INTRODUCTION

Debates about development and the alleviation of mass poverty are currently dominated by three issues. The first is sustainable development – a goal commonly regarded as imminently worth striving for, even if there is little consensus about its meaning and, therefore, little clarity about the methodology and strategies required to reach such a state of being.1 There is, however, broad agreement on some of the key elements required to ensure sustainable development (however defined), including a concern about incorporating gender sensitivity in any development effort, and about enhancing democratic processes within developing states. Apart from being regarded as key elements in the process of achieving sustainable development, these two concepts – gender and democracy – are issues that dominate the development discourse in their own right.

Each of these three issues – democracy, development and gender – are vast areas of research and academic scholarship and each is characterised by fierce internal debates. The area where these three concentric circles of interest overlap is a mesh of complex relationships, contradiction and confusion. This chapter attempts to highlight some of these relationships and contradictions by examining gender and democracy from a development perspective.

A certain level of generality is unavoidable in a study of this nature. Writing in general about gender, development and democracy, one ends up generalising about ‘the’ state (as if there is only one kind of state, ignoring different political systems, and differences at national and local levels), ‘development’ (as if it is a commonly understood term, a ‘feel good’ phrase about which there can be no disagreement), and ‘women’ (as if women are a unitary and unified grouping in all societies). The postmodernist rejection of grand theory in favour of the metanarrative has increased the awareness that women are not the same the world over, and do not share the same ideals and problems simply because they belong to the same sex. Women, like men, are characterised by difference and diversity and there is a need to acknowledge specificity and homogeneity.2 This does leave any analyst with a dilemma, as can be seen in the words of Waylen: "If identities are complex, comprising multiple intersections of class, race, gender and sexuality, causing individuals to react in different ways at different times, women will act politically, not simply on the basis of gender, but race, class and sexuality as well, in a complex interaction."3 Although this makes it virtually impossible to talk of a single category of ‘women’, Waylen, with reference to Mohanty, comes to the conclusion that it is possible to talk about "Third World women" as a political constituency because of their shared "context of struggle."4 In the development context, this struggle is one of achieving sustainable development which concerns not only the environment, its resources and their continued availability, but also the continuation of processes, the availability of infrastructure and the improvement of human capacities which all work together towards increasing people’s choices to control their own worlds. This struggle is also against mass poverty and for increasing the opportunities for individuals to get their voices heard and their needs attended to.

Whereas Hudson focused mainly on a feminist critique of security in Africa and on the insecurity of African women in the previous Monograph, this chapter draws attention to the way in which gender is a mostly ignored concept in African development policies. The idea is to give a more ‘practical’ slant to Schoeman’s argument in the introductory chapter, that a thorough understanding of genuine people-centred security necessitates a link between security and development.

This chapter argues that, what is required, is commitment from the African state to democratic processes that accommodate the needs of the entire population and, in particular, to do so in an equitable manner. But, as will be seen, the African state is weak (or soft, as Hyden5 calls it) and tends to put short term political survival before long term and sustainable development needs. Paradoxically, as will be described here, some policies that aim to foster both democracy and economic growth mitigate against any attempts states might make to bring about equitable development. This is especially true of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) designed by the Bretton Woods institutions and which have now become the norm for any donor recipient.

CURRENT STATUS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA

Over the past four to five decades, vast resources – technical and material – were pumped into developing states, but seemingly to little avail. The Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) show that levels of human suffering and insecurity are still exceptionally high in most states of the South, and particularly in Africa where states with the lowest per capita income are located, where inequalities between race, class and gender abound, and where little political freedom is found. Reasons for the lack of improvement in the material and physical well-being of the citizens of these states were sought in, among others, assumptions that underpin theories of development and underdevelopment, in the application of various theories in practice, in the strategies and methodologies used, in the nature of the African state, and in traditions and indigenous practices that supporters of modernisation theory argued were blocking development efforts.

Towards the mid-1970s, development planners, theoreticians and practitioners started focusing on specific social sectors that they thought would prove to be keys that could unlock the inherent development potential of the South. One of these sectors was women. It was argued that women constitute more than half of the world’s population, that it was worth including them in any development effort simply because of their numbers, and because of the multiplier effect that increased welfare efforts towards women would have as a result of their reproductive role in society.6

Yet, despite more than two decades of allegedly concerted efforts and of targeting women as the new human resource and the new input in the development process, there is no denying that the statistical odds are still very much stacked against women, as Torres and her co-authors show:

women perform 67% of the world’s working hours;


women earn 10% of the world’s income;


women are 2/3 of the world’s illiterates;


women own less that 1% of the world’s property.”7

Rural women in sub-Saharan Africa produce between sixty and eighty per cent of all food grown on the subcontinent. They also process and market the food crops they produce. Statistics have shown that farmers who have had four years of formal schooling are likely to produce eighty per cent more than those without formal schooling, yet 62 per cent of women in Africa are illiterate, and currently, less than three out of every five girls have access to primary schools. Of these three girls, only two will actually complete four years of schooling.8

In addition to their tasks as farmers, women in a country like Tanzania perform almost three quarters of household tasks, such as collecting firewood and water, and taking care of the health needs of the household. The other quarter of the time devoted to such tasks is shared between adult males and children.9

Apart from their productive tasks, women also fulfill essential reproductive tasks. Women in sub-Saharan Africa are likely to produce at least six children in their lifetimes. Childbirth in Africa is a dangerous task, because of the lack of trained medical and paramedical staff. Health services are seldom available to those who need it most: pregnant women and young children. African women are 22 times more likely to die in childbirth than their counterparts in industrialised states.10 At the same time, the mortality rate among infants and young children, especially in rural areas, is high. In some countries, up to thirty per cent of children are likely to die before they reach their fifth birthday.11

Simmons is quite blunt about the effect of development efforts on the world’s women: "No amount of talk about ‘consultation’, ‘partnerships’ and ‘empowerment’ can alter the fact that the principal effect of Third World development, as it is generally practised, is to impose an economic and political system beneficial to a relatively small élite."12 She explains that it has been the very efforts that have targeted women in development projects, since the 1975 UN Conference on Women held in Mexico that have led to the ‘feminisation’ of poverty. She locates the reason for this in five false assumptions that have been made about women’s role in society and their place in development:

Economic growth equals development and a resultant improvement in everyone’s living standards.



Women are not part of the post-war development process.



All women want to be (and have the time to be) part of the international economy.



Economic growth and the aims of women’s movements are compatible.



Women in the developing world have progressed further towards equality with men than their counterparts in the developing world.13

Assumptions such as these do not take into account, for example, that women have lost their land or access to land as a result of government policies that favour men, or the emphasis on cash crops. Attempts to integrate women into the international economy – whereby their labour also becomes measurable – often take the form of experimenting with new agricultural inputs. The idea that women would be pleased with improved high-yielding seed varieties, for example, is mistaken. Such varieties often require more frequent harvesting and more persistent weeding – traditionally women’s work. However, with the increased need to produce subsistence crops on marginal land, where the quality of the soil is constantly degrading because of lack of inputs, women simply do not have the time to take on the extra labour burden demanded by new seed varieties.14 Citing the work of Mies, Simmons15 points out how income-generating schemes "can too easily reinforce oppression in the home and in the workforce." For example, opportunities to make money with home-based enterprises simply mean that women have to perform two tasks simultaneously all day long (that of mother and home-maker, and that of income earner). Also, in such schemes women are kept isolated from fellow workers, which reduces any possibility of joining forces to advocate for better wages or benefits. With reference to access to sources of credit, Simmons16 points out that such schemes have only limited advantages and may not lead to empowerment: "Some credit schemes are successful in assisting women to establish a sound and independent economic base, but this is only in a few rare instances where the participants have real control over the conditions of credit and production. In most cases, the administration of credit remains in the hands of the creditor and is given in instalments." Seldom do women have any say in where or from whom to buy inputs or to whom to sell their products.

In writing about the second false assumption, Simmons points out that women had not been excluded from previous development efforts, or from the national economy. It is rather a matter of women’s position and presence being ignored by the development professionals such as planners, foreign-aid experts and government officials. She explains: "Development projects were planned for men, but it was women’s unpaid and low-paid labour that provided the base for ‘modernization’."17 Women were not only responsible for subsistence farming, but increasingly became responsible for small-scale cash crop farming as men migrated to urban areas or the mines in neighbouring countries in attempts to secure better standards of living for the household. Simmons criticises attempts to integrate women in development efforts (or as Kardam calls it, ‘bringing women in’18) by explaining as follows: "The proposed solution, however – to make the women ‘visible’ by including them in development projects – is merely to propose a failed ‘remedy’ as a solution for the ‘side-effects’ caused by that very remedy in the first place ... The fact that development has left many millions of people worse off than before should lead to a questioning of development and the cultural and political ideologies it stems from, not to a proposal for more of the same."19

The United Nations Decade for Women, declared in 1975, to some extent, made policy-makers aware of women, their specific needs and their plight. Yet, very little has changed since then in terms of the quality of women’s lives. There is greater awareness of the truism that including women is essential in any development process but, as shall be pointed out in the next section, simply following the notion that you have to ‘add women and stir’, has not led to the empowerment of women. All that has happened is that women have now increasingly become ‘targets’ that needed protection; they are seen as valuable ‘inputs’ in any development process; and they are relegated to a special subsection in development plans drawn up by both governments and aid agencies.

POLICIES OF THE PAST

Gender-insensitivity on the part of development planners and the state have brought about major shifts in power relations between men and women. In dealing specifically with the effects that changing agricultural practices have had on women, Momsen includes a useful synoptic overview in table form.20 The summative sections, dealing with changes in women’s socio-economic conditions, are reproduced below.

Changes such as the ones tabled by Momsen, occurred at about the time that development planners and practitioners started attempts to include women in the development process. Simmons rather cynically reports that the attempt to ‘bring women in’ or integrate them into development projects was "a whole new lease of life for the flagging development establishment" and one eagerly grasped by many development agencies. Women in the developing world were not happy with these efforts, as Simmons reports: "The women in these movements were not demanding the right to be included. They wanted to be allowed to decide for themselves what was wrong and how to put it right."21 What is called for, in other words, is the opportunity to completely reformulate and renegotiate the key issues at stake in people’s lives.22

Momsen23 criticises development efforts aimed at women by pointing out that "[d]evelopment projects directed at women are often small, scattered and peripheral to the main aims of development. They usually try to promote greater self-sufficiency rather than development in the sense of expansion and qualitative change." Other problems related to such programmes include the fact that such development efforts focused on what is traditionally regarded as ‘women’s work’, such as knitting and sewing. By doing this, they ignored the fact that African women are the main agricultural producers. Therefore, the typical ‘adding in’ programme simply increased women’s workload instead of offering realistic and practical alternatives that would increase their efficiency and their opportunities to participate in decision-making at all levels of society. An additional problem is that women do not necessarily benefit in the long term from being integrated into the international economy. As a matter of fact, their positions are particularly tenuous as they are usually the most vulnerable in any formal employment context, being the first to be laid off in an economic slump.24

A gendered approach to development will lead to greater understanding of the shifts within power relations. For example, the fact that the current economic crisis affects women more severely than men means that women have had to find alternative sources for survival and have had to develop new coping mechanisms. Momsen25 points out that this has led to changes in women’s position in society: "When women are able to respond successfully to crises they gain status within the household, either because they have become the chief income earner in the family or because they have gained confidence through learning how to negotiate successfully with national and international agencies, and to work with other women. This very success may provoke an additional crisis in the internal gender relations of the household [since it may lead to a] male backlash of violence and the expansion of female-headed households."

If women are simply ‘grafted onto’ the development discourse that is largely informed by Eurocentric assumptions about matters such as the nature of development, ‘true’ democracy and male-headed households, we will never get a thorough understanding of the grassroots interaction between women, men and a gendered state. There is a definite need to re-examine commonly held understandings, but also to examine gender and the state in its context.

THE NEED FOR A GENDERED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT

Seeing women as special targets or as inputs that have been ‘added on’ is likely to increase their vulnerability and dependency. They then become passive pieces in a development jigsaw puzzle being moved about on the basis of recommendations made without being the co-owners of any inputs and decisions. This is why a distinct feminist perspective is required if any real change in the status of women is to be observed and if the dominant tendency to be gender-insensitive is to be reversed.

Many development programmes of states and foreign aid agencies equate gender with women, focusing on access to social welfare services. But this leads to skewed development. Instead, what seems to be called for, is to look at relationships and inequalities between the two sexes anew and to address these, and not to focus on women alone.

One way in which to institutionalise a gender perspective into development policy-making is to ensure that data are generated that will make women visible. There is a distinct need for disaggregated gender statistics, so that it becomes clear who produces what with how much money and how much support. Currently, little of what African women farmers produce, is marketed. This means that they are seen as unproductive, and denied access to factors of production such as land and money.

In addition, women need to be given support for their double role in society. They need access to resources that will reduce the burden of their manual labour, and they need time to increase their educational status which will help them to enter the formal labour market.

A new approach by development workers also seems to be called for. Development workers need to move away from the notion that one can universalise assumptions about women instead of taking socio-cultural and economic factors within countries into account. In addition, they need to move away from the idea that one can focus on women without, at the same time, examining the relations between men and women, that is, without taking broader gendered issues into account. They need to move away from the idea that the impact of state policies can be discerned at household level. Development workers and analysts have to take household analyses one step further by taking account of distributive and allocative patterns within a household. This can only be done if development workers and policy-makers are actively encouraged to institutionalise gender issues at national level and in international donor agencies.

THE DEVELOPMENT STRUGGLE OF AFRICAN WOMEN

The literature distinguishes between three kinds of public policies in terms of their effects either on women, or on governing gender relations:

policies aimed directly and specifically at women, for example, ones that control reproductive issues such as abortion legislation;



policies that govern relations between men and women, such as property rights; these often serve to formalise gender relations;26 and



“general policies [which] are supposedly sex-neutral, but have a different impact on men and women.”27 These include traditionally male spheres such as defence, foreign policy, and policies relating to welfare and reproduction, spheres in which women are generally the main providers and consumers.

It is the latter with which this section is primarily concerned. The previous section mentioned a handful of the indicators that give a glimpse into the status of women in contemporary Africa. From these it is clear that women’s development challenge has daunting proportions. Women have to fight the effects of mass poverty on a wide front, ranging from:

battles to control their reproductive rights;



the push factors that govern women’s decisions to migrate to urban areas in search of an income;



the crucial position of women and women’s rights in creating a sustainable environment;



the right to have access to technology that is not simply appropriate, but specifically appropriate to women;



the constant battle for political recognition; and



participation in decisions that affect them intimately.

One theme that seems to be destined to affect all of the battles mentioned above, is that of structural adjustment. This is one of the most serious challenges facing African women today. It is an issue that has already started to change women’s status in society and is likely to continue doing so in years to come. It is also an issue that will have an impact on power and gender relations, on decisions to migrate, on the search for modern employment opportunities, on sustainable development and on political issues.

Gendered outcomes produced by policies – irrespective of whether initiated by governments or by large aid organisations – are often disadvantageous to women. Sometimes these outcomes are merely constraining, sometimes they are outright disadvantageous.

Much of the blame for this can be laid at the door of the built-in bias against women that characterises macro-economic analysis and policy.28 Macro-economic statistics do not stipulate gender or the sexual division of labour and appear to be neutral or value-free. However, statistics such as those reflecting gross domestic product (GDP), refer to marketed goods and services, and do not allow for subsistence farming, or for fuel gathering, water collection, preparation of food, nurturing of children, caring for the elderly or the ill, or for processing food – all women’s tasks.

This bias – which renders women invisible – has serious policy implications and goes a long way towards explaining some of the negative effects of SAPs. Elson explains as follows: "Macro-economic policy assumes that the process of raising children and caring for members of the labour force carried out by women unpaid will continue regardless of the way in which resources are re-allocated. Women’s unpaid labour is implicitly regarded as elastic – able to stretch to make up any shortfall in other resources."29

But women’s time and women’s work are not infinitely elastic. Put simply, the curbing of expenditure on social services, such as health, means that women have to work longer and harder to make up for this reallocation of resources. Policy-makers are unaware of the potential problems this may cause: unpaid work is not reflected in any economic or cost-benefit analyses of development programmes. It is clear, though, that women will not indefinitely be able to cope with all the additional tasks they have to take upon themselves. Some authors even believe that the increased incidence of street children is a sign that large numbers of women have reached breaking point and are choosing to send their children out on their own as a survival strategy and coping mechanism.30 Anecdotal evidence also abounds. In some countries, the cutbacks on health services mean that meals are no longer provided in hospitals. Women have to leave their farms to feed ill husbands. When a hospital stay is an extended one, it has happened that women have missed the planting season on the farm. This means they have lost subsistence crops, and the chance of earning additional income from potential surpluses.

Another reason for the negative effects of SAPs on women is simply because aid agencies and development workers still use notions of gender based on their understanding of gender and gender relations in the North. This imported understanding of gender sees a woman as an economically nonproductive member of a nuclear family.31

Western stereotyping, therefore, forms a strong basis for the assumptions that inform the development programmes of foreign aid organisations. Despite the fact that women produce up to eighty per cent of food grown in Africa, Western stereotyping of women’s place in society still means that women are seen as gardeners, rather than farmers.32 Little is done to encourage women to improve production in order to increase local supply and lower the demand for expensive imports (one of the key aims of SAPs). Instead, it is assumed that all households are headed by males. This means that aid agencies gear their activities in such a manner that agricultural extension advice on large scale farming is given to men. Loans for mechanisation and for buying inputs are given to men – they are the ones who own land and are able to provide the necessary collateral to acquire loans. Often, the results of such aid packages simply make women’s task more difficult. Instead of spending the average of fifteen to sixteen hours a day working the fields, women now have to work harder and longer hours to plant and weed the extra land that has been cleared by the new ploughs and tractors.

In addition, most of women’s work in Africa is unpaid labour. The problem with unpaid work is that, if no price is put on labour, it is assumed that the labour has no value. In other words, value and price are conflated. This helps to justify the payment of low salaries to women who enter the paid labour market, either on farms, or in urban areas.

Because women’s work is unpaid and invisible, aid agencies assume that women’s labour is freely available, and also at no cost, to assist men in their export crop farming activities. This further reduces the time women have available to produce their food crops and to market their small surpluses. This lowers their earnings and reduces their financial independence.

Small and subsistence women farmers have little chance of becoming financially independent and increasing their operations. Banks are more inclined to lend money to men than to women. Men own land, and have the necessary collateral for loans. Women produce largely for subsistence, and expected earnings from marketing surpluses are low. One of the key functions of SAPs – the removal of ceilings on interest rates – leads to interest rates rising sharply, and a lack of cheap credit. This further decreases the chances of women, and poor and middle-income people to take out loans.

As already indicated, in trying to broaden the economic base of developing world countries, incentives are given for the production of export crops. These activities are normally male dominated, affecting women and their status negatively. More communal land is used to grow export crops, which reduces women’s access to land rights. Because they have insecure access to land (often on loan from husbands), women tend to take decisions that adversely affect the environment. Rather than focus on long term returns from the soil, women are inclined to opt for actions that will guarantee short term benefits. They then use certain agricultural techniques and practices that encourage erosion, and overutilise and exhaust the soil. Therefore, large scale environmental degradation can be one of the unintended consequences of SAPs.

Supporters of SAPs incorrectly assume that, if one member of a household (the male) produces export crops, thereby increasing his income, this benefit will also filter through to the other members of the household. Yet, this does not happen as differences in spending patterns between men and women have shown. Men are more inclined to spend extra income on luxury items, such as alcohol, gambling, prostitution, another wife; whereas income under a woman’s control is spent on children’s and domestic needs.33 Therefore, differences in the political and economic status of men and women, and in their entitlements, will have a massive impact on the macro-economy of a country, and can inadvertently alter the outcomes of SAPs.

One of the main assumptions underlying SAPs is that the benefits of these austerity measures will eventually trickle down, and improve the lives of the poorest of the poor. However, it is now widely accepted that the negative effects of SAPs are particularly felt by the poor of the developing world and, more specifically, by poor women. For example, although SAPs open up new employment opportunities, women are seldom in a position to take advantage of these. They either do not have the necessary training to do so, or they do not have the time. As indicated earlier, SAPs mean that spending on health and other social services are curbed. This inevitably means that women have to "increase their work as providers of health and social services. Thus the increased domestic work imposed by these cuts actually prevents women from taking advantage of any new economic opportunities."34

The changes in prices of consumer goods (brought about by a devaluation of the local currency or by cuts in subsidies) are also likely to affect women rather than men. Elson points out that the nutritional status of children, and pregnant and lactating women drastically deteriorated in countries following International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank SAPs. When households cannot afford to buy sufficient food of the right quality for the whole family, preference is given to adult males.35

The effects of SAPs also affect different members of the same household differently. Evidence suggests that if the private cost of education goes up (that is, if user charges are introduced or increased), the participation of women and girls is the first to be reduced. This is because the expected returns on the education of males are much higher.36

There are many other ways in which women and girls are affected by SAPs, of which the following are but a few:

more women have to enter the labour force to supplement their husbands’ income; at the same time, the likelihood of women getting employment in the formal sector is lower than that of men because their educational status is lower than that of males;



more women enter the informal sector in the absence of jobs in the formal sector;



women farmers do not benefit directly from the devaluation of the local currency because they produce largely for own consumption, or they trade only in restricted, non-international markets;



the unpaid work of women definitely increases, as already mentioned. One way in which this happens, is that they have to spend more time shopping to get products at low prices, and then have to spend longer preparing food because they buy less processed foodstuffs, or cheaper cuts of meat. In urban areas, they often start food gardens;



girls assist their mothers with unpaid work; there is less time for schooling, and girls’ eventual educational attainment is lower than that of boys; and



there is a higher incidence of male migration in search of work. The benefits of such action do not filter through to the other members of the household. As a matter of fact, it adds to the burden of rural African women, who now also have to become farm managers. As Sparr explains, “[m]igration is a male survival strategy – not a female or household strategy.”37

Calls are increasingly being made for "adjustment with gender equity" to ensure that women do not become worse off – both as individuals within households, and in comparison with men in comparable social groupings.38 This objective means that cuts in public expenditure must be done more selectively, for example,

cut subsidies on national airlines rather than on basic foodstuffs;



place greater emphasis on self-reliant food production, rather than on export crops;



introduce measures that will enable women to use new economic opportunities by rechannelling some of the incentives for export crop production towards support services for women (that is, establish day-care facilities, better access to water and fuelwood); and


bring about truly transformative changes to the economy, rather than simply adjustments.



in other words, change the laws that govern women’s access to factors of production – to land and to credit.

There seems to be a need to look for different ways in which to restructure public service activities and thereby reduce public expenditure. More money has to be earmarked for primary health care rather than expensive urban hospitals. Paramedics and barefoot doctors have to be trained rather than fully-fledged doctors. In the field of education, user charges at tertiary education levels should be higher than that at the level of basic education. User fees should be differentiated: charges for electricity in wealthier suburbs should be higher than in low-income areas. None of these options will be popular, but they are essential if the skewed power relations in African societies are to be addressed, and the negative impacts of ‘development’ programmes reduced.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY INTERFACE

The positions of men and women in a developing state, their roles as citizens, their relationships with one another and with the state, are constantly in a state of flux. This is further complicated by the fact that these roles and relationships are subject to countless variables – many of which are outside the control of either the state or its citizens, such as the international prices of commodities, and the unintended consequences of compliance with externally induced SAPs.

Writing about the nature of the state and the relationship between people and the state, Kothari describes the state as "the basic unit of organisation and identity in the world."39 In this context, the state can either reduce "all other corporate identities to individualized subjects or, to the extent it admitted the existence of the former in the form of a complex called civil society, it has purported to be both the embodiment and the protector of such civil society ..." In Kothari’s brief cameos of the relationship between state and people, it is clear that each possible relationship also has a polar extreme. For example, among the various sets of relationships identified by Kothari are what he calls the "bourgeois democratic liberal institutional model of the state based on the theory of accountability ...", and the "social-democratic model of the state assuming responsibility for the social transformation and the welfare of the people." The state therefore seems to both servant and leader. Paradoxes such as these abound, and are not only found to exist among states, but also within a single state. Much seems to depend on the specific context or the defining situation in mind. This is also evident in Kothari’s own description of what he calls his "own idea (not yet a model)" of a state as "a plural arena which, while it displays growing use and misuse of the coercive apparatus and sinews of repression and terror, nevertheless continues to be a mediator among contending groups ... I think of it as an increasingly problematic yet still relevant arena encompassing the large diversity of both contending and coalescing populations and interests within a context of historic transformation based on the democratic aspirations of countless millions of people round the world."40

The demands made of the arena to which Kothari refers, are immense. Democracy and principles of ‘good’ governance require "sensitivity to issues of accountability, transparency and civil responsiveness in public decision-making ..."41 Governance also describes the relationships between people: "Central to this [relationship] is the issue of how social systems are organised and managed, resources allocated and consumed and the lifestyles of present and future generations are determined."42 The inference is therefore that governance is concerned with

political decision-making: determining how resources are allocated within society;



socio-economic planning, i.e., with determining what is needed, where and when, and what the norms and values are that determine the distribution of any goods within society; and



the establishment and maintenance of structures and institutions that are regarded as legitimate by the majority of the population, again based on the dominant values and norms.43

In moving away from more conventional notions of democracy as a purely (or primarily) political phenomenon and concept, Bauzon emphasises the importance of a comprehensive, inclusive understanding of the term. He explains: "... the meaning of democracy has been redefined ... as not merely the expansion of political rights and popular participation in government and politics, but also – and perhaps more importantly so – as the empowerment of people in the pursuit of their own economic and social well-being."44 This understanding of democracy corresponds very closely to contemporary people-centred views of development. Development, as does democracy, touches on all social aspects that relate to initiatives that affect people’s lives. It ties in closely with the notion of ownership of and control over resources, institutions and processes. By taking Bauzon’s view of democracy as a starting point, we implicitly and explicitly link development to a political process within which democratic principles and norms are foremost.

The concerns of an integrated and holistic view of development also mirror those of democracy. Current development concerns are also the concerns of democratic processes and structures. Democracy, like development, emphasises accountability to grassroots movements, accommodating gender-related and gender-informed needs, the demand for physical well-being through ensured food security, a sustainable environment, people-centred and participatory processes, demographics (including population growth and population movements within and across national boundaries), instilling in people a sense of humanity and pride by acknowledging prior experiences and traditions.

But how has African states fared in the process of giving meaning and substance to both democracy and development? And how has the West, in its guise as international aid givers fared in this process? Neither have given satisfactory performances. African states fall short, precisely because of their own fragility and their reliance upon imported knowledge and technology, their own weaknesses in harnessing the strengths and potential of their people and their inability to create enabling settings for the empowerment of their populations. International aid organisations, such as the Bretton Woods organisations, fail to respond to the realities prevailing in the South and dovetailing their adjustment programmes to accommodate these realities.

In contemporary development discourse, dominated by the advocates of people-centred and adaptive development such as David Korten, Dennis Rondinelli and Robert Chambers, the aim is to "... reverse the tendency toward concentrating power in impersonal and unaccountable institutions, returning it to people and communities and ensuring its equitable distribution. This empowerment process is advanced in part through developing strong member-accountable institutions and strengthening local resource control and ownership. There is no question that local organizing is integral to people-centered development."45 Yet, African states are characterised by increased centralism, despite the threatening collapse of states and their capacities. Where attempts have been made to decentralise government institutions to grassroots level, such as in the case of the Zimbabwean village and ward development committees, these have ceased to function in nearly all instances.

In discussing linkages between development and democracy, we dare not try to find positive causal linkages. Broadbent makes this point clear in three propositions concerning causal relations between human rights and economic growth:

Although the sacrifice of human rights will not guarantee economic development, it will guarantee injustice to those whose rights are denied.



Although the suppression of democratic rights has been done by governments in the name of economic development, the only constant consequence has been to maintain the power and wealth of the governing party, elite, or class.



Although civil, political, social, and cultural liberties will not guarantee a fair distribution of economic benefits, it is unlikely that such fairness will occur when such liberties are denied.”46

At most, an attempt can be made to identify common ideals and norms between democracy and development. As pointed out, if Bauzon’s definition of democracy is taken as the starting point and compared that to people-centred development, the linkages are clear and manifold.

When indicating the linkages between democracy and the eradication of poverty, Axworthy writes as follows: "The precondition to solving mass poverty, according to Galbraith, is to break the equilibrium of poverty – the passivity or acceptance of fate that many traditional societies exhibit. At a minimum, democracy is a means to stir people up. It requires participation. By giving responsibility, it demands involvement."47

Participation is one of the cornerstones of people-centred development and has become one of the catch phrases of contemporary development discourse. As with most development terminology, definitions and diverse viewpoints abound. The contributors to the book edited by Nelson and Wright distinguish between "... participation as a means (to accomplish the aims of a project more efficiently, effectively or cheaply) as opposed to participation as an end (where the community or group sets up a process to control its own development). Both types of participation imply the possibility of very different power relationships between members of a community as well as between them and the state and agency institutions. Simply put, the extent of empowerment and involvement of the local population is more limited in the first approach that it is in the second."48 They state their interpretation of the concept clearly when they point out that "... ‘participation’, if it is to be more than a palliative, involved shifts in power. These occur within communities, between ‘people’ and policy-making and resource-holding institutions, and within the structure of those organizations."49

Typical definitions of participation can be categorised as being either instrumental or transformative. "Getting communities to decide on their own priorities was called transformative; getting people to buy into a donor’s project was instrumental."50 Today it is commonly understood that participation means that people are actively involved in a transformative process in which they determine their own priorities, courses of action and resources. This means that participation is no longer mere involvement in a predetermined set of actions decided upon by ‘outsiders’ (including government and non-government organisations (NGOs)) whereby their involvement lends either credence or legitimacy to the initiators of the change, or whereby they become providers of cheap labour. However, as Nelson and Wright remind us, participation in practice can never be either instrumental or transformative because any ethnographic research would show that there are different kinds of participation at play at different levels and in different situations within any given context.51

In drawing people into the democratic process, participatory methodology becomes increasingly important. Participatory research methods assist people from all classes and from either gender group to make their voices heard, both within the community and towards ‘outsiders’. The results of participatory research processes, such as participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and participatory learning in action (PLA), in themselves, would lead to shifts in power relationships among community members because of ‘exposing’ people’s feelings and experiences and questioning practices (such as the amount of time women spend on household tasks relative to that of men in a ‘traditional’ society). But such participatory methods also lead to power shifts between subject and object in the research process (usually communities and foreign development aid organisations). This promotes the move away from what Schrijvers calls the "dichotomous, hierarchical oppositions between an active subject and a passive object."52 In this sense, participation describes "... an empowering process which enables local people to do their own analysis, to take command, to gain in confidence, and to make their own decisions. In theory this means that ‘we’ participate in ‘their’ project, not ‘they’ in ‘ours’."53

True democracy in any state would need to ascribe to the more radical conceptualisation of participation as a transformative process. This was clearly pointed out by Meintjes when she wrote about the prospects for true democracy, citizenship and equality for South African women: "If the new democratic dispensation simply adopts procedural and conventional liberal constitutional, legal and political forms which underpin western systems of government, an effective democracy which includes the participation on an equal basis of all its citizens will elude South Africa. The citizens of a merely formal democracy would be considered equal before the law, and would enjoy the vote. But unless these rights are accompanied by access to property, educational institutions, and empowerment opportunities empowered citizenship will remain a dream of the ANC’s RDP [(Reconstruction and Development Programme)]."54

Writing about people-centred development and its relationship with development and poverty, Korten points out that "[i]t attributes poverty to a concentration and misuse of power and resources – especially environmental resources – in a finite world."55 If a redistribution of resources and assets is then a precondition to development, how likely is this to happen given the way in which social changes exacerbate the precarious position of women, rather than enhance their chances of taking control of their own lives? It is issues such as these that will be addressed in the following section.

SOME LINKAGES BETWEEN GENDER, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

As in the case of the impact of SAPs, democracy and the mutual impact of gender issues on the establishment and maintenance of democratic processes cannot be examined by looking at democracy only at a fairly centralised level – that of the public domain. It is also essential to look at the lowest level to determine how intrahousehold power relations affect the opportunities of women to participate in any democratic actions (time shortage in particular, lack of access to resources (finances, land, credit) in general are important here). In this context, Rai remarks that "... the time and resources at their disposal to cross the boundary of their private lives into the public sphere remained very limited."56 It is commonly believed that it is sufficient to look at the household as a unit of analysis for the impact of development efforts and state intervention. However, this does not take the different power relations within a household into account. A household is not devoid of power and conflict relations. Power struggles and conflict occur on an almost daily basis (albeit less visibly so at some times that at others) as men, women and children jostle to strengthen their own positions within households. Nevertheless, the state is tempted to see households as single, homogenous units, headed by men. It is also important to examine the potential of civil society as a democratisation tool.

But this does not mean that gender inequalities and skewed power relations should only be considered at intrahousehold, or non-government levels. It is particularly when women transcend private domain boundaries and enter the public arena in large enough numbers to reach critical mass that any meaningful changes in equity and true development can be observed. However, the public domain is riddled with gender inequalities and low levels of participation and representation. This is true throughout the world. Contrary to popular belief, gender inequality is not typical only of African states with their predominantly patriarchal systems. The underrepresentation of women at all levels of political participation in all states is clear from the special conference held in February 1995 by the Council of Europe in preparation for the 4th World Conference on Women (Beijing, 4-15 September 1995). Taylor encapsulates the reasons for women’s underrepresentation in public life in Europe as follows: "There are structural and attitudinal reasons why women are not involved full-time in political life, and why the skills they show in other areas of activity are not used politically. These reasons include social and cultural beliefs, socio-economic factors, difficulties in reconciling family life with paid employment or political activity, the structure of political parties, including a reluctance to select women candidates, and the prevalence of the male norm in public professional and political life."57

The low levels of participation are pointed out in statistics given by Karl.58 She shows that women hold an average of only ten per cent of parliamentary seats worldwide. In 1993, women accounted for more than twenty per cent of seats in only eleven out of 170 countries. In 1990, the average percentage of women serving as ministers was only four per cent.

The low levels of women’s participation in higher political echelons can also be attributed to either attitudinal and practical or structural factors. In the first instance, women’s household commitments prevent them from actively participating in politics, thereby denying them the practice normally associated with career politicians. Secondly, as Waylen points out, the structure of formal politics is largely masculine: "This ranges from the timings of meetings, the combative style and machismo ... and more widespread discrimination against women, for example in selection procedures, which prevents them from rising in political parties."59

However, not only are there relatively few political office bearers in the world that are women, but they are also unevenly represented in the bureaucracy. In addition, analysts have remarked on the "embedded masculine style and organisation of state bureaucracies, epitomised ... by the Weberian rational model."60 In situations where it is difficult for women to access formal political institutions that are characterised by male bias, one is tempted to assume that non-government organisations will provide a safer conduit for women’s political and participatory aspirations. However, in taking up the dichotomy of state/civil society regarding women’s participation in democratic processes, Rai shows that this is not the case.

Rai takes as her definition of civil society that of Walzer: "the space of uncoerced ... human association and also the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology – that fill this space ... [In contrast] ... the state is grounded on coercion ..."61 The importance of civil society lies therein that "[t]he process of democratization has been one of the reinstitution of the autonomy of civil society."62 But, as Rai immediately points out, the existence of civil society is no guarantee that women will find a safe space for participation in democratic processes or for improving their lives through participation in democratic institutions – it will not guarantee a greater say in or greater control over their own lives. Rai explains: "In Third World societies (as well as in the West), however, the civil society instead of being an uncoerced space is one ridden with dangers and traumas for women who attempt to leave the private world of domesticity."63 Other questions she asks are: "How are women to participate in associational politics of the civil society, the interest-based politics of the state, and the economy, and also carry the burden of domestic work? Further, if the dominant (male) discourse on social relations excludes women, how is there to come about a civil society that is open and democratic? For many Third World women, the impetus for their participation in the public sphere has come from state-led economic and political reforms rather than the civil society. Whether this has led to the democratization of the private sphere is another (not altogether happy) story."64

Halvorsen65 points out that the many anecdotal and empirical studies of women and their positions in society show that a gendered state does exist, and that it has a wide variety of effects upon different classes and casts of women. As Rai66 points out, the women that are most directly affected by the machinations of state, are those that can be classified as ‘middle class’ – the wealthy do not rely on the state to provide them with access to health, education, child care and employment, they can afford to make use of the private sector. At the opposite end of the class spectrum is the absolute poor for whom the state can also do very little, simply because it does not have the resources to compensate for things such as opportunity cost.

One of the ways in which the state governs relationships and subsequently determines gendered power relations (and therefore also such access to the means of production that could lead to empowerment and control of people’s own lives) is in the legal status afforded women. If women are seen as legal minors, land ownership immediately becomes an issue that relegates women to subservient positions and subjugates them in a manner entrenched by law. Rai explains why the issue of legal rights is so important: "In many cases women’s exclusion from the public sphere is difficult to fight precisely because while there is a culturally authenticated language legitimizing their invisibility, there is no counter discourse that allows them recognition as individual women in the public sphere."67 One also has to keep in mind that women’s exposure to the state and the law is actually quite minimal in many African states as a result of of the weakness and inability of the state to articulate any changes in policies and laws. Furthermore, women’s inability to access information is also greater because of high levels of illiteracy, a fact that is compounded by vested interests keeping information that is delivered by other means from them. In South Africa, for example, the state’s new housing policy has removed any statutory discrimination from the books in terms of granting subsidies. However, it is debatable how many women, especially in the remote rural areas, are aware of this.

There is no denying that a state containing predominantly democratic processes is desirable. With reference to rape, Rai68 explains the need for a democratic system as follows: "Women need a democratic system not simply as ‘protector’ (which it might or might not be) but as providing an access to a public space in which women might mobilize in their own defence." What this boils down to, is support for the definition of development in the UNDP’s Human Development Report as an increase in the choices or options open to people. Without a democratic system one may not even have recourse to anything that will help to protect women (irrespective of whether it actually does this or not). The chances are that one may have another option (instead of mere acceptance), but there are no guarantees that the state will be able to deliver the goods. Rai supports this as follows: "What is clear ... is that a democratic system, however flawed, partial and gender-blind, provides women with greater and better opportunities to struggle for and in their own interests. The potential that a civil society, however fractured and conservative, provides women to organize is an enormous advantage as compared with a combination of an oppressive civil society and an authoritarian state."69

An indication of the value attached to democratic societies by women is seen in their unremitting participation in struggles to bring about democracy – the South African example is a case in point.70 Other African states that exhibited high levels of women’s participation in liberation struggles include Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In some instances, their participation was largely in supportive capacities. As Karl points out, it was commonly understood that "the emancipation of women would automatically be achieved by the victory of the struggle. At the end of the struggle, however, women were usually expected to assume their traditional roles or were largely limited to supportive positions in political and public life. Although most victorious movements proclaimed the equality of women and stamped out blatantly oppressive practices, women’s issues continued to be considered peripheral."71

South Africa is a notable exception in this regard. It is precisely because of women’s active role in the liberation struggle in South Africa that so many women were subsequently taken up in the higher political echelons. This is one of very few states throughout the world where the contribution of women to struggles for democracy and political freedom is acknowledged. Here women actually occupy a relatively large proportion of the seats in parliament. A deliberate decision was taken by the African National Congress (ANC) as the ruling party, to ensure that one-third of all parliamentarians are female to ‘reward’ women for their role as political activists. This has a marked effect on the way in which decisions are made, and the content of such decisions, as Budlender explains: "The decision by the ANC to have a 33,3% quota of women parliamentarians does not mean that parliament simply looks different. It is different in that women’s issues are starting to be integrated into the work of government in ways that they have never been before."72 One very important way in which this has occurred, is the Women’s Budget Initiative, introduced in 1994. This initiative entails that all items of government expenditure have to specify the impact of such funding on women in South Africa. Very specific objectives have to be set to improve the status and conditions of women and to report on the extent to which these objectives have been met. Budlender explains: "The Women’s Budget is not a separate budget for women. It proposes that all programmes of every department at national, provincial or local level be examined for their impact on women."73

It is important to keep in mind that women’s political actions and activities are not solely linked to the parliamentary political sphere. They very often have an economic or a social basis. Such actions include women’s involvement in food riots in states such as Zimbabwe and Zambia, and women challenging forced removals instituted by the former South African regime by standing in the way of bulldozers and trucks. But their political activities are seldom as militant as these two examples would imply. Often, they take the form of self-help activities where crafts are produced or where soup kitchens are run. The social activities that surround such actions often have a strong political current, for example the Oodi weavers in Botswana that have made political conscientisation a major part of their self-help project.

On the same topic, Momsen points out that women’s groups, that start off as simple organisations to ensure survival, may have political spinoffs that few development workers or politicians take into account: "... these women’s groups may provide a focus for the politicization of women’s lives around issues of prime importance to their domestic role, such as rising food costs and the disappearance of children at the hands of repressive regimes. This link between empowerment of women for household welfare and consequent political action has not been analysed by most development workers."74

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was not to provide an analysis of gender and the democratic state (as opposed to any other forms of state), or to explain the detailed stances of various schools of feminist thought on gender, democracy and development. This would require several volumes. Instead, the aim was to highlight a few of the considerations and contradictions that come to the fore in the interface between gender, democracy and development. These concern gender issues that need to be taken into account in any analysis of how democracies impact on development processes, their results in African states, and, conversely, the demands made by contemporary development theories and approaches on democratic processes.

With reference to Larry Diamond, Bauzon describes strategies that may be used to induce democratisation in states where this is lacking.75 These strategies focus on two sets of actors: political leaders and other political actors within states who need to encourage broad-based consultation and participation; and international aid agencies who may use various methods to encourage the formation and acceptance of democratic principles. The effectiveness and wisdom of such strategies in the African context, and as they relate to the improvement of women’s position in society, needs to be questioned critically. Indeed, as Bauzon further points out,76 arguments such as these are inclined to allow for a too narrow definition of democracy by focusing on the political only, and not including the socio-economic; they seem to equate democracy and elections; they are ahistorical, do not take into account the effects of colonialism, neocolonialism or the inequitable relationships that exist within the world order and which have determined the nature of structures and institutions within Africa. The practical realities of state leadership, the vested interests that need to be protected, the very fragility of state institutions do not allow for any new challenges that may topple the precariously balanced network of clients and patrons. These are simply too precious for the incumbents to allow measures that would improve women’s low status and increase their limited positions in decision-making structures. It simply is not worth it – the risks are too high. Development policies of internal political leaders and international aid agencies all mitigate against improvements in women’s status – the dice are loaded against women, in favour of men, largely because the understanding of male/female relationships is informed by a western and male bias.

What we have in Africa are weak or soft states that are, at best, blind to the interests and needs of gender. And yet, African women are increasingly seeing the state as of crucial importance in their lives. On the one hand, the state serves an enabling function, for example, by means of educational provision. The higher economic status that women achieve because of state-sponsored education draws them into the public arena and gives them the opportunity to question the state’s gender blindness. On the other hand, the very weakness of the state makes it difficult to ensure responsiveness and accountability, even to a growing economic pressure group. Instead, the weak state continues to negate, by law, women’s real positions of economic power by further legitimising and keeping in place measures such as traditional patriarchal practices of land tenure.

What seems to be crucial to any understanding of development, democracy and gender, is that ‘politics’ has to be redefined to also include many of the activities in which women are involved. Waylen points out that, from the time of the contract philosophers, politics was seen to take place in the public domain only.77 In addition, it was assumed that it was the male, representing the household, who entered and took part in activities in the political sphere. The domestic, private domain was not seen to be of any relevance or importance to the public and political domain. This artificial division between public and private meant that the public domain was exclusively seen as masculine, thereby rejecting the possibility (and reality) that many female activities are also political.

This chapter concludes by echoing Rai’s call for an examination of "... the growing and diverse areas of women’s political activities which include not only opposition, but also negotiation, not only struggle, but also strategic bargaining in spaces that are intersections of the private and the public spheres ..."78 Only then can the mesh of the gender, democracy and development interface begin to be disentangled and can clear guidelines for future actions and directions be formulated.

Endnotes

See, for example, K Ginther, E Denters & P J I M de Waart (eds.), Sustainable Development and Good Governance, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995.



See G Waylen, Analysing Women in the Politics of the Third World, in H Afshar (ed.), Women and Politics in the Third World, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 9-10.



Ibid., p. 16.



Ibid., p. 21.



G Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress, Heinemann, London, 1983.



An excellent summary of development policies towards women can be found in C O N Moser, Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 56-57.



ATTorres, RSDel Rosario & R Pineda-Ofreno, Gender and Development: Making the Bureaucracy Gender-responsive. A Sourcebook for Advocates, Planners and Implementers, UNFund for Women, New York, 1994, pp. 2.



See World Bank, World Development Report, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1994, pp. 217-219.



See M Carr, Women and Food Security: The Experience of the SADCC Countries, Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1991, p. 91.



United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1991, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 143.



World Bank, op. cit., p. 215.



P Simmons, Women in Development: A Threat to Liberation, in M Rahnema & V Bawtree (eds.), The Post-development Reader, Zed Books, London, 1997, p. 244.



Ibid., p. 246.



See ibid., p. 246.



Ibid., p. 247.



Ibid.



Ibid., p. 248.



N Kardam, Bringing Women in: Women’s Issues in International Development, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1991.



Simmons, op. cit., p. 248.



J H Momsen, Women and Development in the Third World, Routledge, London, 1991, pp. 52-54.



Simmons, op. cit., p. 249.



See also S Rai, Women and the State in the Third World, in Ashfar, op. cit., 1996, p. 26 who is also vociferous in her criticism of such approaches and argues that what is really called for is a complete "reformulation of the central issues"; also D Pankhurst & J Pearce, Feminist Perspectives on Democratization in the South: Engendering or Adding Women in?, in Afshar, op. cit., pp. 40-41, who point out that part of the limitations in simply adding women in is that it ignores "blocks of key areas of analysis, such as the interaction between gender, ethnicity and class."



Momsen, op. cit., p. 100.



See Simmons, op. cit., p. 250.



Momsen, op. cit., p. 104.



Waylen, op. cit., p. 13.



Ibid., p. 13.



D Elson, Structural Adjustment: Its Effects on Women, in T Wallace & C March (eds.), Changing Perceptions: Writings on Gender and Development, Oxfam, Oxford, 1991, p. 39.



Ibid., p. 40.



See P Sparr, Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment, in P Sparr (ed.), Mortgaging Women’s Lives: Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment, Zed Books, London, 1994, p. 17.



A Brett, Why Gender is a Development Issue, in Wallace & March, op. cit., p. 5.



A Spring, Women Farmers and Food in Africa: Some Considerations and Suggested Solutions, in A Hansen & D E McMillan (eds.), Food in Sub-Saharan Africa, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1986, p. 341.



Sparr, op. cit., p. 18.



T Wallace, The Impact of Global Crises on Women: Introduction, in Wallace & March, op. cit., p. 17.



Elson, op. cit., p. 47.



See R Bellew & E M King, Promoting Girls’ and Women’s Education: Lessons from the Past, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1991.



Sparr, op. cit., p. 29.



Elson, op. cit., p. 51.



R Kothari, The Agony of the Modern State, in M Rahnema & V Bawtree (eds.), The Post-modern Reader, Zed Books, London, 1997, p. 144.



Ibid., p. 145.



H W O Okoth-Ogendo, Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa, in Ginther et. al., op. cit., p. 105.



Okoth-Ogendo, op. cit., p. 107.



Ibid., p. 108.



K E Bauzon, Introduction: Democratization in the Third World – Myth or Reality?, in K E Bauzon (ed.), Development and Democratization in the Third World: Myths, Hopes and Realities, Crane Russak, Washington, 1992, p. 16.



DCKorten, People-centered Development: Alternative for a World Crisis in Development and Democratization in the Third World, in KEBauzon (ed.), Myths, Hopes and Realities, Crane Russak, Washington, 1992, pp. 64-65.



E Broadbent, Foreign Policy, Development and Democracy, in Bauzon, op. cit., p. 102.



T S Axworthy, Democracy and Development: Luxury or Necessity?, in Bauzon, op. cit., p. 116.



N Nelson & S Wright, Participation and Power, in N Nelson & S Wright (eds.), Power and Participatory Development: Theory and Practice, Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1995, p. 1.



Ibid.



Ibid., p. 5.



Ibid., pp. 1-2, 6.



J Schrijvers, Participation and Power: A Transformative Feminist Research Perspective, in Nelson & Wright, op. cit., p. 22.



R Chambers, Paradigm Shifts and the Practice of Participatory Research and Development, in Nelson & Wright, op. cit., p. 30.



S Meintjes, Gender, Citizenship and Democracy in Post-apartheid South Africa, paper presented to the Institute for Advanced Social Research, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 24 April 1995, p 7.



Korten, op. cit., p. 65.



S Rai, Gender and Democratization: Or What does Democracy mean for Women in the Third World?, Democratization, 1(2), 1994, p. 210.



M Taylor, Equality and Democracy: Utopia or Challenge? Proceedings of the Conference Organised by the Council of Europe as a Contribution to the Preparatory Process of the United Nations 4th World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995; Palais de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 9-11 February 1995. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1996, p. 102. In this regard, see also Meintjes, op. cit., p. 7.



M Karl, Women and Empowerment: Participation and Decision-making, Zed Books, London, 1995, p. 61.



Waylen, op. cit., p. 12.



Ibid., p. 13.



Rai, op. cit., 1994, p. 213.



Ibid., p. 214.



Ibid., p. 214.



Ibid., p. 214-215.



K Halvorsen, The Gendered State: A Review of Some Recent Studies on Women and the State, Chr Michelsen Institute, Fantoft, Norway, 1991, pp. 27-28.



Rai, op. cit., 1996, p. 34.



Rai, op. cit., 1994, p. 216.



Ibid., p. 217.



Ibid., p. 218.



See Meintjes, op. cit., p. 4 ff.



Karl, op. cit., p. 79.



D Budlender (ed.), The Women’s Budget, Institute for Democracy in South Africa, Cape Town, 1996, p. 2.



Ibid., p. 8.



Momsen, op. cit., pp. 99-100.



Bauzon, op. cit., p. 5-6.



Bauzon, op. cit.



Waylen, op. cit., p. 8.



Rai, op. cit., 1996, p. 25.