R Cornwell & J Potgieter, Private militias and arms proliferation in Southern Africa, Paper presented at the International Conference on Southern African Security, Centro de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, Maputo, 19-20 November 1998, p. 7.

T Nkiwane, Small arms flows in Zimbabwe, in T Nkiwane, M Chachiua & S Meek, Weapons flows in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland, ISS Monograph, 35, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, January 1999, p. 6.

Nkiwane reported a decrease in reported unlawful possession of weapons since 1992. See ibid., table 2, p. 8.

S Meek, Illegal weapons proliferation in Swaziland, in Nkiwane et al., op. cit., pp. 66-73.

Cornwell & Potgieter, op. cit., p. 6.

G Oosthuysen, Small arms proliferation and control in Southern Africa, Southern African Series, South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein, 1996, p. 51.

Frelimo co-operation with ZANU was contrasted with the CIO’s role in moulding the Mozambican rebel movement Renamo; the antithesis to the close relationship between the ANC and Frelimo was the role of the SADF’s arms supply to Renamo; South African direct and indirect (through arms supply to Unita) intervention in Angola was part of its fight against both Swapo and the ANC whose cadres were accommodated by the MPLA government; and so on.

Nkiwane, op. cit., p. 4.

Cornwell & Potgieter, op. cit., p. 6.

Ibid.

Meek, op. cit., p. 67.

Irrespective whether he was framed, as he has insistently claimed, or not, the hard fact is that this case clearly indicates that former covert arms supplies networks involving liberation/rebel movements and former SADF officers are still in place, serving both the commercial and criminal goals of individuals.

Also, the lack of effective policing and law enforcement capabilities in most Southern African countries has generated a genuine proliferation of private security companies in a bid to ‘privatise security’ in the African context. These companies are also responsible for the movement of weapons, since they rely on these instruments for their work and operations. At the same time, some of these companies have been known to buy and sell illegal weapons, and to move them covertly across borders. This is also an important consideration in understanding the movement of weapons and the demand side of the market.

It is important to note that international criminal organisations consider guns as vehicles necessary for their sustenance and survival. They are not an end in themselves, but an important adjunct to their operations. This was not always so. In the 1970s, for example, there was a strong connection between guns as the focus of interest and drugs as the vehicle to buy guns. Today, that connection has reverted with guns occupying the adjunct position. It thus follows that a passport to the criminal community today is a gun and not a commodity. Likewise, the needs of international relief organisations in the field is no longer a safe, albeit temporary, environment in which to operate with efficiency. Since the operation in the former Yugoslavia, when cease-fires were not a sine qua non for the beginning of a peace process, international relief operators have constantly been jeopardised by the inability to provide for their own security, never mind that of the recipients of their relief. From the anarchy of snipers in Sarajevo to the banditry of armed groups on the road from Luanda to Benguela; from the inability to access Eastern Zaire or Albania to the difficulty in inspecting camps of repatriates in Rwanda and Burundi, international relief organisations are increasingly hostage to a man with a gun, than ever before in the history of their operations. At times, they themselves have had to hire men with guns for the protection of their mission — the same men who would rob them at night, protected them by day, as was the case in Somalia. At other times, they have assisted villages in demining efforts only to see the villagers re-mine the village - as happened in Mozambique– to ensure the permanence of the assistance.

J Cock, The link between security and development: The problem of light weapons proliferation in Southern Africa, African Security Review, 5(5), 1996, pp. 4-22.

For a detailed discussion of the relationship between politics and crime in South Africa, see M Shaw, South Africa: Crime in transition, ISS Paper, 17, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, March 1997.

During this period, political violence was reported to be steered by the so-called ‘third force’.

Cock, op. cit., p. 7.

Nedcor/ISS, Crime Index, 2(3), 1998, pp. 1-5.

Oosthuysen, op. cit., p. 11.

Cock, op. cit., p. 7.

Gun Free South Africa, Stopping gun violence in South Africa, <www.oneworld.org/news/ reports/jun97_Southafrica.html>.

Oosthuysen, op. cit., p. 22.

See MChachiua, The status of arms flows in Mozambique, in Nkiwane et al., op. cit., pp. 27-31.

For the discussion on the ONUMOZ failure to disarm Mozambique, see among others E Berman, Managing arms in peace processes: Mozambique, UNIDIR, New York and Geneva, 1996; Chachiua, op. cit.; A Vines, Light weapons transfers, human rights violations and armed banditry in Southern Africa, paper prepared for Light weapons Proliferation and Opportunities for Control, International Workshop, British American Security Information Council Project on Light Weapons, London, 30 June - 2 July 1996; A Vines The struggle continues: Light weapons destruction in Mozambique, Basic Papers on International Security Issues, 25, April 1998; and Oosthuysen, op. cit.

Vines, 1998, ibid., p. 1.

Study conducted by Refugee Study Programme cited by Vines, ibid., pp. 5-6.

Ibid., p. 5.

For Mozambican arms related crimes, see Chachiua, op. cit.; Vines, 1996, op. cit., p. 10.

Meek points to the fact that old arms pipelines are still being used by smugglers. See Meek, op. cit., pp. 52-58.

According to the Electronic Mail & Guardian, Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi approved a regulation aimed at preventing gangsters from borrowing lincesed firearms. See Electronic Mail & Guardian, <www.mg.co.za/mg/za/news.html>, 21 August 1998; see also V Gamba, Regional efforts to control light weapons proliferation in Southern Africa: An overview, Academy-Carnegie Book on Light Weapons, draft, May 1998, pp. 3-8.

P Batchelor, Intra-state conflict, political violence and small arms proliferation in Africa, in V Gamba (ed.), Society under siege: Crime, violence and illegal weapons, TCP Series, 1, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1997, p. 109.

Vines reported that, as far back as 1995, Manuel Antonio, then Minister of Interior, recognised small arms proliferation as a major government problem; see Vines, 1996, op. cit., p. 10.

Antonio Namburete, Mozambican Attorney General speaking in a Pretoria Crime conference, Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin, 35(9), 9 September 1998, p. 13245.

See Vines, 1998, op. cit., p. 6.

Oosthuysen, op. cit., p. 65.

B Latham, Mozambique: Illegal weapons trade threatens security, Africa Information Afrique, <www.AIAZIM@mango.zw>, 6 March 1995.

Ibid.

For a discussion on how arms are found in Mozambique, see Chachiua, op. cit.

A Bule and J J Monguela, Interviews, Mozambican police officers, Maputo, January 1999.

Shaw, op. cit., p. 1.

This is an estimate of the cost of crime to South African economy; see Vines, 1998, op. cit., p. 9.

Estimates given by a Maputo hospital caregiver indicated that, in 1996, two bullet-related casualties were reported every day. See ISS, TCP Survey, type One, 96-Moz-06, 1996.

Preamble, Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Government of South Africa In respect of Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the field of crime Combating.

Ibid.

Interview, Pretoria, October 1998.

M Bester cited by Reuters News Service, 19 June 1995.

South African Police Service officials have consistently argued that the aim of Operation Rachel, as far as SAPS is concerned, was a preventive measure of tracking down and destroying weapons in Mozambique before they are smuggled into South Africa. Certainly, this justifies why the operation has consistently concentrated on the southern part of Mozambique and most particularly around the border districts.

Naude, Interview, Pretoria, October 1998.

Chachiua provides a detailed discussion on the motives behind the arms caches; see Chachiua, op. cit.

Interview, January 1999.

Naude, op. cit.

W Grove, quoted by the BBC Monitoring Service: Africa, 27 June 1995.

This is an approximation of the value of 30 000 000 Meticais at an average exchange rate of 2 000.00Mt/R1.

National Crime Investigation Service chief W Grove quoted by Reuters News Service, Johannesburg, 29 June 1995

E Simbine, Perto de 12 mil armas Recolhidas de Esconderijos, Noticias, 15 de Septembro de 1997.

SAPS quoted by Reuters News Service, 30 June 1995

W Grove, quoted by Reuters News Service, 6 September 1995.

Vines, 1998, op. cit., p. 11.

Bule & Monguela, op. cit.

Naude, Interview, Pretoria, January 1999.

President Chissano met Dhlakama to discuss arms proliferation in the country. Their joint initiative aborted shortly because Dhlakama wanted a joint team to investigate which Chissano found unacceptable; see Vines, 1996, op. cit., p. 8.

H Abrahamsson & A Nilsson, The Washington Consensus e Moçambique, Padrigu Papers, Gothenburg University, 1995, p. 11.

Criminals may have taken advantage of this situation by removing these weapons. Vines report that mine clearance companies found that unknown individuals removed uncovered weapons before destruction; see Vines, 1998, op. cit.

Two Media Fax editorials for its issues of 2 and 3 June question declarations made by a Frelimo senior member suggesting that there was a force ready to be used if this was necessary. See also AWEPA, Boletim Sobre o Processo de Paz em Moçambique Número 18 - Junho de 1997, <www.mozambique.mz/awepa/awepa18/oprocess.htm>.

Raul Freia, cited by Simbine, op. cit., p. 1.

Sydney Mufamadi, Minister for Safety and Security quoted by BBC Monitoring Service, 12 June 1997.

Naude, Interview, Pretoria 1999.

Interview, Pretoria, October 1998.

A Belinda, SAF/Mozambique, <gopher.voa.gov:70/00/newswire/tue/SAF-MOZAMBIQUE>, as at 12 August 1998.

J J Monguela, Interview, Maputo, January 1999.

S Britz quoted in Police net tons of hidden arms caches in special operation, The Star, 3 November 1998, p. 1.

Monguela was in the team which started from the north, hence he could not be in Mapai at the time when the other group was supposed to excavate the caches there.

Almerino Manhenje cited by Mozambique News Agency, Telinforma (English), 1761, 7 January 1999.