Many nascent African undertakings in the realm of peace and security are not expected to contribute significantly in the short term. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) established an informal structure known as the Council for Common Defence in 1990, but this organ has yet to be tested. Several of the initiatives undertaken by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), including the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, are not likely to be very effective. Although the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been active in the Sudanese and Somali conflicts, its role has been confined to mediation. The Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (known by its French acronym, ANAD) has recently begun to investigate the modalities for a subregional peacekeeping force in West Africa, but its efforts may serve to complicate rather than complement other subregional peacekeeping developments. The Commission for East African Co-operation (EAC) is presently considering a draft treaty to establish the East African Community, which provides a possible basis for joint military operations, but any peacekeeping role for the organisation would be a long-term development.1

Even the initiatives of several of the (relatively) better funded and more institutionalised organisations such as the OAU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are deeply flawed. Although these bodies are attempting to strengthen their peacekeeping mechanisms, their recent flurry of diplomatic and military activity is less significant than it might appear. Severe institutional, financial and operational constraints continue to hamper their effectiveness.

Several ad hoc coalitions also demonstrate the present limitations of African peacekeeping and peace enforcement arrangements. The African force dispatched to the Central African Republic in February 1997 required the direct assistance of France to deploy and to remain operational. Similarly, the proposed peacekeeping operation in the Republic of Congo (Congo) in mid-1997, which the Security Council ultimately failed to authorise, could not have deployed without outside assistance. Although an African force did deploy unaided to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in August 1998, the implications of its intervention are troubling.

The much heralded OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution has not made a significant impact since it was created in 1993.2 Its proponents hoped to strengthen the role of the OAU Secretary General and establish a more formal conflict resolution procedure.3 Historically, the OAU Secretary General has refrained from meddling in the internal affairs of OAU member states. As Sam Amoo has observed, when former Secretary General Edem Kodjo showed initiative in mediating the Western Sahara conflict, "he found himself performing a solitary tightrope walk ... [with] no net to break his fall."4 The OAU Secretary General is now in a slightly less precarious position. On paper, the Mechanism does provide the Secretary General with greater flexibility to undertake initiatives relating to internal affairs of OAU member states. In practice, however, the prohibition against intervention in the internal affairs of OAU member states, which is enshrined in the OAU Charter, continues to limit the Mechanism’s utility.

Other OAU initiatives intended to strengthen the organisation’s ability to promote peace and security have yet to prove their effectiveness. Neither the Early Warning System nor the Crisis Management Room — both part of the recently established Conflict Management Centre — is fully operational. The OAU created the Early Warning System to address the organisation’s previous failure to secure reliable and timely information on conflict situations and to respond effectively on the basis of such information. In addition, it constructed the Crisis Management Room — a 24-hour situation room where civilians and military officers will monitor crises in Africa.5 Even if these structures should begin to function smoothly, however, they are not likely to improve the OAU’s operational performance. Early decision-making is a much more pressing problem for the organisation to overcome than early warning.

A tenuous financial base hampers the OAU’s ability to make progress in promoting peace and security. Only five per cent of the organisation’s annual budget is allocated to peace initiatives.6 The failure of the majority of OAU member states to pay their dues on time and in full exacerbates the problem. The OAU Peace Fund, established to supplement the meagre level of assessed contributions allocated to the Mechanism, has proven largely illusory. The contributions of OAU member states have been "rather modest."7 Although the UN and a number of Western states have made significant donations to the OAU’s conflict management machinery, these contributions have not always prompted meaningful results. Organisational and personnel problems have prevented the OAU from making full use of available funds.8 A UN official familiar with the issue opined that the OAU’s Conflict Management Division needed personnel willing to "roll up their sleeves and work" rather than more money.9

The OAU’s capacity to undertake credible and effective peacekeeping missions remains limited to a few small observer missions. Other than its short-lived and overly ambitious operation in Chad in 1981, the OAU has only dispatched military observers in three conflicts — all in the past six years. The first, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda, was authorised in July 1992, prior to the Mechanism’s creation. In August 1993, the Mechanism approved NMOG II. The Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) was established in April 1994. In December 1997, the OAU dispatched an observer group to the Comoros. Although such missions have played important symbolic roles and have provided useful confidence-building measures, they cannot be expected to assume multifaceted peacekeeping operations.

The Organisation’s current plan to establish a stand-by African peacekeeping force is unrealistic. In October 1997, the OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff recommended that the OAU could earmark a brigade-sized contribution to stand-by arrangements from each of the five African subregions. They also suggested that the OAU should identify 100 military and civilian observers from each of the subregions as a starting point.10 In March 1998, the OAU Council of Ministers agreed that an eventual African peacekeeping force should consist of subregional brigades under the OAU’s command and control, within the framework of the OAU Central Organ.11 Given that the OAU has had to go hat in hand to donors for items such as boots, socks and flashlights for its mission participants, it is difficult to see how it plans to field OAU missions comprising subregional brigades. Moreover, in the light of African countries’ lukewarm commitment to the existing UN Stand-by Arrangements System,12 the idea appears overly ambitious. Even the OAU’s request to have its members identify a stand-by pool of 500 military and civilian observers as a short-term measure is far-fetched.

Reflecting subregional consensus on the need for stronger security co-ordination, SADC established the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in June 1996, but the body is not yet operational.13 The controversy centres around whether the Organ is to be treated as a SADC sector under the umbrella of the SADC Chairperson or as an essentially autonomous structure. At an extraordinary SADC Summit in March 1998, the matter was referred for resolution to the presidents of Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia. The presidential commission completed its preliminary draft proposals in August 1998 and is preparing a report for the other SADC heads of state.14 Nevertheless, the issue will likely remain a source of tension for some time.

Even if the Organ should become operational, it is doubtful whether it will make a difference as far as regional peace and security are concerned. Economic concerns have always been the organisation’s chief focus. Other than the shared goal of liberating neighbouring countries from white rule, political and security issues have been particularly contentious. Recent events surrounding the rebellion in the DRC have shown that SADC members are deeply divided in terms of their willingness to intervene militarily in regional conflicts — organ or no organ.

Indeed, the present divisions among SADC member states threaten to undo the progress that SADC and its member states have made, both in developing a stand-by peacekeeping capacity and in conducting subregional training exercises. Despite the non-functioning of the Organ, a stand-by brigade is being put together for the subregion under the supervision of SADC’s informal security secretariat, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). Each SADC member state is to earmark contingents as well as headquarters staff.15 Even if a stand-by brigade is established, SADC members will be hard-pressed to agree on its deployment. Also, South Africa had planned to host a subregional training exercise, Blue Crane, in November 1998. The exercise was postponed, however, due to tensions and instability in the subregion.16

Yet, the significant military potential of SADC members and the political standing of South Africa on the continent make SADC potentially very significant in the domain of peace and security. South Africa and Angola, in particular, possess considerable force-projection assets that they could bring to the fore.17 Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe have performed ably in UN peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, several Western states have initiated programmes to develop and promote Southern African peacekeeping structures at both the national and regional levels.

Importantly, SADC’s peacekeeping capabilities have yet to be tested. Although the united diplomatic and military response of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe to the Lesotho crisis in August and September 1994 is often cited as an important example, its significance is actually quite limited. No peacekeeping mission was deployed, as a show of force by the South African military along the Lesotho border proved sufficient.18 Moreover, the undertaking was ad hoc and was not organised under SADC auspices.19 The August 1998 military intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the DRC did receive retroactive endorsement from SADC, but the approval is best understood as a face-saving measure for presidents Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela. South Africa’s September 1998 military intervention in Lesotho, in which Botswana also participated, is a ‘SADC force’ in name only. It received such a designation after a series of frantic phone calls between heads of state. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was never activated.

Although ECOWAS has fielded peacekeeping forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone and is contemplating intervening in Guinea Bissau, the organisation lacks an institutionalised crisis prevention and management mechanism. As a result, its military involvement has been ad hoc and not in accordance with a specific operating procedure. In the Liberian conflict, for example, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government established a Community Standing Mediation Committee, which in turn created the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) at its inaugural session. In Sierra Leone, in contrast, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government did not formally approve of the ECOMOG force until some three months after its intervention. In Guinea Bissau, the ministerial-level ECOWAS Defence Council voted to extend ECOMOG’s mandate to Guinea Bissau,20 but the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government have not yet addressed the issue.

This lack of a formal decision-making mechanism and the apparent willingness of ECOWAS to retroactively ‘authorise’ the use of force have raised questions about who controls ECOMOG. ECOMOG is only nominally accountable to ECOWAS, which exercises little oversight and provides minimal political and administrative guidance. The fear among ECOWAS member states that Nigeria has appropriated ECOMOG to further its own foreign policy agenda is widespread and justified. However, the fact that ECOWAS ministers designated the recent Senegalese-led military operation in Guinea Bissau as an ECOMOG force suggests that any country willing and able — not only Nigeria — can manipulate ECOMOG.

The stated intention of ECOWAS to establish a permanent peacekeeping force does not address these concerns. In December 1997, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government agreed in principle to set up a formal mechanism to prevent conflict and supervise peacekeeping in the subregion.21 In March 1998, a ministerial-level meeting was convened to decide upon the structure of this mechanism. Debate centred around whether ECOMOG should be transformed into a permanent force or whether another peace force should be constituted.22 The ministers ultimately decided that ECOMOG would serve as the basis for the future peacekeeping body.23 Whether the force is called ECOMOG or by some other name, the critical issue is who will determine when and how it will be deployed.

The current manner in which ECOMOG is funded does little to discourage interested parties from abusing their power. None of the organisation’s annual budget is earmarked for peace operations. ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone have been funded entirely through voluntary contributions. This lack of a sound and broader financial base limits ECOMOG’s effectiveness and encourages any country willing to cover the costs to act with near impunity. Western countries provided considerable financial assistance to ECOMOG in Liberia, but Nigeria bore the greatest financial burden, as it has in Sierra Leone. (Although Nigeria complains bitterly about the costs it has incurred to undertake ECOMOG missions, it will likely remain in its interests to do so. In Sierra Leone, for example, referring to the force as the ‘Nigerian-led ECOMOG’ was invaluable to a country in need of some positive public relations.)

Moreover, ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia was plagued by numerous operational difficulties and actually prolonged the conflict. Financial constraints prevented the ECOWAS Secretariat from providing logistical support to ECOMOG troops. ECOWAS initially had agreed that each troop-contributing state would provide logistical support for its own contingent for the first thirty days of the operation, after which the ECOWAS Secretariat would take over. ECOWAS was unable to fulfil its commitment, however, and troop-contributing states had to continue to resupply their own troops.24 The force also lacked an effective and unified command during its first several years. Indeed, ECOWAS member states not only supported, but also created different factions in the civil war. Initial Western support was halting, and proposed ‘solutions’, such as the introduction of East African peacekeepers into the force, led to new problems. A new force commander, an influx of Western military assistance25 and a growing war-weariness later all combined to enhance ECOMOG’s effectiveness. The force did ultimately oversee the July 1997 presidential elections, but this achievement does not counterbalance ECOMOG’s previous track record.

The 800-strong African multinational force deployed in the CAR highlights several of the shortcomings of recent African responses. The Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (known by its French acronym, MISAB)26 required the direct assistance of France to deploy and become operational. The force also required French logistical and tactical support on the ground.27 Although each participating state provided its troops with their regular pay and supplied them with weapons, France paid their total food and daily subsistence allowances at rates then applicable to Central African military personnel. France also supplied, maintained and provided fuel for tactical and support vehicles, paid rents for buildings used by MISAB command and military personnel and donated office equipment.28 In April 1998, in view of France’s impending withdrawal from the country, the Security Council established the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)29 to replace the French-supported force.

Transforming the mission into a UN peacekeeping operation has not remedied these shortcomings; in fact, it has created new ones. The Security Council’s decision to place the operation on a shoe-string budget contributed to numerous and largely preventable delays. The lack of adequate air support and logistics personnel has severely restricted the UN force’s ability to provide necessary security and support.30 Due in part to the insufficient number of troops, the elections that are to bring the peacekeeping operation to a close have been postponed until November 1998.

The contemplated peacekeeping operation in Congo similarly illustrates the limitations of African actors. Although the Security Council ultimately decided not to authorise the mission, the proposed Senegalese-led force would not have been able to deploy without outside assistance. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed: "No country emerged that was able and willing to assure the command, control and communications capacity, the rapid deployment capability or the ability to generate the necessary financing that would be required to assume the leadership of a multinational force."31

The financial impediments to the constitution of the proposed force are also telling. According to the Secretary-General, "[m]ost potential troop contributors specified that the force should be a United Nations peacekeeping operation rather than a multinational force."32 This is instructive because it highlights a reality that is often unstated: financial — not political — concerns are often paramount when African countries speak of seeking UN authorisation. UN peacekeeping operations are supported through non-negotiable assessments33 and are pegged at a rate that covers most African countries’ expenses.34 UN multinational forces, however, are financed through voluntary contributions, with participants expected to cover their own costs.

Although Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe proved willing and able to deploy a military force to the DRC in support of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the long-term significance of their intervention is likely to be more worrisome than encouraging.35 Rather than safeguarding the territorial integrity of the DRC, it may actually help to dissolve the country. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the intervening countries are primarily motivated by parochial and business interests. From a military perspective, the troops constitute an effective force which thwarted the initial rebel advance on Kinshasa. Yet, it should be underscored that their gains have thus far been limited to the western DRC. Moreover, logistical as well as command and control capacities have been found wanting.36 One ‘achievement’ that is not in doubt, however, is the harm that the intervention has caused to SADC as a potential instrument for promoting regional peace and security.