The harsh reality underlying these multifaceted initiatives is that Western countries, by and large, are unwilling to become directly involved in African conflicts. By providing African countries with peacekeeping-related training, instruction and equipment, Western states hope to obviate their need to intervene militarily in Africa. In order to truly make Africans more self-sufficient (and thus to enable the West to disengage with a clearer conscience), the provision of peacekeeping-related equipment is crucial, yet this is the least developed element of Western initiatives. Supplying the type and amount of military equipment that might enable African peacekeepers to respond effectively to crises on their continent is neither financially nor politically feasible; providing low-level peacekeeping training and instruction is. Western initiatives respond principally to domestic political concerns — not African limitations.

Yet, the implications and origins of Western policies should not detract from their merits. Indeed, current programmes have many positive aspects. On some level, Western countries have displayed a renewed (if revised) interest in African peacekeeping, and the resources they are channelling into Africa are significant. The various initiatives also impart valuable practical and theoretical skills to participants. Moreover, Western countries have proven willing to alter their programmes in response to perceived shortcomings and criticisms. Importantly, Western and African states have begun to co-operate between and among themselves on peace and security issues.

Room for improvement exists, however, and there is much that Western and African countries can do — both unilaterally and collectively — to build upon this co-operation. Western states must minimise competition among themselves if they want to give substance to their claims of collaboration. There are still too many examples of words and deeds diverging. Western countries should also continue to revise certain aspects of their respective programmes. The most influential and powerful African countries, for their part, must not continue to ‘hold out’ for something more from the West. Working with donor countries to devise sensible programmes would be a better use of their time. The OAU and subregional organisations merit Western political and financial support in spite of their limitations, as they provide potentially important political legitimacy as well as checks and balances.

Above all, ACRI is a response to perceived American needs. It reflects the desire of the US not to be drawn into armed conflicts and humanitarian tragedies in Africa. Indeed, the impetus behind the programme was to devise a quick-fix response in mid-1996 to the anticipated bloodbath in Burundi and to avoid having to commit American troops. The sense of urgency can be seen from the spate of visits by senior US officials to Burundi. US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Special Assistant to the President Susan Rice and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose all travelled to Bujumbura95 to gauge the situation and appeal for cooler heads to prevail. The haste with which the initial proposal for an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) was formulated is further evidence. ACRF sought to create a standing African peacekeeping force. As one Department of Defence official familiar with the proposal stated emphatically, ACRF was "total bullshit, and we [policymakers] knew it from Day 1." The official cautioned, however, that it is important to bear in mind the tremendous pressure the Administration put on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "come up with something."96 Congress’s decision to appropriate US $20 million to support preventive action in Burundi is perhaps the clearest indication of the fear in Washington of a possible Rwanda-type genocide in Burundi97 to which the US might be compelled to send American troops.

Many US government officials readily concede that ACRI is flawed but stress that it represents the best policy option that can realistically be expected to garner Congressional support.98 Isolationist and anti-UN sentiment in Congress does represent a very real constraint. Funding is granted on a yearly basis after much wrangling, and at a very modest level.99 By repeatedly making the UN a scapegoat,100 the Administration has poisoned public opinion and thereby emboldened Congress.

RECAMP, like ACRI, is first and foremost a response to domestic interests and limitations. Throughout most of the 1990s, France muddled through crises on the African continent, often pursuing seemingly inconsistent foreign policy objectives. Because of the questionable allegiances it forged, the French government suffered a series of humiliations and its traditional, pro-active Africa policy came under increasing criticism. France propped up a number of dictatorial or undemocratic African regimes to keep the pro-French élite in power. The French public began to question France’s financial commitment in Africa and policy-makers became increasingly preoccupied with NATO enlargement and European integration. This series of developments led France to re-evaluate and reformulate its Africa policy.

RECAMP is billed as a strengthened commitment to African peacekeeping, but it can best be understood as a cost-cutting measure intended to reduce France’s traditional exposure and expenses on the continent. At the instigation of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, France is scaling down its military presence substantially throughout Africa.101 Although the government is re-channelling some thirty per cent of its military spending destined for Africa into peacekeeping-related activities, the overall aid figure in real terms is significantly reduced. The integration of the Co-operation Ministry into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is further indication that Africa’s privileged status in the formulation of French foreign policy is waning. As France’s schizophrenic support for the proposed Senegalese-led operation in Congo102 and its eagerness to extract itself from MISAB in the CAR both attest, its commitment to strengthen peacekeeping on the continent is dubious.

Although the smaller British and Danish programmes are not such blatant examples of self-interested politics, domestic considerations also motivate and constrain them. Financial limitations have as much to do with the British emphasis on ‘training the trainer’ as coherent policy does. The desire of Denmark’s Minister for Defence to carve out a high-profile role for himself helps to explain the surprisingly large scope of the Danish programme. More broadly, Denmark was eager to differentiate itself from its Nordic partners and has taken obvious pride in being mentioned along with the P-3.

The fact that domestic interests motivate Western capacity-building programmes does not automatically negate their value. As a result of ACRI, for example, the issue of African peace and security is higher on the US agenda than it otherwise would be. Also, France’s decision to pre-position equipment and dispense with it for actual peacekeeping operations has proven beneficial. More generally, Western initiatives provide tangible benefits, including training and confidence-building.

The peacekeeping training and instruction being offered have particular relevance for the development of civil-military relations. The more routine military and policing duties such as instilling proper discipline and decorum in conducting checkpoints and running observation posts are important but perhaps less of a priority.103 Criticisms that the classical peacekeeping training being offered is of questionable utility — given that many African conflicts require robust intervention forces — are too dismissive. Imparting a respect for human rights and an understanding of the ways in which international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations work is of crucial importance in any conflict.

Moreover, as a result of these initiatives, Western and African state and non-state actors have actively begun to collaborate. It is too early to conclude that the West and Africa have entered into a ‘partnership’ (as the US, in particular, likes to describe its relationship with current and potential ACRI recipients). However, Western and African states have become more receptive to working together to address peace and security issues. The P-3 have also begun to share information among themselves on their respective activities. On all fronts, mutual suspicion is slowly giving way to co-operation and mutual respect.104

There are numerous examples of this new-found spirit of co-operation. The fact that interested countries — both African and Western — have twice gathered at UN headquarters to discuss the subject of enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities is encouraging. Similarly, Guidimakha clearly manifested the willingness of Western and African countries to work together. In addition, Guidimakha revealed African states eager to display a unified front. The spectre of Senegalese and Mauritanian troops training side-by-side was a poignant symbol in view of recent tensions between the two countries.105 It is also noteworthy that the UK and the US provided military contingents to take part in the French-organised Guidimakha; such a contribution could not have been contemplated even two years ago. Similarly, the fact that the UK has conducted a peacekeeping course in Ghana open to officers from ACRI-trained battalions106 and that Belgian military officers have worked as ACRI trainers107 are also important developments.

As the negotiations behind the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic illustrate, however, a good deal of distrust and competing interests still exist among the Western actors. The Clinton Administration’s reluctant and much-delayed support for the UN peacekeeping operation in the CAR made the transition to the UN force unnecessarily difficult and acrimonious. It should have been possible to extract additional concessions from France (concerning what assets it would leave behind) and from the CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé (concerning the domestic opposition and the International Monetary Fund) without resorting to stonewalling. France also exacerbated tensions by withdrawing many of its troops prematurely.108

Tensions between Denmark and the UK are also apparent, although their ramifications are less pronounced. Whereas the two countries could work together to strengthen peacekeeping capabilities in the SADC subregion, each spends more time belittling the other’s actions than trying to co-ordinate activities and build upon its counterpart’s successes. Denmark takes obvious pleasure in chiding the P-3 by stressing how its programme is designed to work with and cater to Africans, while the P-3 tend to dictate policy with a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude. The UK views Denmark as an interloper that has usurped part of its turf.

Western countries must stop paying lip service to collaboration while actually competing for the affections of African countries. It should be possible for a country to pursue its own capacity-building agenda without undercutting the efforts of other countries. Denmark and the UK, for example, must stop ignoring one another and pretending that the other’s activities in Zimbabwe are of no consequence. The sooner the two Western donors and the host country devise a common strategy, the better. These three countries should then meet with Canada, Ireland and Zambia to discuss how the military staff colleges of Zambia and Zimbabwe, which both aspire to regional roles, can complement one another rather than compete against one another.

In addition to better co-ordination of their activities, Western states ought to revise specific aspects of their individual training programmes. For example, the field training exercise that concludes Phase 1 of ACRI should be expanded, with greater emphasis placed on developing civil-military relations. While progress has certainly been made since the initial exercises, in which the participation of UN agencies and non-governmental organisations was largely serendipitous, more can be done. ACRI should also provide training to subregional groupings to encourage co-operation among neighbouring states. RECAMP ought to focus more on imparting peacekeeping skills during its regional exercise and less on showcasing military capabilities.109 It is understandable that Guidimakha, as the inaugural RECAMP initiative, was a media circus, but future exercises should be smaller and more straightforward.

If Western states used more rigorous criteria when selecting training recipients, their programmes would be more effective — particularly in the short term. Although training and instruction are potentially valuable regardless of the participant’s current abilities, Western programmes should initially target able and dedicated peacekeepers. This is not presently the case with ACRI. Originally, ACRI recipients were to possess a certain level of military capabilities and peacekeeping experience, as well as a strong tradition of civilian rule. Of the nine countries identified as possible participants, only four were among the initial countries selected.110 (American heavy-handedness in presenting its programme and in recruiting participants undermined its efforts.111) Ultimately, the countries selected had more to do with expedience than with careful planning.

For Western states to use more rigorous selection criteria, targeted African countries need to be persuaded that these initiatives merit their support. Until now, the most powerful and influential African states have been particularly wary of giving their blessings to Western programmes. Both Egypt and South Africa, for example, have steadfastly refused to accept ACRI training. A way must also be found to engage Nigeria now that General Sani Abacha has departed from the scene. Nigeria should be allowed to benefit from the provision of peacekeeping training and equipment. Perhaps more than any other country, Nigeria has the potential to play a positive role in subregional and continental peacekeeping. There are sufficient incentives for Abacha’s successor, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, to make good on his stated intention to return Nigeria to civilian control. The need for Nigeria’s peacekeeping services is too great to make training and equipment conditional upon a complete transition to democracy.

Stronger bilateral commitments should not come at the expense of efforts to strengthen and engage the OAU. Despite its shortcomings, the OAU cannot be replaced and it provides potential political legitimacy to UN and subregional initiatives. It therefore merits continuing Western support. It is appropriate to work with the OAU to develop mechanisms to make it more effective even though its contribution to conflict management and resolution will remain quite limited for the foreseeable future. The money that the West has bestowed upon its conflict management machinery must be put to productive and efficient use. Throwing more money at the problem, however, is no solution. The OAU must still change the way it conducts business.

Just as the West has generously funded various OAU initiatives, greater attention and money should be paid to subregional organisations, particularly ECOWAS and SADC. Given the Security Council’s deference to ECOMOG in regional peacekeeping, ECOMOG must be placed firmly under civilian political control. Despite the persistent schisms within SADC, which have become even more pronounced in recent months, the organisation still has a potentially important role to play in the subregion and on the continent. Western largesse might be put to good use to find a way to mitigate antagonisms. For example, while South Africa and Zimbabwe should not be seen as being rewarded for their military adventures in Lesotho and the DRC, respectively, offering training and equipment for a joint South African-Zimbabwean dedicated peacekeeping battalion might make both political and military sense and would be a timely initiative.

Finally, although linking the provision of training and equipment to participation in actual peacekeeping missions is politically incorrect, it may be militarily desirable. Under the current scheme, Western countries could be building a capacity that will never be tapped effectively. African participants are under no obligation to participate in any eventual peacekeeping force. According to the memorandum of understanding that ACRI recipients must sign, for example, they agree only to refrain from using the donated equipment for unintended purposes. The enthusiasm of ACRI recipients for the programme may have more to do with helping themselves to US training and equipment now, than with helping their fellow Africans later. Raising the issue of linking capacity-building and capacity-utilisation should not be taboo.