An Exploration of the Link Between Security and Development

Dr Maxi Schoeman
Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Studies, Rand Afrikaans University and Research Associate, Institute for Security Studies

Published in Monograph No 27: Security, Development and Gender in Africa, August, 1998


Over the past decade, the field of International Relations1 has been subjected to challenges to its orthodox approaches. New approaches to various subfields within International Relations (e.g., International Political Economics, International Organisation, Foreign Policy) and debates between these, and between them and orthodox approaches2 are characteristic of the current era, thereby making the study of International Relations a vibrant, if contested, discipline.3 One such subfield within International Relations which has been, and still is at the centre of debates and renewal, and the subject of a constant stream of publications is that of Security Studies. So-called ‘new security’, denoting the broadening of the concept to include more than traditional military-political security, and actors, agents and referents other than states and military establishments, is often associated with the space created by the end of the Cold War and the changing nature of conflict. No longer are conflict4 and threats to security confined to the international arena and to military aspects. Security studies now also focuses on intrastate (violent) conflict, particularly in the developing world, and the fact that this ‘world’ is confronted by an ‘insecurity’ dilemma rather than a security dilemma.5 The need to study these, as well as the importance of ‘other’ dimensions of security, such as the economic, social and environmental spheres of security,6 are also acknowledged, or at least debated in terms of what is to be secured and how.7 However, the literature is still rather thin to non-existing when it comes to broadening or exploring the agents of security.8 The reason for broadening our understanding of the concept security is to some extent related to an increasing ethical and moral concern with the human condition, and a realisation and recognition of the fact that, both in terms of International Relations theory and in practice, the ultimate purpose of knowledge and its application are aimed at improving the human condition.

One of the most salient characteristics of the broadening of security is the extent to which the concept has been, and is still being informed by related and previously unconnected disciplines and approaches, such as Sociology, Feminism and Green Political Theory (GPT).9 In practice, security and development are increasingly linked. This connection is generally taken to have been forged by the United Nations Development programme (UNDP) and Boutros-Ghali10 as a result of the deepening inequality between the North and the South, the seeming intractability of absolute poverty in many areas of the developing world, and the extent to which intrastate wars and instability inhibits and destroys development and progress. The literature on security does not as yet reflect academic or scholarly attention to this link between the two concepts and two fields of study, namely Security Studies and Development Studies (and, to the extent that it is considered a separate field of study, that of Development Economics).

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the link between security and development, both from a theoretical perspective and in terms of this nexus in practice, with specific reference to South and Southern Africa. Some of the chapters in this monograph will explore development practice, and particularly the way in which it includes the most insecure sectors of society, namely women,11 in more detail. This chapter is more concerned with Accessing the discussion around the link between security and development, while later chapters, by dealing with issues such as development, democracy, the role of the state, gender and the role and position of women, serve to illustrate the extent to which development is a process concurrent with, but also supportive of security-building. In the first section, the concepts ‘security’ and ‘development’ are dealt with, showing that applying elements of critical theory and critical security studies may serve the purpose of transforming current reality, rather than merely solving the problems which undermine the stability of the current global order. The second section consists of a discussion of the way in which regionalisation may provide a means for securing Southern Africa, i.e., providing security and development as the combined requirements for peace and welfare. It should be stressed that the ideas and suggestions contained in this chapter are very tentative and exploratory and much work still needs to be done in order to come to grips with the link or relationship between security and development, especially at the conceptual and theoretical levels.

The security-development nexus

When dealing with theory, and also with pre-theory at the level of conceptual exploration as in the case of this section, it is useful to keep Cox’s dictum in mind that theory "is always for someone and for some purpose" and that no theory is "independent of a concrete historical context."12 But one needs to understand Cox’s remarks within the intellectual context in which he frames them. Cox distinguishes between problem-solving theory and critical theory. The first takes the world as ‘given’ and "provides guidance to correct dysfunctions or specific problems that arise within this existing order."13 The objective of neoliberalism, for instance, is to ensure that the state-system and the capitalist world economy "function smoothly in their co-existence ... by diffusing any conflicts, tensions, or crises that might arise between them."14 Neoliberal institutionalism has the facilitation of the "smooth operation of decentralised international political systems" as its objective.15 Problem-solving theories do not question the prevailing order or explore its origins, nor are these theories aimed at transformation. In fact, the claim by problem-solving theorists that they are value-neutral,16 however unrealistic such a claim might be, explains why these theories cannot be transformative – they are supposed to reflect ‘reality’, not to work towards radical change guided by moral concerns. Furthermore, the work of some of these theorists, such as the liberal internationalist Fukuyama, seems to claim that the combination of Western liberal democracy and capitalism is an approach and condition beyond ideology, thereby negating the profound ideological underpinnings of these so-called value-neutral, realist approaches or theories.17 According to proponents of problem-solving theories, history is a linear, evolutionary process, and problems and issues arising within history as an existing order/system can be managed and/or solved, thereby maintaining, expanding, ensuring and improving stability and peace, the latter in its narrow definition as the absence of war. In this way, the international state system is de-historicised and elevated to the status of an ‘inevitability’, rather than admitting that it is a human construct and a product of a specific era and context.18

Critical theory on the other hand, in Cox’s words, is "concerned with how the existing order came into being and what the possibilities are for change in that order ... exploring the potential for structural change and the construction of strategies for change."19 In essence, critical theory is an aid in changing the existing order and is therefore self-consciously normative. Although generally viewed as drawing on strands of Western political, philosophical and social thought – traced back at least to Kant, and after him Marx, the Frankfurt Schule and Habermas – the work of dependencia theorists from the developing world has strong links with the basic aims and objectives of this form of theorising. Furthermore, the calls from the developing world for a more equitable and just international order – starting with the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) under the presidency of Prebisch in the early sixties, progressing through the calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s, and the current attempts to revitalise and utilise an organisation such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) towards global transformation – point to the influence of critical theories on developing world leaders and on theoretically informed practice (praxis), thereby rescuing, as it were, critical theory from being solely Western in origin and development.

From a developing world perspective, critical theory with its emphasis on equity, justice, freedom and emancipation20 seems to provide a viable intellectual tool for scrutinising the existing order and the knowledge claims of International Relations, and to reflect on the extent to which social reality is constructed and therefore amenable to radical change. Theory is rooted in reality and conditioned by era and context, impacting on the construction of reality through the way in which it orients the minds of people as actors/builders in/of this reality. This may account for the obvious ‘fit’ between the objectives and subject matter and the normative base of critical theory, and the views, concerns and approaches of the developing world in confronting or trying to deal with an international and global socio-economic reality which is largely the making of and under the control of the North. For the developing world, and particularly for sub-Saharan Africa and within it the Southern African region, issues of emancipation loom large. Taking the situation and condition of the lives of the vast majority of the continent’s inhabitants into account, it is small wonder that explanations and the possible transformation of these conditions would draw security and development together. In order to understand the almost inevitability of this link being forged, and to understand why development issues and the field of Development Studies contribute to critical security studies, particularly in a developing world and in the African context, it is necessary to pay brief attention to the concept ‘development’.

Development

Traditionally – referring here to the post-Second World War era and the period of decolonisation in what has been termed the ‘third world’ – development was largely defined in economic growth terms, much as the definition of security was rooted in military-political thinking and practice. These restricted, narrow definitions point to an intellectual era during which disciplines rather jealously guarded their ‘interests’ and little interaction between various disciplines took place.21 Development was initially concerned with and defined as the ability of an economy to generate and sustain an annual increase in its gross national product (GNP) in real terms, i.e., in excess of its population growth rate. In this way, development was measured in terms of ‘real’ growth in per capita income, disregarding the actual distribution of economic gains and the non-material aspects of human life. By the 1970s, development was also concerned with the distribution of economic growth and with social indicators of development, such as gains in literacy, health conditions and the provision of housing, all of which were considered to be necessary for a ‘healthy’ economy. This broadening of the definition of development to include economic development, rather than just economic growth, came about exactly because economic growth did not necessarily result in the expected spillover effect predicted by liberal economists and implied by the linear and evolutionary approach to history that underlies these theories.

The implicit acceptance of neo-liberal economic thought – that the ‘good life’ is economically constituted, measured and determined – should be noted here, because this points, at least in part, to the dominance or hegemony of this ideology and the fact that its tenets form the core of what passes as contemporary ‘values’. In this regard, one can quote Denis Goulet: "As long as esteem or respect was dispensed on grounds other than material achievement, it was possible to resign oneself to poverty without feeling disdained. Conversely, once the prevailing image of the better life includes material welfare as one of its essential ingredients it becomes difficult for the materially ‘underdeveloped’ to feel respected or esteemed ... Nowadays the Third World seeks development in order to gain the esteem which is denied to societies living in a state of disgraceful ‘underdevelopment’ ... Development is legitimized as a goal because it is an important, perhaps even an indispensable, way of gaining esteem."22

The linear, Rostowian stages of growth theory23 were in ascendance at the time that independence came to Africa. In this era, it was believed that creating and recognising states would enable these entities to become (Northern-like) states, and to follow and replicate the development path of the North. Yet, at the very point in time when the South started from around ‘zero’ to ‘catch up’, the North was entering a technological revolution of immense proportions that would eventually lead to huge social and economic transformation. The point is that Africa never managed to catch up. As in the colonial era, but now on a bigger scale, uneven (and therefore often dysfunctional) penetration and development took place, bringing certain advantages and benefits, e.g. a sophisticated labour movement in a country like South Africa (compared to labour conditions in neighbouring countries), but also creating problems and obstacles to development (e.g. a level of productivity and international competitiveness that cannot sustain the demands of the labour force). Another example is that of Western medical science and technology which contributed greatly to the decline in infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, but natural population growth became, according to some, one of the biggest threats to the future of the continent.24

The point being argued here, is that the very existence of a dynamic industrial North and the way in and towards which it has been developing, largely condition, influence and determine Southern development. One example will illustrate this point. The Northern era of the welfare state which allowed the creation of a large and prosperous middle-class and extensive social security nets is now drawing to a close. Current developments towards an ever-increasing hyperliberal globalising capitalism,25 is at this stage affordable – even though only marginally – exactly because of the benefits that the welfare state created and sustained over decades. And while this era came and went in the North, Africa was still struggling to establish and internalise statehood. It had not reached the stage where its level of political and economic development and its economic integration into the world economy could allow for genuine welfare state policies that could propel it towards post-welfare state capitalism. Yet this is exactly what is currently expected of Africa in terms of liberal economic prescriptions.

The discipline of Development Studies changed its conceptualisation of the term ‘development’ over time,26 accepting that development extends beyond the material and questions of wealth and, furthermore, that in a national setting, it is not so much ‘the wealth of nations’ that determines levels of development, but rather what ‘nations’ do with their wealth – how it is distributed – that accounts for levels of development.27 According to Todaro, development is "a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of poverty."28 When one turns to the ‘three core values’ of development identified by Goulet (and used by Todaro), the meaning of the ‘major changes’ mentioned by Todaro becomes clear. Goulet29 identifies three core values that should serve as a conceptual basis and guideline "for understanding the inner meaning of development", namely sustenance (the ability to meet life-sustaining basic needs), self-esteem (a sense of worth and self-respect, at the individual and the national/state level), and freedom from servitude (to be able to choose, again at the individual and the national level). Such major changes clearly involve the political, economic, social and cultural domains of society, constituting human development which is defined by the UNDP as a process of widening the range of people’s choices.30

Considering the abject poverty and often extreme levels of deprivation suffered by the majority of Africa’s population,31 and the fact that much of this deprivation is caused or exacerbated by civil wars and other forms of violent upheaval and disregard for human rights, the link between security and development, and the need to draw and apply it in practice becomes abundantly clear. In the changed intellectual climate at the end of the Cold War, concerns with people (long suppressed by issues of bipolarity and state and regime security) came to the fore and changed thinking regarding security and development so that the terms ‘human security’ and ‘human development’ are currently, at least on paper, central to development and security agendas worldwide.

Security ... and development

If critical theory (in International Relations) is about interrogating the origin and nature of the socially-constructed international order and the possibility of the transformation of this reality into one more conducive to human well-being, critical security studies lie at the heart of International Relations as a discipline. Critical security studies refer to an orientation towards studying security and, as a subfield, also constitutes a reconstructive agenda32 that broadens not only the dimensions of security (from military and political to environmental, social and economic) or of the referents of security (to include people), but also the agents of security.

From a critical perspective, the broadening and deepening of security poses the question whether the state is a necessary or the only form of political community as system of rule which is in itself worthy of security (i.e., referent of security) and capable of providing and maintaining security (i.e., to be an agent of security).33 In turn, this question begs another: What/who is this state, so easily assumed in International Relations theories, that has to be secured and that has to provide security? And, in addition, another question, implied by Walker and Booth,34 seems relevant: Can we talk about critical security studies, particularly of its transformative potential, if we query everything about security except the state and accept the state in terms and because of its ‘easy identification’35 with security? The idea is not to answer these questions here, but to flag them. And by accepting that states themselves are referents and agents of security, the transformative nature and potential of the arguments in this chapter, are obviously diluted. One justification for such an acceptance is that, by including the state in the object of study and using a critical orientation, the characteristics, role and functions of the state are challenged and explored, and while perhaps or explicitly accepting a role and function for the state, these may in themselves denote elements of transformation.

A way of casting a critical eye on the concept and practice of security is to juxtapose and link it with development,36 as done, for instance, in the Human Development Report 1994: "Human development ... is a process of widening the range of people’s choices. Human security means that people can exercise these choices safely and freely ... There is a link between human security and human development: progress in one area enhances the chances of progress in the other. But failure in one area also heightens the risk of failure in the other. Failed or limited human development leads to a backlog of human deprivation ... This backlog in access to power and economic opportunities can lead to violence."37

The above link between security and development may perhaps better be understood within the context of the new conflict paradigm (NCP) which emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War.38 The literature on the NCP and peace missions ranges far and wide in terms of quality and quantity, dealing with conditions, objectives, strategies and instruments, often in a confusing way and with military terminology dominating the conceptual arena.39 It is within the sphere of peacebuilding – "the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust"40 – that the link between security and development as elements and as the necessary underpinnings of peace becomes clear. Which leads one inevitably to the question of which comes first: security or development? Phrased differently: Is security necessary for development to take place, or vice versa? This is an important question for the simple reason that, if one or the other is the preferred argument, that perspective would probably dominate national policies, internally and externally, as evidenced for instance by the mercantilist approach to (international) political economy.41

It is often suggested or assumed that security is a prerequisite for development. This assumption points to a military-political conception of security, with the state apparently being the main referent of security: if there is peace (the absence of war), it is possible to pursue development (development being conceived of largely in economic terms). This would seem to be the general approach, for instance, to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. If judged by the Declaration of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) heads of state and government which accompanied the formal change of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) into SADC, it becomes clear that this organisation also considers security to be a necessary condition for development: "These [peace, security and stability] are prerequisites for development, and for the improvement of the standard and quality of life of the peoples of the region."42 On the other hand, the above definitions of human security and development, as contained in the Human Development Report 1994, as well as (to some extent) Boutros-Ghali’s approach to the link between security and development43 would seem to indicate that building and maintaining security can (and should) in fact be reinforced by development, and vice versa. Boutros-Ghali, though, incorporates aspects of multidimensional development into what he terms ‘peacebuilding’, thereby strengthening the case for linking the two processes (security and development) and further justifying the case for critically assessing security thinking and practice. This approach, where aspects of multidimensional development are incorporated into peacebuilding, in other words, of ‘using’ development to counter and prevent war, however, begs some more questions: To what extent are development and security the ‘same’ thing if linked in this way? Is there still a difference between the two, particularly in practice? And what does it tell us about policy-making, in the sense of who would make what policy, and who would be responsible for its implementation? These are some of the theoretical and practical issues in need of examination in order to understand and realise the implications of linking the two concepts. A tentative suggestion in this regard is to explore the degree of overlap between the various dimensions of development and security, starting with the assumption that security is a condition and development a process, that they are mutually reinforcing and that the link between them necessitates a co-ordinated approach.44

One way of pursuing the security-development nexus is to focus on regional co-operation and institution-building as means to attain the ideals of security and development. In order to show the link between the two processes and the extent to which the condition of being secure and the ability to develop are interdependent, and to justify the claim that these two should be pursued jointly, the concept ‘secure community’ is employed, derived from, but in some ways different from the concept ‘security community’ as defined by Deutsch and others.45 This is done in the following section, starting with a brief exploration of the concept ‘security community’, before focusing on the idea of a ‘secure’ community. The starting point is the fact that national borders in the region resulted in a skewed distribution and utilisation of human, natural and material resources, and that security and development in Southern Africa are therefore contingent upon co-operation.

Defining a secure community

The term ‘community’ is used here in the sense of ‘political community’ as defined by Deutsch and others. It refers to a social group "with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habit of compliance."46 To this rather impersonal definition should be added Brown’s dimension of "the idea of common interest and at least an emerging, common identity."47 It is the affective quality of community that should be stressed. The modern African state cannot provide what Brown’s Western state has (had?) the potential for: "[T]he modern state could already provide the individual with the basis for a life lived in freedom, dealing justly with all."48 The African state, at the very least the majority of those in Southern Africa, lacks the capacity to provide/be this kind of community unilaterally. Yet, the possibility exists that close co-operation and the development of a community of states may provide this freedom and justice if resources and responsibilities are shared and spread across regions. In the process, strong states may develop, but the point is that the strengths and capacity of individual states to ‘provide’ and ‘maintain’ will be in relation to or contingent upon their relationship with the region as community.

The abiding essential characteristics of ‘community’ seem to be those of ‘time’ and ‘sharing’. A community develops over time and it can only be considered a community if there is reason to expect that its sense of a shared present and future will last. Community in itself refers to sharing – not only a common present and future, but also a common history, covering a number of aspects which make for ‘sameness’ or at least recognition of each other in the sense of, for instance, shared values and expectations. ‘Shared’ does not mean identical, and neither does it mean that the same level of importance is attached to what is shared, or that there is necessarily agreement on how mutuality should be handled. For this reason, Deutsch’s definition of peaceful change as the resolution of problems by institutionalised procedures rather than resorting to physical force,49 should be emphasised.

Community is both a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ construct, involving state/s and society/ies and more than politics and economics, although the relevant dominance of one or more dimension over the other during specific eras or under particular conditions, is possible. Also, the extent to which the development of the community is driven more by top-down or bottom-up incentives and interventions may differ in place and over time. The overriding concern is that of a continuous visible commitment to the community by both state and society.

Deutsch and others stress integration as the defining characteristic of community. Integration in their definition has two dimensions. The first is an intangible dimension of a "sense of community"; in other words, a recognition and acknowledgement of shared interests and that common problems "must and can" be resolved peacefully. The second is a tangible dimension of institutions and practices "strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population."50

Booth expands on this definition of a security community by juxtaposing it against other forms of international and/or regional organisations, such as anarchy and society. He refers to the position of "transcenders" who view the key to security as "the expansion of the obligations between people(s) implied by the idea of community."51 Whereas Deutsch and others study integration at a specific point in time and attempt to determine the requirements for its success, particularly in preventing war, Booth’s definition implies a broader vision: both of positive peace and of a belief that a commitment to inclusivity, care and responsibility (a moral dimension) at and between the state and social levels are necessary elements, principles and aims of community-building.52

It is clear from Deutsch’s work that the most important concern is that of peace. It is not the state or the future of the state which is at issue. This approach leaves room for various forms of structural development and allows for pluralism and amalgamation to act as two points on a continuum indicating levels of "regioness" – a phrase used by Hettne53 to indicate levels of complexity in terms of regional co-ordination, co-operation and integration. The Deutsch approach means that it is not form or structure which determines the process of community-building and maintenance, but (shared) purpose. This is of crucial importance in community-building, because it implies that overriding concern with purpose will determine structure and not the other way around.

As to what creates a security community, Deutsch and his colleagues point to the following:
  • mutual compatibility of values;
  • strong economic ties and the expectation that these will broaden and deepen;
  • a multiplicity of social, political and cultural contacts;
  • increasing institutionalised relationships;
  • mutual responsiveness; and
  • mutual predictability of behaviour.54
Some of these aspects highlight the earlier point about time. A shared history of co-operation or, at the very least, mutual dependence is necessary as this would be conducive to the development of mutual sensitivity and the desire to work towards a common, peaceful future. Deutsch and others refer to this as "increasing responsiveness."

Until now the discussion has focused mainly on the concept ‘security community’. The concept ‘secure community’ needs some elaboration. The coining of this phrase and my preference to use it need to be explained. The concept ‘secure community’ builds on the work of Deutsch and others, and is influenced by Booth55 and Hettne,56 but contains an expansion of their work.

The main purpose of a security community, according to Deutsch and others, is the "elimination of war."57 By contrast, a secure community pursues the dual objective of security and development, each broadly defined, and each specifically within a developing world context.

Another difference between a ‘security community’ and a ‘secure community’ concerns what Deutsch and others term the "essential conditions" for the success of such a community. These are:
  • the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making by the members of the community;

  • the capacity of the members to respond to each other’s needs (‘political responsiveness’); and

  • mutual predictability of behaviour.58
These requirements are implicitly accepted as necessary for secure communities, yet, a secure community would also exhibit the following characteristics:
  • a concern with both security and development;

  • a timeline that sets the limits for achieving the strategic goal of providing a secure environment for development to take place and for attaining a minimum level of development that would encompass the provision for the basic needs of people, both materially and non-materially;

  • an inclusive process that allows for participation by both states and societies, with participation by civil society being much more central to community-building as envisaged by the idea of Deutsch and others of social interaction; and

  • institutionalisation of the process as an essential condition in order to allow for structure, regulation and management.
These characteristics constitute an ideal type and therefore attempts at regional community-building can be measured in terms of and ‘against’ them to provide guidelines for adjusting strategies and medium term goals towards the strategic goal of building a secure community. All four of these should be present or pursued, no matter how flawed the manner, for a regional grouping to ‘qualify’ as building a secure community. A secure community differs in degree from a security community, not in kind. At this point, it would be useful to evaluate the extent to which SADC conforms to the requirements of building a secure community.

A concern with security and development

As was noted earlier, SADC heads of state and governments have made it clear in the declaration establishing the organisation that the objectives of security and development go hand in hand, implying furthermore, that security is considered to be a prerequisite for development. In practice, however, the security wing of SADC – the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security – is bogged down with problems, mainly, it would seem, due to an inability to resolve two interrelated issues. The first is the apparent contradiction between creating a permanent structure to deal with security matters (such a structure, in terms of the definition of an ‘international organisation’, presupposes regularisation of patterns of behaviour and modus operandi), while also retaining the flexible and ad hoc approach to security matters which characterised the Front-Line States (FLS). The second is the lack of confidence among political leaders to allow for the establishment of the various institutions within the Organ that would be necessary for the efficient operation of the security wing, e.g. and in particular a ‘politics/political leg’.

The result of the failure to operationalise the commitment to security as stated in the declaration, and further elaborated in the treaty and the communiqué issued after the establishment of the Organ in June 1996, is that SADC is at present operating, for all practical intents and purposes, without a security structure or framework that could guide and facilitate co-operation. The exception seems to be the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), but this points to a continued bias towards military-political security, not necessarily welcomed by the defence establishments of the region.59 It is also telling to note that the brief for the SADC review process (of which the report was tabled at the 1997 SADC Summit) did not include an examination or evaluation of security arrangements within the organisation, raising questions about how members perceive the organisation.

Another aspect of the review process which casts doubt upon the extent to which the organisation is actually intent on the promotion of multidimensional development, is the fact that the report of the consultants who conducted the review, focuses almost exclusively on economic growth and development. This emphasis exhibits a liberal economic bias that assumes that the non-economic dimensions of development are a "trickle-down product of economic growth."60 It would seem that, despite its declared commitment to security and development, both broadly defined, the organisation does not have the political will or skills to conceptualise and operationalise security, nor the vision to look beyond economic growth to full or multidimensional development as its priority. Little wonder that an analyst such as Malan61 recommends an "amicable divorce" between development and security arrangements within the structures of regional co-operation in Southern Africa, and that Schwersensky62 implies that regional co-operation through SADC seems to be interpreted by its members as merely facilitating "economic integration via market liberalisation." The SADC objective of security and development on paper is not reflected in its approach to security and development.

Timeline

The idea of a timeline or timelines is associated with strategic approaches towards realising goals and objectives. The underlying assumption on which timelines is based, is that without some form of timeframe within which to achieve goals, the process may become sidetracked, stalled or obscured by other priorities because there is no or little incentive to drive the initiative. Timeframes furthermore provide guidelines for monitoring, evaluating and, when needed, adjusting the activities and actions implemented to achieve goals. The SADC review report points out that there are almost no timeframes built into the various programmes and projects of the organisation. As far back as 1995, the executive secretary of the organisation complained that the lack of timelines was one of the major obstacles in building a regional community.63 It is only in terms of the Protocol on Free Trade that a timeframe (eight years) has been formulated, detailing the various intermediary steps that are necessary to achieve the goal of turning the region into a free trade area. The timeline for market liberalisation in the region, incidentally, may be interpreted as further evidence of the extent to which economic growth is privileged in the activities of SADC.

Community-building as an inclusive process

It was stated above that building a secure community requires the participation of states and societies, and this requirement is considered to be as essential as that of linking security and development as the dual objectives of such a process. Multidimensional security and development emphasise the role and place of people as agents and referents of security and development. Within these broad definitions of security and development, it is impossible to conceive of the realisation of these objectives in the absence of genuine social participation. Security and development imply ‘emancipation’ of people in the sense that Ashley defines the term: "freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their own future through will and consciousness."64 Linklater sees security as related to the extension of the human capacity for self-determination.65 Self-determination of humans (as opposed to the traditional association of self-determination with that of ‘peoples’) points to active participation of people in ‘making their own future’, not having it determined for them.

Article 23 of the SADC Treaty states that the organisation will seek to "involve fully, the peoples of the Region ... in the process of regional integration." When read in conjunction with the objectives of the organisation in article 5, it is clear that the potential for the participation and involvement of people in the activities and structures of SADC does exist. Should this objective be realised, it would place the organisation firmly within the definition of a secure community. Furthermore, such participation would probably or could conceivably support the realisation of the objectives of security and development, not least because of the input from civil society in defining the particular strategies and programmes needed to provide security and promote development.66 However, until now, SADC has not managed to realise the aim of involving civil society in a meaningful way in the activities of the organisation. The review process, which could have been an ideal opportunity for initiating such an incentive, remained a ‘management exercise’ focused on, as mentioned earlier, a rather narrow set of issues. This is a pity, as it could be expected that the acceptance and implementation of the recommendations of the review committee will ‘close’ the debate about the nature, functions and future of SADC for at least the foreseeable future.

Institutionalisation

In order to pursue the dual objective of security and development in an efficient and comprehensive way, institutionalisation of the processes and activities related to the realisation of these goals is considered necessary. Regional community-building within Southern Africa is pursued through SADC. So, at first glance at least, the requirement to build a secure community is in place in the region, including the provision for two wings within the organisation – that of a development wing (to a large extent the former SADCC) and the security wing (the former FLS turned briefly into the Association of Southern African States (ASAS)) in the form of the Organ. The apparent failure of the Organ has been dealt with earlier. Yet, the fact remains that the institutional framework, or at least the idea of pursuing security and development in a linked and potentially co-ordinated way, does exist. On the other hand, the overemphasis on economic growth and economic aspects of development – seemingly, at times almost to the exclusion of any other development concerns and needs – has already been noted. The challenge is to activate and provide content to the structures created for the purpose of realising security and development. The recommendations of the review committee regarding the institutional restructuring of the organisation to reform the secretariat and to replace the sectoral co-ordinating units (SCUs) with planning and co-ordination directorates may go some way to streamline the activities of the organisation. The question, of course, is whether such a restructuring, clearly based on business principles and logic, is sufficient for an organisation which claims in its Treaty to be much more than merely an economic institution. One cannot help but come to the conclusion that SADC is overwhelmingly concerned with economic issues, almost to the exclusion (and at least to the neglect) of its aims and principles as set out in the Treaty.

Conclusion

To link security with development is to become aware of the extent to which security is something concerned with people. It is to realise that the security of states is merely instrumental – the state is a necessary actor in the provision of security and in the process of development. To fulfil this role, the state itself needs to be secured and developed, but not as an end in itself. The first, and ultimate, test of security, seen from a critical perspective, is to achieve a moral and just society in which people are the main actors, referents and agents of security. But such a society – one in which people are secure – also points to the rationale for this security:
  • to enable people to develop;

  • to be the architects of their own lives;

  • to co-determine the values that will characterise their life-world; and

  • to participate in the creation of the framework within which self-determination will be exercised.
The ‘state’ is both too big and too small to decide for people, but at the same time, it is a necessary means to contribute to security and development. The authority vested in states, though, can be utilised to include people in the process of building a secure community. It can facilitate the inclusion of those interests and groups which are too ‘small’ for the state to know and to articulate and to decide on. And it can facilitate the utilisation and distribution of the resources, capacity and skills which are available across national borders (the building blocks of security and co-operation which are not within the grasp of one single state – the ‘too big’ functions) by promoting regional co-operation on an efficient and dedicated basis.

Endnotes

  1. In order to distinguish fields of study, disciplines and theories from practice and from existing systems, the former are capitalised: e.g., International Political Economics is a subfield of International Relations as a discipline or field of study, while the world is characterised by a capitalist-oriented international political economy which has certain implications for international relations.

  2. Orthodox approaches are, among others, those of realism and neorealism, neoliberalism and liberal internationalism. Postmodernism and feminism are among the ‘new’ approaches impacting on the study of international relations.

  3. See for example, S Burchill & A Linklater, Theories of International Relations, Macmillan and Krause, Basingstoke, 1996; K & M Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis, 1997.

  4. Conflict in the context used here comprises violent conflict, such as various types of war.

  5. On the insecurity dilemma, see B Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1992. A good exposition of the security dilemma is that of N Wheeler & K Booth, The Security Dilemma, in J Baylis & N Rengger (eds.), Dilemmas of World Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.

  6. The work of Buzan has been pathbreaking in this regard; see B Buzan, People, States and Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991.

  7. See for example, J Matthews, Redefining Security, Foreign Affairs, 68(2), Spring 1989; D Deudney, The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security, Millennium, 19(3), 1990; S Walt, S, The Renaissance of Security Studies, International Studies Quarterly, 35, 1991.

  8. I argue this in somewhat more detail in M van Aardt, The Application of the New Security Agenda for Southern Africa, in H Solomon & M van Aardt (eds.), ‘Caring’ Security in Africa: Theoretical and Practical Considerations of New Security Thinking, ISS Monograph Series, 20, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, February 1998. An example of the recognition of the broadening of security (and the need for and logic of it) is to be found in G Mills, South Africa and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Rim, SAIIA, Braamfontein, 1998. Yet, Mills also accepts without questioning that the military is still the major, if not only, agent of security.

  9. On GPT see M Paterson, Green politics, in Burchill & Linklater, op. cit.

  10. UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994; B Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Development, United Nations, New York, 1995. I make the point elsewhere, though, that this link between security and development was already drawn earlier in the Kampala Document and in the rationale for creating SADCC in 1980. See Van Aardt, op. cit.

  11. H Hudson, A Feminist Reading of Security in Africa, in Solomon & Van Aardt, op. cit.

  12. R Cox, Critical Political Economy, in B Hettne (ed.), International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder, SAPES SA, Cape Town, 1995, p. 31.

  13. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

  14. R Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 63.

  15. R Devetak, Critical Theory, in Burchill & Linklater, op. cit., p. 150.

  16. Ibid.

  17. See for example, S Gill, Theorizing the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s, in Hettne, op. cit.

  18. Examples of a theory built on this form of a-historicity can be found in the work of K Waltz, Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press, New York, 1954, and Theory of International Politics, Random House, New York, 1979, in which the author seeS very little change, if at all, in the ‘international system’ between the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War. See also J Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories of International Relations, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1994, pp. 81-88.

  19. Cox, op. cit., p. 32.

  20. For an excellent discussion of critical theory, see Devetak, op. cit.

  21. The underlying worldview of these theories, though, was the same, namely that of communism as a threat and the need for containment. This is evidenced, for instance, in the subtitle of Rostow’s book: A Non-Communist Manifesto. See W W Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, London, 1960.

  22. D Goulet, The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development, Atheneum, New York, 1971, pp. 89-90.

  23. Rostow, op. cit. He concluded that “the tricks of growth are not all that difficult” (p. 166).

  24. H Solomon & J Cilliers, People, Poverty and Peace: Human Security in Southern Africa, IDP Monograph Series, 4, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, May 1996, pp. 7-8.

  25. R Cox, Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Political Economy, in R Stubbs & G Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 49.

  26. For an overview of the development of this field and various development theories, see M Todaro, Economic Development, Longman, London, 1997, Chapter 3.

  27. UNDP, op. cit., p. 15.

  28. Todaro, op. cit., p. 16.

  29. Goulet, op. cit.

  30. UNDP, op. cit., p. 23.

  31. According to a 1991 estimate, 62 per cent of the people of sub-Saharan Africa live in conditions of absolute poverty. UNPF, Population, Resources, and the Environment: The Critical Challenge, United Nations Population Fund, New York, 1991, p. 16.

  32. M Williams & K Krause, Preface: Toward Critical Security Sutdies, in Williams & Krause, op. cit., pp. xi; xiii.

  33. See R B J Walker, The Object of Security, in Williams & Krause, op. cit.; also K Booth, Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist, in Williams & Krause, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

  34. Ibid.

  35. Williams & Krause, op. cit., p. xiv.

  36. Walker talks about calls for “the need to break down artificial barriers between security and development”; op. cit., p. 65.

  37. UNDP, op. cit., p. 23.

  38. Cedric de Coning, senior programme officer at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), defines the concept ‘new conflict paradigm’ (NCP) as one characterised by being internal, rather than international, non-statutory in that at least one side to the conflict used irregular forces and militias, and civilian in that civilians are both perpetrators and victims of these conflicts. NCPs have been termed ‘complex emergencies’ by humanitarian agencies and other NGOs. C de Coning, Interview,Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, November 1997.

  39. For an overview of terminology and a basic approach to the development of a common understanding of core definitions used in peace missions, see B Rossouw, A South African Perspective on the Place of Peace Support Operations within Broader Peace Missions, African Security Review, 7(1), 1998, pp. 36-43.

  40. Ibid., p. 41.

  41. According to Gilpin, the central idea of mercantilism is that “economic activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state building ... All nationalists ascribe to the primacy of the state, of national security and of military power ...” R Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, p. 31.

  42. SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of State or Governments of Southern Africa, Southern African Development Community, Gaborone, 1993, p. 3.

  43. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., pp. 20-26.

  44. I do not deal with these aspects in this chapter, although I base my definition of a ‘secure community’ (see following section) on the assumption that security and development are closely linked.

  45. K Deutsch and associates, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Greenwood Press, New York, 1957.

  46. Ibid., p. 5. I refer here to the concept ‘pluralistic’ security community (as opposed to an ‘amalgamated’ security community).

  47. C Brown, International Theory and International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way?, Review of International Studies, 21(2), April 1995, p. 185.

  48. Ibid., p. 190.

  49. Deutsch et. al., op. cit.

  50. Ibid.

  51. K Booth, A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Belville, 1994, p. 14.

  52. Brown, op. cit., pp. 185-186.

  53. B Hettne, The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace, in B Hettne & A Inotai (eds.), The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security, WIDER, Helsinki, 1994, pp. 6-8.

  54. See discussion in Deutsch et. al., op. cit., pp. 123-154.

  55. Booth, op. cit.

  56. Hettne, op. cit.; B Hettne, Introduction: The International Political Economy of Transformation, in B Hettne (ed.), International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder, SAPES, Cape Town, 1995, pp. 1-30; B Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds, Longman, Harlow, 1995.

  57. Deutsch et. al., op. cit., p. vii.

  58. Ibid., pp. 65-69.

  59. Van Aardt, op. cit., pp. 108-110; also M Malan, SADC and Subregional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?, ISS Monograph Series, 19, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, February 1998.

  60. S Schwersensky, A Synopsis of the Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action, Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, Johannesburg, June 1997, p. 5.

  61. Malan, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

  62. Schwersensky, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

  63. SADC, op. cit.

  64. R Ashley, Political Realism and Human Interests, International Studies Quarterly, 25, 1981, p. 227.

  65. A Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, Macmillan, London, 1990, p. 10.

  66. For a more comprehensive discussion of the idea of civil society participation in SADC in order to build a secure community, see M Schoeman, Building a Secure Community in Southern Africa: The Case of SADC, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1998.