"Development writing constantly delineates and divides territory by means of a relentless dualistic logic. The binary oppositions between developed (territories that have) and the undeveloped (territories that lack) created by the cartographic exercise are very familiar ... development also needs geography to link these binary oppositions, a task performed through the language of spatial dispersion and diffusion ... the static language of spatial demarcation needs the dynamism of the historical narrative ... it is sometimes helpful to see development as a form of story telling. Put this way, the idea of development as a narrative with stage, plot, characters, coherence, morality and outcome has its appeal ..."2

INTRODUCTION

The Southern African region is usually referred to in terms of its ‘economic potential’ vis-à-vis the rest of Africa. Since South Africa’s transition to democracy and the end of apartheid, the region is, some would have it, on the verge of a new era, one which heralds the formulation of a truly regional development strategy to underpin the regional integration process as envisaged by the Southern African Development Community (SADC)3 (previously the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)).4 However, the nexus between national and international production, finance, security and knowledge structures remains a significant obstacle to regional development.5 This chapter examines the way in which national development strategies in the region are ‘disciplined’ into following the hegemonic discourse on development, by examining aspects of Namibia’s development policy discourse. The analysis highlights the way in which the hegemonic discourse on development is a crucial dimension of the international knowledge structure, particularly in terms of orthodox International Political Economy (IPE) approaches to the developing world, and their need to ‘fit into’ the global economy. The gender aspect of this discourse is stressed in relation to the manner in which the discourse on development truncates understandings of socio-economic security by absorbing and neutralising alternative gendered discourses on development.

There is a large gap between SADC’s stated regional development and integration goals and national economic policies in the region. Since the signing of a formal treaty in 1992, a stronger market-oriented approach has been added to SADC’s original policy goals. The modus vivendi of the new SADC is ostensibly to build economic strength through regional development and integration initiatives, or, to put it more cynically, as was said at one SADC conference, "united we stand, divided we beg." In addition, SADC states have shed most of their socialist and/or communist ideological baggage during the 1990s (which existed, needless to say, at the level of rhetoric for the most part) and are embracing, albeit to varying degrees, democracy, neoliberal economic ideals and free market capitalism. Regional links, at most levels, remain patchy, and despite the stated aim of overlapping economic growth with regional socio-economic security, almost seventy per cent of rural populations in the region remain socio-economically insecure.

The above is at least partly the result of the ‘development’ discourse in the Southern African region, which remains firmly embedded within the national context of each state.6 The discourse is largely but not only, enforced by international ‘development’-oriented agencies and organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The international non-government organisations (INGOs)7 enforce, at the national level, the ‘realities’ as outlined by international financial/development organisations such as the IMF and World Bank, as well as international markets. These ‘realities’ centre around the conceptualisation of individual developing states advancing economically through the introduction of neoliberal, market-friendly policies oriented internationally, not regionally.

To explore the impact of the dominant discourse, aspects of the development policies of independent Namibia are examined.8 The focus is specifically on two dimensions:

the ways in which national development policies become disciplined into reflecting international neoliberal economic norms which underpin a socio-spatial demarcation which is predominantly internationally, not regionally oriented, especially with regard to agriculture and food security; and



the ways in which this discourse drowns out alternative discourses, specifically those on gender.

THE ‘BUILDING BLOCKS’ OF THE DISCOURSE

The development discourse as it is constructed within each individual state invariably uses socio-spatial dualisms as its ‘building blocks’: urban/rural, commercial/communal, men/women.9 The discourse does have ‘development’ variants, but centres most frequently on how to improve the disparities between the advantaged or superior: urban, commercial, men; and the disadvantaged and inferior: rural, communal, women. The discourse, with its variants, usually relates more or less the same ‘story’: the socio-spatial disparities hinder growth, but growth will bring about less disparities, if the superior is not ‘pulled down’ in the process of trying to aid the ‘inferior’. In the opening quotation of this article, Crush alludes to the dichotomous nature of that socio-spatial demarcation and its accompanying history that function at the national, but also at the international level. In the Southern African context, the discourse rarely, if ever, touches on regional (interstate) development, because, as a discourse, it initiates within a contextualised geographically confined entity: ‘the developing state’. This artificial socio-geographic construction forms an integral conceptual part of the larger geographically bounded ‘international development story’. Regional development is illusory because the development discourse, and hence dominant understandings of development, remain glued to the nation-state. The socio-spatial disparities between urban and rural, and between states (developing or developed) form the necessary dichotomous and bounded landscape within which the discourse perpetuates itself.

SADC has both a regional development and an integration dynamic. It appears that neither dynamic provides much input into the construction of policy direction in the SADC states as yet. Increasingly, SADC governments on the national level, speak the language of development as it appears in official reports of international development agencies. A particularly obvious example of this phenomenon is evident in Namibia. The following analysis makes clear that the Namibian government has ‘absorbed’ the development language of, among others, the World Bank, as well as United Nations agencies such as the FAO, UNICEF, UNIFEM and the UNDP.10

The development language of these organisations trivialises much of the critical academic input into the development debate, thus removing a great deal of the power of the critique. Nowhere is this more evident than in the absorption, into official reports, of the critiques of urban/rural, male/female, commercial/communal socio-spatial dichotomies done by critical theorists, postmodernists and feminists. For example, Meena, Parpart, Watts and Thompson11 have pointed out that the discourse severely constrains understandings of societies in the ‘developing’ world, particularly in relation to socio-economic security. The gender aspect of the inclusion/exclusion dynamic in the development discourse is especially pronounced, because it is enforced at national, regional and international levels. This aspect will be discussed in detail below, indicating how the discourse has absorbed and neutralised the gender critique, primarily by making women a ‘development category’, as well as the effect this has had on those the discourse purports to be attempting to include.

AN ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE: FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

There are a number of different theoretical feminist approaches, including liberal, socialist, marxist, radical, ‘third world’, postmodern and critical. It is neither possible nor necessary to explain the nuances of all the approaches here, but certain aspects pertinent to the discussion of development discourses must be highlighted. In terms of epistemological foundations, the approaches are not mutually exclusive, but do posit different assumptions about state-social relations, and consequently also interstate and intersocial dynamics.

Because of the diversity of feminist approaches, there is no single theory or understanding of a woman’s ‘standpoint’ on such issues, but all feminist theories encapsulate a critical dimension, which aims at exploring possible changes to both national and international systems which enforce negative gender discrimination. Feminism thus adds to our understanding of the theory and practice of state-social and interstate relations by pointing out biases, false assumptions and negative stereotypes.12 Furthermore, unlike the dominant realist, or neorealist conceptualisation of interstate relations, feminism is concerned with the politics and economics of inclusion and exclusion, both within and between states, particularly in terms of how these dynamics affect societies. As such, feminism adds a critical and emancipatory dynamic to the understanding of the international system.

The problem of overgeneralisation manifests itself in the attempt to create an all encompassing women’s standpoint.13 Postmodernists and feminist postmodernists maintain that the problem of overgeneralisation stems from the modernist theoretical attempt to achieve universalistic understandings about the nature of social reality.14 In this sense, the problem of achieving a common standpoint rests on knowledge. Socialist and third world feminists, together with feminist postmodernists, emphasise that women in different classes and societies will have different realities, not only by virtue of geographical location, but also in terms of how the dominant or hegemonic discourse relating to power and knowledge is entrenched within their particular society. Similarly, the difference between ‘first world’ women’s interpretation of reality and those in the so-called ‘developing’ world will be different. For example, the experiences of Latin American women or Southern African women would be different in terms of the knowledge structure in each society and/or region. For this reason, third world feminism tries to relocate questions of gender discrimination, in order to make the questions more appropriate.15 It could be argued therefore that third world feminism moves beyond modernist theory, in the sense that the approach deliberately avoids generalising about ‘women’ as a universal category in the social (not biological) sense. Instead, there is a tendency to discuss women as a social category in a regional, or socio-spatially specific context, as the following discussion makes clear. Socialist and third world feminism thus add to emancipatory theory in the sense that they deliberately challenge relations which are enforced and entrenched by dominant understandings about the nature of intra and international relations.

The perspective of third world feminism, by virtue of the political and economic position of women in the third world, tends to emphasise the economic hardship of women caused by capitalism and ‘hangovers’ from colonialism.16 Meena points out that women in Southern Africa have to contend with both the remains of various forms of African patriarchy and Western patriarchy. Meena17 states further that while it is dangerous to generalise about African culture, "... as Africa presents cultural diversities which have been exposed to variety of external forces ...", we cannot ignore the tendency of both the political and economic structures of society in Africa to perpetuate a bias towards African women.18 The emphasis on African culture with regard to women has mystified and mythified women’s roles.19

Third world feminists also point out that women’s roles as farmers, for subsistence and cash, remain trivial to ‘mainstream’ theory and also in terms of government policy. The economic (in)security of rural women, as a result, has received insufficient attention, theoretically and in practice. Part of the reason for this is that the capitalist system, both in its internal and international manifestations, does not regard labour that does not have ‘exchange value’ as particularly important to the functioning of the market.20 The liberal theory of supply and demand, while having the labour component built into the equation, does not regard the reproduction of labour, and labour for use or for informal markets as fundamental economic components of the national or international economic system. It is for this reason that the economic roles of women, both for exchange (informal market) and use (subsistence), have not been adequately addressed.

Third world feminism is thus a particularly salient approach on which to draw when analysing the socio-economic situations of ‘developing’ states. It has some of the advantages of postmodern analysis, for example the distrust of ‘universal truth’ (as representations of truth are most often linked to power), and of logocentric constructions of reality. Third world feminists and feminist postmodernists’ primary referent point for emancipation is deconstructing the knowledge/power nexus in development discourses in their specifically gendered form.21 Because socio-economic groups form the key structural framework for analysis, the pitfall of absurdist deconstruction of concepts is also usually avoided (i.e. the deconstruction of the category ‘women’ out of existence).

However, the chief method employed to include women into ‘public production’ has been one inspired by liberal feminism. The emancipatory content of this approach (or lack of it), and relatedly, the effects of liberally inspired development policies on the lives of women (especially rural women) in the developing world are briefly discussed below.

LIBERALISM IN PRACTICE: WOMEN AS AN ‘ISSUE AREA’

The liberal approach to the incorporation of women into development initiatives has predominated in the developing world.22 This initiative was inspired by the United Nations declaration of the Women’s Decade (1975-1985) through an approach which became known as the WID approach (Women in Development) and which was later developed to the WAD or GAD approach (Women and Development; Gender and Development). These approaches attempted to add women to existing development strategies in the developing world. This was done in such a way that, although it led to a more adequate understanding of the position of women, it did not contribute substantially to their empowerment.23 Based on the Zimbabwean ‘development’ experience, Meena criticises these strategies, mostly funded by external (Western) donors subscribing to liberal ideals of gender equality, as not having been part of ‘mainstream’ development plans.24 The lack of women’s involvement in the actual formulation of these projects, in Southern Africa and elsewhere, led to the WAD approach which attempted to practically involve and economically ‘empower’ (or strengthen) women. However, the approach was still centred on a relatively narrow conception of development which fell within the parameters of the liberal approach. Women needed to be ‘empowered’, according to this approach, in such a way that they could take advantage of the opportunities which capitalism had to offer. The fact was negated that capitalism, in theory and in practice, tends to ignore the multiplicity of roles that women must play (characterised in feminist literature as the "triple workload": mothers, wives, professionals and/or producers) and discriminates against women through its ‘assumed’ gender neutrality.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the need to incorporate women into mainstream theories of development requires a reconstruction of ideas on development, and not simply the absorption of women into existing frameworks, particularly, but not exclusively the liberal framework. This point is well made by third world feminists. As they point out, it is when gender is simply ‘added on’ (as in liberal feminism) that women become a ‘development issue’. The following sections examine the impact of the dominant discourse on development, and particularly its ‘add-on gender dimension’ in the context of Namibia’s development policies. It will become clear that the discourse has a particular socio-spatial orientation, and enforces most of the socio-economic biases of neoliberal economic theory, specifically with regard to the inclusion of gender into the discourse.

THE DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE IN NAMIBIA

The critique of the discourse in Namibia is sketched by examining the ways in which the Namibian government has oriented its economic goals. Attention is focused more particularly on ways in which policy is formulated, as well as the ‘development language’ used in official reports, to gain an understanding of how Namibia’s development script is being written. This discussion of the development discourse in Namibia as a ‘story’ does not intend to obfuscate the clearly visible practical dimension of economic interaction within Southern Africa, and between Southern African states and the rest of the world. It is clear that regional objectives are most often rendered inoperative by the dynamic generated between the developing state and its lack of economic manoeuvrability, as well as the necessity of trading on international markets. Nevertheless, the way in which individual governments interpret their position in the international arena, the ways in which they prioritise, as well as the language used to express those priorities, help to indicate the extent to which governments of developing states in Southern Africa and elsewhere have become characters in the story, rather than authors on their own behalf, and on behalf of the citizens they represent.

OF the NAMIBIAN DEVELOPMENT ‘DREAM’ (AND OF THE PRINCIPLE DREAMERS)

The influence of the West is particularly obvious in Namibia, not surprisingly, given the role played by Western states in the attainment of independence. There is now a particularly strong connection between UN development agencies and the Namibian government. These links were strengthened as a result of regional and international events which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the end of the Cold War, and the economic collapse of many states in Eastern Europe.

The political situation in Namibia is somewhat different to many other states in SADC, not only because of its date of independence from South Africa (1990), but because rhetorical commitment to socialism have been minimal.25 The South West Africa Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO), the winning party in the 1989 independence elections, followed a pre- and post-election strategy of national reconciliation. The influence of the Western Five Contact Group during the early 1980s led to a distancing of relations between SWAPO and previous Eastern Bloc allies.26 This background sets the scene for the particularly powerful influence of international agencies in Namibia. Their direct input into policy has become even more evident since independence.

Suffice it to say that the most convincing conspiracy theories are glibly put. The analysis below is an attempt to point out the ways in which the discourse actually manifests itself in policy debates and, as a consequence, in government decisions on resource allocation, the prioritisation of some socio-economic groups above others, and the justifications for doing so. It is an attempt to indicate how representations of reality tend to lead to reorganisations of reality, especially for those who have minimal input into the development discourse. Because agricultural and food security policies are two areas which affect the lives of the majority of women in Namibia (as is the case elsewhere in the region), these are the point of focus. To what extent does the policy discourse in the area known as ‘the economy’ orientate towards the hegemonic development story?

Namibia’s agricultural policies

Namibia has been de facto part of South Africa since the Treaty of Versailles, which transferred trusteeship of Namibia (previously a German colony) to South Africa. Hence, the legacy of colonialism is particularly strong, the dichotomies of discrimination nailed fast by years of apartheid. While Namibia is referred to as a young country by some, most of the old Namibia (or South West Africa as it was then called) still remains in the form of economic, if not political domination by South Africa. Entrenched patterns of economic discrimination based on race are still prevalent.27 To make matters worse, while most of the SADC states are economically dependent on South Africa, Namibia and the other BLNS states (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), by virtue of their formal economic links, such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement with South Africa, have very little room for manoeuvring in terms of their economic policies.28

Patterns of income inequality and economic dependence have not been fundamentally challenged since Namibia’s independence. SWAPO’s election strategy of National Reconciliation has been followed by a reconciliatory economic policy which does not fundamentally challenge the racial distribution of wealth in Namibia. Approximately five per cent of the population earn more than seventy per cent of the national income and the poorest 55 per cent earn approximately three per cent. Average incomes reflect this disparity. The average income for the top five per cent of the population in 1990, was approximately US $16 300, while those in the traditional sector (communal areas) earned approximately US $85 per annum.29 Put in consumption terms, "...(t)he richest 1% of households consume as much as the poorest 50%."30

The central question is how the government has scripted a redirection to Namibia’s development ‘story’.31 Two major policy documents have been released by the government, the Transitional National Development Plan (1991/1992-1993/1994) formulated in 1992, and the First National Development Plan (NDP1) formulated in 1995. These two documents clearly reflect the priority ‘characters’ in Namibia’s script, and also show the influence of international agencies. For example, while the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) acknowledges disparities in wealth, economic growth is highlighted as the means to alleviate income inequalities. The document states, "... (t)he most striking feature of the formal economy is the lack of participation in it by the majority of the people. It is not just that a small section of the population receives a disproportionate share of the national income, but also that a relatively small number of people produce most of the national income. The need for redistribution is clear but the principle means of achieving general prosperity will be through economic growth and through employing increasing numbers of people."32

This orientation stands in contrast to SWAPO’s earlier commitment to socialism and the redistribution of resources (including land) in order to transfer the "... means of production and exchange into the ownership of the people."33 It is also clear that cash income is used as an overwhelming indicator of ‘poverty’. Once this occurs, monetisation and the market mechanisms to achieve growth become priority objectives in the development discourse.

Poverty alleviation is to occur through the following measures: "... the Government can assist the poorest in four ways ... it can provide direct cash and food transfers ... [t]he second form of assistance is public services ... [t]hirdly the government can adopt policies aimed at encouraging economic growth and employment creation ... [l]astly, the legal system can be used as a means of ensuring access and fairness of opportunity and eliminating exploitation ..."34

The liberal ‘free market’ orientation emerges clearly in these statements. Furthermore, in relation to trade, the TNDP states that two of the Namibian government’s central foreign trade policy objectives should be to "... pursue an open, liberal and fair trading regime ... [and to] ... work towards the progressive liberalisation of world trade by reducing and eventually removing barriers to trade consistent with international obligations ..."35 This orientation has profound consequences in terms of government policies for agriculture and food security, particularly household food security.

The emphasis of liberal economic policy on productivity tends towards producing a definition of those who are less ‘visibly’ productive as ‘vulnerable’. The emphasis on productivity is clearly evident in the approach taken to land reform: "... [t]he challenge to the government will be to come up with meaningful land reform proposals without endangering the productivity of the commercial farm sector."36

It should therefore come as no surprise that hardly any changes have been made, on the part of the government, to the distribution of land. The Bill on Communal Lands (1995) further ensures a maintenance of the status quo in communal areas as there appears to be no fundamental change to customary systems of land usage.37

While the TNDP was never officially adopted, the same commitment to liberal economic policy emerged in the NDP1. Consider the following objectives for the economy in general, and for agriculture specifically: "... [p]roviding an enabling environment for sustained socio-economic development ... [e]nsuring that development is sustainable."38

"The overall goal for the agricultural sector is to bring about sustainable growth in agricultural outcomes, across the broadest possible socio-economic base. This will be achieved by encouraging the subsistence agriculture sector to take advantage of more modern, commercial production practices which will improve productivity and provide a secure foundation for equitable growth and income distribution."39

It is clear that the productivity (for markets) is linked to notions of income redistribution, and that the government is committing itself to an increasingly minimalist economic role. The NDP1 — all 480 pages of it — it must be added, does mention the upliftment of the poor, and the document is peppered with references to women and development. To take, for example, the section on agriculture again: "With de facto agricultural production being inadequate to meet basic food needs ... food insecurity is a serious problem among much of the rural (and urban) population, in particular for members of households headed by women. Seasonal food shortages, and the associated nutritional inadequacies cause particular problems amongst the most vulnerable groups."40

However, the government does not envisage more than creating an ‘enabling environment’ for ‘sustainable growth’, which is ‘development-speak’ for playing the role of the liberal nightwatchman state, and only within the framework of productivity. The following quotations illustrate this point clearly: "[t]he government will promote the involvement of the private sector and co-operatives in both agricultural investment and production activities and in providing essential commercial services such as input distribution, output processing and marketing of produce. Government will also withdraw gradually from supplying services that are more appropriately and adequately handled by private sector initiatives (the supply of seeds, fertiliser and tractor hire services, for example)."41

"... Strong efforts will be made to improve the technical capabilities of the farming community, in particular, women producers, so as to increase productivity."42

Furthermore, it is clear that Namibia has absorbed the category distinction, made by development agencies, between ‘food security’ and ‘agriculture’, the former category being imbued with a strong welfarist dimension, while the latter is more ‘productivity’-oriented. This is evident in two other official documents produced by the Namibian government: Namibia: Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Report, and the National Food Security and Nutrition Action Plan. The two documents were drafted under the auspices of the National Food Security and Nutrition Council and Committee. The Council consists of the permanent secretaries of relevant ministries (such as Agriculture, Water and Rural Development and Education) and is supported by the Committee. According to the Action Plan, "...[i]nternational agencies also play an important role in improving food security and nutrition in Namibia. FAO, UNICEF, WHO (World Health Organisation) and WFP (World Food Programme) are all active members on the FSNTC (the Committee)."43 It is important to note that the welfarist dimension, both at the level of the discourse and materially, is taken care of largely by the international agencies themselves, ostensibly to improve the position of ‘vulnerable groups’. However, it appears as if the participation of organisations such as UNICEF and UNIFEM has enabled the government to slip into a pattern of soothing rhetoric and benign neglect towards those groups.

In addition, Namibia (like other developing states) often relies on the fact-finding reports of international agencies to aid their understanding of current national economic concerns. The negative side of this is that the development discourse prevalent among these agencies is absorbed along with the empirical information contained in the reports.44 Indeed, in many of the agencies’ reports the two are inseparable: the empirical information is interwoven in order to support a specific view of development, for the most part, one which does not challenge free market economics or the prevailing international economic system. Take as an example the following statement from the Food Security Report, bearing in mind that it is an official government report: "Efficient land-use and environmental protection may not be compatible with a radical redistribution of land from large-scale to smallholder farmers. Land fragmentation may lead to reduced outputs (and reduced exports of livestock and meat). This could also result in more intensive range utilisation, beyond carrying capacity, possibly leading to medium-term ecological damage. Summarising the trade-off, the World Bank concluded that ‘an economically efficient land reform is not likely to satisfy the aspirations of many. A land reform which satisfies the aspirations of many may expose new farmers on poor land to undue risk of economic failure’."45

The balancing off of ‘aspirations’ versus ‘economic failure’ underlines the ‘severity’ of failing to adhere to the implicit preference of the World Bank: the maintenance of the current land ownership status quo. The absorption of ‘development-speak’ into the new government’s vocabulary is clearly evident here. Even if the NDP1, like the TNDP, has been solely written by foreign consultants, this does not detract from the fact that the NDP1 is what government has put forth as its official position. The technicist economic edge to this reasoning hides the clear economic bias in favour of leaving the commercial sector untouched. This becomes all the more clear if one looks for any sign of visible change to existing land distribution in Namibia, as well as to existing patterns of land-use.

LAND USE PATTERNS AND REDISTRIBUTION

Approximately seventy per cent of Namibia’s population rely on subsistence farming or farm labour for survival.46 Approximately fifty per cent of households in rural areas are headed by women (de facto and de jure), almost all of whom do not produce for the ‘formal’ economy. Economic statistics and growth rate figures cannot therefore adequately portray the extent to which the majority of the population have benefited (or not) from the new government’s strategies since the informal and semi-subsistence sectors remain hard to quantify in formal economic terms.47

The ‘reserve’ system imposed on Namibia from the period of German occupation, and even more so since the National Party government took control of Namibia, has severely affected production practices in the rural areas.48 Since the Odendaal Commission Report of 1964, large numbers of (black) rural people were relocated to their "appropriate ethnic homeland." Furthermore, the reserves were deliberately denied access to extension services, agricultural and technological inputs, financing and markets. Because of the lack of support from the pre-1990 authorities,49 no ‘trickle down’ from the seemingly quite well developed ‘formal’ capitalist economy has been forthcoming, except in terms of remittances from migrant labour.50

There are clear differences between urban/rural and communal/commercial. However, in the context of the development discourse, the way in which these dichotomies are further polarised into superior/inferior, men/women, remains problematic. Insufficient attention is paid to the fact that some of these dichotomies are largely the creation of former colonial powers. In this context, it is illuminating to note the bland and technical rendering of the discrepancies in the NDP1, which is later followed by an agricultural policy that avoids the land issue: "... a broadly dualistic land tenure structure ... remains today, whereby 6,337 large-scale, private tenure farms, averaging more than 7000 ha in extent, are held by 4,045 owners (mainly individuals) and cover about 44% of the country, while the communal tenure farms which support a total population of almost 900,000 occupy a further 43% of the land area."51

The system of migrant labour, caused mainly by restricting these farmers to reserves, has meant that monetisation of communal areas has occurred mostly in terms of remittances. Most households have developed a need for cash to buy food during lean seasons, for basic household commodities, and for education. Agricultural inputs are rarely purchased, because of a lack of availability, technological expertise and, of course, financial resources. However, while migration in search of formal employment continues, the availability of such employment is limited.52

There is no ownership of land in the communal areas. Rather, land is usually allocated to male heads of households. Although it differs from region to region, women generally do not inherit land, except in the Okavango and Caprivi regions. Although attitudes towards women inheriting land are changing at grassroots level, the problem of access to resources remains.

It cannot be sufficiently stressed that most small farmers are enormously productive if energy expenditure is used as the marker of productivity. However, this is not the definition generally used in the development discourse. While the UN has tried to come up with a definition which takes subsistence and informal labour into account, this is generally not the approach used by governments. The World Bank’s conceptualisation (and the Namibian government’s in this context) is extremely visual — productivity must yield something to see: preferably for (formal) markets. Smaller farmers, and especially women farmers, face enormous difficulties in becoming more ‘productive’ in the latter sense.53 Nonetheless, for many of those unable to find employment, farming in the communal areas remains the only option. This makes the new government’s emphasis on productivity (in the market sense) all the more problematic. There are few programmes specifically targeted towards those who are not potentially productive within the neoliberal economic model. It is also clear that, although land distribution remains unequal, the government has ‘bought’ the World Bank’s argument that redistribution would be ‘inefficient’.

The NPD1 states that the commitment to land reform is to be minimal. The one paragraph on land reform (in the 480-page document) reads as follows: "Government will undertake land reform on the basis of the Commercial Agriculture Land Act 1995. The aim of such legislation is to provide land to poor landless families without jeopardising productivity. N$100 million has been allocated during the course of NDP1 to assist in carrying out the land reform programme."54

The upliftment of the communal areas is seen to go hand-in-hand with the commercialisation of production and minimal redistribution: "... [t]he Technical Committee on Commercial Farmland set up after the Land Conference has earmarked 7.3 million hectares of land for resettlement. However this land includes ... abandoned, under-utilised, unused [in the communal areas], foreign owned, state and municipal land, as well as land which could be made available as a result of the streamlining of multiple farm businesses/farms with excessive land, [and] the expropriation of some foreign owned farms such as absentee owners [sic]."55

Not surprisingly, the World Bank Report (1991), the TNDP (1992) and the NDP1 (1995) stress that commercialising the existing communal areas is the most advisable strategy. In formal (liberal) economic terms, the problem has been defined as "... addressing the country’s equity problem at an acceptable pace without jeopardising growth..."56 The commercial areas have also been consistently prioritised, both before and after independence.57

Because land redistribution is to be minimal, the emphasis is on an horizontal, instead of a vertical restructuring of the agricultural sector. In other words, the focus is on improving methods of production and production inputs.58 A further development is that larger communal farmers are being encouraged to buy land which comes onto the market in commercial areas.59

According to official sources, women are not discriminated against if they wish to buy land in commercial areas. However, because women, in general, are the poorest in terms of cash and resources, they are unlikely to benefit at all from the proposed resettling of "large communal farmers" in commercial land areas. Even more problematic for smaller, less resource endowed farmers, is that wealthier communal farmers have recently begun to ‘privatise’ this land illegally by fencing it off.

Because of the above practice, poorer households are worse off than they were before independence. Devereux and others60 state that such illegal fencing-off has been met by no more than "... verbal interventions from the government." Tapscott61 points out that many of those who have fenced in land have had or have links with the government. While the government has proposed an alternative strategy — the fencing off of land in communal areas (into ‘communal’ communities) — it is unclear how effective this strategy will be if the practice of individual fencing continues. Even then, the envisaged system of fencing will limit communities to already overworked areas. The government’s commitment to ensure access to land for the majority, in this context, should be treated with circumspection.

The representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (MAWRD) who were interviewed all responded that their directorates were ‘gender neutral’, but did not specifically target women as a group for special attention in terms of research or programmes. Brock’s reply to the question whether women would be effectively absorbed into ‘mainstream’ development, was that this was "... unlikely, it would require a massive injection of capital."62

In terms of land utilisation and redistribution, it seems as though the situation will remain relatively unchanged. In accordance with the policy of the ‘wealth creating sector’ balancing the ‘wealth distributing sector’, the commercial farmers are not to be ‘threatened’ in any way.

THE CATEGORISATION OF ‘WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT’

It is clear that the government’s emphasis on productivity — implicitly, if not explicitly — discriminates against poorer farmers, especially women farmers. It is also interesting to note that the TNDP devotes a whole chapter to Women In Development. It appears that the new government has developed a commitment to the ‘free market’ emphasis of the plan, while ignoring, or underplaying its emphasis on social security. The NDP1 (significantly) relegates the question of women and development to a paragraph here and there, and the section on development policy begins: "If participation in the economy is to become a reality, women must have access to education and health and the enabling environment must raise the status of women."63

While this approach is consistent with the liberal feminist WAD approach, it should be clear that the prioritisation of agricultural productivity for markets does not necessarily promote national or household food security. Nor does it show any specific orientation towards regional food security objectives. Most significantly, it takes very little account of the variable impact that agricultural policies have on different socio-economic groups. While rural communities do have certain homogenous socio-economic characteristics, the position in which many rural women, as a socio-economic community, find themselves, is addressed only in rhetorical techno-speak: enabling environments, opportunities, and so on.

Paralleling Zimbabwe, the Namibian government has also created a Department of Women Affairs (DWA) in August 1990, that is attached to the Office of the President.64 With the exception of the DWA, there were only two women ministers and one deputy minister in government in 1991. Other women are employed, but at lower ranking levels or as secretaries. Their influence is therefore minimal.65

Thus, while the Constitution guarantees the legal rights of women, and affirms non-discrimination, gender equality remains far from a reality. Government has effectively neutralised the question of discrimination, however, by absorbing the liberal feminist ‘gender and development’ discourse into its official policy pronouncements and stated commitments. It has been amply aided by international organisations such as UNICEF and UNIFEM, of which the staff have a professional duty to problematise "rural women’s difficulties."66

Namibian government policy shows clearly that capitalist development, based on the international free market ideology, does indeed discriminate against women through its so-called ‘neutrality’. It is also clear that gender stereotyping influences and inhibits the inclusion of women. This is reinforced by the capitalist system, but also stems from social custom. These customs tend to be reinforced when an emphasis is placed on ‘commercialisation’, because the poor are the last to be favoured, and it is not incidental that the majority of poor in the rural areas are women. This has very serious long term implications for both national and regional food security, as it generalises the problem into a non-problem: an issue area which does not form part of the central discourse on "restructuring and developing the economy."

REGIONAL FOOD SECURITY

The Early Warning and Food Information System Unit (EWU) was set up in 1991 to monitor weather and household food security conditions. The Unit is affiliated to SADC. The Unit itself is not responsible for action — it feeds through relevant information to Cabinet, donors and business. No joint drought combating or drought relief programmes exist on a regional basis. Nor is there any strategy for ensuring food security in times of crisis within the region through the EWU mechanism.

It is clear that SADC’s overall policy framework is not sufficiently included in national policy formulation. Little attention has been paid to building regional complementarity, even in terms of drought relief programmes. In interviews, most government representatives looked confused and answered evasively when questions were asked about strengthening regional ties with regard to food security and agriculture. Thus, the intention to examine the linkages between regional and national policy in this analysis was thwarted by the very lack of such linkages.

CONCLUSION

In Namibia, there is a discernible leaning, on the part of both the government and international non-government organisations, towards ‘productive’ or potentially productive groups who can be absorbed into capitalist development in a ‘cost-effective’ manner. Ironically, those who fall into the above category usually form part of the already advantaged section of the population.

Namibia cannot be taken as representative of all the states in the region. Nevertheless, it is evident that external influence from Western states has decisively contributed to the prioritisation of international integration first, and regional integration thereafter. Furthermore, in the Namibian situation, regional initiatives promoted by SADC are undermined by South African domination, particularly through SACU. While the Namibian government has explicitly stated that it supports SADC’s goals and is committed to regional trade integration with other SADC states, there is little evidence of this occurring in practice. It would seem that SADC’s stated objective of achieving regional identity does not extend beyond the rhetorical commitment of government leaders. It is noteworthy that the interests of the national élite in Namibia (both those in government and in economic production) are closer to the priorities of international structures than to those of the disadvantaged majority.67

The theme of Namibia’s development story is evident, wrapped in techno-jargon and neo-Weberian efficiency-speak. The government is defining its character according to the neoliberal economic paradigm which is internationally, not regionally oriented, and internationally, not nationally scripted. This orientation is reinforced, either implicitly and/or explicitly, by international development agencies. As a result, social security, especially for those in rural areas, remains illusory, both nationally and regionally, even while the questions of social security, and ‘women and development’ continue to be largely rhetorical additions to Namibia’s development script.

Endnotes

An earlier version of this paper was published in Africanus, 27(2), 1997.



J Crush, Imagining Development, in J Crush (ed.), The Power of Development, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 14.



SADC is not the only economic organisation in Southern Africa. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and COMESA also function within the regional context. SACU has four members: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African states (PTA) was renamed the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African states (COMESA) in 1994. See for example M Nkuhlu, The State and Civil Society in South Africa: Transition to Democracy, Social Reconstruction and Implications for Regional Relations in Southern Africa, Southern African Perspectives: A Working Paper series, 28, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Belville, 1993; R Davies, D Keet & M Nkuhlu, Reconstructing Economic Relations with the Southern African Region: Issues and Options for a Democratic South Africa, MERG/Centre For Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Belville, 1993.



The Southern African Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was founded in 1980 and renamed itself the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 1992. The member states are Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia (who joined officially after independence in 1990) and South Africa, who joined in August 1994, and who has recently taken over as chair of SADC. As of September 1997, two more states have been accepted, the Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.



S Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, Pinter Publishers, London, 1988; S Strange, An Eclectic Approach, in C N Murphy & R Tooze (eds.), The New International Political Economy, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1991. Strange elaborated on the ways in which these four structures can be understood heuristically as the framework of the international political economy.



It cannot be argued that regional goals are stymied by this discourse only. There are other factors involved which also account for the lack of regional integration, such as an unwillingness to surrender sovereignty, even where this is symbolic, as in the case of the BLNS states. However, the weight of the discourse is a powerful deterrent and, arguably, the most unassailable obstacle to regional integration.



The acronym stands for International Non-government Organisations, although the strong (Western) government influence within the IMF and World Bank, for example, makes the ‘non-government’ part of the definition somewhat misleading.



The effects of the INGOs are felt regionally in that most SADC states have at least the IMF and World Bank involved in their economic strategies. Thus, while the conclusions reached here are country specific, the conclusions have regional resonances.



J Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticisation and Bureaucratic State Power in Lesotho, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; J Parpart, Postmodernism, Gender and Development, in Crush, op. cit.



‘Absorbed’ may have more than one meaning here. Some of government policy papers have been written by foreign consultants, who generally use the same techno-jargon and development approach as the international development organisations.



R Meena, Gender Research Studies in Southern Africa: An Overview, in R Meena (ed.), Gender in Southern Africa: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues, SAPES Trust, Harare, 1992; Parpart, op. cit.; M Watts, A New Deal in Emotions, in Crush, op. cit.; L Thompson, Strictures or Structures? Societal Security and the State in Southern Africa: An International Perspective, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of the Western Cape, 1996.



In terms of stereotypes, ‘feminine’ qualities are pejoratively assigned to interstate relations. This accords with the logocentric way of thinking which permeates all of the social sciences in the effort to be more closely associated with the natural sciences)



For further discussions of this point see A M Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey, 1988; S Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, Cornell University Press, New York, 1987a; S Harding, Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques, in L J Nicholson, (ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism, Routledge, New York, 1990; J Cocks, The Oppositional Imagination: Feminism, Critique and Political Theory, Routledge, London, 1989; S Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism, in Nicholson, ibid.; L J Nicholson & N Fraser, Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism, in Nicholson, ibid.; J Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in Nicholson, ibid.; M Mbilinyi, Research Methodologies in Gender Issues, in Meena, op. cit.; Meena, op. cit.; R Gaidzanwa, Bourgeois Theories of Gender and Feminism and Their Shortcomings, with Reference to Southern African Countries, in Meena, op. cit.



See particularly R B J Walker, The Prince and the Pauper: Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of International Relations, in J der Derian & M J Shapiro, (eds.), International/ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, Lexington Books, Massachussetts, 1989; R B J Walker, Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations, in V Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States, Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1992; Fraser & Nicholson, ibid.; Flax, ibid.; A Yeatman, A Feminist Theory of Social Differentiation, in Nicholson, ibid.; Mbilinyi, ibid., for a critical discussion of the negative effects of trying to incorporate a feminist approach into existing modernist theoretical approaches.



This is the term applied by feminists using this approach. Because of its negative connotations it is not one I would choose to use, but have retained for the sake of representational accuracy.



See for example G Sen & C Grown, Development, Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women’s Perspectives, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1987; S Chant & L Brydon, Women in the Third World, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 1989.



Meena, op. cit., p. 8.



Meena quotes Fanon in trying to define the situation: “... decolonisation is quite simply the replacing of a certain ‘species of men’ by another ‘species of men’”; ibid., p. 9.



See Sen & Grown, op. cit.; Brydon & Chant, op. cit.; Meena, ibid.; Gaidzanwa, op. cit., for a discussion of this point. Western feminists emphasise that the same has occurred in the context of Western culture. See M Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Beacon Press, Boston, 1987; L Schiebinger, The Mind has no Sex?, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989.



T Manana, Conventional Economic Theories and Gender Analysis, in Meena, op. cit.



Bordo, op. cit.; Spike Peterson, op. cit.



See Brydon & Chant, op. cit.; Sen & Grown, op. cit.; Manana, op. cit.; Meena, op. cit.



Sen & Grown, ibid.; Brydon & Chant, ibid.; Meena, ibid.; Mbilinyi, op. cit. critically discuss the impact of WID and WAD approaches.



Meena, ibid., p. 20. This point is substantiated by research done by Brydon & Chant, ibid., and Sen & Grown, ibid.



L Cliffe et. al. The Transition to Independence in Namibia, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1994, pp. 222-231 point out that, during the 1970s and early 1980s, SWAPO did in fact adhere to a ‘socialist’ ideological stance, which tempered gradually. By the time the elections took place, references to socialism were practically non-existent. See also C Tapscott, Changing Discourses of Development in South Africa, in Crush, op. cit., pp. 161-163.



J Pitswane, Namibia: Challenges of the First Decade, in L Benjamin & C Gregory (eds.), Southern Africa at the Crossroads, Ashanti Publishers, Johannesburg, 1992; A du Pisani, Rumours of Rain: Namibia’s Post-Independence Experience, Southern African Issues, 3, SAIIA, February 1991; Tapscott, ibid.



IFAD, Namibia: Northern Livestock Improvement Project, Socio-Economic and Production Systems Diagnostic Study, FAO/IFAD, Rome, 30 November 1992, p. 3; S Devereux et al., Namibia Poverty Profile: A Report for SIDA, Social Sciences Division, Multi-Disciplinary Research Centre, University of Namibia, February 1995, pp. 40-41.



Davies et. al., op. cit., pp. 52-54.



IFAD, Report of the Strategy-Cum-Identification Mission to The Republic of Namibia, 1, February 1992, p. 22. Average incomes vary significantly. A comprehensive study on incomes and poverty for SIDA compiled by Devereux et. al., op. cit., pp. 8-9 calculates that, measured in terms of “standardised consumption levels” (SCL), 28 per cent of the 247 000 households in Namibia have “low economic resources” and a further 22 per cent have “very low economic resources.” Those households whose SCL are less than N$496.69 per month are classified as ‘poor’, and those with an SCL of less than N$248.35 are classified as ‘very poor’. These calculations are based on Namibia’s CSO survey (1994).



Government of the Republic of Namibia, National Development Plan 1 (NDP1), prepared by the National Planning Commission, Windhoek, 1995, p. 10.



The redirection implies that per capita income is accepted as a valid way of assessing the well-being and security of individuals.



Government of the Republic of Namibia, Transitional Development Plan 1991/1992 – 1993/1994, (TNDP), prepared by the National Planning Commission, Windhoek, December, 1992, p. 11.



UNIN, Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development, UN Institute for Namibia, 1986, pp. 59-60.



TNDP, op. cit., p. 9.



Ibid., p. 100. These international obligations create some conflict in terms of trade orientation. As they are listed in the TNDP and NDP1, these are seen to be towards SACU, SADC, GATT, UNCTAD, the Commonwealth and the Lomé IV Convention. Ironically, the conflicting agendas of these organisations and institutional agreements are not discussed in either the TNDP or NDP1.



Ibid., p. 11.



While the Bill appears initially pathbreaking, for example, by replacing traditional authorities with Regional Land Boards, it allows for the delegation of power in terms of land allocation, or the cancelling of land use rights back to traditional authorities. See Government of the Republic of Namibia, Bill on Communal Land, Windhoek, 1995, pp. 12-13.



NDP1, op. cit., p. 39.



Ibid., p. 146.



Ibid., p. 139.



Ibid., p. 147.



Ibid., p. 151.



Government of the Republic of Namibia, National Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Report (NFSNAR), prepared for the National Food Security and Nutrition Committee, Windhoek, August 1996, p. 7.



There has been a veritable spawning of reports in Namibia since the country’s independence, some of them have been used for factual information in this article. Most are very detailed and comprehensive, but are generally subject to the criticisms levelled here. Unfortunately, it is impossible to examine them in any depth.



NFSNAR, op. cit., p. 59.



TNDP, op. cit., p. 55; IFAD, op. cit., p. 5. The term ‘subsistence farming’ is more accurate in Namibia than in, for instance, Zimbabwe, as many rural households do not sell their produce. There is however some informal trading.



See R Dixon-Mueller & R Anker, Assessing Women’s Economic Contributions to Development, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1988; they discuss UN and ILO definitions of ‘productivity’ and the difficulties of quantifying informal (including subsistence) forms of economic productivity.



Devereux et. al., op. cit., pp. 31-34.



The public administration of Namibia, prior to independence, consisted of a central authority, second tier authorities (ethnically based) and third tier or municipal authorities; see World Bank Report, Namibia: Poverty Alleviation with Sustainable Growth, World Bank, Washington, 1991, p. iii.



As in other Southern African states which still have migratory labour patterns.



NDP1, op. cit., p. 138.



Devereux et. al., op. cit., pp. 15-16; DWA, op. cit., pp. 31-32.



Detailed studies have been done since independence on the situation in the communal areas; see, for example, IFAD, op. cit.; and Devereux et. al., ibid.



NDP1, op. cit., p. 50.
55 P Harnett, The Land Issue and Affirmative Action: Options for Range Management and Tenure, report prepared for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Namibia, 1993, p. 13.



World Bank, op. cit., p. iii.



Devereux et. al., op. cit., pp. 46-47; IFAD, op. cit., pp. 59-60.



NDP1, op. cit., pp. 150-153.



Ibid., p. 146.



Devereux et. al., op. cit., p. 67.



Tapscott, op. cit., p. 166.



C Brock, Interview, Chief Co-operative Officer, Co-operatives Directorate, Windhoek, Namibia, 27 October 1993.



NDP1, op. cit., p. 49.



It evolved from the Women’s Desk which was set up immediately after independence. Although many of the SWAPO women activists wanted to see women represented adequately in all spheres of government, a Cabinet decision in 1990 concluded the debate, which led to the creation of a separate department; see H Becker, From Anti-colonial Resistance to Reconstruction, Namibian Women’s Movement 1980 to 1992, unpublished Ph.D., 1993, pp. 213-216.



Becker, ibid.; DWA, op. cit.



ILO, Namibian Women and Employment, Documents of a Tripartite Symposium held in Windhoek, 25-29 November 1991, pp. 6-7, discusses the limited efficacy of the Constitution in redressing gender inequalities. The UN agencies’ focus on ‘women’ stems from the UN declaring the 1970s ‘the women’s decade’. Although the earlier approach (Women in Development) is said to have been replaced by a less welfarist (Women and Development) approach, this is not often obvious in practice. See Meena, op. cit; and Thompson, op. cit.



Tapscott, op. cit., pp. 162-167, discusses the process of national reconciliation in Namibia and points out that the new government, through its unwillingness to alienate foreign and local capital, has largely replicated the socio-economic inequality of the colonial period. In this sense, the ‘nationalist’ populist ticket which SWAPO has used to gain the support of the majority of Namibians has been separated from the new government’s economic policy. In fact, as Tapscott notes, the separation of political from economic issues helps to conceal the non-populist nature of the government’s economic policies.