Chapter 11

Wanted - Capacity to Intervene:
The Evolution of Conflict Prevention and Resolution Africa

Introduction

The brief for this paper is a broad overview of approaches to conflict prevention and resolution. It therefore looks at the evolution of modern-day preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping doctrines and their impact on Africa. It also briefly touches upon Africa’s own experiences and asks whether it is not better to develop new understanding of the challenges facing the continent, and consequently, to probe new approaches to the resolution of long-standing conflicts in Southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent.

The scope of the problem

Why must time be spent thinking about conflict, its prevention and its resolution? Should the focus not rather fall on poverty and its alleviation? For millions of people, particularly in the global south, both violent conflict and poverty continue to define political life. As conditions in Angola show, development cannot flourish under conditions of war. Even though both should be considered (or the nexus between the two, as peacebuilders tend to do), it is to experiences of conflict management that this paper is dedicated.

The post-Cold War, post-apartheid and postmodern world is even more violent than the preceding turbulent years of east-west rivalry. Indeed, the five years between 1990 and 1995 proved to be twice as lethal as any half decade since the end of World War II. According to one calculation, there were 93 wars involving 70 countries. Of the 22 million people who perished in armed conflict since 1945, 5.5 million died during the early 1990s. Furthermore, war has ceased to be primarily a profession of arms: if at the beginning of the 20th century 90% of war deaths were soldiers, by the end, on average, 75% are civilians. Apart from war, there is the phenomenon of state-sponsored violence — that is, the mass murder of civilians. According to one rough estimate, the number of victims of state violence not related to war in the 20th century amount to 155 million. The top three murderous regimes of the century include communist China, the Soviet Union, and the Nazi Third Reich.1

And the situation in Africa?2 In 1999, President Thabo Mbeki remarked that "the one spot in the world where things seem to be regressing is the African continent"; Le Monde diplomatique wondered whether the era of Afro-optimism had not given way to Afrique-cauchemar (an African nightmare);3 and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had this to say:

There are various ways to look at and interpret war and conflict in Africa. The way one defines a problem obviously determines the nature of the response. There is no single, encompassing and all-inclusive theoretical approach with which to understand Africa’s problems. Instead, analysts have developed various approaches, of which three are mentioned as examples.

Douglas Anglin provides a useful scheme within which to ‘place’ or locate African conflicts.5 He identifies three key sources of conflict: military ambition, territorial ambition, and resource ambition. He also identifies three conflict systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Each has an epicentre which constitutes the principal source of regional destabilisation. Thus, in the Great Lakes region, Rwanda has been the major instigator of hostilities throughout the region, and particularly in the eastern Congo. In the Horn of Africa, conflict has been more dispersed, with Sudan and more recently Eritrea as the prime provocateurs and the southern Sudan/Uganda and Ethiopia/Eritrea borders the main nodal points. In West Africa, Liberia has been the wellspring for much of the misery inflicted on unfortunate Sierra Leoneans.

In 1998, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, released a key report entitled The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. In it, he broadly identified the causes of conflict in Africa as:

historical: the colonial legacy of exploitation and conquest, and the cold war legacy of superpower support for repressive African regimes;



internal: the nature of political power in many African states, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power; and



economic: those who profit from chaos and lack of accountability, and who may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and much interest in prolonging it — such as international arms merchants, or the protagonists themselves.

A more theoretical approach puts state collapse at the centre of the explanation. Increasingly, a wide array of analysts such as Allen, Clapham, Chabal and Daloz, Duffield, Mazrui, Human Rights Watch, and others write on the politics of endemic violence and self-enrichment which is associated with the process of state collapse in Africa.6 This kind of analysis — as part of a probing, vibrant, paradigmatic debate — has obvious implications for potential actions in situations such as those in the Great Lakes, the Horn of Africa, or Sierra Leone.

It is for these reasons that a close focus on the development and record of conflict prevention and resolution is required, and the following sections will attempt to unpack these concepts systematically.

The evolution of preventive diplomacy doctrines

How are the conflicts, such as those referred to above, being dealt with at the level of the international community? The first article of the first chapter of the UN Charter states that the first purpose of the UN is to "maintain international peace and security." It undertakes to do this through collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression (or other breaches of the peace). Regardless of its success rate, the UN system is the only multipurpose universal organisation with the authority to promote conditions conducive to the prevention of violent conflict and the redressing of the causes of conflict once it has occurred. As Doyle has remarked, the UN holds a unique claim on legitimate authority in international peace and war,7 and in the words of Kofi Annan:

"For the United Nations there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development."8

It is for these reasons that this discussion of conflict prevention and resolution starts on the level of the UN.

It is generally recognised that the dynamics of the Cold War largely prevented the UN from effectively carrying out its primary objectives. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the UN’s agenda for peace and security rapidly expanded. In this period, the Security Council quadrupled the number of resolutions issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations authorised, and increased from one to seven per year the number of economic sanctions imposed. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than 10 000 to more than 70 000. The annual peacekeeping budget accordingly shot up from US $230 million to $3.6 billion in the same period.9 All of this reflected the new international political and legal environment in which the UN operated. It also testified to the new, expanded role the international community wanted the UN to perform. Therefore, in 1992, at the request of the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual foundations for of an ambitious UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, An agenda for peace. Boutros-Ghali highlighted five key roles which he hoped the UN would play in the context of rapidly changing post-Cold War politics. Although the report came in for severe criticism in later years (which will be examined below), it is useful to revisit its conceptual approach. The five interconnected roles are:

Preventive diplomacy: This refers to action undertaken in order "to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." Examples of ‘action’ would include confidence-building measures, fact-finding, and early warning. According to Gareth Evans, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait would be an example of the failure to use preventive diplomacy, while the cessation of North Korea’s nuclear activities in 1993 would be an example of early and successful preventive diplomacy.10



Peace enforcement: Action with or without the consent of the parties to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These military forces are composed of heavily armed, national forces operating under the direction of the Secretary-General.



Peacemaking: Mediations and negotiations designed "to bring hostile parties to agreement" through peaceful means such as those found under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.



Peacekeeping: Military and civilian deployments for the sake of establishing a "UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned." This is a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties as diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace, or officials attempt to implement an agreed peace.



Post-conflict peacebuilding: Measures undertaken to foster economic and social co-operation to build confidence among previously warring parties; develop infrastructure (social, political, economic) to prevent future violence; and lay the foundations for a durable peace.

Initial assessments of the UN’s ‘new’ post-Cold War role were bright and optimistic. From the perspective of the north, the UN’s newly found assertiveness reconciled an advocacy of collective security, universal human rights, and humanitarian solidarity with the need to refocus Cold War spending on domestic reform at home. However, as is now known, post-Cold War conflicts proved too complex, intractable and enduring for even the so-called ‘new globalism’ to resolve. Assertive multilateralism climaxed during the Gulf War in 1991 and withered with the disaster in Somalia in 1993.

Generally, then, how can the UN doctrine on conflict prevention and resolution be described? According to Doyle, peacekeeping operations — as defined above — have come to encompass three distinct activities that have evolved as ‘generations’ of UN peace operations.11 In traditional peacekeeping, sometimes called first generation peacekeeping, unarmed or lightly armed UN forces are stationed between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, or buffer zone while political negotiations go forward. It is not always clear what these achieved: conflict delayed rather than resolved? The second category, called second generation operations by Boutros-Ghali, involves the implementation of complex, multidimensional peace agreements. Peacekeepers often engage in various police and civilian tasks, of which the goal is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict. Namibia would be a good example of a successful second generation multidimensional peacekeeping operation. In Boutros-Ghali’s lexicon, ‘peace enforcement’ missions — in effect ‘war-making’ missions — such as those in Korea in 1950 and against Iraq in the Gulf War, are third generation operations. They extend from low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of cease-fires. The defining characteristic is lack of consent by one or more of the parties to some or all of the UN mandate.

However, might this understanding of the international community and the UN’s approach to conflict prevention and resolution be too simplistic? Could the bland terms of description hide underlying problems with the approach? Surely, reality is much more complex than what it is made out to be in An agenda for peace? Consider the critique developed by Jarat Chopra and colleagues. The argument is that, where states fail (collapse) and where warlordism emerges, a comprehensive political strategy is needed to pull together all forms of intervention and assistance that may be required. This is controversially termed ‘peace maintenance’ (to distinguish it from peacekeeping and peace enforcement).12

A better description of second generation peace operations than that provided above comes from Chopra. In his view, the challenging (post-Cold War) environment of internal conflicts necessitated the development of a concept for the limited and gradually escalating use of armed force for multinational missions. UN military operations could be divided into nine categories, arranged in three levels of varying degrees of force. At one extreme were level one operations: the familiar tasks of observer missions and peacekeeping forces. At the other end were the level three tasks of sanctions and high-intensity operations (characteristic of articles 41 and 42, respectively, of the UN Charter). The five level two tasks in between represented the latest doctrinal developments, as follows:

Preventive deployment: A UN force may be deployed to an area where tension is rising between two parties, to avoid the outbreak of hostilities (such as the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission — UNIKOM)



Internal conflict resolution measures: A UN force may be required to underwrite a multiparty cease-fire within a state. It may have to demobilise and canton warring parties, secure their weapons, and stabilise the theatre of conflict (such as the UN operation in Mozambique)



Assistance to interim civil authorities: A UN force may be required to underwrite a transition process and the transfer of power in a country re-establishing its civil society from the ashes of conflict. Tasks include managing returning refugees, elections, infrastructure redevelopment (such as the UN operations in Namibia, Cambodia and El Salvador)



Protection of humanitarian relief operations: A UN force may be deployed to establish a mounting base, delivery site, and corridor between warring sides to protect the provision and distribution of relief (mixed successes in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Iraq)



Guarantee and denial of movement: A UN force may be called upon to secure the rights of passage in international waterways and airspace, or across national territory, or it may have to restrict movements of ‘delinquent’ parties (such as in Bosnia and Iraq) .

Second generation peacekeeping became somewhat of a misnomer. It confused the narrowly defined practice of peacekeeping, on the one hand, and second generation operations that were not exclusively reliant on the consent of belligerents and that did not restrict the use of force to self-defence alone, on the other. According to Chopra, the application of a diplomatic peacekeeping approach in challenging environments is precisely what proved fatal in Cambodia, Angola and the former Yugoslavia.13 Furthermore, the artificiality of a third generation of peace operations has exacerbated the confusion. When Boutros-Ghali first acknowledged the emergence of a second generation, he also suggested the existence — simultaneously, and rather illogically, therefore — of a third generation, defined by institutional ‘peacebuilding’. These concepts have since become more distorted by a reversal of their meanings: second generation operations have been defined as consensual peace-building, and third generation operations as peace enforcement equated with high-intensity enforcement.

The complex, multifunctional operations of the second phase, designed to supervise transitions from conditions of social conflict to minimal political order, had limited impact because of excessive reliance on either diplomatic peacekeeping or military peace enforcement. Consequently, transitional arrangements required, but did not achieve better co-ordination between military forces, humanitarian assistance, and civilian components organising elections, protecting human rights, or conducting administrative and executive tasks of government. In short, another concept became necessary.

The problem faced by UN operations on the ground can be explained as follows. The UN has to contend with the contradictory phenomena of too much order and authority by a powerful government, such as in El Salvador or Namibia, and of the varying degrees of anarchy, as in Cambodia and Somalia. In the incoherent malaise of factionalism, a kind of warlord syndrome emerged in which the appetites of power could mobilise destructive forces (religion in Lebanon, ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia, clan lineage in Somalia). Unchecked by either a weakened population below or the diluted resolve of the international community above, factional leaders proliferated and inherited the places where UN deployments proved ineffective. Interstate diplomacy conducted by bureaucrats between factional leaders in internal conflicts served to further fragment conditions of anarchy. Use of military force without sufficiently clear political objectives inevitably led to confrontation.

The current third phase of peace operations doctrine therefore needs to elaborate functional dimensions of a political framework, and this is where Chopra introduces the concept of ‘peace maintenance’. In his view, to avoid being undermined, the UN must deploy decisively and establish a centre of gravity around which local individuals and institutions can coalesce until a new authority structure is established and transferred to a legitimately determined, indigenous leadership. In the interim period, the UN needs to counterbalance or even displace the oppressor or warlords. This implies that the UN claims jurisdiction over the entire territory and ought to deploy throughout if it can. It establishes a direct relationship with the local people who will eventually participate in the reconstitution of authority and inherit the newly established institutions.

Can the UN do this? Chopra himself cautions that such an approach needs a psychological shift in the mindset of the international community. Furthermore, it needs specifics. In his view, "the evolution of civil administration and the UN’s political role in internal conflicts (should) build on the organisation’s experience and in joint form will be more cost-effective than reliance on military peace-enforcement."14 Others are more sceptical. Chester Crocker (in the foreword to Chopra’s book!) remarks that not all will be persuaded that such holistic strategic planning for intervention by leading actors in the international community is feasible or even desirable. He raises a list of old order, realist objections — peace maintenance sounds like "unrestrained internationalism delinked from considerations of national interest" and so on. More importantly, a chapter by Bratt systematically identifies the obstacles which ‘peace maintainers’ need to overcome, ranging from conceptual to the eminently practical. Regarding the conceptual, it must be asked what the connection is between ‘peace maintenance’ and the critical interpretation of ‘peacebuilding’.15 This paper cannot deal with the detail except to concur that peace maintenance "has yet to undergo a rigorous debate over its merits and deficiencies." It becomes somewhat of an urgent task if Africa’s pathologies are considered and the immediate challenge of bringing peace to the Great Lakes, Angola, Sudan, Eritrea/Ethiopia and others. These are all examples of fractured societies in need of solutions through a harmonisation of diplomatic, humanitarian, civilian and military objectives as part of an overall political framework.

Preventive diplomacy in Africa: Experiences of the OAU and SADC

The experience of the OAU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in conflict prevention and resolution deserves attention. Before concluding that the experience has been sufficiently limited and disappointing to warrant the consideration of alternative vehicles for conflict transformation, a background introduction is in order.

From an international or global perspective, the UN is seen as the only institution with the necessary depth and width to address (but not always solve) violent conflict between or among societies. Some decentralisation of its prime function has always been envisaged (even the League of Nations noted the validity of regional organisations for securing the maintenance of peace). The Security Council carries primary responsibility, but in the spirit of the post-Cold War era, regional action is seen as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and co-operation with UN efforts. The UN clearly also does not have the funding, human resources and other capacities required to deal with all conflicts. The UN Charter devotes chapter VIII (articles 52-54) to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. As Boutros-Ghali points out in his 1992 Agenda, such regional organisations "possess a potential that should be utilised in serving the functions [of] preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building." However, Boutros-Ghali’s successor, Kofi Annan, presented a different perspective — more informed and realistic, perhaps. In his 1998 report on Africa’s crisis, he notes that, despite the UN’s intense post-1990 attention to Africa’s problems (for example, of the 32 peacekeeping operations launched by the UN between 1989 and 1998, 13 were deployed in Africa), the international community is reluctant to get involved. Its experiences in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia have resulted in a great reluctance to assume the political and financial exposure associated with deploying peacekeeping operations.

For Annan, the UN has learned important lessons. The mistakes of Somalia produced a mindset which continues to hamper UN capacity to respond swiftly and decisively to crises. This, according to Annan, was tragically evident in the UN’s inaction over the Rwandan tragedy: "that experience highlighted the crucial importance of swift intervention in a conflict and, above all, of political will to act in the face of a catastrophe." A positive lesson was drawn from the UN operation in Mozambique. There, its influence was augmented through constant dialogue with the parties on the ground and with other states. For Annan, this showed that, in the right circumstances, peacekeeping operations can offer a flexible and uniquely adapted means to confront conflict in Africa. The successive UN deployments in Angola have indicated the crucial need for realistic peace agreements, and the importance of having a credible deterrent capacity within a peacekeeping operation in situations that remain dangerous and volatile.

What are the roles for UN (and regional) peacekeeping in Africa? The Secretary-General lists quite a number, key among them:16

separating the protagonists and monitoring their conduct;

implementing comprehensive settlements;

deploying preventively;

protecting humanitarian interests;

authorising the use of forceful action;17

co-deploying with regional, subregional or multinational forces;18

strengthening Africa’s capacity for peacekeeping;

protecting civilians in situations of conflict;

addressing refugee security issues;

mitigating the social and environmental impact of refugees on host countries; and

co-ordinating humanitarian aid and assistance.

Turning to the OAU, what is the reality of its experience on the ground? According to the Secretary General of the organisation, Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU "as a regional organisation is entrusted with the responsibility of promoting the unity and solidarity of the African states as well as ensuring peaceful settlements of disputes…"19 He identifies the role of the OAU as being an ‘amalgam’ of facilitating negotiations between those in conflict, constructive involvement by way of diplomatic action and mediation of conflicts, and peace observation, including the preventive deployment of military observers. Writing in 1995, Salim also foresaw the organisation expanding into peacekeeping "to close the operational gap that the organisation experiences from time to time."20

Unfortunately, the OAU has many handicaps — all well-documented. Salim’s effort to illustrate the organisation’s efficacy as a stabilising force in African conflicts is not quite convincing, especially given the examples he uses: Liberia, Congo, Gabon, Lesotho and Rwanda. Perhaps its essential nature — a ‘creature of compromise’ — is the biggest drawback in what it can do to prevent or resolve conflicts. The obsessive focus of the OAU Charter on ‘solidarity’ among member states, as well as on ‘respect for sovereignty and independence’, effectively handicaps it when confronted with conflicts over boundaries, territory, or human rights. The OAU is managed and controlled by the state élite, many of whom were and are responsible for the conflicts their ‘club’ is supposed to address. The OAU’s mediation successes can mostly be attributed to the personal diplomacy of ‘legitimate’ and respectable leaders, a role played by very few.21

In the view of Olara Otunnu, most regional organisations such as the OAU are still far from able to play the role envisaged for them in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, mainly because of their lack of relevant tradition, financial resources, political prestige and credibility, impartiality and operational capacity.22 In similar vein, Shannon Field writes that, despite myriad ideas, the OAU has been handicapped by a lack of resources.23 Chronic funding difficulties have prevented the organisation from assuming the conflict management role envisioned by its leaders. Substantial work has been done on creating a blueprint for African security that is embodied in the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution which is meant to anticipate and prevent conflicts. The mechanism incorporates collective and regional approaches to internal and interstate security, and is indeed, as Field argues, a "bold conceptual leap in African thinking about security."24 However, operationalising the collective security plans of the mechanism (its Central Organ) have been almost impossible due to resource constraints; efforts to build peacekeeping capacity have received lukewarm support.

But, there is a possible role for the OAU in conflict prevention. It can continue to assist with building peacekeeping capacity. A small group of analysts has recommended that the OAU focuses its efforts on conflict prevention and confidence-building measures through, for example, the Elders’ Council for Peace.25 Using the preventive diplomacy approach, it could draw on the talents of African elder statesmen (no women?) and distinguished personalities. Field concludes that "until the OAU becomes financially more independent, it will likely play an intermediary role between the UN and sub-regional organisations" — a depressing statement, but difficult to dispute.26

If it is accepted that, for the various reasons advanced above, the OAU occupies a position of minor influence in the great question of conflict prevention and resolution, then the attention must shift to subregional institutions such as SADC. Is SADC’s capacity to deal with these issues, as outlined by the UN Secretary-General above, any different? Sadly, the history of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is a similar tale of inappropriate design, suffocating influence of an arrogant state élite, and lack of resources.27 Despite upbeat assessments of a renewed role and future impact, it is difficult to see SADC overcoming the hurdles it faces. Although the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) works well on a technical level28 (and in the process pushing functional co-operation as the key to SADC’s success), the organisation is caught, in essence, in a situation it purposely created. Invoking sovereignty and national interest, very few of the ruling élite in Southern Africa would want to see a powerful and influential Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, and consequently, it will continue to bow to the wishes of its political masters. The continuing crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is proof of that. It will not be able to comprehend, let alone deal with the forces which are tearing SADC apart — war in Angola and the Great Lakes region coupled to refugee flows and small arms throughout; undemocratic tendencies in small states such as Lesotho, Swaziland and the Seychelles; threats to democracy in Zambia and Zimbabwe; natural disasters striking at the heart of Mozambique; and poverty-related threats to human security throughout.

Conclusion: Old conflicts, new approaches?

How then should the question of conflict prevention and resolution in Southern Africa be approached? Can violent conflict really be understood without seriously considering the context of poverty, underdevelopment and dependency? Asked differently, what needs to be in place for the DRC conflict to be resolved? In this concluding section, a few tentative ideas are put forward.

First of all, the Great Lakes conflagration is perhaps Southern Africa, the continent and the international community’s biggest and most complex challenge in terms of conflict resolution. And it is not immediately clear that international intervention — commonly understood as bringing the abilities of the UN, the OAU and SADC to bear on the situation — is the obvious route to go. Mark Malan argued that, in the DRC, these organisations "did too much too early", while the enforcement action that was taken by SADC Allied Forces lacked the support of the international community and the subregional body. He concludes that the ‘peacemakers’ and ‘peace enforcers’ have been at odds from the outset, creating a very shaky foundation for the final layer of international response to the conflict — the deployment of UN peacekeepers.28 This is a sobering perspective and puts the challenge in perspective.

In recent articles, it was argued that SADC and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security should not be put on a pedestal from whence it will direct rescue operations.29 It does not have the capacity to, nor was it designed for this reason. Secondly, a broader framework must be adopted for understanding the obstacles to the region’s revival — or put differently, for understanding the nature of the region’s reconstruction and development agenda. It is a daunting task but possible if less state-centric concepts such as human security, peacebuilding, or peace maintenance are employed:

Human security is a concept which emerged out of debates which broadened the concept of security from a preoccupation with the security of the state by military means, to that of people through prevention and the non-violent management of conflict and other fractures. For example, in the popularly known Kampala document of 1991, security was conceptualised as follows: "The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights."30



The concept of peacebuilding advances this approach. Peacebuilding involves efforts to promote human security in war-torn societies, and can be defined as processes and interventions that reduce or eliminate the root causes of a conflict. Seen in this way, it provides an important link between the debates on development and security.



Peace maintenance addresses the question of how to manage conflict under conditions of state collapse. It is an innovative concept designed to alleviate the problem of fractured societies through a harmonisation of diplomatic, humanitarian, civilian and military objectives as part of an overall political framework.31 The umbrella framework that co-ordinates these elements will need a UN administrator as politician if complex transitional arrangements in internal conflicts are to be successful. To date, the UN has not adequately developed political strategies commensurate with diplomatic, military and humanitarian activities. This is what the proponents of peace maintenance are calling for, and this, it is proposed, is what the conflict in the DRC and in other parts of Africa calls for.

Having established that resolving violent conflict and war — by building, restoring and keeping peace — is a complex, multidimensional human endeavour, do past and current practices offer appropriate routes? What will work in the DRC? Are the experiences of the international community such that fine-tuning and adjustments are in order? More peacekeeping, but better organised? Should it be accepted — to the realist’s delight — that because life is brutal, nasty and short, states should merely soften conditions of suffering where it is in their self-interest? Less peacekeeping, on an ad hoc basis? Or can conflict be transformed? If so, should less faith be put in states and state structures, and the roles of civil society, social movements, international non-governmental organisations and the like rather be explored? More peace building and peace maintenance? These questions beg for urgent answers.

Notes

Quoted by M Ehrke, Germany: United, rich, unhappy, International Politics and Society 1, 2000, p 84.



Quoted by D Anglin, Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, July 1998 — July 1999, Southern African Perspectives 81, 1999, p 1.



Ibid, p 2.



Ibid, pp 2-3.



For a good discussion and overview see C Allen, Warfare, endemic violence and state collapse in Africa, Review of African Political Economy 81, 1999.



M Doyle, Discovering the limits and potential of peacekeeping, in O Otunnu & M Doyle, Peacemaking and peacekeeping for the new century, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1998, p 10.



K Annan, The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, 1998 Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council, <www.un.org>.



Doyle, op cit, p 3.



G Evans, Preventive action and conflict resolution, in Otunnu & Doyle, op cit, pp 66-70.



Ibid.



J Chopra (ed), The politics of peace maintenance, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998.



Ibid, p 6.



Ibid, p 16.



For a discussion of conceptual innovations in the ‘peacebuilding’ genre, see A van Nieuwkerk, Looking ahead: Peacebuilding in Southern Africa, Global Dialogue 5(1), 2000.



See Annan, op cit, for a thorough discussion.



As Annan notes, the obligation to obtain Security Council authorisation prior to the use of force is clear; but while authorising forceful action by member states or coalitions of states can sometimes be an effective response to such situations, it also raises many questions for the future, particularly the need to enhance the Security Council’s ability to monitor activities that have been authorised.



The collaboration with ECOMOG succeeded in restoring peace in Liberia.



S A Salim, The OAU role in conflict management, in Otunnu & Doyle, op cit, p 247.



Ibid, p 249.



One possible candidate might be Haile Selassie’s mediation efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s. See B Agyeman-Duah, The role of the OAU, in D Zormelo & P Mayer, Peace-keeping and peace-making: Changes in international politics and implications for peace in Africa, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Accra, 1996.



O Otunnu, The peace-and-security agenda of the United Nations, in Otunnu & Doyle, op cit, p 303.



S Field, Whither regional peace and security: the DRC after the war, unpublished paper, February 2000.



Ibid.



See C de Coning, Preparing for the third millennium: Towards a policy framework for the OAU conflict management mechanism, Accord Occasional Paper 4, 1999. Laurie Nathan provides a challenging analysis on the question of why Africa’s conflicts were — and are — resistant to mediation efforts. See L Nathan, When push comes to shove: The failure of international mediation in African civil wars, Track Two 8(2), 1999.



Field, op cit.



There is a great academic debate on SADC and its Organ. On the one hand, see the prolific output of the Institute for Security Studies, <www.issafrica.org>. On the other, see the approach by Walter Tapfumanei in newsletters produced by the Institute for Global Dialogue, <www.igd.org.za>, or Accord <www.accord.org.za>.



It is at the level of the ISDSC, aided by generous amounts of donor money, that regional confidence-building is being promoted. The Harare-based Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) is one example of this approach. Tapfumanei, Cilliers and others report that the ISDSC is making steady progress with co-operation in the fields of disaster management, satellite communications, peacekeeping training and doctrine, and public security issues such as drug-trafficking and firearm-smuggling. See J Cilliers, Building security in Southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture, ISS Monograph 43, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 1999.



M Malan, The UN ‘Month of Africa’: A push for actual peace efforts or a fig leaf on the DRC?, ISS Paper 44, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, February 2000, p 2. To get a better sense of the challenge faced by peacekeepers, consider the tasks of a suggested mandate for a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC:

* working with the Joint Military Commission and the OAU in its implementation;

* observing and monitoring the cessation of hostilities;

* investigating violations of the cease-fire agreement and taking measures to ensure compliance;

* supervising the disengagement of forces as stipulated in the cease-fire agreement;

* providing and maintaining humanitarian assistance to and protecting displaced persons;

* collecting weapons from civilians and storing them;

* scheduling and supervising the withdrawal of all foreign forces; as well as

* a number of ‘peace enforcement’ operations such as the tracking down and disarming of armed groups; screening mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; and handing over suspected genocidaires to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Malan, pp 4-5).



A van Nieuwkerk, Promoting peace and security in Southern Africa, Global Dialogue 4(3), 1999; A van Nieuwkerk, Looking ahead: Peace-building in Southern Africa, Global Dialogue 5(1), 2000.



Quoted by A du Pisani, Security and defence: Concepts and discourse in Southern Africa, paper read at the Conference on Demilitarisation and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa, Pretoria, March 2000.



Bratt, in Chopra, op cit, p 123.