INTRODUCTION

Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in South Africa range from two to eight million. Whatever the exact figure, it could be argued that the presence of such large concentrations of undocumented migrants holds a serious threat to the stability of the South African state and adversely affects the quality of life of ordinary South Africans. For instance, in 1994 12 403 illegal immigrants were arrested in South Africa for committing serious criminal offences, including rape and murder. The negative security implications of hosting a large illegal foreign population are well documented, not only in South Africa, but in Asia, Europe, the Americas and in the rest of Africa. It is not the purpose of this article to analyse the facilitating factors which lead to population displacements or the effects of such mass migrations. There is a burgeoning literature on these aspects1. Rather, it seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of various strategic responses to curb the influx of illegal immigrants into the country and to conclude with a few concrete proposals.

SOUTH AFRICA'S MORAL DEBT: A CASE OF MISDIRECTED MORALITY?

There is an argument that, given the years of apartheid destabilisation of the region, South Africa owes a moral debt to the region. This debt prevents South Africa from employing coercive measures to solve its illegal alien problem. Rather, it is argued that South Africa needs to accommodate the region's people within its borders in some form or another. This is not only dangerous, but its logic is extremely fallacious.

It is dangerous because, as any realist knows, if a relatively safe and prosperous country (as South Africa is within the African context) opens its borders, it risks being overwhelmed by a massive influx of immigrants from poor or violent countries. Myron Weiner puts it this way: "Any country rich or poor, that opened its borders might soon find other states taking advantage of its beneficent policy. A neighbouring country whose elite wanted a more homogenous society could readily expel its minorities; a government that wanted a more egalitarian society could dump its unemployed and its poor; an authoritarian regime could rid itself of its opponents; a country could empty its jails, mental institutions, and homes for the aged. In an extreme case, an overcrowded populous country could take over a hypothetically generous country simply by transferring a large part of its population, and an aggressive country would no longer need tanks and missiles for an invasion.2"

But the logic of the moral argument is also fallacious, and several criticisms can be levelled against such a view. Can the current South African government be held accountable for the actions of the previous illegitimate apartheid one? Can the current French government of Jacques Chirac be held responsible for the turmoil Napoleon Bonaparte had caused in Europe in the nineteenth century? The answer is obviously no!

Secondly, regional destabilisation was far more complex than some commentators would have us believe. The truth is that certain of South Africa's neighbours benefited a great deal from co-operation with the apartheid state. Consider just two examples: Malawi and Swaziland. Malawi, under President-for-Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda, was one of the few African states to enjoy full diplomatic relations with South Africa. For this and its co-operation in other spheres it received various material benefits from the apartheid pariah. Swaziland, too, benefited greatly from co-operating with the South African state. One of the alleged undertakings between South Africa and Swaziland in the 1980s was a secret security agreement. In return, Swaziland was to receive part of South African territory - in the form of Ingwavuma - for its troubles.3 To emphasise the underlying point once more: regional destabilisation was far more nuanced than was apparent. However, to extend the moral argument to the case of Malawi and Swaziland: does this mean that South Africa should close its borders to these states for co-operating with apartheid Pretoria, while according preferential access to the country to those states who suffered greatly from regional destabilisation such as Mozambique or Angola? If one was to accept the moral argument, then the internal consistency of this argument must be accepted.

There is another side to South Africa's relationship with its neighbours that revolves around the relationship between its liberation movements and the Front-line States (FLS). Soldiers of the African National Congress' armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) fought alongside Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) fighters during that country's rocky road to freedom. Does this mean that Zimbabwe also owes South Africa a moral debt for assisting them in their independence struggle? Does this debt cancel out the debt cause by apartheid regional destabilisation?

Thirdly, while there should be concern over the welfare of human beings everywhere, does the South African state not owe a greater moral debt to its own citizens: large numbers of whom are homeless, unemployed and illiterate?

Finally, how does one quantify a moral debt?

The moral argument has been evaluated and found wanting. While personally appealing, morality is an inadequate basis for the development of sound policy.

THE AMBIGUITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Some of those who embrace the moral argument also point out that there are various international norms which prevent the state from undertaking several coercive measures, such as enforced repatriation, to deal with the question of illegal aliens. Once more, there are problems inherent in this argument that stem largely from the fact that international law is rather ambiguous on the question of trans-border migration.

Various global norms have evolved to deal with issues of international migration. The foremost of these is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." Balancing these individual rights, however, are agreements emphasising the rights of states to regulate their borders. For example, the 1985 Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country In Which They Live, approved by the United Nations General Assembly, states: "Nothing in this declaration shall be interpreted as legitimising any alien's illegal entry into and presence in a State, nor shall any provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and conditions of their stay ..."

Hence, one may conclude that the various international legal provisions regarding migration do not take away the power of the state to regulate its borders: states are free to decide who should enter and in what numbers.

THE EFFICACY OF CONTROL?

There is an argument which posits that given the `failure' of control measures to stem the tide of illegal immigrants, these aliens should somehow be accommodated in South African society. Accordingly, the supposed `failure' of these control measures is evinced in the fact that despite enforced repatriation4 the influx of illegal immigrants continues unabated: illegal immigrants are said to enter the Republic at a rate of one every ten minutes.5

Some of the scholars who question the efficacy of control measures, argue for intervention as an alternative to control and accommodation measures. This seeks to address the root causes which give rise to population displacements. What follows is a brief account of Europe's relative success in applying such an approach and the utility it holds for Southern Africa.

The objective of the interventionist approach is to provide incentives for prospective emigrants to stay within the borders of their own country. Essentially, this aims to redress the political and economic causes which give rise to mass migrations.

One line of the strategy argues that political pluralism should be encouraged in the Third World. This is generally seen in terms of liberal democracy, a multiparty system, and free, fair, and frequent elections. These, the argument runs, would stem political conflict and civil war, and reduce population flows. As the resumption of fighting after the elections in Angola in 1992 suggested, it could have the opposite results to those desired. This point is of special relevance to Southern Africa where "... the difficulties which transitions pose are exacerbated by the overall weakness of the polities within which change is taking place."6

Recognising that poverty, or rather the lack of economic opportunities, is often at the root of population movements, the interventionist approach stresses the need for economic development within sending states. This is often done by special trade agreements, investment programmes and educational schemes. A programme of this kind has been proposed by Italy and Spain with regard to North Africa. The hope is that these policies will result in job-creation and economic stability and hence that they will reduce population movements from North Africa into Southern Europe. One criticism which can be levelled against this approach, however, is that South Africa is a Third World state whose own development needs are such that it cannot become a donor country in the foreseeable future.

Another weakness of this approach is that it tackles the global nature of the problem on a piecemeal basis. Globalists argue that only a restructuring of the international economy will reduce south-north and south-south flows and, until this happens the haemorrhage will continue. This also has special relevance for South Africa which is not only facing an influx of illegal immigrants from the region, but also from as far afield as Nigeria, Algeria, Asia and Eastern Europe. Moreover, even if such a strategy is to prove successful in the long run, it does have contradictory results in the short to medium term. Hamilton and Holder puts it this way: "The development process itself tends to stimulate migration in the short to medium term by raising expectations and enhancing people's ability to migrate. Thus the development solution to the problem of unauthorised migration is measured in decades - or even generations ... Any cooperative effort to reduce migratory pressures must stay the course in the face of shorter term contradictory results."7

A more sophisticated strategy is to encourage regional integration. Proponents of such a strategy see regional integration as the key to stem migration flows and point to the European Union (EU) as a successful example. For instance, Gomel8 points out that the countries of Southern Europe in the 1970s (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal) ceased exporting their `surplus labour' to the more affluent countries of Northern Europe as a direct result of EU regional integration; which effectively decreased wage differentials and generally increased economic and social homogeneity within the EU.

On the surface such a strategy seems feasible. However, on closer inspection, various cracks are revealed. For example, the decrease in population flows from Southern to Northern Europe was not only the result of economic factors - demographics also played a role. A lowering of birth rates decreased the pressure on the social and economic infrastructure, increasing the overall living standards of the population, thereby diminishing the impulse to migrate.

Meissner9 contested whether wage differentials between Southern and Northern Europe were that wide in the first place. She also pointed out that Turkey's application for membership of the EU was turned down for fears that with wage differentials of 10:1, economic integration might lead to substantial emigration from Turkey to Europe. She used this as an example of migration acting as a serious deterrent to broader economic integration. This is an important lesson for the states of Southern Africa, which are considering regional integration, and where large wage disparities exist, for example, between South Africa, Botswana and Namibia on the one hand; and Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique, on the other. Could such wage disparities serve as a spoke in the wheel of regional integration in Southern Africa? The case of the EU suggests that it may. Furthermore, doubts regarding the future of the regional project are reinforced by the weakness of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the fact that there is not a single regional vision of integration as is evidenced by the plethora of regional organisations in Southern Africa: in addition to SADC, there is the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The alternative approaches to controlling undocumented migration put forward by the critics of control measures have been evaluated and they were found wanting. Moreover, if it should work, Hamilton and Holder have already noted that it would take generations. The question then is what to do in the interim?

TURNING BACK THE TIDE: THE WAY FORWARD

In an effort to turn back the tide of illegal immigrants, Pretoria's responses has generally been reactive, ad hoc, short term policy measures. These have ranged from misdirected control measures - including deploying a further 5 000 SANDF troops to beef up border security; the use of airborne camera surveillance on remote-controlled drones; enforced repatriation; and the establishment by the South African Police Services (SAPS) of a Technical Sub-committee on Border Control and Policing - to accommodation - for instance, the recent cabinet decision to legalise the presence of illegal immigrants who have resided in the country for longer than five years, who have been gainfully employed, who have no criminal record, or who are married to a South African spouse.

These, however, have failed to stem the tide of illegal immigrants. A convincing argument could be made that the reason for this failure lies in the fact that neither of the above approaches takes into consideration the underlying root factors which motivate people to move in the first place. It can be argued that any policy to curb the inflow of illegal aliens should be the result of both control and interventionist approaches.

South Africa's failure to apply control measures should not be seen as a failure of control measures in general. After all, other countries have made use of control measures with a great deal of success. For instance, the United States Border Patrols along the Rio Grande have managed to reduce the flow of illegal Mexicans into the US by sixty per cent. This was achieved by the extensive use of floodlights, 400 motion detectors and heat sensors.10 In addition to stronger border controls, what is needed is stronger internal controls. This includes:

• tamper-proof identity cards;
  
  

• a system to ensure that illegals are not employed in the underground economy; and
  
  

• a comprehensive national registration system (such as in Sweden) with built-in punitive measures against employers who do not check the national registry before employing anyone.

In addition to this, and given the failure of the regional project in Southern Africa, South Africa needs to establish a number of bilateral agreements between itself and its neighbours. The substance of such agreements would reflect both control and interventionist measures. Africa has a long history of bilateral treaties between countries regulating population movements. Consider here the agreement between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea and between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire regulating population flows. Such bilateral agreements also exist between Burkina Faso and Gabon; between Gabon and Cameroon; and between Ghana and Libya. These treaties all cover issues of both entry and departure. More comprehensive agreements covering not only issues of entry, residence and departure, but also occupational and social rights, participation in trade unions and social security rights, also exist between France and its former French colonies of Senegal, Mali and Mauritania.

Building on this long tradition, South Africa also seems to be going the bilateral way. Consider here the agreements between the Minister of Home Affairs and his Zimbabwean and Mozambican counterparts. The objective of such bilateral agreements does not only need to be the control and regulation of population flows, but can also pro-actively aim at intervention to address the root causes of mass migrations. Note in this regard, Pretoria raising concerns about the lack of democracy in Swaziland with King Mswati III. The success South Africa has had in these agreements can be seen in the recent decision by the Swazi monarch to undertake constitutional reforms.

The merits of such an approach lie in the fact that it bridges the concerns of illegal aliens and those of the state. From the perspective of potential illegal immigrants who do not really want to leave their country of birth but find that the `push' factors are so great that it leaves them no other option but to cross national frontiers, it addresses the root causes which motivate people to migrate. From the perspective of the potential host state, it relieves the burden on the socio-economic infrastructure which illegal immigrants inevitably cause.

ENDNOTES

See for instance Sarah Collinson, Europe and International Migration, Pinter, London, 1994.



Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights, Harper Collins, New York, 1995, p. 175.



This did not materialise because of strong opposition from Inkatha.



In 1994, South Africa forcibly repatriated 90 692 illegal aliens to 39 countries. This constitutes a 100 per cent increase from 1988 when 44 225 illegal aliens were forcibly deported.



M Reitzes Alien Issues, Indicator South Africa, 12(1), 1994, p. 9.



P Vale, Southern Africa's Security: Some Old Issues, Many New Questions, paper read at the Seminar on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Windhoek, Namibia, 24-26 February 1993, p. 5.



K A Hamilton & K Holder, International Migration and Foreign Policy: A Survey of the Literature, The Washington Quarterly, 26, 1991, p. 201.



G Gomel, Migrations Towards Western Europe: Trends, Outlook, Policies, The International Spectator, 27, 1992, p. 70.



D Meissner, Managing Migrations, Foreign Policy, 86, 1992, p. 82.



CNN World News, 2 January 1996.