The challenge to police the gang problem has been one of the most topical and daunting developments in post-apartheid policing. At issue is whether the strategies of the police have kept abreast with developments in the gang underworld. It is contended that the reaction of the police as an institution has traditionally lagged behind developments in the underworld of organised crime. It is correct to classify the strategy of the police as ad hoc and short term. It may be a case of the police not really understanding the transition in the underworld, therefore rendering them unable to make an impact on the developing problem.

In addition, there is the problem of the mismanagement of police resources. Further compounding the issue are problems with racism in the police service. The police as an institution cannot achieve maximum effectiveness if some of its members are perceived by sections of the community to be racist. This has resulted in the community refusing to work with the police to provide them with information on criminals. It also means that criminals will be protected by the community, because the common enemy is the (racist) police. Such a state of affairs leads to the community being perpetually caught up in a spiral of violence and fear. In this climate, criminals sense that they can commit crimes without fear of being reported.

The police have not had an official policy on policing gangs until 1999. The policy that was adopted in this year is largely based on American-style gangs. The police manual for gang control used for training does not take into account the regional and local peculiarities of gangs operating in South Africa. When considering gangs and their characteristics in the United States, it is clear that there are stark differences in the structure and organisation between those in the US and those in South Africa.1

The police are nominally in control of the streets of, for example, Los Angeles and New York and other parts of the US with regard to policing gangsterism.



Gangs in the US are decentralised and not mass-based. In contrast, gangs in South Africa have a strong centralised culture, as well as being mass-based in some instances. In the South African context, this means that gangs can succeed in getting hundreds of people into the street in areas such as Manenberg, so that gangsters can avoid arrest by having the community fight with police officers.



The age range of gang members in the US differs considerably from their South African counterparts. In the US, gang members rarely involve themselves in gang activities if they are over the age of 25. By this time, they will be out of the gangs or dead. In South Africa, it is the exact opposite, with gang members up to the ages of 40 to 50.



Given the nominal control that the police and other social agencies exercise in the US, the chances of preventing youth from joining gangs are fair, while the same cannot be said for South Africa. There is a definite problem with the magnitude of the issue and the insufficient resources to address the problem of youth at risk effectively. Moreover, the legitimacy of the police in the Western Cape has been in tatters despite the political transition. In fact, the perception that the police is corrupt, is also underscored by outside experts.2

The history of police responses to the gang problem can mainly be traced to the various operations that have been conducted in the Western Cape at a huge cost to the taxpayer. From these, it is clear that there has not been an effective policy towards policing gangs and organised crime in the long term.

Operations against gangs have almost always failed to result in convictions. Invariably, the accused would walk free from the court after a high-profile arrest. This has led observers to remark that the police are either not thorough in their investigations, or in gangsters’ pockets. The latter is not far-fetched, considering that there have been consistent allegations of police complicity with gang members. During 1994, the provincial member of the executive committee for Safety and Security at the time, Patrick Mackenzie vowed to deal with crooked police officers and promised to prosecute them mercilessly. Nothing happened.

At issue for the police was corrupt members among their own ranks as gangsters claimed that they were usually tipped off before raids took place. This made a mockery of the efforts of honest police officers to defeat the gangs. Numerous operations were undertaken to deal with the gangs and all failed to achieve their objectives.

Public pressure encouraged the police to launch operations such as Gangbust, Saladien, Recoil, Shaka and Good Hope with much fanfare. However, these operations failed to make even a dent in gangsterism in the Western Cape. What did happen, was that gangs became more organised and sophisticated when dealing with law enforcement agencies. They recruited police officers to work with them, to provide them with information and to assist them with robberies and other types of crime. This was once more revealed in January 2000 when police officers assisted the Hard Livings gang to break into a police base in Faure to steal firearms.3

More importantly, the gangs won a huge psychological battle over the police when the media accompanied them on raids. During most of these raids, no firearms or drugs were found in substantial quantities, as was predicted. This often led to police officers having to arrest people for trivial offences such as urinating in public. Gangsters openly bragged that they were tipped off by the local police before such raids. This put paid to many hours of operational planning and was an important factor in lowering the morale of rank and file officers.

It has been argued that two of the elements in the police’s failure to deal with the gang problem, have been their inability to understand how gangs have changed and the absence of a provincial strategy to address gangs effectively. The lack of trust in the police compounded this failure. The police also did not seek to cultivate a sound relationship with the community, despite the introduction of community policing in the early 1990s.

The responses of the police remained reactive rather than proactive, with almost no intelligence-led policing. In fact, the head of the violent crimes unit, who was responsible for the management of the gang unit at the time, rejected the concept of intelligence-led policing. The response of the police to establish a gang unit when events had already degenerated seriously, was typical of police planners. When the first wave of gang attacks became unbearable in the late 1980s, the SAP started a gang unit. The unit was set up under the leadership of Captain Hein Smit in 1989.4 Smit made it clear that he was given the task of setting up the unit to respond to pressure emanating from affected communities. Initially, police management recruited about 30 officers to staff the unit. The focus of the unit was to come down hard on gangsters and violence was often used.

The formation of the Western Cape Anti-Crime Forum (WCACF) in 1994, was in response to gang killings across the suburbs of metropolitan Cape Town. Being a coalition of different community organisations, CPFs and anti-crime committees, the WCACF became critical of what was perceived as a racist approach by the white management of the SAPS.5 At issue was the inability of the police to redistribute and reallocate existing resources such as forensic laboratories, police vehicles and personnel to black and coloured communities on the Cape Flats. In addition, the police were accused of failing to respond adequately and to investigate murders timely in these communities.

The effect of this attitude was that it alienated communities who could not trust the police nor work with the various station commissioners. The collection of police statistics was also questioned at several meetings of the eastern and western police area boards. It became clear that people living in white areas were more likely to report crime, even the most trivial of offences, and that black and coloured people did not sufficiently trust the police to report crime. The fact that there seemed to be more crime in white areas, ensured that whites retained the lion’s share of resources.

The inability of the police to act decisively led to many communities launching their own campaigns against gangs with marches and demonstrations condemning gang violence. The management of the police came in for severe criticism from community-based organisations around the perceived collusion by senior members of the SAPS with the gangs.6

Commissioner Perry Anderson of the Cambridge police force in Massachuchetts, made the following comments in a report on policing in the Western Cape, completed in 1995: "The Western Cape Town [sic] police has many challenges facing and confronting it. The first and primary concern being that of corruption."7 The findings of the report were never made public.

By 1996, the police had still not taken note of accusations of racism among its ranks and complicity with gangs levelled against certain sections of the service. Many communities had lost faith in the ability of the police to deal with the problem and the clamour for community action had become louder.

It is plausible to argue that, while the police were not prepared for the social effects of political changes, the gangs were clearly ready. They seemed to have made preparations to exploit the new political freedom in marginalised communities such as Valhalla Park, Bonteheuwel and Manenberg, among others. Through Core, gangs had embarked on public relations campaigns, negotiating peace with rivals and challenging the police in shootouts, while establishing themselves in other areas.

It seems as if the police still struggles to redeem its image in the Western Cape. The ISS victim survey conducted in the metropolitan area of the city in 1998 confirmed the perception of the community that the police were ineffective in policing gangs.8

Community action and reaction

Throughout the long history of conflict between gangs, communities across the Cape Flats have had to bear the brunt of attacks by gangs. Various organisations were formed through the years to deal with gangs and their violence. Although these community-based social movements have heightened awareness of gangs, they have seldom been able to penetrate the social reasons why more young people have chosen to join gangs. Non-governmental welfare organisations such as Nicro have played an important role in raising awareness of the effects of gangsterism, but they have not impacted the socio-economic conditions underlying the reasons why people join gangs.

One of the oldest community organisations, the Peacemakers, was founded in the early 1970s. It was a home-guard group that started in Manenberg and rapidly developed into a major social movement on the Cape Flats. It sometimes even paid people’s rent when they had difficulties, and helped to build a sense of community within the different townships. The victory of the Peacemakers was that it succeeded in lowering the crime rate in the inner city areas of Cape Town, although this was short-lived.

As a social movement, members of the Peacemakers were very violent. Soon, it became a vigilante movement that indulged in excesses, and found itself the victim of the police’s anti-apartheid legislation, among others, the Riotous Assembly Act (1976), which decreed that people could not gather in groups of more than three at any time. Members were soon given the choice either to become police reservists, or to disband. The majority chose not to become police reservists and the movement was decimated with many of its members joining the emerging political organisations and civic movements.

After the elections in 1994, the WCACF was started in Manenberg with the co-operation of communities where there was gang violence. It grew soon into an influential lobby, especially as it included representatives of some 30 communities across the Western Cape. The WCACF succeeded in launching several initiatives across the province and, by 1996, launched the West Coast Anti-Crime Forum. Among others, the WCACF made submissions around several pieces of legislation, including the Witness Protection Act, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act. In addition, it launched community campaigns against crime and supported the establishment of community police forums and neighbourhood watches.

Their meetings were vibrant and, for a few years, they were at the cutting edge of community efforts to deal with gangsterism. They assisted in getting legislation to Parliament, as the organisation became a very effective lobby group.

The killing of Hard Livings co-leader, Rashaad Staggie, catapulted Pagad onto the national scene and even government officials and ministers were heard supporting the actions of Pagad. Pagad set its objectives as the eradication from society of all drug dealers and gangsters in the Western Cape. The run-up to the events of 4 August 1996 saw Pagad delivering ultimatums to drug dealers to quit dealing or face the mandate of the ‘people’. Very soon, those who earlier chose to support its activities, accused Pagad of being a vigilante organisation.

By then it was too late, as the vigilantes had set their sights on working outside the framework of the law and had succeeded in intimidating many drug dealers into stopping their activities. Initially, the police tolerated the actions of the few people in Pagad who had hidden agendas. Among its own ranks, members felt that Pagad had been hijacked by fundamentalists with an Islamic agenda. People who made such accusations were expelled from the organisation in the aftermath of a leadership purge. When this agenda was exposed, there were condemnations from all over the country for Pagad’s actions.

By the end of 1996, gangs had come together to form the Community Outreach Forum (Core) with the aim to defend gangsters and facilitate their reintegration into the community.

Vigilantes and gangs

With stories of the gangsters making the news headlines almost daily, the police were even more distrusted and seen to be failing. By 1996, gangs — the Hard Livings in particular — were seen to be untouchable with their leaders becoming local celebrities in communities. People rallied to their defence and when the police raided their headquarters, the residents attacked the police. A feeling of helplessness permeated the communities where these gangs were active.

By 1996, Pagad had emerged. Its leadership was determined to defeat gangsterism and crime, and invaded the home of the minister of Justice with demands that the death penalty should be brought back. They warned that they would act against drug dealers and gangs. In August 1996, the execution of Rashaad Staggie set the tone for the protracted war between the vigilantes, the police and the gangs for control of the streets of Cape Town.9 Thereafter killings of gang leaders, Muslim businessmen and Pagad members continued without ceasing for the following two years. An assortment of weapons, including pipe bombs, handgrenades and automatic weapons were used. Remote-controlled bombs and other sophisticated devices also made their appearance.

The media, cabinet ministers, businessmen and academics initially rushed to support the actions of the vigilantes as they felt that the public were sick and tired of gangs. The WCACF, however, warned against support for Pagad and predicted that the organisation would resort to lawlessness to eradicate and eliminate all drug dealers and gangsters, as it set out to do. The euphoria of public support for the activities of Pagad soon died down as the media, the police and the government realised that they were dealing with a vigilante group that was strongly influenced by hardline extremism which would stop at nothing to achieve its aims.

However, the moral support of the police, the media and the government was withdrawn when it was too late. By then, vigilantes had clandestinely succeeded in launching bomb attacks on most of the drug dealers and gangsters. By 1998, the vigilantes had executed some 30 gang leaders and drug dealers without any vigilante being convicted. Most of the charges brought by the police against vigilantes collapsed in the same way that charges had earlier collapsed against leaders of the Hard Livings. The police embarked on a variety of operations to deal with the vigilantes, but have yet to achieve success.

The attacks by Pagad have since shifted to police officers and businessmen. Police stations have been attacked to procure weapons for vigilante death squads. Businessmen in the Muslim community, who refused to provide money to vigilantes, were attacked with pipe bombs and assassinated. Pagad resorted to extortion to extract money from its victims. Businessmen who refused to pay, were labelled as cohorts of the drug dealers, and their businesses and properties were bombed by vigilantes.

Instead of blunting gang activities, the Pagad actions of 1996 had the opposite effect and succeeded only in uniting gang leaders and drug dealers. Opposing gangs came together to start Core, an organisation that intended to defend their criminal interests. Its professed aims were to respond to Pagad attacks and assist the community with various projects to deal with unemployment.10 It also proclaimed that it wanted to fight crime. It was headed by the surviving leader of the Hard Livings and its membership included most of the gangs on the Cape Flats.

The hegemony of The Firm was consolidated by the formation of Core. In fact, the gangs became so brave that they launched a march on Parliament and attracted over 3 000 supporters in 1996. A series of ultimatums were issued by Core to the government, which led to tit-for-tat killings across the Cape Flats.11 The actions of the vigilantes were also an informal means of social control with many people fearing to criticise both Core and Pagad for fear of reprisals and attacks.

The resultant attacks and counterattacks by gangs led to a full-scale war on the Cape Flats between Pagad and Core members.

Statistics for 1998 and 1999 show the following trend in terms of urban terror and gang-related violence (see figure 3).

This figure shows that there has been a decrease in gang attacks during 1999, with the greatest number of gang-related incidents occurring in 1998. There were over 441 gang-related shootings during 1998, whereas this was reduced to 316 incidents in 1999, a decrease of 28%. There were very few pipe bomb attacks during this period. This is clearly not a preferred method of attack among gangs.

Gangs were under attack from vigilantes, however, whose preferred method of attack was the use of pipe bombs. Police regard vigilante attacks as urban terrorism, as shown in figure 4. ‘Urban terror’ refers to those criminal activities designed to strike fear in the hearts of the local population and to undermine the criminal justice system and the government in the process. The trend shows that urban terrorism has also succeeded in striking fear among gangsters in 1998, with no fewer than 72 pipe bomb attacks.

Figure 4 shows a similar pattern of decreasing as that of gang attacks. In total, there were 86 shooting incidents with 72 pipe bomb attacks in 1998. By 1999, this decreased by 45.6% to 46 attacks. Similarly, pipe bomb attacks totalled a massive 72 in 1998 compared to 9 in 1999, a decrease of almost 87.5%.

A number of reasons can be proposed to explain the sharp decrease in incidents. No doubt, the police would be the first to claim that Operation Good Hope was the reason. The fact that there is a visible drop in the incidence of attacks, however, is not sufficient evidence that the operations of gangs or vigilantes have been stopped. The figures show that gangs have been fighting among themselves while, at the same time, having to deal with threat and attacks from vigilantes. More importantly, it remains doubtful that the response from Pagad has seriously dented the ability of drug dealers and suppliers to continue operations.

It also has to be considered that the security forces were already moving against Pagad towards the beginning of 1998, with arrests of its members and search and seizure operations against its leadership. It is also plausible to consider the claim that there were other perpetrators of violence in the Western Cape, according to Deon Mostert, for example, a police informant who made allegations of police complicity in bombings in the city at the end of 1999.12

It is generally accepted that the choice of weapons of anti-drug vigilantes have been pipe bombs and an assortment of firearms, which included the police-issue R-5 rifle. The fact that some attacks showed modifications to the type of bomb being used, is evidence of the growing sophistication of the vigilantes. Remote devices such as cellular phones and telephone or facsimile tones have also been used to detonate bombs.

As many as 30 gang leaders have been killed by stealth attacks, considerably slowing them down when responding to vigilante attacks. However, it has by no means stopped the drug trade. In fact, the death of these dealers and gang leaders has to be seen in context. Leaders who died at the hands of vigilantes have consolidated their financial earnings and built up empires over the years. It is a natural development that someone would replace them. Younger, more militant sections of the gang will undoubtedly vie for control of the profits and the gang. This younger generation who will now start new wars among themselves for control of these empires. The events in Manenberg has shown an increase in gang fights during 1999, clearly as a consequence of leadership battles.

The killing of gang leaders has provided the prison gangs with the opportunity to regain some lost glory in the drug underworld, as they have attempted to reassert control and respect with regard to their former position, from their positions of relative safety.13 Some of these leaders have since been released and have also come into conflict with the existing leadership, others have taken control and some have started their own operations anew. It remains to be seen whether the gang leadership will collectively continue to honour the agreements made in The Firm.

During 1998, there were attacks on many senior leaders of The Firm, and they retaliated in some cases and killed prominent Muslim businessmen and Pagad members. Some of the leaders of gangs have chosen to relocate to other parts of the country, like Colin Stanfield who has moved to Johannesburg and Rashied Staggie who has temporarily moved to Durban. The fact that Staggie has converted to Christianity speaks volumes of the strategy to get people on his side and isolate the vigilantes. It has been a very effective short-term insurance policy. While most of the other leaders in Core were killed, Staggie survived.

Waldeck suggests that some gang members think that Staggie has succeeded in hoodwinking the community, as they believe he will return to the gang underworld.14

Politics, gangs and organised crime

Organised crime has a reputation as the part of crime that is organised for the explicit purpose of refining acts of crime with maximum returns while remaining undetected. The description of Mahan and O’Niel finds resonance in South African examples and indeed in those of other developing and developed countries:

"[O]rganised crime really consists of a coalition of politicians, law enforcement people, business people, labour leaders, and (in some way least of all), gangsters. There is an inherent tendency of business, law enforcement, and politics to engage in systematic criminal behaviour. This is not so because there are too many laws but rather criminal behaviour is good business, makes sense and is by far the best, most efficient and profitable way to organise the operations of political officers, business, law enforcement agencies and trade unions in a democracy."15

The fact that the chairperson of Core stated that he wanted to urge Core to support the ANC in the run-up to the second national elections in 1999, needs to be explored.16 Initially, under the auspices of Core, gangs indicated that they would be forming their own political party called the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) that would fight against coloureds’ political exclusion. It is not without reason that, after initially campaigning on its own, Core decided that it needed to support the ANC. Although the ANC did not publicly express its position on gangs joining the party, it is a well-known fact that the Hard Livings applied to the Manenberg ANC branch for membership before the 1994 elections. They were rejected and members of the gang applied directly to the regional office where they received membership cards. The tendency of organised crime — such as the gangs in the Western Cape — to dabble in the world of politics is not new. All over the world, for example in Russia, East Germany and Latin America, crime families need political parties in power that would turn a blind eye to their activities.

From today’s vantage point, Core has disintegrated in the face of Pagad attacks, and the support base that it attempted to cultivate, has collapsed. In fact, the gangs have not made enough political capital, but they were important constituents, especially on the eve of the 1994 democratic elections.

Although both Core and Pagad were potential vote carriers, the influence of these organisations have waned considerably over the last two years.

The fact that Pagad seemingly recruited its members from traditionally middle class areas, and Core recruited in traditionally working class areas made for some interesting debate. However, in the context of organised crime, such a debate is of no real consequence. Organised crime knows no boundaries and transcends all religious, political and racial boundaries. At its core is an economic imperative, which seeks to supply goods and services illegally at the highest possible prices outside the traditional market economy. The debate over the middle/working class divide is only important in the context of unequal distribution of income and the levels of poverty in the areas concerned.

It is contended that Core succeeded in capturing the attention of working class communities precisely because it could provide families with resources that were unavailable to them under normal circumstances. It displayed an open bravado in sharing its illegally gained profits with the victims of poverty. If the government did not intervene, Core would certainly have posed a real threat to the ability of provincial and national governments to deliver programmes to the marginalised sections of communities that brought them to power.

Pagad also had a political agenda, which proved to be its undoing. Soon after the Staggie killing, Pagad set itself up as the gatekeeper over crime issues. Its inability to recruit sufficient people from religious groups other than Islam was the factor that led to its decline. In addition, its intransigent stance on certain pieces of legislation that was proposed by the government, such as the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, further undermined its position. Pagad failed to capture the high moral ground in the face of its move towards criminality, and and as a result of the official impotence of the government.

Core seemed to achieve greater community support when considering where it proclaimed it was going to invest its money. It purported that consideration would be given to development projects in communities, and it offered to build a preschool for the Tafelsig community in Mitchell’s Plain. It made donations to various churches, charities and even football clubs. However, this generosity could not forestall its demise.

The demise of Core

Claimed by many police officers and community anti-crime activists to be a front for The Firm, Core reached the end of the road when it was exposed that it was undertaking operations to secure control over all the Western Cape gangs, allegedly to act against Pagad’s killing spree. It seems as if political organisations such as the New National Party (NNP), the ANC and the Democratic Party (DP) initially miscalculated the effects of the internecine conflict between Core and Pagad. All were at first silent on the war raging on the Cape Flats. The ANC allegedly accepted that the community would eventually blame the provincial government led by the NNP, while the NNP tried to show that the blame for the situation in the Western Cape sat squarely at the door of the national government. The DP was unusually quiet in the face of these events. Eventually, all the political parties were blamed for the state of affairs when the WCACF went to see the president and called for the dismissal of both the national and the provincial ministers for Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi and Gerald Morkel in October 1997.

In the face of the killings, and attacks by Pagad, Core was split as the more militant elements among its ranks wanted to strike back at the Muslim community and at Pagad, while the leadership was publicly committed not to attack Pagad. Although there was a public stance not to attack, a few Muslim businessmen and Pagad members were killed as a result of this faction’s actions. The real cause of Core’s demise, however, was its claim that it represented all the gangs on the Cape Flats.

In its campaign to build a defence fund, all gangs were asked to contribute money to Core’s ‘war chest’. This proved nothing more than a clever extortion racket and some of the gangs refused to pay, leading particularly to a confrontation between the Sexy Boys and Core. As a result, other members rebelled and stopped paying membership fees. At the heart of the matter was the control of The Firm over Core. The Firm was run by members of the powerful Twenty-eights prison gang, while the other leaders were playing second fiddle. Core’s extortion schemes were well-planned, and gangsters and shebeen owners who refused to pay, were attacked.

Core also threatened and killed Muslim businessmen and proceeded to buy their properties, especially in the Belhar area. This was to set the tone for a well-developed extortion network that the vigilantes were to adopt as a strategy when dealing with other Muslim businessmen. Many people were shot and killed as a result, and businesses and homes were also bombed.

An intelligence report presented to the Integrated Planning Group on Safety and Security questioned Core’s ability to stop gang fights: "CORE’s ability to impact on gang related violence in the Western Cape is also questionable given its sectional association with gangs affiliated with the Firm."17 The report also confirms that "traditional street and area based gangs associated with CORE have become peninsula and provincially based organised crime syndicates with infra structural links to crime syndicates in other provinces."18

Whereas a few of the leaders of Core — such as Rashied Staggie and Ernest La Pepa — were holding out for negotiations with the government and Pagad, the more militant elements did not agree. When the government refused to meet with Core, its public image and the reason for its existence were blown out of the water. The result was that some gang bosses such as Glen Khan and Simon Stanfield became impatient and warned of attacks. This led to counterattacks, and during 1998, a series of violent attacks decimated the executive of Core, leaving about 60% of its leaders dead.

The Firm did not stop operating, however, and by the end of 1998 was still active, albeit with fewer leaders to share in the spoils of ill-gotten gains. It mainly concentrated on illegal poaching in the Saldanha are and in other West Coast towns, as well as in the Hawston area where abalone and crayfish were caught. They also started different schemes in which they paid community members on the West Coast to tender for fishing quotas which were subsequently sold to the leaders of The Firm.

Interestingly, Waldeck, the former chairperson of Core, resigned during the height of attacks on Muslim businessmen. In an interview, he offered the following reasons for his resignation:

"I sensed that within the leadership there was distrust and a power struggle coming. I tried to sort it out, but because of the pressure from Pagad, we found it difficult in 1996. It was peaceful amongst the gangs then. They told me to step down or be killed."19

It became apparent from the interview that Waldeck was one of the leaders of Core who had supported negotiations with Pagad. He was marginalised in the process.

Notes

See I Kinnes, Unpublished report to the Western Cape Anti-Crime Forum on a visit to the United States, 25 February 1998.



P Anderson, Report into South African Police Service: Western Cape, April 1995.



The Argus, 5 January 2000.



Structured interview conducted with Superintendent Hein Smit (SAPS), 19 April 1999.



Biennial Report of the WCACF, 1997



C Ferndale, Democratising policing, in F Nel & J Bezuidenhout (eds), Human rights for the police, Juta,Cape Town, 1995, p 45.



Anderson, op cit, p 40.



L Camerer, A Louw, M Shaw, L Artz & W Scharf, Crime in Cape Town: Results of a city victim survey, ISS Monograph 23, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, April 1998, p 10,



R Galant & F Gamieldien, Drugs, gangs and people’s power: Exploring the Pagad phenomenon, Claremont Masjid, Cape Town, 1996, p 37; see also Open letter to President Mandela, Cape Times, October 1997.



SAIRR, South African Survey 1996/1997, SA Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1997, p 73.



Cape Argus, 12 August, 1996 and 31 July 1997



Cape Times and Cape Argus, 9 December 1999.



Informed sources inside prison.



Interview with Ivan Waldeck, 24 November 1999.



S Mahan & K O’Niel, Beyond the Mafia: Organized crime in the Americas, Sage, California, 1998, p 109.



T Viljoen, Saturday Argus, 22 May 1999.



Ministry of Police Service: Western Cape, Nicoc report to IPG for Safety and Security, 27 May 1997, p 39.



Ibid.



Interview with Ivan Waldeck, 24 November 1999.