In response to recent humanitarian tragedies in Africa, countries such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States have started to offer peacekeeping-related training, instruction and equipment to African states. In May 1997, they announced the ‘P-3 Initiative’, a common capacity-building programme designed to strengthen and co-ordinate their respective policies and provide a forum for other interested countries to participate. Despite the apparently non-controversial nature of these undertakings, the three countries have nevertheless felt compelled to defend their actions.

In an effort to portray the P-3 Initiative in a favourable light, Western officials have endeavoured to display a unified front and downplay African scepticism. When Nigeria’s Foreign Minister denounced Western capacity-building initiatives at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers meeting in March 1998, Western countries quickly discounted his criticism as sour grapes. US law precludes Nigeria from receiving American assistance, and France and the UK have also withheld support. Libyan and Sudanese support for Nigeria’s stand has been interpreted as proof of Nigeria’s isolation. The US, in particular, dismissed reports that Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe had also joined Nigeria in voicing their disquiet.

Nevertheless, African fears of further marginalisation and Western disengagement are widely held. While a number of African countries have participated in Western-sponsored bilateral and subregional training programmes, no African regional or subregional organisation has formally approved of Western capacity-building initiatives. In light of this undercurrent of wariness and hostility, United Nations officials hosting the 5 December 1997 Meeting on Enhancing African Capacity for Peacekeeping feared that the conference would be a diplomatic fiasco and were greatly relieved that it even took place.

African countries view these initiatives as a manifestation of the West’s desire to avoid being drawn directly into conflicts, either financially or militarily. The Security Council’s growing reluctance to commit UN Blue Helmets — in sizeable numbers if at all — has altered the international peace and security landscape substantially. This trend has affected Africa more severely than other regions because of the huge demand for peacekeeping on the continent and the difficulty African actors have in responding effectively on their own. While the mere interposition of peacekeepers (be they UN or others) is not necessarily beneficial, the failure to deploy can also have grave consequences.

At the same time, African states are aware of their own limitations. As a general rule, individual African countries possess inadequate military infrastructures to mount sustained operations beyond their borders. Scant economic resources also restrict their abilities. While a number of African states have considerable UN peacekeeping experience, they have benefited from Western and UN largesse in carrying out their responsibilities. In fact, logistical and financial constraints often preclude African states from participating in peace operations that receive Security Council authorisation as multinational forces, but do not receive UN equipment or financing.

African states are thus attempting to become more self-sufficient in responding militarily to various crises by developing collective responses. To this end, a number of political and economic alliances on the African continent have been expanded to include military dimensions. The OAU and various African subregional organisations are attempting to create new mechanisms and develop new capabilities. African states are also increasingly willing to form ad hoc coalitions to respond to conflicts.

While it is important that African actors have recognised the need to take primary responsibility for responding to crises, even their collective abilities to undertake credible and effective peacekeeping operations remain limited. Their political will far surpasses their peacekeeping capabilities. For the recently established UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR), for example, France transported all of the African contingents to the mission area.

This monograph assesses current efforts to develop African peacekeeping and peace enforcement capabilities. As a starting point, it identifies the shortcomings of African regional, subregional and ad hoc attempts to manage and resolve conflicts on their continent. It then describes various Western capacity-building initiatives, highlighting larger individual programmes such as those of Denmark, France, the UK and the US. In order to chart an appropriate future course, the monograph examines the true motives underlying Western initiatives, identifies the positive aspects of these programmes and suggests how they can be made more effective.