MEMBERSHIP

The West African experience suggests that the membership of any regional security organisation should err on the side of inclusiveness, rather than exclusivity, and that this membership should be wider than that of any overlapping regional economic grouping. If this is not the case, the ECOWAS experience suggests that it is the economic component that will take the lead in handling issues related to regional peace and security a role for which such groupings are clearly not designed.

The other examples suggest that it is easier to allow for the expansion of a regional security arrangement than it is to expand an economic community of member states. While a longer-standing economic grouping (where mutual trust has historically been built) may form the core of the membership, a system of differentiated membership (including full members, associate members, observers, dialogue partners, etc.) facilitates expansion in the security domain.

In this way, certain conflict-generating aspects of economic integration (and hence vacillation in decision-making) can be avoided, while benefiting from confidence-building among a wider range of countries. This is particularly relevant in sub-Saharan Africa, where both border configuration and regional demarcation are largely artificial constructs, and where security concerns do not match arrangements for economic co-operation.

FOCUS

While the major thrust of the arguments presented thus far aim at divorcing economic issues from security concerns, the example of L'ANAD also warns against too narrow a conceptualisation of security, and of focusing almost exclusively on defence, rather than on several security `baskets'. The OSCE, on the other hand, takes a comprehensive view of security, to include issues of arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building, human rights, and election monitoring. While the WEU assumes the responsibility for European defence and security policy formulation, its priorities lie in the area of conflict management and peacekeeping, rather than mutual defence. Defence is also downplayed as a key issue in the ASEAN Regional Forum, which aims at confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution.

Thus, while the stillborn SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security is perhaps nominally appropriate in its focus, the reality of functioning only at the level of the ISDSC, where defence and police predominate, mitigates against the adoption of a comprehensive approach to regional peace and security. The clear lesson is that, even if an appropriate focus is defined at the higher political level, this becomes blurred (or narrowed) if the vision is not backed by relevant structural arrangements.

STRUCTURE

The structure of the OSCE reflects its purpose and focus. The creation of an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which plays an active role in election monitoring and provides assistance with constitutional engineering, is an essential ingredient of an organisation which encompasses a number of formerly hegemonic regimes. Likewise, the High Commissioner for National Minorities lends credence to the notion of conflict prevention through early involvement in potential ethnic conflicts. The relevance of these structures should be obvious to Southern Africa, with its recent history of apartheid rule and ethnically-based single party governance.

Both the WEU and the OSCE have a firm but flexible legal structure, which makes them legitimate instruments for conflict management under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The legal basis for delegating responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security in Southern Africa to SADC remains extremely vague, and the legality (or lack of) under the SADC Treaty of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security remains a major point of contention among member states. It would thus appear that the negotiation of a completely new treaty defining the modalities for security co-operation has become an urgent requirement.

While L'ANAD has a biennial Conference of Heads of State and Government as the supreme authority, the ARF is controlled by a forum consisting of the foreign ministers of member countries. The OSCE convenes a biennial Summit of Heads of State or Government, but the foreign ministers also hold an annual Ministerial Council Meeting. However, the Permanent Council of the OSCE meets once a week and delegations of member states meet almost daily in Vienna.

The OSCE example, in particular, indicates the importance of creating a firm basis for regular meetings of the various bodies making up a regional security organisation, as well as the utility of formalising meetings, with declining frequency, according to the levels of seniority of the attendant officials. This allows for continuity, for delegation, and, most important, for the implementation of decisions taken at each level.

Given the negative impact on the evolution of the Southern African security architecture of personality-based leadership at the Chief Executive level, it would be advisable to formalise a similar hierarchical arrangement in the subregion, with clear channels of authority from summit level down to the level of officials. Moreover, even with its limited role and functions, L'ANAD has been blessed with a permanent, well-staffed Secretariat and a mechanism for implementing the (albeit infrequent) political decisions of ministers and heads of government. This is something which has been sadly lacking in the Southern African region.

PROCESS

The ARF example highlights the utility of a phased approach to regional security co-operation, beginning with confidence-building and ending with instruments for the conduct of preventive diplomacy. While the urgency of the security challenges in the Southern African region preclude the luxury of a drawn-out process to establish a viable conflict management mechanism, it may be noted that the SADC countries have already enjoyed a number of meaningful confidence-building engagements in the nearly four years since the demise of apartheid.

On the other hand, the WEU experience and the limited utility of L'ANAD warn against `jumping the gun' by the premature creation of a mutual defence pact. While a non-aggression pact is a good starting point for regional security co-operation, the inclusion of a mutual defence pact in the initial agenda endorsed by Summit for the SADC Organ was patently overambitious. Overly ambitious agendas tend to create doubt and suspicion, and eventually undermine the credibility of an institution when their terms can simply not be met.

The lesson for Southern Africa is that a process is necessary in which a modest but meaningful security agenda is articulated, and systematically expanded once member countries have exhibited a proven commitment to co-operation in these areas. After all, the organisation which promises to be all things to all people raises dangerous and unwarranted expectations, and eventually ends up by being nothing unto itself.