Co-Operation Between the UN and the OAU in the management of African Conflicts

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Margaret Aderinsola Vogt

Published in Monograph No 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? April 1999

One of the most important innovations in the management of international security in the post-Cold War era is the concept of shared responsibility between the United Nations and some regional organisations for the effective management of conflicts within the regions of the world. Africa is the first region where extensive efforts have been made recently to formalise the relationship between the UN and the regional organisation, in this case the the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with the specific objective of enhancing the management of conflicts in the region. There is a clear history to the primary place that the United Nations has ascribed to its relations with Africa.

Following the end of the Cold War, Africa’s security landscape changed drastically and, to some extent, the process of transformation is still ongoing. The internal stability of many countries in Africa came under tremendous threat. Authoritarian regimes and repressive governments that had operated under the protection of one or the other of the superpowers were challenged as it became apparent that these powers and even the former colonial powers were no longer interested in investing their military resources in the defence of specific African regimes. During the Cold War, the position of Africa was rated as central to the stability of the spheres of interest of the superpowers. African states joined the community of independent nations when most of them acquired independence in the 1960s and 1970s. The newly independent African states were courted for their political support in the evolving international system. They were also encouraged to adopt the political ideologies of one or the other of the superpowers in efforts to expand their spheres of influence. For this reason, the character of the regime was not considered to be the important factor. On the contrary, great investments were made by the superpowers to assure the internal stability of ‘friendly’ regimes. Once the Cold War ended, however, and Communism was no longer considered to be a threat to international peace and security, external powers were no longer interested in regime stability in Africa.

The withdrawal of the superpowers from direct interventions to support regime stability in Africa unleashed a series of revolts against the authoritarian nature of governance in many African countries, and especially against the creeping poverty, and the great inequity in resource distribution and access to economic and political powers. Military insurgency and civilian-led armed revolts became a common feature of the post-Cold War political landscape in Africa. The Secretary-General of the UN, in his report presented in April 1998, noted that, since 1970, "... more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intra-state in origin." He noted further that, "... in 1996 alone, 14 of 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees returnees and displaced persons." The most frequent news from Africa after the Cold War has been reports of new outbreaks of violent conflicts, horrendous incidences of massacres and the genocide of innocent civilians and people of opposing ethnic groups. Government has become irrelevant to the economic well-being and security of most Africans. The following became common to Africa:

In some of these incidences, powerful armed insurgents and local authorities have imposed new rules and established new relationships with the people, often threatening their security and economic well-being.

The ascendancy in the number of internal wars in Africa and the incidences of state failure have challenged all the traditional tools of international conflict management and have become a source of embarrassment to the managers of international security. The international system is unable or unwilling to address the fundamental causes of these conflicts, nor is it able to provide acceptable and adequate frameworks for the effective management or resolution of these conflicts. The traditional tools of international conflict management have not been effective in the management of contemporary conflicts in Africa. The fundamental problem is the issue of interest. The major powers that control the international security apparatus, of which the UN provides the major and most critical framework for international action, are no longer interested in huge investments, either of human or material resources in the security and stability of the African region. The withdrawal of the major powers from Africa has been apparent since the end of the Cold War.

When the Liberian civil war broke out in December 1989, after already having claimed the lives of thousands of people, there was practically no interest shown by the international community in this development. By June 1990, it was obvious that Liberia was a failed state. Thousands of Liberians and people from neighbouring African countries living in Liberia had lost their lives in an internal war in which both the government forces and the insurgency groups were killing unarmed civilians with impunity. The UN did not intervene in the war. The argument was that the UN Charter prevented it from getting involved in a purely internal crisis. It was argued that, since the war in Liberia was internal, the UN could not intervene to protect the innocent. This was despite the fact that the Liberian government had obviously collapsed, had become one of the warring factions, and was just as brutal in its assault against unarmed civilians. The marginalisation of Africa became obvious from 1990 onwards when the lack of responsiveness by the international system to the conflicts in Liberia and later in Somalia is considered. The two conflicts claimed thousands of innocent lives and occurred at the time when Security Council members were busy implementing one of the most expensive military interventions in modern times to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

The Gulf War was an interstate war and thus justified the full attention that was given to it by the UN. Many political analysts were of the opinion that the terrible humanitarian disasters in Liberia and Somalia deserved far more attention from the international community because these conflicts affected the lives of thousands of innocent people.

The UN did intervene in an internal crisis in Somalia to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In 1992, the civil war in Somalia and the activities of the Somali militia prevented the cultivation and free flow of food to the population. Intensive fighting among the militia resulted in the destruction of vital infrastructure, homes, as well as the complete breakdown of social services. Central authority collapsed and various regions came under the control of the factional militia who could not agree to form a new national government. The initial United Nations Observer Force (UNOSOM I) that was deployed to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance was completely ineffectual in persuading the factions to allow the flow of humanitarian assistance to the population centres and to the rural areas. This situation resulted in the massive starvation of a large proportion of the population. Moved by extensive media coverage of the Somali disaster, the United States decided to mobilise a more robust intervention force consisting of troop contributions by some of the Security Council members to compel the factional militia to allow access to the international humanitarian agencies for the delivery of support. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was to operate outside of the framework of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which was extensively augmented into one of the largest UN operations ever undertaken.

While the 1992 UN interventions were initially successful in allowing access for the delivery of international support, the force, especially UNITAF, soon experienced tremendous opposition, especially from one of the Somali factions as they sought to forcefully disarm the militias. The situation became more complex and ugly when, in 1993, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia under the command of Mohammed Aidid, killed eighteen US Marines who were part of the UNITAF forces and dragged their bodies around Mogadishu. The SNA militia later killed 25 Pakistani peacekeepers following an ambush. The US immediately withdrew its forces from UNITAF and other Security Council members soon followed. This series of incidences, coupled with the heightened hostility against the international community in Somalia led to the decision of the Security Council to withdraw from Somalia.

The experiences of the UN in Somalia affected its approach to the sharing of responsibility with regional organisations in the management of international security. The complications which resulted from UNITAF’s attempt to operate an enforcement mandate in Somalia made the UN wary of operating multidimensional peace missions, especially when it has to enforce its mandate. The fear of entrapment in a complex civil war, similar to the experience in Somalia, inhibited the Security Council from authorising an expansion of the UN’s presence in Rwanda in June 1994 when the conflict escalated beyond the control of the small UN intervention force that was then on the ground. Rather than augment the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMlR) and change its mandate to allow it to employ enforcement action, the Security Council ordered the UN force to withdraw from Rwanda when all information indicated that a serious security breakdown was imminent. It is widely accepted that this decision left the space wide open for the horrible genocide that ensued soon after the withdrawal of the majority of the UN force. In 1994, more than 500 000 Rwandans were massacred within days in a horrible genocidal conflict which could have been prevented.

Again quoting the UN Secretary-General in his report on Africa, Kofi Annan bluntly admitted the failure of leadership by the international community: "By not averting these colossal human tragedies, African leaders have failed the people of Africa; the international community has failed them, the United Nations has failed them." Having admitted the failures and inadequacies of the past, to what extent is the international community better prepared to avert the crises of the future? How can African governments, organisations and civil society ensure that the management of regional security is more adequately structured to avert crises in future? This represents the fundamental challenge to the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and the UN system. The concept of co-operation between the UN and the OAU stems from the desire to put a mechanism in place which would be effective in preventing future conflicts, and when these occur, to manage them effectively to ensure that the minimum human, material and political damage is experienced.

The deterioration of security in Africa, especially the rise in the number and intensity of internal conflicts, led to a reopening of the debate on the need for an OAU security agenda The OAU agreed to institute the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. The OAU Mechanism provides for:

Among other functions, the OAU Mechanism is meant to augment the capacity of the OAU Secretariat and the political leadership to manage conflicts in Africa more effectively. The Mechanism should enable the Secretary General to initiate action in the management of conflicts in the region and to mobilise resources, both within Africa and from the international system, for effective conflict management in the region.

Since the adoption of the Mechanism, discussions on how it could be made operational have centred on the development of the capacity of the OAU to expand its role in conflict prevention through the expansion of the organisation’s ability to predict potential conflicts by using a wide range of early-warning systems. In this regard, it is expected that the partnership with the UN will expand the ability of the regional organisation to tap into the extensive information resources that are available within the UN system. Furthermore, partnerships with a wide range of African institutions will provide the OAU with points of entry into many African states, both for collating information and for the implementation of preventive measures. It is also expected that more relationships between the OAU and different levels of non-state actors and institutions would expand the scope of the organisation.

The challenges facing the OAU in its efforts to establish an early-warning capability are the same as those facing all international organisations. The knowledge of an impending conflict does not always translate into the political will to act. The decision to intervene is more often based on the political calculation of states of where their greatest interest lies. The capacity of the OAU with regard to conflict mediation should be developed and expanded as it is an area where many believe the organisation has been reasonably successful. The OAU and the UN were unable to mobilise intervention forces successfully to de-escalate the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville or in the Comoro, even if it was acknowledged that such interventions would not necessarily have facilitated the peace processes.

The establishment of ad hoc commissions of heads of states on specific conflict situations could also occur. (In such an instance, an OAU summit vests the co-ordination of the organisation’s intervention in specific conflicts to a group of heads of states that act on behalf of the whole and report accordingly). An ad hoc commission of Mozambique’s neighbours contributed by applying pressure on the two factions during the Mozambican peace talks and at the implementation stages to ensure that they remained committed to the objectives of peace. In Somalia, Ethiopia was given the responsibility of co-ordinating the facilitation of the peace process. Increasingly, subregional organisations or groupings of subregional states have assumed the lead role, not only in the political management of the peace process, but also in military intervention. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mounted the ECOMOG interventions into Liberia and Sierra Leone. These interventions were critical to the successful stabilisation of the security of these countries and the establishment of democratically elected governments. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia have recently intervened on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The OAU provides the framework for the mediation of the Congo crisis that involves Uganda and Rwanda, which are not members of SADC.

The OAU has expanded the concept of political mediation to allow for the continuing role of its special envoys over an extended period so that they would have the opportunity to shepherd the process to a logical and successful conclusion. It is now a standard practice that the OAU Secretary General appoints a special envoy or representative to support the political facilitation of conflicts in the region. The OAU and the UN appointed a Joint Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region. The current practice is for both organisations to collaborate through the activities of their Special Envoys in the political mediation of a specific conflict. The choice of the organisation that would assume the leadership role depends on the history and the stage of the conflict. Increasingly, the UN allows the OAU or the relevant subregional organisation to assume the principal role in political and even in military interventions into conflicts in the African region.

The OAU’s activities also include peace operations which are essentially civilian political missions consisting of OAU political officers to provide technical management and advisory support to peace negotiation teams and for the implementation of political decisions. Working with special envoys, such political missions have monitored and facilitated peace and constitutional talks in some countries, for example, Congo-Brazzaville and Sierra Leone. They have provided political support, observed electoral processes and facilitated discussions between some governments and the opposition, again more recently in Sierra Leone where the OAU remained engaged in the negotiations between the rebel group and the government.

The OAU has also deployed military observer missions to Rwanda and Burundi. While these have had mixed results, the thinking is that the OAU has a comparative advantage to effectively prevent the escalation of conflicts through the use of its observers, subject to adequate funding, management and organisation. It has been argued that the presence of OAU observers in Rwanda delayed the collapse of general security in that country. It is further argued that the transfer of the mission to the UN contributed to the massacre that occurred in 1994. Even after the UN decided to withdraw from Rwanda, it was only the African component of the UN team that remained. In Burundi, the OAU observer force, though very small and with limited reach, has remained in the country even despite the imposition of sanctions, and the withdrawal of other international organisations and governments.

The increasing reluctance or lack of political will of Security Council members and Western European powers to commit their troops to UN military interventions in Africa is the reason for the heightened interest to invest in the development of the OAU Mechanism. The expectation is that, since the UN is unlikely to authorise a major peace operation in Africa, Africans themselves should be equipped to perform this function. However, beyond the issue of the transfer of responsibility to regional organisations is the more fundamental issue of comparative advantage.

When it becomes necessary to mount an intervention into a conflict situation, either as a preventive measure or for peacekeeping or peacemaking, at what level should such an intervention occur? Should all responsibilities for international peace and security remain particularly with the UN, since this body already has the capacity and framework to take such initiatives? Is there a role for regional organisations in the management of disputes occurring within their regions? The question of the comparative advantage of the OAU to mount peacekeeping missions in Africa, as opposed to the UN and subregional organisations has been analysed.

A school of thought in Africa argues that the OAU lacks the institutional structure, managerial capacity and resources to manage a peacekeeping operation properly. As a result, some argue that this task should be left to the UN, since it has the comparative advantage in this regard. Furthermore, it is argued that the role of the OAU should be limited to the preparation of African forces for UN operations and to support UN efforts at peacekeeping. The OAU’s capability may be more limited as the concept of multidimensional peace operations becomes a greater reality, consequently necessitating the modification of mandates during an operation and the use of enforcement action. Another school of thought argues that the experience of the Somali operation has reduced the political will of many European countries and the US, in particular, to deploy their ground forces in peace operations in Africa, especially under a UN command. Africa is increasingly required to provide the ‘bodies’ for UN peace operations in an arrangement in which the logistic, technical, transport and other support facilities will be provided by Western European states and the US, perhaps through the UN and even possibly directly in a bilateral relationship with the OAU. In recent experiences, the OAU has found that, even when Africans are prepared to provide the forces for deployment in UN operations in Africa, the Security Council is reluctant to authorise such missions. Some of the Security Council members do not want to commit resources to African operations that may continue for indefinite periods. This was the experience in Congo-Brazzaville, Sierra Leone and the Comoro.

An understanding of the concept ‘comparative advantage’ in the management of conflicts is important in a region where several actors are increasingly becoming involved in the same conflict. Before the end of the Cold War, the options in the division of labour between the UN, the regional organisations and the subregional organisations were clearly understood:  the UN mounted military peace operations and deployed political missions, while regional organisations concentrated on preventive political and diplomatic measures. In the post-Cold War era, with the proliferation of internal conflicts and the increasing intensity of conflicts, this division is no longer clear.

For example, the OAU limited its role to the facilitation of political mediation and reconciliation for the reasons discussed above, and did not develop its security instruments. The attempt by the major powers to promote an OAU intervention in Chad failed, as had previous interventions by Nigerian forces in the past. The OAU mounted the peacekeeping force, even though it lacked the policy framework, technical support and financial capability to manage a peace operation. The OAU peacekeeping force consisted of troops drawn largely from the states contiguous to Chad. Nigeria supplied the bulk of the troops, the force commander, and underwrote the cost of the operation, while France and the US financed the participation of forces from Senegal and the former Zaire. The OAU could not provide the communication and technical support for the force, and troops could not be deployed in good time as a result. Failures in communication at critical times on policy issues undermined the entire operation. There was confusion over the interpretation of the mandate and the force commander failed to receive clear instructions from Addis Ababa until the OAU force was overrun by the rebel force and had to be withdrawn.

The OAU has focused its efforts on laying the ground rules for its role in regional security management. The first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of African states took place in Addis Ababa in June 1996 with the purpose of discussing common strategies for managing the security problems of Africa. This body concluded that the first stages in the development of African capacity should be the standardisation of training programmes, logistics and communication resources for peacekeeping, the development of a regional concept of operations, and the integration of planning at the level of the OAU. However, it is becoming evident that, to be fully effective, major restructuring of the OAU Secretariat would be required. The current emphasis on the development of an early-warning capacity would remain fundamentally flawed if the system cannot quickly prevent the escalation of crises on the continent nor provide a clear road map towards their solution.

The assumption exists that, because regional organisations are close to a conflict and are more familiar with the local conditions, they have a comparative advantage to play the lead role in the negotiation of such conflicts.

However, it is not always true that regional organisations have the comparative advantage to act. Where incumbents are powerful, with independent resources to prosecute the conflict, with relatively limited dependency on external support, and the ability to manage their international public relations, both international and regional organisations can only have limited impact on their positions. This is the case with the parties to the Angolan civil war who are accused of stalling the peace process by delaying the quartering of their forces. The UN and regional states can appeal for co-operation, but they have relatively limited effective weapons to use as pressure. In Mozambique, on the other hand, the war fatigue of the people and soldiers, the denial of support to Renamo by South Africa following the end of apartheid, the pressure from its neighbours, and incentives given by the international donor community contributed to the two Mozambican factions’ engagement in the peace process until the demobilisation of the belligerent forces were completed and elections held.

Many of the conflicts in Africa have raised the possibility of enforcement action. Chapter VII of the UN Charter vests the responsibility for the use of enforcement action in the UN, allowing regional organisations to act only with its permission. However, as a result of the problems caused by the use of enforcement action in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, many have argued that the UN is not poised to conduct credible enforcement action. This is partly ascribed to its mode of operation. The UN does not operate an integrated military command structure — urgent decisions on key issues relating to mandates and, by extension, the concepts of operation, have to be discussed by the Security Council whose decisions are based purely on the political perspectives of its members and their national interests. Secondly, the UN has no independent military resources, nor a large security account that can be used for deployment to theatres of conflict with flexibility and speed. It also does not have the necessary resources to use as back up when such conflicts escalate. The UN has to depend on what its member states agree to make available, which varies according to each conflict, as contributing states have to approve the particular missions and the functions for which their forces are employed.

Proposals for the provision of a rapid reaction capability by the UN have been stalled by some Security Council members based on the argument that such a capability would be expensive for the international organisation to sustain, and for reasons similar to those discussed above. This is in addition to the political arguments on the impact of the use of UN forces for enforcement on the perception of the organisation’s partiality in the eyes of the incumbents, as well as the confusion that may be caused in the minds of the people. The distinction between the forces for peacekeeping and those for enforcement may become blurred. For some, the concept of the UN prosecuting an assertive defence negates its role as an organisation aimed at the pacific settlement of disputes. For example, during the period in which ECOMOG instituted enforcement action in Liberia, the Nigerian Air Force was extensively employed in aggressive air operations to cut the supply lines of the factions, resulting in many civilian casualties.

While complications similar to the UN’s experience in operating enforcement action are likely to attend such attempts by the OAU, the regional organisation is currently even less structured than the UN to handle peace operations. The political difficulties of establishing a framework for effective command and control may equally be a problem, especially given the tradition in the OAU for decisions to be taken through consensus. However, the same sensitivity did not inhibit ECOWAS from mounting peace operations in Liberia and conducting enforcement action. ECOWAS’s role, however, was facilitated by hegemonic roles, especially those of Nigeria and Ghana. The two countries provided the bulk of the initial force that was deployed in Liberia. Nigeria, in particular, provided about eighty per cent of the force when ECOMOG’s strength was increased to 12 000 during Operation Octopus in October 1992 before it was again decreased from 1993.

The sizes of the Nigerian and Ghanaian contingents were partially informed by the reluctance of some of the members of the Committee of Nine, principally Côte d’lvoire. Burkina Faso and Togo to contribute troops to ECOMOG. However, there is an added problem arising from the capacity of regional states. Many of the states in West Africa have relatively small armies with a stronger emphasis on internal security concerns in their security doctrine. Since many have serious internal problems, they probably could not spare the men and the resources to deploy forces to another country. For example, the government in Togo was paralysed for longer than a year between 1993 and 1994 due to a political crisis, with opposition groups demanding change to a democratic political process. Mali experienced a crisis with the rebellion by its Touareg population. In 1991-1992, Benin was just recovering from a serious constitutional crisis and the push for the institution of multiparty democracy. These West African countries have had the added complication of having to finance their participation in Liberia.

Unlike UN peacekeeping where participants are reimbursed for their contribution to operations, ECOWAS did not have the resources to fund peace operations, and the Peace Fund for Liberia which was launched by the UN did not attract adequate contributions to meet the needs of the operation. Given the problems of human and material resources, only Nigeria and Ghana were in a position to provide the necessary resources for the Liberian operation. ECOMOG was more strongly perceived as a Nigerian operation when the overall command of force came under a Nigerian force commander. The concept of operations for the force was largely directed from the Nigerian capital until the Committee of Nine and the Chiefs of Staff of the ECOMOG force contributing states started to meet regularly from 1995. The lessons learned in Liberia suggest that it is at the level of the subregion that assertive peace operations can be more easily initiated and successfully sustained in situations pertaining to the internal security of states. Only states that are directly affected by the impact of a crisis in their neighbourhood would be willing to invest the resources and would exhibit the staying power required for seeing the operation through.

The fundamental issue that underlies the management of conflicts in any region remains the same, whether or not such conflicts are internal or interstate. The management of international security is heavily dependent on the willing and the able. For example, extensive attention is being given to the crisis in the economies of some Asian countries, especially to those in Japan and Russia, because it is believed that crises in these countries would directly affect the interests of the major powers in the international system.

The UN Charter contains a bill of rights aimed at protecting the fundamental rights of the individual. The OAU adopted a set of political principles in 1991, which its member states agreed would serve as the guiding principles for the management of the region and their countries. Members of the OAU are also signatories to international protocols on human rights. The OAU itself has adopted an African principle on human rights.

Early-warning signs are replete with information of economic and political crises in many African countries. Authoritarianism, economic and social collapse, extensive abuse of human rights have all become the way of life in many countries on the continent. There is no discussion of economic and social packages to bale these countries out. Neither are discussions being held to force governments to adhere to fundamental political principles. The OAU is just as guilty as the UN. Very often, early-warning signs are not acted upon because it is difficult to evolve a coalition of the willing and the able.

It has become apparent that the UN can be effectively mobilised to intervene in a crisis when the interest of the major powers, especially the Security Council members, is affected. In the past few years, the Secretaries-General of the UN have lamented their inability to mobilise sufficient international support, even from the Security Council members, for major crises in those regions of the world that are not considered as central to the interest of the major powers.

The move towards regionalism is being encouraged because it is expected that regional organisations would be better able to provide the necessary focus to the security crises in their regions. The OAU and subregional organisations have improved the timing and the extent of their interventions in internal crises. Operating under a rule of confidentiality which denies them the opportunity to gain recognition for what they do, these organisations, just like the UN, depend upon the willingness and ability of regional hegemonies to act. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea were able and willing to commit their national resources to the management of the conflicts in these countries and, as a result, ECOWAS could be effectively engaged. Senegal and Guinea have also deployed their forces to Guinea-Bissau to prevent the crisis in this country from affecting their own security. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a coalition of the willing and able — Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, acting on behalf of SADC — deployed their forces to support the government of Laurent Kabila against an insurgency movement that is supported by external actors. Regional and subregional organisations themselves are dependent upon their ability to mobilise a coalition of the willing and able. What happens when it is impossible to mobilise such coalitions? What happens to the management of such conflicts? What happens to the people?

The UN, the OAU and African governments, since the current Secretary-General of the UN assumed office in 1996, have been engaged in discussions on ways and means through which the two organisations can collaborate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa more effectively. On 25 September 1997, the Security Council convened at the ministerial level to discuss ways through which the world body can improve its co-operation with the OAU in managing conflicts in Africa. The Secretary-General of the UN issued an important report on 13 April 1998 dealing with The causes of conflicts and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. The UN has further established a political liaison office at the OAU to enhance information flow and the co-ordination of the political activities of the two organisations in Africa. As mentioned earlier, special representatives of the Secretary-General in specific conflict situations, operate in close consultation with the OAU. In addition to discussions at the highest political levels, the Secretaries-General of the two organisations have directed that staff of the relevant departments should meet with OAU counterparts to design a working relationship which will enable the UN to support the OAU more directly. In December 1997 and May 1998, the UNDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations convened an African Peacekeeping Training Strategy Session which was attended by 64 delegations, including representatives from 27 African countries.

At the time of writing, the Security Council is scheduled to meet on 24 September to discuss the Secretary-General’s report and to consider the outcome of the deliberations of six Security Council working groups established to negotiate the detailed agreement on what the Security Council will do to solidify co-operation with the OAU and Africa in the management of conflicts on the continent. The objective of this series of meetings and consultations is to develop an institutional relationship through which the UN can provide support to peace and conflict management in Africa. One of the most urgent requirements is its support for the operationalisation of the OAU Mechanism.

The UN enhanced its own peacekeeping capabilities after the Somalia debacle with more extensive arrangements for mission planning, and standby arrangements with countries that would designate their preparedness to participate in UN peacekeeping in advance of a conflict. A situation room is now fully operational, staffed by civilian and military officers and, finally, the UN has a fully developed section for peacekeeping training. The objective is to link the various facilities of the UN to the OAU, and for the UN to assist the OAU to develop similar capacities. It is hoped that closer collaboration between the organisations will enable the UN and African regional and subregional organisations to acquire a better understanding of conflicts, and how they should be prevented and managed. The concept of joint deployment of OAU and UN missions is being actively examined with the objective of ensuring that each organisation is brought in to do what it can do best in a specific situation.

One of the most innovative aspects of the Secretary-General’s report is his emphasis on peacebuilding issues, especially those of economic development as a contribution to conflict prevention and conflict management. The Secretary-General particularly emphasised the need to involve international economic and financial institutions in the management of all aspects of conflicts. He suggests that economic tools should be fully integrated into the mechanisms for conflict management, arguing that, ultimately, the state of health of the economies of countries in the region will have a major impact on the state of security. The OAU was encouraged to implement plans for the establishment of the African Economic Community and to expand the functions of this grouping to include support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The recommendations of the UN Secretary-General are at the cutting edge. The ideal arrangement will be one in which the OAU is fully involved in all aspects of the preparation of African forces for UN operations. The OAU should also be in a position to deploy peace missions to African conflicts, based on a mandate from the Security Council and with active political and financial support from the UN. A great deal of the recommendations and approaches suggested by the UN Secretary-General was already contained in the report and in recommendations made by the second meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the OAU Central Organ. These recommendations form the framework used by the OAU for the operationalisation of its Mechanism.

In the meantime, some of the subregional organisations are also at the cutting edge of conflict management. As mentioned above, SADC and ECOWAS have been able to mobilise quickly and to intervene in situations of conflict, especially when enforcement action was required. ECOWAS adopted a Draft Mechanism for conflict management in July 1998, which the heads of state have considered in October. SADC had already adopted its own Mechanism. Similar subregional mechanisms are required in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in the Great Lakes region and Central Africa, and in North Africa. Again, the report of the second meeting of the OAU Chiefs of Staff provides a clear road map to guide the relations between the OAU, subregional organisations and the UN. It is important for subregional Organisations to be included in current discussions and planning. It is particularly important for them to begin a series of discussions with the OAU similar to the one ongoing between the UN and the OAU. Subregional mechanisms should be closely related to and integrated with the OAU Mechanism.

The implementation of some of these initiatives will revolutionise the way in which conflict is managed in Africa. However, these plans will work only to the extent that the Security Council and the superpowers are willing to provide financial and logistic support to the continent for conflict management. The fact that some of the most important members of the Security Council have not paid their dues to the UN and have refused to operate through the organisation will remain a major handicap. The UN Secretary-General has tried to establish a mechanism through which UN resources can be made available to Africa for conflict management as a matter of routine. It will become important when Africa presents an agenda for the management of conflicts in the region for the UN Security Council to be ready to provide the logistic and other critical technological support.

The OAU and African subregional organisations need to be clearer on the moral and political principles which should inform the relationships between and within states on the continent. These organisations should uphold minimum standards, of which the violation should be penalised equally across the board, and not only when the culprit is a relatively less powerful member of the organisation. It is desirable for the different subregions throughout the continent to develop mechanisms to manage conflict in their regions. The process through which consensus is developed for these mechanisms is important for the resolution of the underlying security crises of each region. Security perceptions and threats of aggression from states that are contiguous are forced into the open in the process of negotiating these mechanisms. If properly handled, this process can lead to greater transparency and confidence. Such a process is urgently required in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, two regions where underlying internal and transregional security threats have resulted in a great deal of intrastate and transborder conflicts and interventions.