The criminal justice system has been slow to react to the activities of gangs in the Western Cape. This has not been due to a lack of resources or capacity, but chiefly because the government seemingly did not care what was happening in the Western Cape, especially in the light of other, more important national priorities. These included the provision of houses, schools and drinking water, as well as dealing with the transformation of the public sector, especially the criminal justice system.

The apartheid government had a cosy relationship with gangsters, according to revelations made during the proceedings of the TRC. Gangsters were used to intimidate and even kill opponents of the government.1 The history of repression of political opponents has added a new dimension of criminality to the government.

The actions of gangs only caught the attention of the government when they dared to tread on the government’s ability to deliver. Examples include when the day-hospitals in Manenberg and Heideveld were closed as a result of gang attacks. In Manenberg, both the rent office and the library were also closed as a result of intermittent gang shootings. This became the trend in other communities as well.

Under these circumstances, the residents of these communities arranged mass demonstrations at Parliament and at the Cape Town police headquarters. While it is important to note that organisations such as the WCACF were very vocal in their attempts to bring the issue to the national agenda of Safety and Security, the focus of the government was still on ongoing political strife in KwaZulu-Natal.

While the gangs have not been created as a result of the inception of democracy, the government attempted to deal with them in a way that is consistent with democratic norms. However, the media have had a field day in deriding the efforts of the police, in particular, as too little, too late. It has helped to create the impression that gang leaders were beyond the reach of the law and were in fact, untouchable. Various newspapers published profiles of gang leaders such as Hard Livings’ kingpins, Rashied and Rashaad Staggie. They emerged as media personalities in their own right, thus creating news and becoming newsworthy. This had a spiral effect: whenever they appeared in court, newspapers would report on the event, and when they walked away scot-free, it made news headlines.2

As a result of the fear generated by these failures, the government decided to act and declared that it would ban gangs from operating and would look at the doctrine of common purpose when prosecuting them.3

The Department of Justice considered legislation that would deal with the illegal proceeds of crime, as well as legislation banning the activities of gangs. The result was the Prevention of Organised Crime Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1999, which proposed to deal with gang members who have not declared their income. It offered powers of seizure to the police and Department of Justice to confiscate the property of druglords and gang bosses. It also proposed to deal with organised crime structures such as gangs and syndicates in a similar manner where membership of such structures would be held against persons convicted of any offences. Initially, human rights organisations protested arguing that banning gangs would violate the constitutional right to freedom of association. Human rights organisations also did not trust the motives of the government and even the WCACF did not support the proposed legislation. The legislation was subsequently abandoned.

It could be argued that the government attempted to introduce legislation similar to the US’s Rico Act (racketeering, influenced and corrupt organisations).

Although not entirely successful, the government attempted to regain the strategic moral high ground from the gangs. It had become more aware of the existence of organised crime syndicates and had begun to categorise it. Shaw notes that as many as 194 syndicates with 1 903 suspected members are known to be operating in South Africa.4 Most of the crime syndicates specialise in drugs.

A series of revisions to existing legislation — such as the Criminal Procedure Act — gave law enforcers more power to deal with gang deviance. In addition, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act was passed by Parliament in 1998 and thereafter amended a few times, but could not be applied retrospectively. It has caused huge embarrassment to the government which has lost cases in court to well-known drug dealers when attempts were made to confiscate their property. The police and their strategy to deal with gangs are clearly not addressing the problem effectively.

While the police have not kept track of the changes in gang organisation, gangs and drug cartels certainly benefited from political conditions, which greatly facilitated their growth and development.

The political uncertainty of the past years brought about the erosion of the moral authority of the bureaucracy. It is the rationale behind the development of The Firm from a relatively obscure street gang into an organised criminal empire. It remains to be seen whether the gangs will continue to grow and challenge the authority of the government as the latter awakens to its responsibilities.

Social disorganisation in the communities continues in the face of the tight social organisation of gangs and drug cartels in the Western Cape. The assessment of Gastrow is thus appropriate:

"The political transformation and the resultant ‘opening up’ of South Africa during the early 1990s, provided an ideal opportunity for organised crime structures to use foundations built during the 1980s as the springboard from which to dramatically expand their activities. The new environment continued to have low risks and offered even more opportunities for organised criminal groups than during the 1980s."5

If the social and economic needs of communities such as Manenberg, Bonteheuwel and Mitchell’s Plain are not addressed by policy makers in the long term, gangs such as the Hard Livings, the Americans and most definitely The Firm will continue to be regarded as the providers by the community and will thus continue to grow.

They have clearly succeeded in reaping the rewards of the illegitimate opportunity structure during the political transition. When Cape Town authorities have to close down rent collection offices, libraries and clinics because of gang activities, it raises questions about who really controls the city.

Making sense of the inaction

Inextricably bound with gangs and anti-drug vigilantes in modern-day South Africa is the issue of a third force. The reaction of vigilantes has muddied the waters so that it is difficult for independent observers and social scientists to identify the associated issues of responsibility clearly. It goes without saying that the gangs have established a presence in the Western Cape, and so have the vigilantes. However, third force elements from the old order, opposed to the changes brought about by the democratic transition, have also shown a keen interest in both the gangs and the vigilantes.

If a report card is drawn up on the successes of the police thus far, it can be concluded that there has been very little action. It seems to outside observers that there has been official inaction to the war between the gangs and the vigilantes. This despite the fact that, according to police, about 156 members of Pagad have been arrested on about 55 charges with at least one conviction so far.

During 1997 and 1998, in particular, the government has been ruthless in pursuit of elements within the gangs and among vigilantes. The new targets of urban terrorists were common areas particularly frequented by tourists to Cape Town. Restaurants on the Waterfront, the Cape’s premier tourist attraction, were targeted and, at the end of 1998, a powerful bomb blast wrecked havoc at Planet Hollywood, killing two people and injuring scores of others. It was followed by bomb attacks at the headquarters of the police’s Pagad task team. Soon after, another bomb was detonated at the Waterfront and there was attacks on police officers investigation urban terror incidents. This was followed by bombs at the Mowbray and Lansdowne police stations. There were also armed robberies at the Claremont, Strandfontein and Stellenbosch police stations. During these robberies, police officers on duty were detained by a group of balaclava-clad men with firearms. They took weapons from the police safe and tied up the police officers. In 1999, three powerful bombs were placed in public places — a gay bar, a St Elmo’s pizzeria and in a dustbin outside a restaurant in Sea Point. All of the bombs claimed victims.

In addition, several police officers who were investigating Pagad, were attacked in drive-by shootings and one died as a result of his wounds. Some key witnesses in Pagad-related trials were also assassinated during 1997 and 1998. The response of the police was inadequate, and soon Steve Tshwete, the new minister for Safety and Security, was on the warpath. In interviews, he argued for amending firearm legislation and firmly declared war on crime.6 After the bomb blast at the pizzeria, he argued that the Constitution should be amended in order to hold urban terror suspects for longer periods for questioning. This created uproar and editorials and condemnations appeared throughout the country rejecting his proposal.

It remains difficult to imagine that the police were unable to apprehend anyone for the spate of bombings in Cape Town. It became obvious that there were other groups of bombers at work, because the targets were civilians and people who had nothing to do with either gangs or Pagad. The focus shifted from the gangs and Pagad when Pagad claimed that former and current National Intelligence Agency (NIA) operatives supplied it with these bombs. One alleged NIA agent also claimed this in court after he was arrested with other members of Pagad.

As far back as 1997, the minister of Justice accused a third force of being responsible for the pipe bomb attacks on the Cape Flats. During December 1999, Deon Mostert, an alleged police informant, claimed that there has been police complicity with the bombing attacks and that senior police officers were involved.

The former police commissioner, George Fivas ‘cleared’ Mostert of the bombings, and claimed that Mostert was a ‘chronic liar’. Yet, claims that police officers were involved, did not disappear. There have been allegations that the only people who could gain from the bombings were the private security companies that could make millions of rands from additional security measures that had to be put in place. But, speculating about the identity of the bombers is not the purpose of this monograph. It is merely mentioned to convey the seriousness of these allegations.

Common sense indicates that the police do not have the capacity or the training to develop an holistic strategy to investigate organised crime. The fact that the police have been unable to make significant breakthroughs in organised crime, points to inherent weaknesses in this regard. Shaw argues that:

"Apart from the weakness among the investigative arms of the police, it is clear that some of the largest obstacles are to be found in the institutional weaknesses of the criminal justice system itself. Unless the reactive components of the system can be reformed, any attempt to control crime generally, and organised crime specifically will be hamstrung from the beginning. In the short term, one immediate result of weak institutional controls is the growth in corruption in lower levels of the system. This may have potentially serious consequences if it becomes institutionalised."7

Since 1998, however, the government has set up the Scorpions (the Directorate of Special Investigations — DSI) to deal with and investigate organised crime, among others.

But, the police are no closer to the truth on the bombings in urban centres. The SAPS also had to admit that Operation Good Hope was unsuccessful. In the process, the police department in the province has sadly alienated many community police forums. In its biennial report, the WCACF states:

"[T]he state of community policing in the Province leaves a lot to be desired. This is undoubtedly due to the reality of many unresolved issues including high levels of distrust between the community and the police, the pursuit of a just and equitable reallocation, redeployment of personnel and redistribution of resources. That remains a threat to real community policing. I want to state that only once these issues have been addressed will we see progress in the relationship between the community and the police."8

It is therefore not difficult to see why the reaction by the government has been slow. By reshuffling the cabinet, it was hoped that a new minister for Safety and Security would help the police to restore confidence in themselves. To date, the minister has achieved this. He has supported police officers and even proclaimed in one standing committee meeting in Parliament that the police are not corrupt, or at least 99% of them.9 He also indicated that he wanted the police to be proportionally representative of the population. This is mainly as a result of the police’s inability to overcome the old racist divisions of the past. Many of the top managers could not work with one another and this resulted in a lack of shared information. There was also the perceived interference by the national police department that was normally met with a lack of co-operation on provincial level.10

It remains doubtful whether the proposed changes will heal the distrust among members of different units in the police. Apart from racial differences, a deeply entrenched professional jealousy remains among regular police staff and some of the members of the élite units.

Notes

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report, volume 3, Juta, Cape Town, 1998, p 461.



Cape Argus, 7 May 1998



Ibid.



M Shaw, Organised crime in post-apartheid South Africa, ISS Paper 28, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, January 1998.



P Gastrow, Organised crime in South Africa: An assessment of its nature and origins, ISS Monograph 28, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, August 1998, p 67.



T Legget, Crime and Conflict, 17, Spring 1999, p 5.



Shaw, op cit, p 12.



Western Cape Anti-Crime Forum, Biennial Report, 1999.



Address by Minister Steve Tshwete to the standing committee on Safety and Security, September, 1999



During the investigation of Director Ivor Human around the alleged complicity of the police in the Western Cape, the newspapers claimed that he was stonewalled by local cops.