Chapter 5

French Political Culture and African Policy:
From Consensus to Dissensus

Introduction

The cultural variable is the principal missing element in explanations of France’s African policy. Analyses agree on the fact that this policy, since the countries became independent, is characterised by its singularity. Bonds of a simultaneously economic, monetary, military, linguistic nature, testify to an intense and almost fused relation between France and Africa. Some see in it the manifestation of a neo-colonialism with theoretical foundations drawing upon the imperialist model. Others see in it the illustration of the realism that governs any international relations. Yet others insist on the often private and personalised nature of the bonds instituted between the metropolis and its old colonies: the relation between state and state would fade in the face of patrimonial logic whose famous networks would constitute the cornerstone.

Without going into the fundamental debate about the relevance of these various explanations, it nevertheless seems necessary to stress that they all appear to be unable to account for the modifications which have affected France’s African policy for several years, except to deny their reality. However, the relations between France and Africa, marked by an undeniable continuity since the beginning of the 1960s, are currently undergoing substantial changes both in terms of direction and institutionally. The passage of an African policy — set in a continuity that was long considered immutable — to an African policy which can be described as new at this stage, is less due to specifically African reasons than to the cultural change which has been affecting the French leadership for almost 20 years. Having been wed for a long time to a system of common values, the French ruling élite is today split between opposite cultural poles. The African policy, like all other public policies, is an incarnation of this change at work. The era of consensus has now been succeeded by the era of cultural heterogeneity, hence of conflict.

The French leading class and the Franco-African consensus

For almost three decades, relations between France and Africa were based on a concept common to the French leading class: the Gaullist consensus. This structured Franco-African relations and transcended partisan differences, especially as these relations formed part of the extension of a global political culture based on the idea of exception.

The political culture of exception

France’s identity relates back to the idea of exception, in other words, the belief and the will to represent a singular political model. It does not fit into the scope of this paper to go back to the origins and basic elements of this singularity. However, its principal ingredients should be recalled.

The French exception is based on a body of values endowed with a universal vocation whose founding moment is symbolised by the Revolution of 1789 and, in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even though the historical period of the ancien régime also contributes to nurture the myth of exception. These values — summarised in the republican trilogy of freedom, equality, fraternity — are represented by two key instruments: the nation and the state. The first constitutes the political embodiment of society, as surpassing particular identities, the crucible of the social bond and of democracy. The second enables the nation to have an instrument of action, which guarantees the republican principles. For these reasons, the French state is interventionist and centralist.

The politically homogeneous French model is also culturally so, in particular because of a common language which unifies the territory and the society. But, this language does not only live and function internally. It also participates in the external influence as a universal tool of communication. It is the expression of French influence, of that search for station that haunts the dreams of the ruling élite. In essence, the French model could not be limited to the hexagon (France) alone. It can express its genius and its mission only by spreading these to all those parts of the world that vitally need them. As the writer Victor Hugo noted in the 19th century: "Without France the world feels alone."

These representations, summarised in broad outline, delimit the contours of the cultural base common to the ruling élite. Transmitted and perpetuated by the mechanisms of specific socialisation instances, in particular the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques (Free School of Political Sciences) under the 3rd Republic or the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (l’ENA — National School of Administration) since World War II, it is possible to transcend divisions and partisan ideologies. In the French political system, convergences are revealed to be as powerful as oppositions. Foreign policy, in particular, gives concrete expression to this point of view where, if there is divergence with regard to the means, there is agreement on the objectives. France, seen as a great power, forms part of the heritage common to the French ruling élite. It governed the French presence in international relations under the 5th Republic where General Charles de Gaulle, in spite of a bipolar international system that was not very favourable towards the assertion of French power, was able to give body to the myth of exception.

African policy and Gaullist consensus

France of the 5th Republic deployed a policy in Africa that resisted the sudden ups and downs of the internal political system. Continuity, that keyword of specialists of France’s African policy, defines the permanence of this policy irrespective of changes in rule. From Charles de Gaulle to François Mitterrand, and including Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the African policy was hardly subject to any other than marginal innovations. Essentially, the institutions, the actors and the representations remained the same. Such a communion deserves some thought. In fact, in its own way, Africa has permitted the elaboration of a specific version of the French exception.

Africa is the guarantor of France’s standing in the world. Through it, France has at its disposal a sure resource, even when all others are disputed. Faced with the vicissitudes of history, Africa has, in fact, always shown its fidelity. At the time of World War II, Africa under the aegis of Governor Felix Eboué, rallied a France that was still defeated and occupied. Decolonisation, far from introducing a break with the metropolis — with the exception of Guinea under Sékou Touré — showed how much the African élite remained attached to France. In short, Africa is experienced in French representations as a natural extension where the Francophone world and Francophilia merge. Symbiosis borders on fusion as testified by the recurring terminology about relationships between the protagonists: Does one not officially speak about the great Franco-African family?

The spontaneous closeness of the two groups gives a special place to Africa in the foreign policy of France. Africa appears so much won over to France’s side that there is no need to discuss the question. A paradoxical and unforeseen situation is the result. Being a quasi-vital necessity to ensure France’s rank, Africa is at the same time absent from considerations and thinking related to French foreign policy. As much as Europe, nuclear power or bipolarity sparks off debate, so much also does Africa shine in its absence. This unforeseen situation does not arise from negligence. It incisively expresses the fact that Africa does not pose a problem. Under any hypothesis, it constitutes a resource acquired by France, without any need for concern or consideration about the why and wherefore. Franco-African relations are practically dependent on the nature of the reality which imposes itself on the actors.

The institutionalised form of the relationship is a direct extension of this indisputable fact. Through a range of means, such as the CFA franc, military agreements, and others, France installed a mechanism of shared sovereignty which, in many ways, can be analysed as a questioning of the independence of states and consequently of Gaullist dogma. But, in this instance, contradiction is secondary. The main issue is that, due to its relationship with Africa, France has the illusion of having an international currency (the franc zone), an operational army officially put forward as the police of Africa, and thus of being a recognised power. In a bipolar world where it is threatened by marginalisation, France sees in Africa a continent of its own dimension that enables it to maintain this image of an actor of influence. Louis de Guiringaud, President Giscard d’Estaing’s former minister of Foreign Affairs, best summarised this French-centred vision: "Africa is the only continent where with five hundred men France can claim to make History."

The French ruling élite agree with this idealised vision of Franco-African relations. The Gaullist consensus also extends to the left, as shown by France’s African policy after the election of François Mitterrand as president of the Republic in 1981. The failure to reform co-operation as advocated by Jean-Pierre Cot is certainly due to the general outcry that this aroused both in France and in Africa among the players directly involved in the implementation of an often opaque relation. It is undeniable that, behind the idealised representations, shameful networks and interests prospered most of the time. But, the extraordinary silence of the ruling élite should also not be forgotten either. Both on the right and on the left, with few exceptions, consent prevailed. The rallying of the left, to tell the truth, does not constitute a real surprise. The same mechanisms of socialisation bound together a leading class within which partisan divisions were blurred behind a complicity rooted in time.

A consensus in crisis

The new direction given to France’s African policy is often explained by the end of the Cold War. Although this argument is quite acceptable, it does not account for the changes that took place during the 1980s in the representations of the French ruling élite. The rallying of a broad section to the liberal paradigm could not remain without consequences for Franco-African relations. The reform of the policy of co-operation and, de facto, of the African policy, is explained by the end of a homogeneous cultural system. Admittedly, the current dissensus does not result in a rigorously balanced division of respective forces. But, the time of the welded unity within the leading class seems to be over.

The liberal paradigm

The economic liberalism prevailing at the end of 20th century caused a shock to the whole system of values of the French leading class. The promotion of market values, competition and the values of the individual directly affected the foundations of the structure of French exception. The interventionist state, inherited from the Colbert tradition and consolidated in the course of history particularly just after the end of World War II, was given a pounding. The public sector, strengthened by the nationalisation programme of 1982, was subjected a few years later to the policies of privatisation adopted by the various governments which followed one another in power. The choice made in favour of the European Union supports the liberalisation of what had appeared to fall under a strict state monopoly for a long time. The end of the attachment to an interventionist and regulatory state is manifested within the leading class by a growing attraction to the private sector. Already under the seven-year term of President Giscard d’Estaing, osmosis had taken place between the public and private sectors, giving place to the phenomenon of pantouflage.1 The phenomenon kept on increasing, culminating in a marked preference of the leading class for the private sector to the detriment of the public sector.2 The French ruling élite, unified by its previous control over society by means of a multifunctional state, thus gradually moved away from its culture of public service towards a system of values based on mobility, profitability and success.

At the same time, the other elements of the French exception were faced by a challenge of the same magnitude. The nation, which is the political expression of the community, was counterbalanced by particular demands of identity. The rights of minorities, both regional (exacerbated by the policies of decentralisation) and gender-based, in particular, contributed to a reformulation of the idea of the nation, less and less homogeneous and more and more relativist, and officially affirming communities against the nation. In terms of language, an identical evolution occurred. The claim of a French language with universal status faded before what appeared to be the inevitable supremacy of English. For an increasing section of the ruling élite, the use of English in the deliberations of international authorities is no longer challenged.3

Without proceeding any further in the analysis of the symptoms, it is a fact that the feeling of exception regressed to make way for a less pre-eminent vision of France. This readjustment is expressed by the new rank that France assigns to itself in international relations at the start of the 21st century. By designating ‘superpower’ status to the United States, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hubert Védrine, has officially recognised the downward revision of French ambitions. France is returned to the second rank, together with seven or eight states which certainly have considerable resources to affirm themselves, but cannot compete with the US, the only one that has all the constituent factors of power at its disposal. Such an admission would have been inconceivable 20 years ago. In the current context, it hardly raises any protest, as a dominant section of the leading class has now gradually accepted for two decades, and in the name of modernity, a more modest but also more ordinary vision of France.

The new direction of African policy

With a new vision of France comes a new vision of Africa. Africa as the natural extension of the metropolis in the discourse of exception, could not avoid being subjected to the effects of the cultural shift that affected the French ruling élite. The outlines of the new African policy, as it has taken shape for slightly less than 10 years, conform to the liberal principles controlling the new dominant system of values of the leading class.

Faced with the inevitable process of globalisation where the market defines the lines of force, Africa is badly off. Downgraded, useless, it is seen to be of little interest. Situated outside the great flow of exchanges, poorly incorporated into international economic relations, it cannot merit attention. Admittedly, such a radically realistic vision could not be bluntly declared. Hence, soothing speeches are made in the international community on the duty of solidarity with regard to an Africa intended for modernity. But, in the minds of the decisionmakers, the choices have been made. The French ruling élite have endorsed the principles that govern the political and economic international programmes intended for the African continent. According to time-honoured expressions, the market democracy sets limits on the thought frameworks, not only of the leaders of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or even of the US, but also on those of the French élite. Renouncing the embodiment of a countermodel is explicit as demonstrated by the new version of the various elements of France’s African policy.

Everywhere the state must give way to the market. Development, seen for a long time as the product of state intervention in independent Africa, could result only from the free operation of the market. From this follows a minimalist concept of the state, cut off from any active potential. The privatisation of public companies, the dismantling of public services, the policies of decentralisation, all relate to an Anglo-Saxon vision of the state, valid for any place and any circumstance, at a time when Africa has an urgent need for solid states. Neo-liberal economic policies ring the changes without France claiming to represent or promote another scenario. Since the doctrine of Balladur, prime minister from 1993 to 1995, which subjected France’s aid programmes to prior agreement with the World Bank in accordance with the principles of structural adjustment, France never distanced itself from a close alignment with the tenets in force in Washington. The continued fall in public aid for development has the characteristics of this neo-liberal design where, according to the well-known maxim of ‘trade not aid’, commerce must prevail over assistance. Even if France remains one of the principal contributors of government aid for development, it has also aligned itself in this area with the prevailing practice. With development aid slightly exceeding 0.4% of gross domestic product, and falling constantly since its peak in 1994, France has returned to a lower level than that which prevailed some 20 years ago.4

At the same time, the end of the French model of safety has also dawned. For a long time described as the police of Africa, a reputation which it did not refute, France started a process of revising its military doctrine applying to sub-Saharan Africa. Direct intervention was set aside in favour of a policy of training and logistic support for African troops called to intervene within a multilateral framework where local conflicts would require it. The RECAMP programme corresponds to this new focus. The doctrine still has to be finalised, but appears to challenge the defence and safety agreements signed after independence.

Relations with Africa, based on the previous patrimonial policy that constituted the backbone of the French presence in Africa, were abandoned in favour of a deliberately continental approach in tune with the new principles. France’s utilitarian African policy was obliged to support new emerging markets that correspond with possible future power centres. In this respect, South Africa represents the most promising actor, with Nigeria offering fewer guarantees because of the divisions which affect its internal political system. In terms of comparative advantages, Francophone Africa does not seem the most attractive, as it is not the best equipped in terms of demographics and economic dynamics. The setting-up of a ‘priority zone of solidarity’ makes this break official by extending the French system to the whole of Africa. Development aid, the market and strategic interest will thus be better combined with regard to their respective virtues.

The outline of this new African policy does not mean that France has removed Africa from its concerns. But, the various elements that constitute this policy have their own coherence. They reflect a relatively ordinary view of Africa in French foreign policy. The new rules of the game that France has accepted, show that it has abandoned the attempt to assume its exception. The presence that it displays in Africa is still visible as France is less disinterested than others in what happens in sub-Saharan Africa. But, the stakes are obviously elsewhere.

The dissensus

The liberal paradigm and its African variation, dominant as they are in the representations of the ruling élite, are not devoid of all contradiction. Two zones of discontiguity can be found. The first lies in the permanence of a culture of exception, the second in the contradictions existing among the group of modernists.

Advocates of the Gaullist paradigm and, in a wider sense, of a culture of exception have not disappeared. They find support within the core of the French political community and are still able to gain acceptance for their point of view. This finds expression in events that have affected the course of France’s African policy during the last 10 years. Since the pronouncement of the Balladur doctrine that signalled the entry of modernists into the field of African policy, the two streams have alternated. The election of Jacques Chirac to the presidency of the Republic in 1995 halted the process. The rationality of networks and loyalties inherited from the Gaullist period could again prevail. The victory of the French left in the legislative elections of 1997 again swung the balance in the other direction. The government of Lionel Jospin deliberately follows a policy of breaking with the Gaullist consensus. But, balance is always precarious as shown by the coup d’état in Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 1999: the two streams clashed, the government finally prevailing over the presidential view. Globally, the proponents of change have more assets in hand for reasons that have less to do with specifically African causes than with the French political system. The personnel directing the principal French policies are indeed essentially won over to the liberal paradigm. Consequently, there is a relatively homogeneous political discourse which makes it difficult to express the ‘exceptionalist’ current. The logic of electoral competition is based on an historical left/right partisan division, imperfectly reflecting the reality of current divisions. Only particular circumstances, such as the referendum on the Maastricht treaty, make it possible for the division to appear between the advocates of exception and the liberals. But, by definition, these circumstances, in the absence of a radical change of the political system, remain the exception.

The language of modernity is also not exempt from internal contradictions between the two subgroups of which it is composed: the politicians and civil society. United in their attachment to the liberal paradigm, they dissociate themselves in their relations from political action. Though they both condemn France’s African policy in its traditional conception, they are likely to diverge on the way in which the programme should be continued. Those belonging to civil society — particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) — have a primarily ethical vision of relations with Africa. Sensitised to Africa through the humanitarian approach that has been very much in vogue for the last 20 years or so, they represent the second wave of development aid organisations. Their liberal-humanitarian approach has difficulty in accepting the liberal-realistic approach among political leaders. For the latter, African policy cannot exclusively follow moral considerations. Economic interests, in the oil sector in particular, or politico-military considerations can control choices in terms of alliances, or support, and are not necessarily compatible with morality alone. As the new African policy deploys its logic, complicity could give way to a certain animosity.

There are latent tensions likely to emerge from the new African policy. They will be expressed with all the more strength when circumstances allow. The advocates of the liberal paradigm still have to impose their views fully, as they have not yet completely clarified them. Ultimately, this revised African policy is not free of contradictions. It does not have real ‘marching orders’, laying down its objectives, defining its interests and the means of reaching its goals. In short, it lacks a doctrine. Perhaps such an ambition is impossible because of the reactions which it could arouse. Ambiguity and a makeshift job sometimes make it possible to reconcile the expectations or the reticence of the various actors taking part in the Franco-African process with everyday life. But, the ‘unvoiced comment’ can also be a sign of fragility.

 Notes

‘Pantouflage’ indicates the practice of a high-ranking public official leaving the public administration for a given period for a post in a private company. The statute of the civil service allows this mobility which, to a large extent, thus breaks down the former barriers between the two sectors.



This change has manifested itself in a particularly graphic way since 1997, with the difficulty encountered by several ministers in obtaining competent officials to occupy strategic positions in the central administration. The officials likely to be named for the posts in question were active in the private sector.



The example of Renault, the car manufacturer, which uses English as the language of internal written communications by the company management, demonstrates the extent of the change.



In 1983, French development aid amounted to 0.53% of GDP. This figure continued to increase until 1994 before starting to fall and has now stabilised around 0.4%. See D Bourmaud, L’aide publique au développement en 1998: les moyens de la fin? (Government aid for development in 1998: The end of the means?), Observatoire Permanent de la Coopération Française, Karthala, Paris, 1998.

*Professor of Political Science, INALCO - Paris