorism is a process that has three elements:
  • the act or threat of violence;
  • the emotional reaction or extreme fear on the part of the potential or future victim; and
  • the social effects that follow the violence.
The desired effect of terrorism is not the physical hurt to the victim, but the psychological impact on the target. As a consequence, the terrorist’s victims must be carefully selected to assure the maximum possible psychological impact on the target.11 The subjects of terrorist attacks generally have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group but represent a larger human audience whose reaction the terrorists seek. The objectives that terrorists have in mind may be classified as long-term objectives (that differentiate terrorist groups) and short-term or proximate objectives (that unite all terrorist groups over the whole spectrum of ideologies). The latter are defined in terms of the reactions that terrorists want to achieve in their different audiences. The most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention. Violence and bloodshed always excite human curiosity, and the theatricality, suspense and threat of danger inherent in terrorism enhance its attention-drawing qualities. In fact, publicity may be the highest goal of some groups; international recognition encourages transnational terrorist activities in escalation, and destructive power. The larger the audience grows, the greater the extremes to which terrorists will go. Terrorism is also used to disrupt and discredit the processes of government: terrorism as a direct attack on a regime aims to promote the insecurity and demoralisation of government officials, independent of any impact on public opinion.12

Hidden or concealed agendas

Certain states sponsor terrorism as part of a campaign of geographic expansion of political control at the expense of existing state structures. According to Crenshaw, terrorism also serves as an internal organisational function of control, discipline and morale building within the terrorist group, and may even become an instrument of rivalry among factions within a resistance movement.13 Through counter-reaction against specific individuals from the targeted government, terrorists increase publicity and demonstrate to the people that their charges against the regime are well founded. Through these martyrs, recruitment follows and more funds are collected, especially under state-sponsored terrorism. For example, Hizbollah make use of video recordings of their attacks. These recordings are then sent to Iran, from where they receive their financial backing and instructions.

Targets

Terrorists often direct their violence and threats at a target group that is not directly involved in the political decision-making process that the terrorists seek to influence.14 Hanle distinguishes between direct terrorism (where the target of influence and the target of terror are one and the same) and indirect terrorism (where the entity targeted to receive the terror and the entity targeted to be influenced are separate).15 According to Crenshaw, different forms of terrorism involve various degrees of selectivity in the choice of victims.16 Some acts of terrorism discriminate precisely, while others are broadly indiscriminate. Schbley, after interviewing 26 Lebanese Shi’a Muslims, listed the most likely targets of Shi’a religious terrorist groups.17 Topping the list of preferred hostages are diplomats, and civilian and military intelligence officers. Other targets include national symbols of state, namely heads of state, public officials, airlines and national security key points.

Terrorism against key economic targets is another trend. In Turkey, Egypt and Spain, terrorist groups have systematically targeted the tourist sector in order to inflict economic damage. In Latin America, South Asia and the former Soviet Union, terrorism has become increasingly interwoven with organised crime and drug trafficking, undermining the viability of the fragile and corrupt governments in those areas.18 In Colombia, for example, 43% of the targets of terrorism represent the commercial sector. Here, attacks are directed against oil pipelines and mines owned by multinational corporations. In a single Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) attack in September 1997, Exxon suffered an estimated US$3 million in losses.19 With reference to the situation in South Africa, especially in the Western Cape (as will be discussed in the following chapters), it could be argued that the alleged target selection of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) changed from drug and gang leaders to restaurants associated with the United States (for example, Planet Hollywood, Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonalds).

According to Laqueur: "the terrorist of the future will be less ideological, more likely to harbour ethnic grievances, harder to distinguish from other criminals, and a particular threat to technologically advanced societies".20 Ethnic terrorism draws on greater public support than ideologically motivated terrorism does. Organisations that adhere to a nationalist or separatist ideology — such as Muslim extremists, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) — have a larger constituency of potential recruits, supporters and more political clout and resources than the extreme ideological groups (for example, the Red Brigades in Italy) whose activities are on the decline.

Modus operandi

The most common weapons of terrorists are threats, as well as sabotage, assassination, hostage taking, murder, kidnapping and bombing. According to Crenshaw, terrorists use whatever means are available to further their objectives — the technological advances of the modern era have made this possible and have created opportunities and vulnerabilities.21

Professional terrorists have become increasingly ruthless, sophisticated and operationally competent. Although most terrorist groups remain technologically conservative, using off-the-shelf weaponry, some groups adapt or improvise their weaponry. For example, terrorists used readily available fertiliser as the main component of their device to bomb the World Trade Centre in New York in February 1993.22

Although the modus operandi of international terrorist groups is to a large extent static, the first use of chemical weapons by terrorists occurred in March 1995 when members of the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, placed sarin gas on five trains in Tokyo. Bombings still characterise most international terrorist incidents.

Between 1968 and 1999, more than 7 000 terrorist bombings were recorded.23 Bombing, armed assault, firebombing, sabotage, kidnapping and hijacking were the main methods used in order of prevalence. Business facilities were first on the hit list, followed by diplomatic representatives, government facilities and armed forces. The trend is a shift away from attacking specific targets towards indiscriminate killings. The dividing line between urban terrorism and other forms of terrorism has become less distinct, while it is often impossible to draw a line between politically motivated terrorism and the operation of national and international crime syndicates.24 The most serious concern is that terrorists are seeking to kill and injure more and more people.

Bombing

This has been the most common tactic used by terrorists since the manifestation of international terrorism in the 1960s. The objectives have changed from symbolic bombings, not intended to produce casualties (especially in the 1970s), to incidents where the ultimate objective is to cause as many casualties as possible. The latter objective emerged in the 1980s, especially with the suicide bombings used by religious extremists in the Middle East and North Africa. The most obvious reason for the popularity of bombing as a modus operandi is that explosives can be easily purchased, stolen or manufactured from commercially available materials. Knowledge of how to build a bomb and explosives can be obtained from books and the Internet. Individuals have access to conventional as well as unconventional bomb-building material through mail order catalogues. Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani refers to this access as "the poor man’s nuclear bomb".25 The Internet is also being used by terrorist groups to gather information on weaponry and techniques, and to spread propaganda.26

Terrorists are further exploring advanced technologies and are utilising more imaginative ways of operating explosives, detonators, communications, and concealed devices. Bombings require little organisation and can easily be one-man operations. As diplomatic and military targets have become better protected, terrorists have focused their attacks on soft targets. Terrorists are also exhibiting a lack of discrimination in target selection with the trend towards huge truck bombs in urban centres such as, for example, Buenos Aires and Moscow.27

In December 1988, a bomb exploded on flight Pan Am 103. Pieces of the plane fell onto the Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing 259 people on the plane and 11 people on the ground. This incident is regarded as the worst air-disaster of the 20th century. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) was suspected of being responsible for planting the bomb. Despite the threat of economic sanctions Libya initially refused to deliver two of its nationals, who were the main suspects of the bombing — Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah — after they were charged with murder, conspiracy to murder and contravention of airline security.28 In April 1999, with the contribution of former South African president Nelson Mandela, Libya extradited the two suspects to stand trial in the Netherlands according to Scottish law. The trial commenced in May 2000.

Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah was alleged to belong to Libyan intelligence and to have been the station officer of Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta at the time of the bombing. In January 2001 Fhimah was acquitted of the charges against him.

Abdel Basset al-Megrahi was alleged to have been a senior officer of the Libyan Intelligence Services and head of Libyan Arab Airlines security in Malta in December 1988. Al-Megrahi bought clothes from a Maltese store that were contained in the suitcase bomb on board flight Pan Am 103. Al-Megrahi was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Terrorists use computers, cellular phones and encryption software to evade detection. These methods of evading detection, as well as the forging of documents and passports, were used extensively by Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his gang, who were convicted of a plot to blow up 12 US airliners over the Pacific in 1995.29 Yousef was arrested in Islamabad, Pakistan, in February 1995, after fleeing from the United States and was sentenced to 240 years imprisonment in November 1997.30 Yousef was convicted of the explosion at the World Trade Centre in New York in which six people died and more than 1 000 were injured, and of planting a bomb that killed one person on a Philippines Airlines flight to Tokyo in 1994.

Another example of the use of technology in the planning of terrorism is illustrated by Osama Bin Laden, who uses computers and cellular phones to co-ordinate the activities of his international network of operatives. (Bin Laden is also linked to Yousef. Three years before Yousef was charged for the World Trade Centre bombing, he lived in a Pakistan guest house paid for by Bin Laden.31) After the Afghan war, Osama Bin Laden emerged as one of the primary role-players in exporting transnational terrorism. During the Afghan war, close co-operation was established with Muslims from different nationalities that form part of the current network of Islamic extremist elements. Bin Laden heads the large Islamic organisation Al-Qaeda. Most of the groups that participate in his front remain independent, although the organisational barriers between them are fluid. In the centre of Al-Qaeda is Bin Laden’s own inner group, which conducts missions on its own. The best-known terrorist act with which Osama Bin Laden is connected is the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, in August 1998, which killed more than 200 people. Ten minutes after the Nairobi blast, a bomb placed in a refrigerator truck exploded outside the US embassy in suburban Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 people.

Hostage taking

Hostage taking, whether by kidnapping individuals, hijacking airlines or storming buildings, has always been a popular tactic due to its demonstrated effectiveness. Although Jenkins argued in 1987 that the seizing of embassies would decrease because of an increase in their security measures, the left-wing Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement seized the Japanese embassy in Peru in 1997.32 Hostage situations are on the increase among desperate groups in many Third World countries. In fact, there was a 33% rise in the kidnapping of foreigners in the 1990s.33

Assassination

In modern times, types of assassination have included:
  • diplomatic assassination (group or state);
  • murder involving religious issues (individual, group or state);
  • murder where the driving motive is nationalism (individual, group or state);
  • murder where the driving motive is class struggle (individual or group); and
  • murder committed for reasons of state (state).
A recent example of this type of international terrorism took place in June 1995, when gunmen attempted to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during a visit to Ethiopia. Ethiopian counter-terrorist forces and Egyptian security forces foiled the attempt. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG), masterminded by Egyptian citizen Mustafa Hamza, claimed responsibility. According to Egypt’s security forces, Khartoum’s Islamist junta was involved in the attack. Hamza took refuge in Khartoum and holds a Sudanese diplomatic passport.34

With reference to the situation in South Africa, the most prominent examples were the assassinations of:
  • Captain Bennie Lategan, a member of the SAPS’ Pagad Investigation Team, in January 1999. Captain Lategan was investigating cases of urban terrorism in the Western Cape. He was shot 10 times at point blank range. Ismail Edwards and Ebrahim Jeneker, both members of Pagad’s G-Force, have been implicated in this assassination. Ismail Edwards was convicted in May 2000 for his part in a pipe bomb attack on Lansdowne police station in January 1998 and for the attempted murder of Nazeem Smith, an alleged drug dealer. Ebrahim Jeneker is facing 124 charges including, nine for murder, 12 for attempted murder, ten for armed robbery, eight for the possession of unlicensed firearms and one for the possession of explosives. Jeneker is also implicated in attacks on the police and businessmen.35
  • Magistrate Piet Theron, in September 2000. Theron, who was presiding over urban terrorism cases, was assassinated in front of his house. He was shot five times in the head and chest.36

Support

Oots identifies the following types of support given to the whole spectrum of terrorist organisations:37
  • financial support;
  • training;
  • weapons;
  • organisational support: groups and friendly regimes supply terrorists with passports, documents or propaganda support (the recognition of their cause and sympathy); and
  • operational support: terrorist organisations may support other terrorist organisations because of ideological compatibility, or a shared ideology of revolution.

Zones of public action38

The first level of the zones of public action reflects the constitutional order, with a basic level of stability within a democratic society.

The second level is the comfort zone of usual activity, involving legitimate dissent and protest, both within and outside parliament. Legitimate protest is regarded as a valuable mode of political communication, criticism and democratic consultation. In a liberal democratic society, peaceful protest and agitation should be regarded as legitimate and vital aspects of social reform. Political and moral pressure includes the mass campaign of marches, processions, demonstrations and mass meetings, inevitably coupled with massive media publicity and pressure on the government and political parties.

The third level encompasses the zone of ambiguity. This could be defined as a ‘grey’ area where contentious issues in society and the behaviour of individuals and groups result in disorderly conduct and acts of civil disobedience and conscientious objection, although the initial objective leading to these acts does not involve a comprehensive rejection of the state’s legal authority. Although it is a non-violent means of individual resistance to authority, it may, on occasion, provoke a repressive response by the authorities or by members of the community hostile to the objector’s position. Peaceful acts of civil disobedience may on occasion be infiltrated or may even be taken over by those who have no inhibitions about the use of violence, or who have an ulterior motive. In other cases, the demonstration, however peaceful in intent, may provoke a violent counter-demonstration of response. Therefore, a peaceful campaign of civil disobedience can result in violent confrontation, especially if ‘protesters’ are swept up into more dangerous and destructive emotions and actions. There is a tendency for such demonstrations to become more aggressive, partly because of the rising threshold of shock needed to attract media attention, and partly because, when peaceful demonstrations fail to achieve results, frustration usually leads to more violence.39

The fourth level of the zones of public action is the security zone, a level of disorder where the potential or actual occurrence of crime, conflict, violence and subversion poses a threat to society or the state. An escalation of the problem could lead to conditions of anarchy, militarisation and social collapse. Internal violence can be divided into two groups based upon the prime objectives. The first directly endangers the survival and stability of the constitution itself; the second indirectly and cumulatively undermines the state’s authority and support by major defiance of law and order and by endangering the lives of citizens to the point where confidence in the state’s authority is eroded.

Legitimate public dissent may lead to violence associated with terrorism, inter-communal violence and crime for a number of reasons.
  • According to Leventhal and Chellaney, the longer terrorists are involved in underground campaigns, the more brutal and hardened they tend to become, and the greater is their desperation to attract national and international attention to their cause.40 It is also possible to detect a shift inside terrorist organisations, away from the more pragmatic ‘politically-minded’ terrorist leaders to individuals obsessed with vengeance and violence.
  • In order to keep the public’s attention and to recover coercive power lost as governments become more resistant to their demands, terrorist groups are ‘forced’ to use more coercive tactics.41
  • The longer individuals and groups are involved in illegitimate dissent, the more resources and technical know-how needed to operate at a higher, more lethal level become available.
  • Terrorist movements have political as well as military wings. Through this dual strategy the political arm is able to conduct overt operations, while the military or covert structure is engaged in ambushes and assassinations. The strategy enables the political leadership to dissociate itself publicly from the operations of the military wing. In some cases this strategy has become flawed as armed wings have begun to operate independently, rather than remain under the control of their political wings. In fact, individuals have begun to lose sight of the aims and objectives of the larger movement.42
The above-mentioned factors listed as contributing to the potential escalation from legitimate dissent to violence and terrorism do not imply that all protest actions develop into violence. Instead, the possibility of violence is presented. For example, when discussing the activities of Pagad, it is useful to bear in mind that although the initial objectives of Pagad were to rid the community of drugs and gangs and to let the government know that something would be done about its lack of response to crime, Pagad as a pressure group has developed into a vigilante group that seems to be associated with acts of terrorism.

Categories of terrorism

Table 1 distinguishes between the four main categories of terrorism based on the level of government and individual involvement in terrorism.

Table 1: Government and individual involvement in terrorism

Government controlled Nationals of more than one state
Domestic terrorism Yes No
International terrorism Yes Yes
State-sponsored terrorism Yes No
Transnational terrorism No Yes

Since the 1960s, the threat posed by terrorism has changed. The changing nature of this threat and changes in the primary character of terrorism are represented schematically in Table 2. The different forms of terrorism may, however, occur in different periods and are not necessarily exclusive to one period.

Table 2: Eras of terrorism

Period 1960 – 1979 1980 – 1989 1990s
Type Revolutionary terrorism State-sponsored terrorism Transnational terrorism
Threat National stability Regional stability International stability
Character Instrument to combat colonial rule
Domestic terrorism		 Cold War instrument used by the former super-powers and their allies Instrument in the hands of individuals in an international network

Domestic terrorism

Domestic terrorism occurs when the violence and terror associated with it are confined to national territories and do not involve targets abroad. In practice, it is, however, very difficult to find any intensive terrorist campaign that remains purely internal as the terrorists eventually look across their national borders for support, weapons, financial assistance and a safe haven.43 The use of domestic terrorism is not limited to non-governmental groups as state terrorism forms an integral part of domestic terrorism. Governments, their armies, secret police and intelligence services may be labelled as terrorists when they are involved in terrorist activities. Autocratic governments often resort to violence (associated with terrorism) to limit legitimate dissent.

Political terrorism

Political terrorism can be defined as the use or threat of terror by a state or a group outside government in pursuit of a set of ideological objectives that ignore the objectives of domestic and international law. "The intimate connection between terrorism and ideological politics is vital for present purposes, since it is precisely this connection that distinguishes modern terrorism from earlier forms of political violence."44 This form of terrorism is used primarily for political ends. Terrorism used as a modus operandi by political groups reflects their inability to achieve their political objectives through legitimate means. Political terrorism cannot be understood outside the context of the development of terrorist, or potentially terrorist, ideologies, beliefs and lifestyles. Thus, political terrorism embodies violence or the threat of violence against non-combatants in order to achieve political goals. In fact, as is argued by Stohl and Lopez, there is no clear classification for political terrorism across regional and ideological lines.45 The use of violence by states has been accepted as a standard operating procedure since the 1960s, in response to liberation struggles.

Crime-related terrorism

Criminal terrorism is defined as "the systematic use of terror for ends of material gain".46 The primary manifestations of force in this form of terrorism include kidnapping, extortion, assassination and murder. Targets are selected primarily on considerations of personal and material gain. If a member of a state structure is selected at all, it is either for direct personal gain or to reduce interference by governmental authorities in their efforts to put an end to criminal activity. For example, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 15 independent states came into being. Poor socio-economic conditions contributed to a deterioration of law enforcement, border forces and to general unemployment. Control over weapons and explosives (conventional and unconventional) weakened, which threatened not only national, but also regional and international security. The national security of states in the region was threatened by the escalation of criminal gangs and organised crime syndicates. Political and criminal terrorism are regarded as a major threat to security within the territory of the former Soviet Union. Criminal terrorism has taken the form of contract assassinations, kidnappings and intimidation bombings. Targets include business people, politicians, government officials, government buildings, military personnel, trains and border guards.47

In South Africa, the best example of crime-related terrorism is the phenomenon of taxi violence. Taxi violence is especially prevalent around Cape Town, Johannesburg and East London. Taxi violence occurs mainly between owners and operators of minibus taxis, between members of opposing taxi associations, and between minibus taxi operators and operators of other modes of transport such as buses. Competition for routes, licences and passengers exacerbates the problem. An emerging phenomenon in taxi violence is that of professional hit squads hired by operators to attack rivals in drive-by shootings.48 According to Swindells, nearly 1 500 people were killed in taxi-related violence between 1996 and January 2000.49 Many were victims of contract killers hired by rival taxi operators specifically to kill taxi drivers, for as little as R5 000 per driver. Taxi owners have attacked and murdered several bus drivers in a war over who gets to transport thousands of commuters.

In the Western Cape, violence in the transport industry escalated in April 2000 when a bus owned by the Golden Arrow Bus Company was shot at near the Nyanga bus terminus. This attack unleashed 57 violent incidents between April and August 2000, during which two commuters and 11 bus drivers were killed, and 42 commuters were injured. In these attacks, buses were shot at with pistols and automatic rifles from passing taxis and vehicles. In some instances, persons on foot, hiding behind shacks and walls, fired shots at buses on the bus routes in the townships and on highways.50 In July 2000 alone, there were 13 attacks by independent minibus owners and drivers, against buses of the Golden Arrow Bus Company. These attacks started in late May 2000. At the time of writing more than 60 attacks had occurred resulting in seven fatalities and dozens of injured people. The Golden Arrow Bus Company has suffered losses of hundreds of thousands of rands.

Narco-terrorism

Narco-terrorism can be described as terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It may take the form of assassination, extortion, hijacking, bombing, and kidnapping directed at judges, prosecutors, elected officials, or law enforcement agents, and the general disruption of government, to divert attention from drug operations.

Although narco-terrorism is a sub-element of crime-related terrorism, it is significant enough to be considered in its own right. Narco-terrorism, in the first instance, includes narcotics trafficking by terrorist groups in return for the funds with which to conduct terror. In the Asia/Pacific region, narco-terrorism is linked to political terrorism. The objective is to force governments or their agents (such as law enforcement agencies) to scale down their activities against drug syndicates.51

In other words, narco-terrorism refers to the use of extreme pressure and violence by the growers, producers, or distributors of narcotics to force a government agency to modify its opinion with regard to curtailing the sale and the use of narcotics. Although violence has always been an inevitable part of the drug trade, narco-battles have increasingly spilled over into the non-criminal world. Today’s narco-terrorism involves the assassination of political leaders, the bombing of civilian aeroplanes, alliances between armed guerrillas and narco-traffickers, widespread gunrunning, and may even involve attempts to overthrow a government that is attempting to curtail the drug trade.52

Colombia is one of the best examples of a state where narcotics introduced not only terrorism, but also an illegal international arms-trade network. State-sponsored terrorism also plays a role as a destabilisation factor. For example, all four major terrorist groups in Colombia have received arms and training from Cuba and aid from Libya. The involvement of Cuba and Libya (although indirectly) supports the conclusion that an international network exists, linking terrorist groups and individual role-players. Colombia has historical ties with Cuba, organised crime organisations (which are active in drugs, guns and illegal alien smuggling in Panama) and the Russian Mafia responsible for supplying weapons to Colombian narco-terrorist forces. China’s flagship commercial shipping fleet, China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), is directly connected to the Chinese armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army, and the Chinese government. COSCO ships have served as carriers for massive smuggling operations of weapons, drugs and illegal aliens around the world. In addition, the Chinese government has used COSCO in undertakings to ship missiles — and components of weapons of mass destruction — to rogue nations such as Pakistan and Iran.53

Issue-motivated terrorism

Groups that coalesce around various social issues (such as racial equality, pro- and anti-abortion, animal rights, and nuclear issues), environmental concerns, land and economic rights, and other matters impinging on the public conscience, generally operate within the bounds of legitimate democratic dissent. However, in certain cases these pressure groups exceed the bounds of legitimate protest. This form of terrorism can be considered as the least serious form of random violence against the public. In some cases issue-motivated terrorism may also include elements of religiously motivated terrorism, with reference to fundamental interpretations of religious doctrines (for example, the debate about the ‘right’ to take a life).54

Eco-terrorism

Many developed countries have experienced forms of eco-terrorism. For example, multinational corporations such as Tarmac, Costain and ARC (a unit of the Hanson conglomerate) have been targeted by ecological activists. Companies not only face financial threats from highly sophisticated, well organised eco-organisations, but are also subjected to terrorist tactics, such as bomb threats, and the intimidation of their staff. British police are, for example, investigating the tactics used by underground eco-groups, which distribute leaflets with instructions on how to assemble home-made explosives. In the United States ‘Earth First’ was established in the 1980s, focusing on nuclear facilities and associated electrical systems. In 1986, this group was responsible for a successful attack on the Palo Verdes nuclear facility transmission lines in the United States. Radical environmental movements, and acts of terrorism associated with them, are on the increase.55

International terrorism

Alexander and Gleason make a distinction between domestic and international terrorism: "Terrorist activities may be regarded as international when the interests of more than one state are involved, for example, when the perpetrator or the victim is a foreigner in the country where the act is done or the perpetrator has fled to another country [in contrast to domestic terrorism]."56 The international character is highlighted with the participation of foreign nationals in "international terrorist organisations", such as the activities of the Abu Nidal Organisation in the United States. The activities of this group (as well as others with the same modus operandi) include the smuggling and transfer of currency, and providing information and intelligence to other members inside the United States and throughout the world. The Abu Nidal group has also obstructed investigations, fraudulently obtained passports, bought weapons, recruited new members and collected information in a clandestine manner.

The international political system has contributed to the increase in international terrorism in a number of ways.
  • During the Cold War unconventional modes of warfare, such as terrorism, became more attractive as instruments of policy for states and non-state organisations such as national liberation movements. "Such methods are low-cost, relatively low-risk and yet afford the possibilities of high yield in terms of weakening, penetrating or even gaining control through covert means. State-sponsored international terrorism carries the added attraction for its perpetrators that it can be carried out secretly, and, if suspicions are voiced, plausibly denied."57
  • Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip contributed to religiously motivated terrorism and the establishment of several terrorist organisations with a network all over the world. The Middle East problem has never been purely local since its original cause — the creation of the state of Israel — was an act of the international community rather than an outcome of the domestic balance of forces between local Jews and Arabs.58
  • Socio-economic problems, which are sometimes aggravated by a government’s action or inaction, contribute to communities’ feelings of frustration with and alienation from the government. Unattended grievances of various ethnic and religious minorities have led to the establishment of terrorist groups set up to counter the inadequacies of regimes.59 For example, the division between the rich northern hemisphere and poor southern hemisphere has contributed to the development of terrorist groups. Islamic revivalism and extremism go hand in hand with poor socio-economic conditions. Since the 18th century periods of Islamic revivalism, religio-political movements have developed in response to political fragmentation and economic, social and moral decline.
International terrorism, in other words, comprises acts that have clear international consequences. These acts include incidents where terrorists cross national borders to strike foreign targets, select victims or targets because of their connections to a foreign country (for example, diplomats, local executives), attack airliners on international flights, or force airliners to fly to other countries. International terrorism does not include the activities of dissident groups when carried out against a local government or citizens in their own country if no foreign connection is involved.

State-sponsored terrorism

State-sponsored terrorism involves the employment of lethal force across international borders for the purpose of destroying or weakening the political cohesion of a targeted political entity. The state that resorts to terrorism does not use its own military instruments to deliver the lethal force, but harnesses social elements within the targeted entity to do so. States sponsor terrorism for three basic reasons:
  • it is safer for the agent state;
  • it is cheap; and
  • the current interstate infrastructure enhances and supports the use of terrorism for political goals through modern technology.
Within state-sponsored terrorism, Hanle has identified three basic types of terrorism employed by social forces that lend themselves to outside sponsorship:60
  • National revolutionary terrorism (so-called ‘homo-fighters’, or terrorists operating against their fellow countrymen). For example, both sides during the anti-apartheid struggle used terror tactics against fellow South Africans.
  • International revolutionary terrorism (‘xeno-fighters’ who employ terrorism against targets controlled and operated by persons other than the terrorists’ fellow countrymen, including colonial terrorist organisations). These organisations include, for example, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) fighting those who control their homelands and those who are allied with them; and ideologically motivated terrorists that have widespread popular support, for example, Islamic Jihad and other radical Islamic terrorist groups. International terrorists need and receive more support from the outside than do domestic terrorist groups. This, in turn, gives them a greater technical ability to operate at a higher level of violence than their domestic counterparts. State sponsorship puts resources such as intelligence, money, sophisticated munitions and technical expertise at the disposal of the terrorists, thus reducing the constraints on the terrorists. States supporting international revolutionary terrorists are usually those with the same ideology as the terrorists or those wishing to destabilise and weaken the targeted entity politically.
The difference between homo-fighters and xeno-fighters is that the latter tend to adopt more indiscriminate tactics. This explains the indiscriminate nature of force used by international terrorists as opposed to national revolutionary terrorists.
  • Minute, political terrorist gangs or so-called micro-political terrorist gangs that seldom have a membership of more than a dozen people (including the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Japanese Red Army of the 1970s).

    State-sponsored terrorism may be expected to continue as a form of limited conflict used by marginalised states. State-sponsored international terrorism can also be used as a tool of domestic or foreign policy.61
  • Iran, even with US sanctions, continues to use terrorism as a weapon of foreign policy to kill dissidents and to disrupt peace processes through its support for Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command (PFLP-GC). It also provides a safe haven for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
  • Sudan supports the armed opposition groups of all its neighbouring countries and was even involved in the planning and training of the assailants involved in the attempted assassination of president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. Thus, Sudan could be considered to be a destabilising factor in Northern Africa. Before the assassination attempt, the Egyptian government accused the fundamentalist government in Khartoum of instigating militant Islamic violence inside Egypt.62 In addition, Sudan also harboured Osama Bin Laden and members of the world’s most violent groups such as the Abu Nidal Organisation, Hizbollah and Hamas. Khartoum is known as a major transit point and base for a number of terrorist groups.63
The growth of international terrorist movements has been linked to the willingness of some nations to sponsor campaigns of terror directly or indirectly, often through proxies and other means.64 States sponsor terrorism by providing funding, training, a safe haven, weapons and logistical support to terrorists. State sponsorship increases the danger of terrorism because it provides the client group with far greater firepower than they would ever be likely to obtain in the normal arms-market.65

Transnational terrorism

A shift has been detected since the 1990s from state-sponsored international terrorism, that is generally more structured with well-established hierarchies and infrastructure, towards international radical terrorists that operate in a decentralised fashion. This trend is regarded as a significant internationalisation of terrorist activities. In the past, it would have been correct to say that in general terms most terrorist organisations were readily identifiable from their constitution, which was often organised on quasi-military lines, with a definable command structure, a strategy and an identifiable political aim.

According to Anderson, transnational terrorism is "... the use, or threat of use, of anxiety — including, extra normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, through its location, through the nature of its institutional or human victims, or through the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries".66

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) distinguishes between international terrorism and transnational terrorism, stating that the latter is terrorism "carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states", as opposed to "international terrorism, which is terrorism carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state".67

Transnational terrorism refers to groups comprised of individuals of various nationalities, all united under the dual banner of religion and violence. According to Mickolus: "terror is transnational when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution and its ramifications transcend national boundaries".68 In other words, adherents of international radical terrorism generally overcome traditional national differences by concentrating on a common goal of achieving social change, under the banner of personal beliefs, through violence. These individuals may not consider themselves to be citizens of any particular country, but instead seek common political, social, economic or personal objectives that transcend nation-state boundaries. The World Trade Centre bombing may be considered as an act of transnational terrorism, because of the different nationalities of the terrorists involved. The suspected bombers include Egyptians, Iraqis, Jordanians, Palestinians and US citizens.

Conclusion

Although not all of the above-mentioned categories of terrorism exist in South Africa, terrorism is an international phenomenon. The implication for South Africa is that transnational terrorism, in association with transnational crime, presents a real threat to national, regional and international security. South Africa is an open society with a large number of illegal immigrants and a well-established infrastructure. This presents a fertile ground for individuals and groups who want to engage in terrorist activities.

South Africa is regarded as the gateway to the rest of Africa, especially to southern Africa. However, as with other African countries, the threat presented by terrorism is on the increase. The threat can be seen to exist on two levels, namely as an external threat and as an internal threat.

Notes

  1. A P Schmid & A J Jongman, Political terrorism: A guide to actors, authors, concepts, data basis, theories and literature. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1988, p 28.
  2. Y Alexander, Middle East terrorism. Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Washington, D.C., 1994, p 1.
  3. M Schönteich, South Africa’s arsenal of terrorism legislation, African Security Review, 9(2) 2000, pp 1—2.
  4. Review of security legislation (terrorism: section 54 of the Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act no. 74 of 1982)), South African Law Commission, discussion paper, project 105, part 2, July 2000, Pretoria, p 312.
  5. M Crenshaw, The causes of terrorism, Comparative Politics, 13 (4), 1981, p 387.
  6. A A Mazrui, The Third World and international terrorism: preliminary reflections, Third World Quarterly, 7 (2), 1985, p 349.
  7. D J Hanle, Terrorism: The newest face of warfare, Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, New York, 1989, p 111.
  8. A A Mazrui, Cultural Forces in World Politics, Heinemann Educational Books, New Hampshire, 1990, p 13.
  9. H Abdalati, Islam in focus, World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), 1982, p 38.
  10. G Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A real threat? Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, 1996, p 424.
  11. D J Hanle, op cit, pp 111—113.
  12. M Crenshaw, op cit, pp 379; 386—387.
  13. Ibid, p 387.
  14. E Iksoon Im, J Cauley, & T Sandler, Cycles and substitutions in terrorist activities: A spectral approach, Kyklos, 40, 1987, p 238.
  15. D J Hanle, op cit, p 114.
  16. M Crenshaw, op cit, p 391.
  17. A H Schbley, Religious terrorists: What they aren’t going to tell us, Terrorism, 13, 1990, p 237.
  18. P Wilkinson, Blood is spilling all over the world, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 12 (31), 1996, p 18.
  19. A Corsun, Significant Incidents of Political Violence against Americans: 1996. United States Department of State: Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, 1997, p 15.
  20. W Laqueur, Postmodern terrorism, Global Issues: Targeting Terrorism, 2 (1), 1997, p 9.
  21. M Crenshaw, op cit, p 381.
  22. G Cameron, op cit, p 425.
  23. United States Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, Office of the Secretary of State: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2000.
  24. P Probst, Future trends: Some observations. Terrorism, 14 (4), 1991, pp 234—235.
  25. W Laqueur, op cit, p 11.
  26. P Wilkinson, 1996, op cit, p 18.
  27. Ibid.; see also J E Stern, Will terrorists turn to poison? Orbis, Summer 1993, p 401.
  28. BBC. Key facts on Lockerbie, 4 December 1998. http://www.bbc.co.uk
  29. P Wilcox, Terrorism remains a global issue, Global Issues: Targeting Terrorism, Electronic Journals of the US Information Agency, 2 (1), 1997, p 6.
  30. BBC. Life for World Trade Centre bomber, 10 January 1998. http://www.bbc.co.uk
  31. CNN, Persian Gulf wealth backing terrorists, 14 August 1996. http://www.cnn.com
  32. B M Jenkins, The future course of international terrorism, The Futurist, 21, 1987, p 10.
  33. P Wilkinson, 1996, op cit, p 18.
  34. A Buccianti, Egypt and Sudan involved in border clashes, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 11 (28), 1995, p 22.
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  36. Moord op landdros ‘terreur teen staat’, Beeld, 8 September 2000. http://www.news24.co.za
  37. K L Oots, Organizational perspectives on the formation and disintegration of terrorist groups. Terrorism, 12, 1989, p 146.
  38. A Botha, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad): A study of structures, operations and initial government reactions, Unpublished MA Thesis, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, 1998, p 59.
  39. R Clutterbuck, The future of political violence: Destabilization, disorder and terrorism, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1986, p 41.
  40. P Leventhal, & B Chellaney, Nuclear terrorism: Threat, perception and response in South Asia, Terrorism, 11, 1988, p 460.
  41. B M Jenkins, op cit, p 10.
  42. W Laqueur, op cit, pp 9—10.
  43. P Wilkinson, Terrorist targets and tactics: New risks to world order, Conflict Studies, (236), 1991, p 1.
  44. N O’Sullivan, Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution, Colorado, 1986, p 5.
  45. M Stohl & G A Lopez, The state as terrorist: The dynamics of governmental violence and repression, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1984, pp 4—6.
  46. D J Hanle, op cit, pp 125—127.
  47. D A Pluchinsky, Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union: A Primer, A Puzzle, A Prognosis. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 21, 1998, p 120.
  48. R Brand, Anger at admission over taxi violence, The Star, 21 September 1999, pp 1—3.
  49. S Swindells, Taxi-war report points at corrupt police, 2000, p 1. http://www.iol.co.za
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  51. D J Hanle, op cit, p 127.
  52. A J Behm & M J Palmer, Co-ordinating counter terrorism: A strategic approach to a changing threat, Terrorism, 14 (3), 1991, pp 174—175.
  53. C Smith, The Panama Canal in transition: Threats to U.S. Security and China’s growing role in Latin America, 1999, pp 1—13.
  54. A J Behm & M J Palmer, op cit, pp 174—175.
  55. E V Badolato, Environmental terrorism: A case study, Terrorism, 14, 1991, pp 237—239.
  56. Y Alexander, & J M Gleason, Behavioral and quantitive perspectives on terrorism, Pergamon, New York, 1981, p 16.
  57. P Wilkinson, 1991, op cit, p 3.
  58. A A Mazrui, 1985, op cit, p 360.
  59. L Weinberg, Turning to terror: The conditions under which political parties turn to terrorist activities, SAIS Review, 11 (2), 1991, p 427.
  60. D J Hanle, op cit, pp 181-184.
  61. P Wilkinson & A M Steward, Contemporary research on terrorism. University Press, Aberdeen, 1989, p xiii.
  62. J Wyllie, Egypt — A State in jeopardy, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 6 (1), 1994, p 30.
  63. J Walsh, Electronic Journals of the U.S. Information Agency, Global issues: Targeting terrorism, 2 (1), 1997, p 28.
  64. P Leventhal & B Chellaney, op cit, p 457.
  65. P Wilkinson, 1991, op cit, p 19.
  66. S K Anderson, Warnings versus alarms: Terrorist threat analysis applied to the Iranian state-run media, Studies of Conflict & Terrorism, 21, 1998, p 282.
  67. Y Alexander & J M Gleason, op cit, 1981, p 2.
  68. E Mickolus, Transnational terrorism: Symposium on international terrorism, Defence Intelligence Agency, Washington, 2 — 3 December 1985, p 35.