INTRODUCTION

The Chinese curse, "May you live in interesting times", seems to have specific relevance to the latter half of the twentieth century. The relative security of the Cold War days has been shattered: the straitjacket imposed by bipolarity in which the lay person, academic and policy-maker have derived such comfort, has disappeared. There is an almost chaotic `New World Order' in place. Some instances seem to support the thesis of a human rights culture rapidly becoming a universal phenomenon; other instances, like the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, seem to contradict this. On one level, a global culture and a global identity seem to be developing. CNN broadcasts reaching 200 million people in ninety different countries are testimony to this.1 However, the growth of virulent ethnic nationalisms may lead to a revision of your opinion of a global identity. On one level the fall of authoritarian socialism in Eastern Europe seems to have spurred on the winds of liberal multiparty democracy throughout South America, Africa, the Middle East and the Eastern bloc itself, but recent events from Angola to Algeria and from Kenya to Kazakhistan once more undermine perceptions of progressive global democratisation. In short, the end of the Cold War has brought new challenges to the practitioners and scholars of international relations, as well as to the person on the street, while traditional challenges have retained their saliency. Southern Africa has proved to be no exception to this world-wide trend.

For almost a quarter of a century, South Africa's apartheid state constituted the main source of insecurity in Southern Africa. The democratic elections in South Africa on 27 April 1994 raised hopes that the region would soon enter a new period of peace and prosperity. Despite high expectations, the reality appears more complicated and regional peace, security and development are not guaranteed, nor will they be attained easily. Indeed, new threats to security have emerged. These include a range of non-military and transnational threats such as droughts, mass migrations and drug trafficking. As a consequence, shifts in the conceptualisation of security, as well as an overhaul of existing security institutions are a prerequisite to deal effectively with the source of regional insecurity.

This article therefore seeks to contextualise regional security within the new theoretical paradigms of security; secondly, it seeks to identify and briefly discuss a selection of the more important sources of insecurity in Southern Africa; and finally it aims to assess the utility of regional integration as a mechanism to deal with these issues.

NEW PARADIGMS OF SECURITY2

The contention that theory is of no use to `practical' people needs to be disposed of at the outset. The evolution of theories and concepts are more than mere intellectual or academic indulgences. Theories both inform the manner in which policy-makers understand their world and shape their responses to pressing global, regional and national issues. In this way, theory contributes to the creation and re-creation of the world and is, therefore, a matter of intense practical importance.3

These insights are vital in developing an understanding of the concept `security' and how it may be enhanced in Southern Africa. The manner in which the sources of Southern Africa's security is understood, will partially determine the success or failure of policies that attempt to reverse the region's downward spiral. In many respects, therefore, one key to the region's future lies in transforming the parameters and nature of the regional security debate along more collaborative, emancipatory and peaceful lines. As these processes are still embryonic in the Southern African context, intellectual debate constitutes a critical terrain of struggle.

Traditionally, security has been concerned with understanding the causes of war and, conversely, the conditions for peace. In the period following World War II, however, a rather narrow definition came to dominate mainstream thinking in security studies.4 In this view, security was deemed to be based primarily on the military capacity of states to defend their sovereignty and integrity from the predatory ambitions of others.

From the 1970s onwards, this state-centric and military conception was increasingly contested. In the first place, the logical consequence of the traditional conception of security is the so-called `security dilemma', where the enhancement of the security of one state through military build-up is likely to effect a corresponding decrease in the security of others. This establishes the psychological preconditions for escalating arms races and exacerbates general insecurities and anxieties. However, the criticisms levelled against the traditional definition go much deeper.

On one level, such a definition of security ignores the underlying reasons for conflict, as well as the dangers that emanate from non-military sources, such as environmental degradation or economic stagnation. Moreover, fixation on the state and military strength reflects the narrow concerns of the dominant `knowledge-producing' centres of the world during the Cold War - the United States and its Western allies - and tends to overlook the threats to the lives and security of the vast majority of the world's people who live in the developing world. It is in these regions that some of the more severe contemporary conflicts (military and otherwise) are being played out.

It is in the light of such considerations that the idea of security is being recast, both to deal with the wide range of threats to international peace and to incorporate the security concerns of people, and not merely states, around the world. In attempting to chart a course through the maze of threats to peace and security in Southern Africa, it is useful to concentrate on two deceptively simple questions: whose security is being addressed, and security from which threats?

In answer to these questions, Ken Booth5 has argued that a redefinition of security requires broadening the concept both `horizontally and vertically'. Expanding the definition horizontally involves creating an agenda that recognises that security is as dependent on such factors as political democracy, human rights, social and economic development, and environmental sustainability, as it is on military stability. To expand the concept vertically involves recognising that people should be the primary referent of security. In this way, it becomes possible to identify threats to human security that emerge at sub-national, national and transnational levels.

In Southern Africa, the debate on security, among others, has considered issues of common security, disarmament and the peaceful resolution of conflict.6 Common security is premised on the interdependence of nation-states and, since many problems transcend national borders, states are no longer capable of protecting their citizens unilaterally. In such a context, states share an interest in joint survival. States need to organise their security policies co-operatively and such arrangements are most effective when they are formalised.

While informal arrangements grant the political flexibility that is often necessary for effective diplomacy, it can work against the interests of less powerful states. Moreover, informal arrangements do not regulate inter-state behaviour in an agreed and predictable fashion and, as they are not binding, they tend to break down in times of crisis. Ultimately, the issue of informal arrangements should not be seen as mutually exclusive and it should be possible to incorporate an adequate measure of flexibility into formal conflict resolution procedures.7

Regional security will also be enhanced through disarmament. While arms build-up inevitably deepens insecurity and anxiety (the security dilemma), it also increases the potential that conflicts which may potentially be resolved peacefully, deteriorate into armed conflict. Disarmament may reduce the likelihood of such outcomes. Moreover, in contexts of underdevelopment (as in Southern Africa), resources may be redirected towards alleviating poverty which, in many instances, is the underlying cause of conflict.

Wider, more nuanced conceptions of security constitute a more adequate conceptual `fit' with the realities that confront Southern Africa. At the same time, such conceptions encourage the development of a more appropriate regional security agenda. Nevertheless, the expanded security concept needs to be complemented with additional considerations. Firstly, attempts to uncover the region's security dynamics must recognise Southern Africa's position of economic dependence and political marginality within the global stratification system.8 Secondly, regional insecurity should also be explained as the product of the dynamic and historical interplay of domestic, global, political, economic, social and environmental factors. As these are inextricably intertwined and mutually reinforcing, distinguishing between cause and effect is often an exercise shrouded in obscurity, as the following section on the sources of regional insecurity demonstrates.

SOURCES OF REGIONAL INSECURITY

Population Growth

Africa is generally characterised by very high rates of national population and urban growth. Population density varies from arid to well-watered areas. At present, Africa's population is growing at an average rate of 2,8 per cent per year (about 20 million persons). In Southern Africa, the population growth rate is expected to average 2,7 per cent over the next five years (see Table 1). The long term major implication of population growth is that it tends to deplete and overstress the continent's natural resources base. This results in the emergence of problems related to the scarcity of water and lack of space in urban areas. It is no coincidence that the murderous events that have scarred Rwanda and Burundi occurred in the two most densely populated countries on the continent.

Uncontrolled population growth on the continent is primarily a reflection of the level of modernisation in Africa. Yet, it can also be attributed to inadequate educational facilities that would change public perceptions of optimal family size in favour of small families. It is further exacerbated by the confining to urban areas of service points at which family planning advice is provided, when these should be spread out to reach rural areas, and a general lack of enthusiasm for the use of modern birth control methods. Religious and traditional beliefs are often advanced in communities against the use of modern birth control measures. Fast, uncontrolled population growth seems to be on the increase in poorer countries in Southern Africa, such as Malawi and Swaziland. Even more affluent countries, like South Africa, will soon find themselves in serious difficulties if they do not embark on radical measures that will contain population growth as Table 1 indicates.

Overall food production in Africa has increased by thirty per cent over the last decade, but per capita it declined by nine per cent or nearly one per cent per year. Few African countries produce enough food to meet their own needs. Lack of food security in the past has fomented riots and public disorder in many parts of the continent. Short-falls in the production of staple foods and other agricultural products have contributed to aggravate food insecurity. The lack of foreign exchange in the region and in Africa, generally, to redress these short-falls through commercial imports of grain is also a cause of major concern. Other major factors that continue to aggravate food shortages are erratic or insufficient rainfall; civil wars; price collapse of export commodities; prioritisation of export commodities at the expense of food production; population growth; inflow of food aid and the liberalisation of food imports which, in turn, has led to the reduction of food prices in the international markets.

To remedy the situation, the excessive production of agricultural products that are less in demand, has to be curtailed, and government mismanagement and inefficiencies with regard to food production sectors have to be corrected. Furthermore, investment policy also has to be biased in favour of creating the necessary infrastructure that would allow food production to prosper.

Disease

The region's stability is also hindered by the high incidence of diseases whose spread could be controlled through the provision of primary health care. Alongside the commonly known diseases on the continent, such as malaria, tuberculosis and water-borne diseases like diarrhoea, the prevalence of AIDS and its consequences are yet other major causes of concern.

Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest number of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infected adults in the world. In 1993, while it was estimated that thirteen million adults were infected by HIV world-wide, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for an astonishing eight million. A recent report by the Panos Institute in London shows that one in five of Zimbabwe's sexually active population will die prematurely, and four out of ten of their offspring will die in childhood as a result of the disease.19 In South Africa, estimates suggest that 27 per cent of the total population between the ages of fifteen and sixty will be HIV positive by the year 2000.20 Besides the human loss, this implies devastating consequences for the regional economy in terms of decreased productivity and increased demands on the health infrastructure.

What accounts for these high statistics? Judith Head, in a breakthrough study, argues that the rapid spread of the virus in Southern Africa is intimately related to poverty, and not to sexual behaviour: "Poverty is ubiquitous in Southern Africa. In many countries of the region large numbers of people regularly do not get enough food to eat. In addition to malnutrition; tuberculosis; bilharzia; malaria and measles are all common. All these diseases weaken the immune system and leave the individual more vulnerable to subsequent infection. It is plausible that if two people are exposed to HIV infection, the person with a compromised immune system will be more vulnerable than the person who is well-fed and healthy ... it follows that many more people will contract the virus in Africa, including South Africa, than the better-fed and healthy North Americans and Europeans."21

The suggested conclusion is clear. If the spread of HIV is to be slowed down, poverty needs to be alleviated, implying the need for real economic growth.

Ethno-centric nationalism

A key feature of the post-Cold War era is the rampant resurgence of a chauvinistic ethnic nationalism in far corners of the world, as events in the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and Rwanda have shown. Southern Africa has also not been spared the scourge of inter-ethnic violence. Although more muted, there are indications that ethnic rivalries may erupt in various areas of Southern Africa.

For many years the Angolan conflict was seen through the prism of a Cold War proxy conflict between the Marxist oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) being pro-West. Released from the straitjacket imposed by global bipolarity, the conflict has taken on increasingly ethnic and racial dimensions. Savimbi portrays himself as the leader of the Umbundu people, Angola's largest ethnic group, whom he claims are being marginalised by the MPLA. UNITA claims that the Kimbundu people and mesticoes (those of mixed Portuguese/Angolan descent) are the enemy, as they support the MPLA government.22 Although this is a simplistic ethnic dichotomy disproved in the recent elections in Angola when large sections of the Umbundu voted for the MPLA, ethnic tensions are sometimes easily exacerbated by leaders who exploit those differences for political gain.

This phenomenon is not confined to Angola. Since its inception in 1974, Inkatha under the leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, has portrayed itself as a moderate, pro-Western alternative to the `radical Communism' of the ANC. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unbanning of the ANC, however, Inkatha has pursued a narrower Zulu nationalist agenda, that has resulted in an upsurge in violent conflict with thousands of lives being lost in the troubled province of KwaZulu-Natal.

Unscrupulous political leadership is not the only reason for the resurgence of ethnocentric nationalism. In many cases, there are legitimate grievances held by specific sectors of the population who believe their needs are neglected by government. This is the case in Botswana. With a population of only 700 000, Botswana is divided into more than twenty different ethnic groups. One group - the Bakalanga - are demanding greater socio-economic and political recognition, as well as a recognition of language rights from the dominant Tswana.23

In Mozambique, unscrupulous leadership and legitimate grievances have combined with devastating consequences. Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) largely draws its support from the Ndau ethnic group who inhabits parts of central Mozambique. Renamo's war against the government of the Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frelimo) was often portrayed as a struggle against a government dominated by Southerners. Frelimo supporters in the South are markedly better off socio-economically and in terms of education than their Ndau counterparts. While it is widely acknowledged that Renamo has been the creation of specific interested parties in South Africa and the former Rhodesia, it has recently been successful in using real grievances of the Ndau to carve out a constituency in the Mozambican political arena.

The advent of multiparty democracy in Southern Africa has at times exacerbated ethnic and regional tensions, as the Malawian experience indicates. The former Malawi Congress Party (MCP) derives its support largely from the Chewa tribe in the central region. Prior to the election in 1994, new political parties appeared to have organised themselves mainly along regional and ethnic lines. The Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) received most of its votes from the North, and the United Democratic Front (UDF) led the polling in the southern region.24

The dilemma facing many countries in the region centres around the securing of the rights of particular ethnic groups in a democracy, while preventing narrow, ethnically motivated conflict. The dilemma is further complicated by the fact that African states have never been as integrated as their European counterparts. As is well known, nation-states across Africa were artificially created during the colonial era. Divergent ethnic groups were thrown together without due regard to historical conflicts, and the colonial policy of `divide and rule' served to antagonise inter-ethnic rivalries. This legacy continues to have an impact on current developments.

In addition, arbitrary colonial borders sometimes cut through territories inhabited by a single ethnic group. Consider the larger numbers of Basotho people living in South Africa than in Lesotho, the number of Tswanas in South Africa opposed to those in Botswana, or the number of Swazis in South Africa opposed to those in Swaziland. In such cases, the potential for an emergence of a transnational ethnic consciousness is not unimaginable, especially if grievances are fuelled by demagogic leadership. Shifting allegiances in this way can occur within countries and also between them. For instance, Zulus in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa have expressed their desire to be part of KwaZulu-Natal, while sectors of the Ndebele population in southern Zimbabwe - historically related to the Zulus in South Africa - are outraged at being treated as second-class citizens by the Shona majority, and have sought incorporation into the Republic of South Africa.25 In this case, they see themselves as part of a greater Zulu diaspora.

While inclusive nation-building would go a long way to assuage such ethnic tensions, poverty also needs to be combated. Economic development is after all one of the most effective ways to overcome ethnic conflict. Whenever or wherever the struggle for scarce resources intensifies, people organise themselves into ever-smaller groups to compete more effectively for access to resources. While such conflicts may be rationalised in terms of religion (for example, between Muslims and Christians in Tanzania), or ethnicity (for instance, between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda), the underlying imperative is the struggle for economic security. Economic growth, coupled with proper distribution policies will go far in averting most of these so-called `ethnic', `religious' and even `regional' conflicts.

Small arms proliferation

A legacy of the almost 25 years of war in Southern Africa has been the surfeit of weaponry introduced into the region. As the region enters a period of relative peace, the problems associated with small arms proliferation, of which the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle is an example, have escalated. These have become tradable commodities that are widely available and are used for a variety of different purposes. In Mozambique alone, there are an estimated 1,5 million automatic weapons which move freely among the population.26 Apart from fuelling crime in a host state, these weapons are increasingly being smuggled into South African townships via regional crime syndicates.

Once inside the townships, these weapons help to transform ethnic differences into ethnic conflict and political differences into political violence. In addition, crime by heavily armed assailants has risen dramatically. Between 1988 and 1993 murders in South Africa increased by fifty per cent, and armed robbery by 109 per cent.27 In 1992, 500 people were killed and 575 injured in 650 incidents in which AK-47s were used. The same type of weapon was used in 165 robberies, indicating an increase of 61 per cent over the 1991 figure.28

In an effort to curb the flow of weapons, Pretoria stepped up patrols on the country's borders and sought to impose more severe penalties on arms smugglers. This strategy met with little success for the following main reasons:

• the length of South Africa's borders make it difficult to patrol effectively;
  
  

• the budget of the security forces has been reduced; and
  
  

• Pretoria has approached the problem of arms smuggling unilaterally.

In 1992, however, the police established a special task force to stop cross border gun trafficking and began to seek greater co-operation with the Swazi, Lesotho and Mozambican police forces.29 These regional initiatives have already paid some dividends. For example, in June and July 1995, a joint South African-Mozambican police operation inside Mozambique successfully located and destroyed a number of weapon caches.30 The lesson to be gleaned from this is that arms smuggling could be combated more successfully at a regional level, as opposed to a national level.

The rocky road to political pluralism

The poor record of the African continent with regard to the promotion, observation and respect of human rights is increasingly under sharp focus in a bid to improve the situation. The main thrust of this ongoing debate focuses on developing integrated approaches to the protection of human rights, while at the same time being sensitive to issues such as cultural diversity, pluralism, and minority rights. The major contradiction in this debate lies in the fact that the recognition of human rights as universal, interdependent, indivisible and interrelated, is not reconciled with the reality that human rights cannot be considered as an abstract notion devoid of cultural settings or as a set of values. Despite this, western countries and donor agencies are increasingly using the observance of human rights as a condition for granting aid.

Soon after the imminent destruction of the Soviet system was signified when the Berlin Wall was torn down in November 1989, the winds of multiparty democracy started to blow strongly in Southern Africa. The corrupt one-party system of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia was replaced by Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). In Malawi, the despotic rule of President-for-life Hastings Kamuzu Banda came to a peaceful end when Malawians went to the polls for the first time and voted Banda and his Malawi Congress Party out of power. He was replaced by Bakili Muluzi's United Democratic Front (UDF). In Lesotho, the rule of the generals ended and the Basotho National Party lost their dominance in an election which brought Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhekhle and his Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) to power. In South Africa, white minority rule came to a relatively peaceful end on 27 April 1994, the country's first racially inclusive elections. Meanwhile, both of the region's former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique started to make the long and difficult transition to political pluralism.

The history of mankind has not been one of linear progress, and so, invariably, the democratic process received some severe setbacks. Swaziland continues to be ruled by a despotic King Mswati III who treats the country as little more than his own personal feudal kingdom. There are still severe question marks hanging over the political stability of Mozambique and Angola where the advent of multiparty democracy has resulted in the endorsement of FRELIMO and the MPLA respectively. In both countries, opposition parties, such as UNITA and RENAMO, have found it difficult to accept their subordinate position. This is aggravated by the fact that, after years of civil war, a culture of violence has permeated the entire society, reinforcing the perception that changes may only be brought about by the bullet and not the ballot. In Zimbabwe, opposition parties have accused President Robert Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African NAtional Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU (PF)) of intimidation. In addition, a democratic press has been gagged effectively by various draconian pieces of legislation and the imprisonment of journalists critical of the ruling party. In Zambia, the newly-elected Chiluba government has lost any pretense of democracy, and ordinary Zambians have increasingly become disillusioned with the MMD. Journalists have been imprisoned, Kenneth Kaunda and his United Independence Party (UNIP), the only credible opposition to Chiluba, have been harassed, and various ministers of the new ruling political elite have been implicated in corruption. In Malawi, the fragility of the African polity in which democratic transition takes place, has been underlined by the attempted coup in February 1995 by a group of army officers against the Muluzi administration. In Lesotho, Prime Minister Mokhekhle's BCP has increasingly become more totalitarian. All Principal Secretaries in the Lesotho civil service have been replaced by members of the BCP. The use of the Westminster first-past-the-post system in the 1993 elections resulted in the BCP winning all sixty seats in the new Parliament, while the rival BNP, which won 25 per cent of the national vote, obtained no seats. The outcome is de facto one-party rule that has inhibited broad political participation, undermined the development of a vibrant civil society, and generated new extra-parliamentary forms of protest and opposition.

Obviously, this is an untenable state of affairs. Southern Africa cannot hope to escape from its current economic malaise if there is no democracy. After all, a functional relationship exists between good governance, foreign investment and economic growth. The problems posed by democratic transition in African states are further complicated by poor civil-military relations.

The Role of the Armed Forces

In a historical context, Africa's civil-military relations are characterised by an interventionist political culture, insubordination to civilian control and a lack of transparency, accountability and professionalism. Two factors seem to have played a prominent role to render these relations fragile.

Firstly, the political elite of the continent sought to cultivate a close and special relationship with the military, because the military monopolised the use of force and was held in high esteem in those countries where it played a role to end colonial rule or where it was to avert a potential threat of external aggression. This relationship guaranteed special privileges and benefits for the military and in turn placed the politicians in a better position to use the military for political expediency.

The second factor which contributed to erode civil-military relations in Africa was the creation of a situation that would discourage academics and civil society to scrutinise these relations. This was largely the case during the Cold War. Governments and military staff shared a common perception that security forces did not fall into the purview of academic or civilian scrutiny. Security forces also tended to over-exaggerate sensitivity over national security questions to protect confidentiality from civilians whose motives were always considered suspect. Under these circumstances, civil society and academics applied self-censorship and self-restraint because the study of security forces was clearly a `no-go' area. Sensational events like coups, mutinies and strikes became the only events that left the security forces open to scrutiny.

The above factors served as fertile ground for the politicisation of the security forces and their transformation into de facto armed wings of ruling parties. In turn, this encouraged forces to demand preferential and different treatment to that accorded other civil servants and encouraged unaccountability and a lack of transparency to prosper. Furthermore, it obliterated any semblance of civil and legislative control over the forces left behind by former colonial administrators.

In recent years the salience of military intrusions into politics appeared to be on the decline as moves toward democratisation gained momentum. There are now indications of a revival of the `cult of the military', as armed forces once again pose a serious challenge to the state - for example in Gambia, Nigeria and more recently in Lesotho and Niger.

Military intervention is not a habit the men with guns will find easy to abandon. Even in the absence of military threats, many governments and leaders are constantly having to glance nervously over their shoulders to see what their armies are up to, particularly in Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Burundi. Nor have the traditional devices of recruiting the armed forces from supposedly reliable ethnic groups or deliberately politicising the senior officer corps proved totally reassuring. Military leaders, like politicians, like to stay in power, once they have tasted its heady effects.

A related and disconcerting development is the emergence of shadowy, ill-disciplined, rebel movements comprised of dispossessed and disaffected rural youth, many still children, for whom aimless violence has become a way of life and a source of personal liberation. While several `terrorist' organisations, such as the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda and the elusive 18th February Movement in Kenya, exhibit some of the characteristics of this phenomenon, the paradigmatic case is the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) ravaging Sierra Leone. Renamo, a movement accused of many of the same characteristics, was accommodated within a conventional political structure in Mozambique. The end of the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique has not brought about peace in these two troubled states. Demobilised soldiers have increasingly turned to banditry and other nefarious criminal activities. Two factors enhance such activities: the easy availability of small arms and ammunition, and the freedom from constraints that exists in societies in the process of disintegration.

Given this state of affairs, the major challenge in the proper regulation of Africa's civil-military relations lies in designing mechanisms that will effectively contain the destabilising role of the security forces in their efforts to oust democratically elected governments, entrenchment of civil and legislative control over these forces and the inculcation of a culture of accountability, transparency and professionalism. In a bid to re-design their civil-military relations, African countries have to demonstrate sensitivity towards national interests and other considerations, as opposed to the importation of ideas that may not be compatible to their conditions.

There have been recent indications that organisations, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as individual donor countries, accept that the reorientation of the African armed forces, civil-military relations and demobilisation and social reintegration of former combatants may have to be part and parcel of any type of socio-economic restructuring package. More bluntly, the allocation of a portion of aid money to the reorientation of the military, getting them back to the barracks and keeping them there, may be money well spent. Included in such measures would be reinvigorating African-Western military ties (to achieve a transfer of organisational culture), comprehensive civil-military education programmes, direct military training assistance and the limited use of the military in support of nation-building activities.

Lack of Economic Growth

Whereas lack of economic growth is prevalent throughout the continent, economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is less than that of North Africa. The continent's poor economic growth is attributed to three major factors: the debt crisis, over-dependence on one or two export commodities and the failure of economic structural adjustment programmes.

• where policy-makers of political units and their respective societies cease to contemplate the possibility of mutual warfare; and
  
  

• where states cease to allocate resources for building military capabilities aimed at each other.38

Southern Africa, once more, does not meet these criteria. Who can forget that Botswana and Zimbabwe nearly went to war in the early 1990s over access to the waters of the Saabi River, or the fact that Botswana and Namibia nearly went to war over a territorial dispute. These examples certainly indicate that Southern African states have not ceased to contemplate the possibility of mutual warfare. The second criterion is more difficult to prove or, indeed, to disprove. For example, while it is known that Botswana is undergoing a massive military build-up, the purpose of the build-up is unclear. Defence expenditure currently stands at 8,8 per cent of GDP, with indications that it will increase to 12,5 per cent of GDP over the next five years. As to the purpose of this heightened defence expenditure in an environment which is relatively peaceful, the only comment that could be elicited from the commander of the Botswana Defence Force, Lieutenant-General Ian Khama, was: "We are trying to build a force which will deter any potential threat."39 Certainly, this does not reflect much faith in the durability of the climate of peace in Southern Africa.

In addition to Deutsch's two criteria, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff add yet another facilitating factor for the formation of security communities, namely the presence of an external threat of force.40 It could be argued that one of the factors spurring on the development of the European Community was the real threat of Soviet aggression during the Cold War. Similarly, it could be argued that fear of apartheid South Africa's aggression prompted the formation of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC). The question which now needs to be addressed is where the external threat arises in the context of a post-apartheid, post-Cold War Southern Africa.

Thus it is doubtful, by the criteria listed above, whether Southern Africa could constitute a security community.

Towards Regional Integration?

What is integration? Jones defines integration as the "... process by which a supranational condition is achieved, in which larger political units conduct the business now carried out by national governments."41 For Haas integration is "... the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."42 Lindberg, on the other hand, sees integration as the process "... whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs."43

Although there are minor differences in each of these definitions, they have one thing in common: each views regional integration as a centripetal process which is supranational in character. This, in turn, establishes one of the basic prerequisites for regional integration: a willingness on the part of states, which form part of the process, to surrender certain powers to a central supranational body. Brussels and the European Union display such supranational characteristics. On the other hand, Gaberone and SADC display the characteristics of an inter-government body as opposed to a transnational one. The reason for this is not hard to find: national self-interest is predominant as opposed to a collective regional interest. It could be argued that a mechanism needs to be found which reconciles national self-interest with a collective regional interest. But this is difficult to do. Consider the case of Nigeria's `bullying' role within ECOWAS, Chile's `hegemonic' role within the Andean League, Zimbabwe's behaviour within SADC, and the dissolution of the East African Community. In each of these instances the regional project foundered on the rocks of national self-interest. Within SADC, the danger posed by national self-interest to the regional project has been underlined by the failure of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) initiative. In Southern Africa, the dangers of national self-interest are further aggravated by the role of personalities, where leaders, like Robert Mugabe, seek to dominate the process of regional integration and would view any encroachment on their national power base by a supranational entity with intense suspicion.

The fact that SADC is more an inter-government than a supranational body, accounts for its very weakness. This weakness became apparent in 1994 during the Lesotho constitutional crisis when King Letsie III dismissed the democratically elected Prime Minister. In a bid to restore democracy in the mountain kingdom, South Africa with Botswana and Zimbabwe, successfully pressurised Letsie III to step down in favour of his father King Moshoeshoe II and for Prime Minister Mokhekhle to return to office. What is interesting to note, however, is that the actions undertaken by Pretoria, Harare and Gaberone took place outside SADC structures. More recently, the situation in Swaziland has deteriorated. There is a patent lack of democracy, opposition leaders have been intimidated and imprisoned, and there is evidence of other gross human rights abuses. Although democracy and a respect for human rights is something which SADC frequently pays lip service to and is supposed to promote in Southern Africa, it has been powerless or has refused to act in the case of Swaziland. Once more, it was left to the regional triumvirate of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe to raise the twin issues of political pluralism and human rights violations with King Mswati III.

Another precondition for integration is a high degree of economic and political complementarity.44 Does Southern Africa exhibit such a high degree of economic and political complementarity? The answer is emphatically no! At the economic level, South Africa's GNP contributes 84 per cent to Southern Africa's regional GNP. To put it another way, the average South African earns 36 times more than the average Mozambican.45 Looking at the European example of integration, it is important to note that such a state of affairs serves as an impediment to regional integration. During the 1960s, when Turkey requested membership of the European Union, its application was repeatedly turned down, as West European leaders feared that the wage differentials of 10:1 would cause Turkey's citizens to swamp West European capitals. Most of the economies in Sub-Saharan Africa are similarly structured, and produce, consume, export and import essentially the same goods. Instead of complementing each other, the countries of Southern Africa are competing, especially in exports of mostly primary commodities that are sent to similar markets, generally in Western Europe. They also compete in importing the same products from the same source - again mostly Western Europe. In a comprehensive historical study that was released during April 1995, that looked at attempts at regional integration, irrespective of their success rates, and involved all five continents, the World Bank found that the twenty countries in sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest level of complementarity of all those studied. The bank concluded that "this strongly suggests that the structure of African countries' exports and imports differs so widely that regional trade integration efforts hold little promise for accelerating industrialisation and growth."46 In fact, only 2,7 per cent of the region's total trade is among members.

As to political complementarity, one need only to point out the level of democracy in South Africa, as opposed to Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe or Zambia, to the tenuous situation in Mozambique and Angola, and the decay of countries bordering on the north and north-west of the Southern Africa `region'.

Thus, by the various criteria set out above, Southern African regional integration still remains a vision rather than a reality.

CONCLUSION

This paper has situated the debate about security and insecurity within the context of `new thinking' and argued that these wider, more nuanced conceptions of security constitute a more adequate conceptual `fit' with the realities confronting Southern Africa. Some of these realities reinforce insecurity, among them the high population growth, mass migration, lack of food security, rising incidence of disease, resurgence of ethno-centred nationalism, proliferation of small arms and ammunition, incomplete and halting progress to political pluralism, continued destabilising role of the armed forces, and the lack of sustained economic growth. Each of these sources of insecurity were briefly discussed and provided the backdrop to discuss the popular quest, at least at the rhetorical level, of regional integration in Southern Africa. The fundamental question is simply: `Is Southern Africa a region?', to which the objective answer appears negative. In fact, the region described as Southern Africa fails every litmus test on regional integration except that of proximity. In the same manner that living next to someone does not imply good neighbourliness or a community identity in itself, the fact that the countries in Southern Africa share common borders and occupy the southernmost tip of the African continent does not in itself justify any real `region', apart from the mere ascriptive use of the term.

Progress towards a shared democratic value system among the various constituent states of the region, and sustainable and rapid economic growth are clearly the building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security in Southern Africa. However, the prospects for a greater degree of regional economic integration do not appear to be favourable and the surge of democratisation of the 1980s appears to be faltering.

Although regional economic integration and multilateral co-operation may be a slow process, bilateral security arrangements between South Africa and its neighbours on a variety of issues of mutual interest are flourishing.47 While the commitment to SADC and the OAU dominates at a rhetorical level, it is often these bilateral arrangements which rapidly produce tangible results - an impression which is confirmed in private discussions with officials from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

Bilateral agreements have even been signed at provincial level between South Africa and neighbouring regions. During June 1995, for example, Mpumalanga Premier Mathews Phosa signed an agreement with the neighbouring Mozambican provinces of Maputo and Gaza.48

In contrast, academic discussions have concentrated on encompassing terms of collective regional security, in which multilateral arrangements would include non-military concerns. This latter debate has been heavily influenced by the model of the former Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE - now the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)). The OSCE's major strength lies in it essentially being a process within which participating states co-operate in finding a solution as against the adoption of a prescription formulated by a qualified majority. The sharing of common values, parity in levels of development, and similarity of geopolitical constellations are some of the instrumental factors that ease communication and foster good relations among participating states. In this way amicable solutions and maximum agreement prevail.

While co-operation is easily achievable among partners sharing a common system of values and the same level of development, this is not readily so when significant disparities are evident among the participating countries. This parity in levels of development clearly does not exist to any real degree in Southern Africa. The absence in parity could lead to the establishment of a hierarchy and domination amongst co-operating partners. Economic leverage tends to determine decision-making and the ability to execute a mandate. In the long run, this could undermine an effective regional co-operative structure.

What are the implications of the above in addressing the various sources of regional security? First of all, it does not mean or imply any reduction in the quest towards regional integration and the establishment of regional co-operative measures. It does imply a measure of prudent caution in the often unrealistic expectations that abound of the capacity of sub-regional organisations to affect meaningful regional integration and co-operation. In fact, the reality of daily experiences in the region underscore the conclusion that technical and bureaucratic co-operation such as that within the ambit of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) is more meaningful and the real substance of regional co-operation, while bilateral agreements and negotiations will dominate formal inter-state relations for many years to come. Such is the reality, as opposed to the rhetoric, of Southern Africa.

ENDNOTES

H Solomon, Global Change and the Challenge to International Relations Theory, Politeia, 14 (1), 1995, p. 45.



This section is from an unpublished manuscript written by Hussein Solomon and Xavier Carim entitled: Southern African Security in the 1990s.



R Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, Millennium Journal of International Studies, 10(2), 1981, pp. 126-155.



S Nolutshungu, Southern Africa in a Global Context: Towards a Southern African Security Community, SAPES Books, Harare, 1994.



K Booth, A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations, Southern African Perspectives, 30, 1994, p. 3.



L Nathan & J Honwana, After the Storm: Common Security and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa, Arusha Paper Series: A Working Paper on Southern African Security, 3, 1995.



Ibid., p. 14.



L Swatuk, Foreign Policy and the Third World: A Critical Review and Alternative Framework, Occasional Paper Series, 24, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto, 1994.



Africa Institute of South Africa, Africa at a Glance, Pretoria, July 1995, p. 16.



H Toolo & L Bethlehem, Labour Migration to South Africa, paper read at the Workshop on Labour Migration to South Africa, National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), Johannesburg, 31 August 1994, p. 5; M. Reitzes, Alien Issues, Indicator South Africa, 12(1), 1994, p. 7.



B van Niekerk, The Impact of Illegal Aliens on Safety and Security in South Africa, ISSUP Bulletin, 7/95, 1995, p. 5.



H Solomon, From Uncertainty to Confusion: The Illegal Immigrant Question in South Africa, paper read at the Workshop on South Africa within Africa: Emerging Policy Frameworks, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies and Institute for African Alternatives, Johannesburg, 23-27 January 1996. p. 6.



Reitzes, op. cit., p. 8.



D Schutte, Migration: The Status Quo and Prospects for Southern Africa, ISSUP Bulletin, 1993, p. 8.



Fax to the author from the Department of Home Affairs, 10 January 1995.



Solomon, op. cit., p. 12.



Buthelezi in Alien Warning, Sunday Times, 3 March 1996.



Africa Institute, op. cit., p. 12 (total area covered by seasonal and permanent crops and established grazing, together with temporary fallow land, as a percentage of the total land area).



G Mills, From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1994, p. 72.



R Packard, AIDS in Africa old and new questions, in M. Venter (ed.), Migrancy and AIDS, Cape Town, Medical Research Council, 1994, p. 8.



J Head, HIV/AIDS, Poverty and Social Structure, in Venter, ibid., p. 33.



Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, July 1993, p. 5.



Ibid., p. 6.



Ibid., p. 7.



Ibid., pp. 10-11.



G Mills, Small Arms Control: Some Early Thoughts, African Defence Review, 15, March 1994, p. 44.



L Glanz, Recent Crime Statistics, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1994, p. 4.



Mills, op. cit., March 1994, p. 45.



Ibid., p. 47.



South African Broadcasting Corporation, Television 1 News, 20h00, 19 July 1995.



Africa Institute, op. cit., p. 42.



The Human Development Index measures human progress as reflected in longevity, knowledge and standard of living. These figures reflect those from the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report.



See Solomon &Carim, op. cit.; Nolutshungu, op. cit.; P Vale, Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness: South Africa and Regional Security in the mid-1990s, CMI Report Series, 4, 1994.



G Evans & J Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, p. 294.



Ibid., p. 281.



Ibid.



Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1957.



K J Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Prentice-Hall, London, 1983, p. 441.



Quoted in New Nation, 23 February 1996.



J E Dougherty & R L Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, Harper and Row, New York, 1981, p. 418.



W S Jones, The Logic of International Relations, Scott, Foresman and Company. Boston, 1988, p. 622.



E B Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1958, p. 16.



Quoted in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 421.



Holsti, op. cit., p. 442; Jones, op. cit., p. 623; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, ibid., p. 417.



The Economist, 4 March 1995, p. 48.



R Umoren, World Bank Pessimistic about Region's Economic Integration, Economic Bulletin, IPS, April 1995, p. 14.



Examples include measures to counter weapon smuggling, drug smuggling, cattle rustling and vehicle theft, disaster relief, security training and assistance, policing of maritime exclusion zones, etc. The recent agreement between South Africa and Mozambique to counter the trade in small arms has led to a joint operation in Mozambique between the South African Police Services and the Mozambican authorities during which the task force destroyed more than a thousand weapons within a matter of months. On 12 June 1995 South Africa and Namibia signed a comprehensive agreement on cross-border policing aimed at combating syndicates smuggling drugs, arms and stolen vehicles. The agreement, signed by South African Minister of Safety and Security, Sidney Mufamadi and Namibia's Deputy Home Affairs Minister, Jerry Ekandjo, also included provision for joint border patrols and the sharing of specialised training and technology; see SA-Namibia Deal to Fight Border Crime, The Citizen, 13 June 1995.



The agreements include increased security against highway bandits, wildlife protection, organised tourist promotion, agriculture, use of common water resources and training of administrative, cultural and sports staff; see Phosa Signs Security Pacts in Mozambique, The Citizen, 13 June 1995. Provinces are increasingly becoming involved in the execution of South Africa's interests in the region, to the extent that the Department of Foreign Affairs is establishing a Directorate: Provincial Liaison to act as liaison between the provincial administrations and the various branches of the Department, and to co-ordinate activities of mutual concern outside the borders of the country. DFA, The Southern African Development Community: An Integrated Approach towards Regional Co-operation and Development, paper read at The SADC and ISDSC: South African Perspectives, IDP round-table discussion, 26 September 1995, Pretoria.