Endnotes

Published in Monograph No 33: Constructive Disengagement, December 1998

This article is part of an ongoing research and writing project on African peacekeeping, which will culminate in a book published jointly by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Institute for Security Studies. It is current as of 15 October 1998. The authors would like to thank the Institute for Security Studies for its financial assistance, which facilitated their research. They would also like to thank the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Geneva Foundation to Protect Health in War for their continuing financial support.

  1. In June 1998, the three EAC member states – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – together with the US undertook their first joint peacekeeping exercise, Natural Fire, in Kenya.

  2. The Mechanism was established in part to allay fears of Africa’s marginalisation in the post-Cold War era. See M Mwagiru, The Organisation of African Unity and the Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa, International Studies, 3(1), January - March 1996, p. 7.

  3. Although the OAU Charter provides for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the Commission was never activated.

  4. S Amoo, Role of the OAU: Past, Present and Future, in D Smock (ed.), Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 248.

  5. W Nhara, Telephone interview, Co-ordinator for Conflict Prevention and Research, OAU Conflict Management Division, 20 August 1998. See also W Nhara, The OAU and the Potential Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations, in J Cilliers & G Mills (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa, Vol. 2, Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, 1996, pp. 105-07.

  6. In contrast, roughly eight per cent of the OAU’s budget is spent on translation and interpretation services. F Soudan, La face cachée de l’OUA, Jeune Afrique, 1851, 26 June - 2 July 1996, p. 92.

  7. Statement of Salim Ahmed Salim, 68th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, June 1998, <www.oau.oua.org/oau_info/burkdoc/council_of_ ministers.htm>

  8. H Cohen, African Capabilities for Conflict Management: The Role of the United States, in D Smock & C Crocker (eds.), African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1995, p. 84.

  9. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations official, Interview, New York, 16 March 1998.

  10. See Draft Report of the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the Central Organ of the OAU, 24-25 October 1997, OAU/CHST/Co/Draft/Rpt (II).

  11. See OAU Wants Sub-regional Brigades for African Force, Panafrican News Agency, 9 March 1998, <www.africanews.org/pana/search.html>

  12. As of 1 October 1998, twenty African countries had officially expressed their willingness to participate in the Stand-by Arrangements System. Of those, only Ghana and Nigeria have actually signed memoranda of understanding with the UN. See Monthly Status Report, UN Standby Arrangements, 2 October 1998, <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/str.htm>

  13. As Mark Malan has written, “the Organ has the potential to become a source of conflict rather than an instrument for its prevention, management and resolution.” M Malan, SADC and Subregional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?, ISS Monograph Series, 19, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, February 1998, p. 16.

  14. See Team Chosen to Draft SADC Reorganisation Plan, Panafrican News Agency, 10 August 1998, <www.africanews.org/pana/search.html>

  15. Maj-Gen D S Hamman, Interview, Secretary, Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, Halfway House, 21 January 1998.

  16. As of 15 October 1998, efforts to salvage the civilian police component of the exercise were continuing.

  17. South Africa, however, is likely to remain preoccupied with reorganising and downsizing its military and will not be eager to make external commitments. R M Williams & N Sendall, Interview, Defence Policy Department, South African Department of Defence, Halfway House, 23 January 1998. Its September 1998 military intervention in Lesotho was intended to be limited to a show of force.

  18. For an account of this incident, see B Seery, Africa’s Reluctant New Policeman Twirls His Truncheon, in M Shaw & J Cilliers (eds.), South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Vol. 1, Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, 1995, pp. 87-97.

  19. See L H Evans, Preventive Diplomacy in Lesotho and Mozambique, in Cilliers & Mills, op. cit., p. 188.

  20. See ECOWAS Puts Out Plan to End Bissau Mutiny, Panafrican News Agency, 5 July 1998, <www.africanews.org/pana/search.html>

  21. A Kuma, ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit Ends in Lomé, Panafrican News Agency, 18 December 1997, <www.africanews.org/pana/search.html>
  22. News in Brief — Thursday, 12 March 1998, Panafrican News Agency, 12 March 1998, <www. africanews.org/pana/search.html>23 West African ministers agree on peacekeeping force, BBC News, 13 March 1998, <news.bbc.co.uk>
  23. F Olonisakin, African ‘Home-made’ Peacekeeping Initiatives, Armed Forces & Society, 23(3), Spring 1997, pp. 363-64.
  24. In February 1997, for example, the US transported 1 200 ECOMOG troops and their equipment to Liberia. M J Ogou, US Military to Transport African Peacekeepers, United States Information Agency, 14 February 1997, <www.usia.gov/products/pdq/wfarchive.htm>
  25. MISAB comprised troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, and later, Senegal and Togo.
  26. France estimated the cost of its support at US $2 million per month. Col B Dary, Interview, Director, Operational Centre, Africa Division, État Major des Armées, Paris, 29 May 1998.
  27. See Letter Dated 20 August 1997 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Enclosure), S/1997/652, 21 August 1997, containing the International Monitoring Committee’s First Report to the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1125 (1997).
  28. See S/RES/1159 (1998), 27 March 1998. The authorised strength of MINURCA is 1 350.
  29. See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, S/1998/540, 19 June 1998, and Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, S/1998/783, 21 August 1998.
  30. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Republic of Congo, S/1997/814, 21 October 1997, para. 27.
  31. Ibid.
  32. The rates are based largely on contributions to the UN’s regular budget, with the permanent members of the Security Council paying a premium.
  33. Governments that provide formed military units to UN peacekeeping operations receive approximately US $1 000 per month per person, regardless of their actual outlays.
  34. Subsequently, Chad sent troops. Sudan is widely reported to have sent a contingent as well, but officially denies having done so.
  35. Attacks on Kisangani and cities in the eastern DRC have been limited to aerial bombardments. Kabila’s willingness to discuss a cease-fire was due in part to the alliance’s inability to support a military campaign to retake the East.
  36. M Duval, Letter, Permanent Representative, Canadian Mission to the UN in New York, to B Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, 2 March 1998, courtesy of the Canadian Mission to the UN in New York.

  37. See H Hernes, Nordic Perspectives on African Capacity-Building, in M Malan (ed.), Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa, ISS Monograph Series, 21, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, February 1998, p. 64.
  38. All four Nordic countries, as well as Botswana and Zambia, will provide instructors, and the Institute for Security Studies will co-ordinate the programme. Significantly, this is the first Western initiative to focus on civilian police rather than on the military.
  39. ACRI training borrows from US, UK, Nordic, UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) peacekeeping doctrines.
  40. M McCallie, Interview, ACRI Special Co-ordinator, Washington, DC, 11 March 1998.
  41. P Egger, Telephone interview, Political Officer, Office of the ACRI Special Co-ordinator, 25 August 1998.
  42. P Egger, Written correspondence, Political Officer, Office of the ACRI Special Co-ordinator, 27 August 1998.
  43. Maj R Naughton, Interview, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy, the Pentagon, 11 March 1998.
  44. S Fisher, Statement, Political-Military Advisor, ACRI Interagency Working Group, SADC Peacekeeping Training Seminar, Harare, 29 July 1998.
  45. For example, Tunisia had held out for armoured vehicles to be included in the training package, which was not in the offing. C Ikins, Interview, Management Consultant, Cohen and Woods International, Arlington, Virginia, 11 March 1998.
  46. Lt Col M Bailey, Telephone interview, Chief Operating Officer, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy, 20 August 1998.
  47. JCET also allows the US to provide training to countries that otherwise would not receive Congressional approval, provided the purpose of the exercise is primarily to train US troops. See L Duke, Africans Use Training in Unexpected Ways, The Washington Post, 14 July 1998, p. A1.
  48. See HQ USEUCOM MEDFLAG Exercises in Africa, unclassified document, 27 August 1996, courtesy of the US Department of Defence.
  49. See DoD Deploys Forces to Guinea for Medical Training and Civic Assistance Exercise, News Release (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence), 13 March 1998, <www.defenselink. mil/news/Mar1998/b03161998_bt109-98.html>
  50. See FLINTLOCK Background Paper in Support of DCINC Africa Visit, unclassified document, 12 March 1998, courtesy of the US Department of Defence.
  51. See Statement of France, Meeting on Enhancing African Capacity for Peacekeeping, New York, 5 December 1997.
  52. Some 4 000 troops from Benin, Burkina Faso, France and Togo participated in the week-long Nangbeto exercise.
  53. Belgium provided a C-130 aircraft but no troops and is not included in this number.
  54. Guidimakha 98, EMA-EMIA, Sirpa/Bureau édition, Paris, May 1998, courtesy of French Ministry of Defence.
  55. French military and diplomatic officials, Interviews, Paris, 28-29 May 1998.
  56. There is another BMATT in Pretoria, which provides advice solely to South Africa on restructuring its armed forces and does not provide peacekeeping training. G Coglin, Written correspondence, Acting Head, Peacekeeping Section, United Nations Department of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 21 October 1998.
  57. G Coglin, Telephone interview, Acting Head, Peacekeeping Section, United Nations Department of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 July 1998.
  58. Coglin, Written correspondence, op. cit.
  59. The officer is currently examining staffing at the OAU Conflict Management Division and planning a command post exercise (as a follow-up to the US-run exercise of April 1998) for the Conflict Management Centre, scheduled for March 1999. Ibid.
  60. An April 1997 exercise, for example, was attended by diplomats and military officers from seventeen African countries.
  61. SADC members Mauritius and Zambia did not participate. Slightly more than half of the 1 584 troops were from Zimbabwe. Angola sent only two civilian police, and Botswana sent only two civilian police and two observers. Brig A Naughten, Interview, Commander of BMATT Southern Africa, Harare, 26 January 1998, and Written correspondence, 9 February 1998. The DRC and Seychelles, SADC’s most recent members, did not join the subregional organisation until after Blue Hungwe.
  62. Transcript of Remarks by President Clinton to Senegalese Troops in ACRI Training, Thiès, Senegal, 1 April 1998, <www.usia.gov/products/pdq/wfarchive.html> The centre will be modelled after the George C Marshall Centre in Germany.
  63. Transcript of Remarks by Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, City Club of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, 17 April 1998, <www.usia.gov/products/pdq/wfarchive.html>
  64. Fact Sheet on African Centre for Security Studies, White House Press Office Release in Dakar, 1 April 1998, <www.usia.gov/products/pdq/wfarchive.html>
  65. US Department of Defence official, Telephone interview, 27 August 1998.
  66. Ibid.
  67. US Department of Defence official, Interview, the Pentagon, 9 March 1998.
  68. See US Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Defence Issues, 10(78), August 1995, <www. defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/di1078.html>
  69. Col J Digonnet, Interview, Deputy Chief, Military Co-operation Mission, French Ministry of Co-operation, Paris, 29 May 1998.
  70. E Lenain, Interview, UN and International Organisations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 28 May 1998. In addition to financing the construction of the centre, France will provide a monthly allowance to trainees.
  71. Col P Sartre, Interview, Strategic Affairs Division, État Major des Armées, Paris, 28 May 1998.
  72. These schools are located in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Togo.
  73. Information taken from briefing given by the École d’État Major Ouest-Africaine de Koulikoro during Guidimakha, Bakel, Senegal, 28 February 1998.
  74. Digonnet, op. cit.
  75. Sir J Weston, Letter, Permanent Representative, British Mission to the UN in New York, to B Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, 20 February 1998, courtesy of the United Nations Department of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The UK has also funded the construction of additional classrooms and dining facilities and has provided computers. It is now funding the construction of new accommodations that will house 28 students.

  76. Ibid.

  77. Coglin, Written correspondence, op. cit.
  78. Weston, op. cit.

  79. Coglin, Written correspondence, op. cit.
  80. Ibid.
  81. Memorandum of Understanding between Denmark and Zimbabwe, 31 January 1997, courtesy of the Royal Danish Embassy, Harare.
  82. The three Baltic countries — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — have agreed to contribute troops for a joint battalion earmarked for international peacekeeping duties. Denmark, together with Norway and Sweden, has taken the lead in providing peacekeeping training to these countries.
  83. SHIRBRIG is designed to provide the United Nations with a capability to respond quickly and effectively to international crises. In December 1996, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden pledged to co-operate in establishing and maintaining this high readiness brigade, but the arrangement is not yet operational.
  84. Eleven of fourteen SADC members sent representatives, although not all at the ministerial level. P L Hansen, Interview, Head of Department for Southern Africa, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 17 February 1998.
  85. Ibid.
  86. K Mosgaard, Training Co-ordination: The NACC Clearing House Concept, in Malan, op. cit., February 1998, p. 88. The programme is modelled after the successful handbook and database compiled by the North Atlantic Co-ordination Council (NACC).
  87. J Cilliers, The United States, Southern Africa, the ACRI and the ACSS, background paper prepared for a meeting with Amb M McCallie, April 1998, courtesy of author. Although these initiatives are somewhat tangential to peacekeeping, they provide the basis for important confidence-building measures that contribute to peacekeeping.
  88. Col D McCracken, On the Record Briefing, Amb M McCallie and Col D McCracken, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 29 July 1997, <www.usia.gov/products/pdq/wfarchive. html>
  89. See Capt M Doubleday, Department of Defence News Briefing, 9 May 1996, <www.defenselink. mil/news/May1996/t050996_tbrfg050.html>
  90. French military officials, Interviews, Dakar and Bakel, Senegal, 23-28 February 1998.
  91. French military and diplomatic officials, Interviews, Paris, 28-29 May 1998.
  92. Digonnet, op. cit.
  93. Coglin, Written correspondence, op. cit.
  94. Amb G Moose, Interview, Permanent Representative of the United States, US Mission to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 4 March 1998.
  95. US Department of Defence official, Interview, the Pentagon, 9 March 1998.
  96. Moose, op. cit.
  97. US government officials, Interviews, Geneva, Pretoria and Washington, DC, Winter and Spring 1998.
  98. ACRI received US $15 million its first year and US $20 million its second year. As one government official observed, "this is supposed to be a major African policy initiative, but it’s living from hand to mouth." See J Rupert, US Troops Teach Peacekeeping to Africans; Despite Little Funding, Program to Form Continental Force Draws Interest Abroad, The Washington Post, 26 September 1997, p. A16.
  99. President Clinton was all too willing to let others ridicule former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in an effort to prevent the Republicans from making the UN an election issue. Clinton first chose to demonise the UN after the ill-fated attempt to capture Somali warlord Gen Mohamed Farah Aideed, which had been an American-initiated policy in the first place.
  100. The French Minister of Defence, Alain Richard, confirmed that France would reduce its forces from 8 100 to fewer than 6 000, and would close its bases in the CAR. See H Sada, L’allègement du dispositif français en Afrique, Défense nationale, December 1997, p. 189. See also, for example, France: A New Foreign Policy, The Economist, 6 September 1997, p. 32.
  101. While France was expressing its tentative support before the Security Council for a UN authorised intervention, President Jacques Chirac allegedly cut a deal with the opposition on behalf of French business interests. See B Ankomah, ‘Chuck your bloody constitution in the dustbin’, New African, May 1998, pp. 12-13.
  102. According to the US, the UN Military Advisor advocates that Western capacity-building initiatives follow a ‘crawl, walk, run’ format. (McCallie, op. cit.) While this explanation for the US focus is convenient (as it takes the ‘blame’ for the provision of such low-level training away from Congress and the Clinton Administration), it is not entirely convincing.
  103. As Richard Cornwell warns, however, this ostensible co-operation has potentially negative repercussions for Africa. He postulates that Africa may be increasingly marginalised as a result of diminished competition between not only the US and the Soviet Union, but also among the US, the UK and France. R Cornwell, Interview, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 23 January 1998.
  104. Indeed, the dispute centred around territory in the very area where the exercise was held.
  105. Weston, op. cit. Officers from five ACRI-trained countries — Ghana, Senegal, Malawi, Mali and Uganda — took part.

  106. Ten Belgian officers took part in Phase 1 training in Ghana.
  107. In the end, however, France did provide assets that greatly facilitated the transition from MISAB to MINURCA.

  108. Guidimakha resembled a military exercise more than a peacekeeping training exercise.

  109. The nine were Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Mali was subsequently added as a tenth country in deference to French sensitivities. US Department of Defence official, Interview, the Pentagon, 9 March 1998.
  110. As President Mandela explained to reporters just before his meeting with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "Africa would like to feel that they are handling things themselves ... not acting in response to suggestions that come from outside the continent." See H French, Africa Hears Indifference in a US Offer to Help, The Washington Post, 20 October 1996, p. D4.