Chapter 7

Lasting Security and Economic Development in Africa

Introduction

This brief paper deals with the links between lasting security and development in Africa from the point of view of an economist.

Security refers to the acquisition of and respect for the rights of people that guarantee their safety. It implies preventing and limiting risks, crises and conflicts. It involves the establishment of institutions, governmental and non-governmental organisations, different types of regulations, and reactive, interactive or proactive attitudes on the part of private and public decisionmakers. Insecurity in Africa is the result, to various degrees, of natural or human catastrophes, the vulnerability of people and groups, and institutional failure (absence of a legally constituted state).

Economic development is an endogenous and cumulative process of increasing productivity and of the long-term reduction of inequalities, enabling a growing number of the population to move from a vulnerable and insecure situation to one where there is better control over uncertainty and instability, and greater satisfaction of fundamental needs.

Faced with the increasing insecurity that affects people and with rising conflicts, traditional economic development initiatives have lost much of their significance. In many African countries, humanitarian and emergency aid has overtaken development aid and the very short term prevails over long-term projects. It is the responsibility of major countries and regional powers to contribute to greater safety.

The question of safety will be presented in this paper on two levels:

Zones of tension and conflict in Africa1

The interaction between these two levels will be illustrated with reference to food insecurity and famines, before proposing a route to follow in order to achieve better security for both people and states.

The insecurity of states and the economy of war

Expansion and splitting up of conflicts in Africa

A large expanse of war zones can be observed on a world-wide scale. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, more than 60 conflicts resulted in 17 million refugees and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. In Africa, it is estimated that, in the 11 countries involved in conflicts during the 1990s — Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville — the number of deaths was between 3.8 and 6.8 million, or 2.4 to 4.3% of the sumtotal of the population in these countries (155 million). In 2000, 20% of the African population and 14 countries are involved in war. The number of refugees is estimated at 4 million and the number of displaced persons at 10 million.

The web of conflicts and increasing chaos around the DRC

In 2000, the web of violent conflicts, with the Democratic Republic of Congo at the epicentre, has resulted in coalitions with multiple interests:

Support for Kabila comes from Angola (wanting to avoid attacks by UNITA), Namibia (allied with Angola), Zimbabwe (for mining and agricultural advantages and to show its power vis-à-vis South Africa), Sudan (of which the enemy (RDC) of its own enemy (Uganda) is its friend), as well as Hutu or affiliated (Mayi-Mayi) militias.



The forces opposed to Kabila come from Uganda (whose troops plunder the riches of the RDC), Rwanda (opposed to Hutus related to Kabila), Burundi (linked to Rwanda), as well as from militias (the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, RCD-Goma, RCD-ML).

The stakes are of an ethnic order (Hutus against Tutsis), or hegemonic (Zimbabwe against South Africa and Uganda), or relate to policy or internal struggles (UNITA against the MPLA, the support of UNITA for Lissouba against the support of the MPLA for Sassou Nguesso in the Congo). There is a great risk of the conflict spreading further afield. The headlong rush of Mugabe in Zimbabwe towards economic bankruptcy led to the occupation of land by veterans of the war of independence, with the approval of the majority of blacks in South African townships. This can destabilise communities in the country.

Conflicts during the Cold War, characterised by ideological oppositions and the support of the major blocs, were succeeded by many forms of guerrilla warfare, to a greater extent taking place between Africans after the withdrawal of the major powers. The increase in the numbers of conflict zones in Africa is also the result of the resurgence of ethnic, religious or nationalist identities, the failure of legally constituted states and collapsing sovereignties, the interference of regional and international powers and a globalisation of international criminal organisations. Guerrilla wars depend on external support, preying on external production or assistance or on the capture of natural resources. There can also be synergy between guerrilla movements, for example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone paid Charles Taylor a levy on diamonds which passed through Liberia to be exported to Europe.2

The economic factors of war

The causes of conflicts are found on various levels, among others:

local: competition for limited land or for water;

national: ethnic or political conflicts;

regional: ties between political parties and regional support; and

international: links with Mafia-type international networks.

The explanatory factors have to do with the political interests of the various powers, with perceptions of image, the stubborn assertion of identities, and with economic interests. All wars do not have an economic cause, but all need financing. War can have the political aim of acceding to power by force or it can result from a profit motive. Many wars in Africa are related to the control of riches (diamonds, oil and drugs), to plundering or to the search for protection subject to remuneration. They rely on poverty and unemployment for the recruitment of militias. The opportunistic cost of war is less because youthful populations are unemployed and without resources. Wars are greatly facilitated by the widespread traffic in light weapons: among these the recycling and sale of surplus weaponry by the Eastern European countries.

Of course, these economic factors only apply under certain political conditions: the absence of a legally constituted state, the collapsing sovereignty of states, and the lack of democratic rules. Usually, authoritarian powers with little legitimacy control the security forces. This leads, in the absence of democratic debate, to armed struggles between opposing groups, resulting in a cycle of violence ending in the militarisation of society. This process can be fuelled from outside, through financing provided by other states or companies (notably mining or oil companies).

At a more basic level, African societies form part of an informal world economy or a world without law.3 The globalisation in progress, which presents economic growth opportunities linked to the lifting of barriers, also leads to the rise of mafia economies and sales of weapons facilitated by the breakdown of communist countries, as well as drug-trafficking and money-laundering. Africa forms part of this international parallel economy that is, at the same time, a source for the accumulation of wealth and a contributing factor to conflicts and the disintegration/reconstitution of states. Diamonds, drugs and oil become products of trafficking before being ‘laundered’ in international networks. Conflicts result from the interdependence between the control of illicit products, the purchase of weapons, the mobilisation of militias and links with the international business world. Access to mining or oil riches leads to the ‘straddling’ between positions of power and positions associated with the accumulation of wealth.4

The economic effects of war and conflict

War has a high cost in terms of military expenditure and foreign debt. Table 1 shows some indicators for African countries at war. In 1999, Angola spent US $900 million of oil revenues for the purchase of military equipment. Zimbabwe and Uganda are bled dry by war. The economic bankruptcy of Zimbabwe has resulted in an inflation rate of 60%, a break with the Bretton Woods institutions and a headlong rush likely to lead to a large-scale exodus of white farmers and a brain-drain. In Ethiopia, the cost of the war with Eritrea has been estimated at US $1 million per day.

Wars directly affect African economies. They lead to the destruction or the depreciation of physical resources (infrastructure, equipment), human resources and social resources based on trust and the rules or networks of relations.

The debate over long-term effects

In certain cases, war may appear to be a means of creating states, of making primitive acquisitions and of constituting the basis for the later productive accumulation of territories.5 European nation-states were constituted, to a large extent, by means of war: ‘the state makes war, war makes the state’. African societies find themselves on a long historical trajectory, unconnected to the present world.

Conversely, it can be considered that, in African states, wars are essential factors in economic underdevelopment, not only because of the resulting destruction of people or goods, but also because of the state of insecurity among economic agents. These factors result in widespread migrations and large numbers of refugees. They contribute to the proliferation of diseases such as Aids. They lead to insecurity about property rights and access to primary goods. Plundering escalates. A war is rather a factor in the disintegration of states. Today, wars have become internationalised through their weaponry, their alliances and their stakes. In a globalised universe, it cannot be assumed that the withdrawal of the old imperial powers leaves a clear field for an African history set outside of world time, erasing the period of colonisation and the artificiality of borders. Wars are also indicative of wheeling and dealing, vote-catching and a neo-patrimonial attitude that bind Africa’s internal policies with more or less Mafia-style foreign relations.

The insecurity of people and goods and economic growth

Economic factors in African growth

For a long period, the per capita income of sub-Saharan Africa has stagnated, despite the marked differences between the region’s 50 countries. The weak economic growth can be explained by a range of economic factors. In the long term, the determinants of African economic growth are interest rates on savings, the capacity for imports and improvements in productivity through various factors. Interest rates on savings of around 13% are limited by short-term performance, high insecurity, and the failure of financial systems. It is estimated that more than 40% of African savings are reinvested elsewhere. Capacity for imports is a function of the growth and diversification of exports. However, more than 90% of Africa’s exports remain basic products with unstable and regressive prices in the long term. The improvement in productivity factors is inhibited by inefficiency in the allocation of resources, and the limited role given to the mastery of technology or to training and the use of skills.6

The role of security and the institutional environment

It is, however, necessary to take into account, besides these economic factors, questions around the institutional environment and insecurity. Economists have rediscovered obvious results, namely that military conflicts or civil wars, the failure of institutions, natural catastrophes and the absence of personal security or property rights play a determining role in weak African growth.

African economies are particularly vulnerable to natural catastrophes, whether they are epidemiological, political or military. These modify both rules and roles. Crises generally result in a marked differentiation between agents implementing survival practices, who accept to enter the cycle of debt and decapitalisation, and the ‘sharks’ or speculators with opportunist strategies. These processes can only be avoided if there are systems in place for self-insurance and to cover risks through binding credit, and security that is assured by private or public collective organisations.

The absence of a security system or of social protection encourages old-age insurance taken care of by children, or the mobilisation of a youthful labour force in an urban or rural environment, and thus a strong demographic growth that can create emergent effects on a collective level.

The absence of land security (property rights) is, at the same time, a way of managing extensive systems, of controlling migratory flows (the land is held by those who exploit it) and an obstacle to the intensification of agriculture. Land conflicts have been increasing both because land is more scarce — "the time of finished space starts in Africa"7 — and because of the repurchasing of land that has become transferable, for example, in Côte d’Ivoire, the exodus of 25 000 citizens of Burkina Faso following the reinstitution of ancestral rights to land by the Kroumen.

The absence of the means to fight against generalised epidemics such as Aids leads to medical insecurity with devastating effects. Africa accounts for 86% of Aids deaths (13.7 million) and 70% of the affected population in the world (23.3 million). Is it necessary to recall that 99% of the money spent on Aids benefits 5% of the infected population (in western countries), or that the cost of AZT for the 4 million HIV-positive individuals in South Africa would represent 10 times the annual health budget?

Besides the human dramas (4 million orphans in Africa), Aids has economic and social consequences. It contributes, in particular, to the decapitalisation of the élite. It is the active and best qualified persons who are the most affected. Figures of 25% HIV-positive individuals are quoted for public officials in Côte d’Ivoire or for employees of the Eskom company in South Africa.

The collapse of states precludes the elementary means of social survival (security, respect for property rights, the provision of collective services) resulting in civil society taking charge (at best), or the installation of a predatory economy.

The impact of insecurity on African growth

Certain econometric studies such as that of Easterly and Levine, introduced ethnic divisions and conflicts as a determining factor of weak African growth.8 They are based on debatable methods, however, by assuming the number of ethnic groups to be a factor contributing to possible crises. Thus, Burundi or Rwanda, which are bi-ethnic, are seen as homogeneous and stable.

Work on the country risk introduces political risks as a determining factor for exporters and investors and as a constituent of the business climate, together with financial and business environment risks.9

The analysis has to be taken further. Instability and unrest create probability risks and uncertainty for the parties involved. There is uncertainty about the endurance of reforms. Theoretically diversified risks are not in fact so, because of the real risks of spreading and of false representations being extended to contrasting African situations (Afro-pessimism). Risks that can be anticipated by players are coups d’état, natural catastrophes and health risks. False representations, the result of Afro-pessimism, lead to pessimistic expectations that do not relate to real risks. The resulting short-term attitudes are obstacles to growth and economic development. In a risk context, agents prefer reversible solutions (option value), have a strong preference for liquidity, choose ‘exit’ solutions (of people or capital) and seek a rapid rate of return on capital. Uncertainty results in a lack of training and capitalisation.10 Insecurity and the risks of war are important reasons for weak foreign investment in Africa (1% of the world’s direct investments), whereas the rates of return on capital are the highest in the world (29%). The historical studies of north showed that the security of property rights was one of the determining factors of growth.

Links between the insecurity of states, goods and people: Food insecurity and famine

The inadequate satisfaction of fundamental needs or the lack of access to ‘primary goods’ — in accordance with the meaning of Sen, "goods that any man is supposed to want": freedom, education, health and food11 — result in varying degrees from the two levels of insecurity discussed previously, namely states of war and the insecurity of people linked to institutional weaknesses and failures. The case of food insecurity serves as an example.

How are food insecurity and famine explained?

Famines in Africa are numerous, even though there are surpluses of food in the world today. There were precolonial famines, for example, in the empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai. Recent famines affected Ethiopia (1972/74, 1984/85), the Sahel (1973-74), Madagascar (1986), Sudan (1998), Lesotho (1983/85), Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Angola, and the former Zaïre, Uganda, Somalia (1992) and Liberia.12

There are several related factors that transform pockets of malnutrition into a nutritional catastrophe. There can be insufficient food availability due, in particular, to climatic variables or to a lack of creditworthy demand following a drop in income or a rise in food prices. There is generally a loss of rights as these result from factors such as purchasing power, public redistribution, or membership of social groups with associated rights and obligations. Malnutrition or famines can also result from the political actions of certain groups. States involved in conflict or guerrilla wars suffer more easily from famines. Warlords sow terror and seek to eliminate opposing groups by starving them; thus, in Somalia, after having starved the population by destroying peasant food production, these warlords plundered or blocked food aid initiatives in order to create famines.

In the case of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in 2000, the combination of drought (three years without rain), the cost of the war with Eritrea, the pro-crisis role of Ethiopian governmental authorities (or at least their wait-and-see attitude) towards the marginalised ethnic nomads of the Ougaden, and the logistic difficulties related to conflicts, exacerbated food scarcity. Food blockades were always used as a weapon against enemies or minorities. African famines are the main consequence of political and military factors. Natural causes play a limited role today in comparison with human factors.

But, it is also important to take into account the strategies of the great international powers. It is recognised that the United States played a role in the Ethiopian famines by using food as a weapon to bring down the Marxist government, even though this government had wanted a rapid transformation of the social links with production which, as in many communist regimes, had created famines.

Faced with the same events of drought and falling production, a differentiation can be made, in the 1980s, between the proactive strategies of Botswana, the reactive strategies of Kenya and the inactive strategies of Ethiopia, Sudan, Madagascar (1986), Mali and Mozambique.

Famine thus appears to be a systemic risk resulting from a combination of factors:

temporary: related to exogenous shocks such as natural catastrophes and politico-military conflicts, resulting in a major disturbance of the system;



structural: related to the underdevelopment of food systems and the vulnerability of social systems, characterised by the vulnerability and exposure to food risk of the population due to insufficient availability, the failure of markets or the absence of rights;



institutional: characterised by the absence of or defective information, prevention and regulation systems, manifested in uncontrolled spreading effects; and



political: characterised by the absence or failure of strategic options: a pro-crisis attitude among the military, politicians or speculators, or the indifference, incompetence and passivity of unconcerned leaders.

 Possible routes to solutions

The solutions are obviously complex and varied. Decision-making processes can seek to limit the catastrophe, to help the victims, or to avoid new crises. The parties involved can be negative (pro-crisis) passive (accepting), reactive (firefighting), preactive (anticipating), proactive (acting in advance to obtain the desired results) or interactive (guiding the interrelationships of events).

Safety can obviously not result from security measures that deal with the symptoms only and not with the causes of violence and conflicts. Possible solutions differ according to the applicable level: international conflicts, lack of legal states or systemic risk in a given sector. It can thus be considered that there is a hierarchy of safety requirements at the international level: the right to personal safety and universal human rights, social rights of access to primary goods which take on various forms according to specific societies, and individual property rights.

A differentiation is made between several modes of intervention at various levels.

The establishment of information systems, democratic rules and citizenship

Information plays an essential role in preventing or limiting crises. Due to the spread of conflicts since the end of the Cold War, and more numerous conflict zones or crisis areas, universal watchdogs have become insufficient. Zones of ‘limited chaos’ remain terrae incognitae. It is necessary to decentralise the means of observation. There are watchdogs, alarm signals or alert warnings that announce the imminence of catastrophes. It is relatively easy today with existing information systems to foresee the majority of catastrophes. The zones at risk are known. On the other hand, linkages between the circles of experts and the political decisionmakers remain missing.

Democracy can be considered as the form of government that limits the insecurity of people, such as that posed by the risk of famine. The functioning of an opposition and the transparency of information are essential. One of the reasons why a democracy reduces famine is that, according to the well-known maxim, no one would like to be in the place of one who dies of hunger. Political rights are necessary to satisfy needs and especially to express them. The social area must be transparent in order to defend the weakest. The ‘voice’ in the sense of Hirschman is essential to avoid famines. But the exercise of democracy is often limited to wealthy countries. Democracy results from rights acquired through struggle and agreements accepted by stakeholders. It is not imposed on societies from outside. It presupposes, in Africa, the establishment of political parties, associations and civil society organisations that permit citizens to participate actively.

The public opinions of industrialised countries are today flooded with information, yet inadequately informed about with many issues. They bear the miseries of the world more or less with compassion and, at best, delegate the responsibility to act to charitable or humanitarian organisations. They accept that government aid for development dropped sharply since 1990 and that it currently accounts for 0.22% of GDP against a stated objective of 0.7%. Opinionmakers, associations and political parties have a great responsibility to support an international citizenship.

The international question of regulating a ‘world without law’

The most important action required to reduce insecurity in Africa relates to the regulation of a world without law. The measures imply negotiations about international public property and about systems of compliance with rules and standards. The scope extends from the control of offshore financiers, to traffickers in illicit products (drugs) or legal products controlled by mafias, including the trade in weapons. The numbers of international players have multiplied: societies, governments, representatives of civil society. Procedural issues and questions around jurisprudence are paramount in the absence of world government. International negotiations must take into account the interdependence of decision levels and the web of hierarchies in the decisionmaking processes.

International co-operation is essential, in particular, to limit the traffic in weapons, to control the trade in products that finance war (diamonds, oil and drugs), and to control offshore organisations linked to mafia-type economies. These agreements can be based on the model of the moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons signed by eight countries of West Africa in March 1997, or on that of the agreements signed within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Countries that export weapons, for example, could prohibit sales to debt-ridden countries that benefit from measures employed in poor, very indebted nations (PPTE).

In a world where the weight of multinational private corporations prevails over that of states, negotiations must also relate to codes of conduct of those involved in oil, diamonds, finance or the production of weapons.

The regional question of interdependencies and crossinterests

The implementation of joint projects, the creation of regional institutions and the facilitation of regional flows of trade, work and capital and thus of economic interdependencies are different means of facilitating dialogue and circumventing political antagonisms. Thus, in East Asia, the open and mainly uninstitutionalised play of interests across reticular regionalism is a manner of surpassing the very high degree of latent conflicts in a zone in the process of a huge arms build-up. Of course, there are regional players that exert polarising pressures and constitute hegemonic powers. The point is that these powers (Côte d’Ivoire within the ECOWAS or South Africa within SADC) should carry out their obligations with respect to the member states of the regional unions.

The legal state and the implementation of democracy

For many positivist or realist political analysts, but also for economists supportive of the idea of ‘public choice’, the state is defined by policy and by policymakers. In the case of neo-patrimonialists, ways are found around the rules or to make money. On the other hand, for economic analysts with a normative conception of a legal-rational state (according to Weber), or a benevolent state taking responsibility for the collective (Keynes), the institutionalised capacity of the state implies a separation of institutions and of those in power (‘to obey rules so as not to obey people’).

The responsibility for preventing and ending armed confrontations and for seeking peaceful solutions falls primarily on states, and regional and international organisations. The imposition of conditions for aid in support of a democratic approach and the establishment of legal states are obviously some of the answers to the prevention of conflicts.

The assumption of responsibility for the collective can also be ensured through a contract involving civil society and the private sector with a schedule of conditions. There is also an obligation on government authorities to allow humanitarian organisations to respond to catastrophes if these authorities do not have the means to do so. The right to interfere has become a necessity in view of the deficiencies of legal states. Recently, national and international networks of private associations for international solidarity and assistance to victims have been formed. According to Jacques Forster:

"Humanitarian action cannot be the continuation of political action by other means. It should neither be substituted for, nor be integrated into policy. The responsibility of the State in the humanitarian field is to promote, support and give the means to act to the impartial and independent humanitarian institutions."13

The point therefore is to build up democracy by increasing the number of decisionmaking authorities and opposition powers, accepting differences and managing different communities bound by the same social contract.

The rights of people

There are three principal opposing concepts relating to the rights of people:

With the liberal concept, the right to do dominates. The only limit to freedom is what harms others. The right to private property is given priority. The market and democracy are supposed to answer to the preferences of individuals. The liberals promote the effectiveness of the market as a means to satisfy needs and, in particular, to avoid food crises. The free play of the market is supposed to result in a normal price. If there is competition between the ‘monopolisers’, their interest lies in stabilising prices by selling at a high price while buying at a low price. Market prices motivate producers. These lead to normal consumption. In the case of shocks, foreign trade is the best regulator. Interventionist policies can be poorly informed. The role of the state is to ensure the safety of goods and people and to permit the free flow of exchanges.



According to the collectivist concept, the right to have dominates. Formal rights must be differentiated from real rights; there are also social rights. It is the state’s role to satisfy fundamental nutritional, educational or medical needs.



With the social interaction or contractual concept the rights between the agents dominate. Rights are credits in society which depend on social organisation and the capacity of citizens to exert their rights. According to Rawls, primary needs must be satisfied because of the veil of uncertainty. What is right is seen as independent from what is good, hence the priority given to procedure.14

Rights in social states can be placed in a hierarchical order as follows:

rights to fundamental freedoms;



inequalities arranged for the greatest advantage of the least privileged and for the advantage of those immediately above the most impoverished or the principle of différence; and



equal opportunities.

If the case of food security is examined, security mechanisms are necessary for the most vulnerable groups that are excluded from the market. Where there is a risk of famine, emergency measures impose themselves: aid, work programmes, regulating stocks. Public authorities have an essential role to prevent and to install safety nets. Systems of binding credit, informal micro-finance or decentralised financing systems are able to cover the risks and avoid the process of decapitalisation and debt for the most vulnerable populations.

The aim then is to implement preventive measures to avoid systemic risks and to mobilise the bulk of the participants, starting with information and rapid intervention systems. Of course, in the long term, the disappearance of famine depends on development policies leading to an increase in food availability through greater productivity, as well as an increase in creditworthy demand linked to redistribution policies. But, the fight against exclusion implies social actions in terms of access to credit, and support of popular initiatives.

Notes

Rapport mondial sur le développement human, PNUD-Economica, juillet 1996; Ramsés 1994, Dunod; Les réfugiés sans le monde, HCR, La Découverte, 1995; The state of food insecurity in the world, FAO, Rome, 1999; Populations en danger, Médécins sans frontières — Lepac, La Découverte, 1995; Interventions, Action contre la faim, 1994; Le monde puet-il nourrir le monde?, Les clés de la planète, hors série no 1, Croissance, Paris, 1998. The original map was created by Marie Odile Blanc and Philippe Hugon from L’Atlas 2000 des conflits, Le Monde diplomatique, janvier-février 2000.



J C Ruffin, L’économie des guerrillas et les trafics, Revue internationale et stratégique, Décembre 1995.



J de Maillard (ed), Un monde sans loi, Stock, Paris, 1998.



For the criminalisation of the state in Africa, see J F Bayart, B Hibou & C Ellis, La criminalisation des Etats en Afrique, Ed complexe, Paris, 1997; for diamonds, see O Vallée & F Missen, Gemnocratie, l’économie politique du diamant en Afrique, Desclée de Brouwer, Bruxelles, 1999.



Bayart et al, ibid.



P Hugon, L’économie de l’Afrique, La Découverte Repères, Paris, 1999.



J Giri, L’Afrique en panne: Vingt-cinq ans de développement, Karthala, Paris, 1986.



W Easterly & R Levine, Africa’s growth tragedy, World Bank, Washington, 1995.



Such as Credit Risk International.



P Hugon, G Pourcet & S Quiers-Valette (eds), L’Afrique des incertitudes, PUF, Paris, 1995.



A K Sen, Poverty and famines: An essay on entitlements and deprivation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.



J von Braun, T Teklu & P Webb, Famines in Africa: Causes, responses and prevention, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, 1999.



J Forster, La sidérurgie au Maghreb: Problèmes poses par l’implantation d’une industrie de base dans une économie en voie de développement et rôle de cette industrie dans le développement économique, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Neuchatel, France.



J Rawls, Collected papers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

 Further reading

K Annan, The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Department of the Secretary-General of the Security Council, United Nations, New York, 1998.

P Hugon, Economie politique internationale et mondialisation, Economica, Paris, 1997.

M Nour Abdel Lotif, Economic implication of civil wars in SSA and the economic policies necessary for the successful transition in peace, Journal of African Economies 8, December 1999.

* Professor Paris X Nanterre CERED/FORUM