Conclusion

Despite the protestations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, their programmes to develop African peacekeeping capabilities are indeed motivated by a recognition that African security is not a priority concern and a desire to avoid direct involvement in African conflicts. Western programmes are simply not the ‘engagement’ policies that their architects would have the world believe. Moreover, the Western-driven Security Council will continue to disengage from Africa, notwithstanding its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.

Because Western capacity-building initiatives respond primarily to domestic political concerns, their emphasis is misplaced. Although many African countries already possess substantial peacekeeping experience and have performed ably, Western programmes focus on providing training and instruction. The provision of peacekeeping equipment, which would seem a more appropriate response, is the least developed element of Western initiatives. African needs have taken a backseat to those of the donors.

Justifiably, African countries are developing regional responses to better prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, but these efforts have achieved only limited success due to numerous financial, operational and institutional constraints. The structures that the OAU has created are not working as intended. For the foreseeable future, the OAU can only be expected to field small military observer missions. The recent military interventions of SADC member states in the DRC and Lesotho have reinforced both the existing weaknesses and the potential strengths of that organisation. Its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security has proven a source of conflict rather than a tool for resolving or managing it. ECOWAS has made the most progress in fielding an effective force, but ECOMOG’s track record is spotty and there is a legitimate concern about who controls it, if anyone.

Recent ad hoc initiatives further underscore African limitations in undertaking peacekeeping operations. Without the support of France, the African peacekeeping force in the CAR could not have deployed or remained operational. For the proposed African-led UN operation in Congo, no state willing to participate in the force was capable of leading it. There were also important unanswered questions about the mission’s financing. While an African force did manage to deploy in the DRC, its range of operations has been severely limited. Moreover, the potential implications of the intervention are worrisome — both in terms of the future of the DRC and regional stability.

Because African states are often not in a position to respond effectively without outside assistance, Western efforts must not be casually dismissed. While Western motives may be morally distasteful and politically short-sighted, their determination not to become directly engaged in African conflicts is likely to persist. African states would therefore do better to try and improve what is being offered.

The fact that Western policies signify a disengagement of sorts and are first and foremost a response to domestic concerns does not make them inherently flawed. Indeed, current capacity-building initiatives have many positive aspects. Moreover, much can and should be done to make them more effective. It is important that Africans and the West work together to improve the services and equipment being provided. Current Western capacity-building programmes provide the basis for such co-operation.