Endnotes


Published in Monograph No 19, SADC and Subregional Security, February 1998



  1. See M Malan & J Cilliers, SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development, ISS Papers, 19, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, March 1997.

  2. Chapter VIII deals with `regional arrangements', Article 52 (1) stating that, "[n]othing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." The Charter provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, but these might include regional military alliances and multilateral military interventions. Article 53 refers to enforcement action by regional bodies, but requires that, "... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council ..."

  3. The force, which had been operating without international approval since early 1997, consists of voluntary troop contributions by Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Kenya, Senegal, and Togo. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MISAB is now entitled to use force in order to implement its mandate, which includes the disarmament of rebellious factions of the CAR military.

  4. Southern Africa, according to SADC Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuende, is "that part of Africa which is south of the equator." Quoted in C Chimhete, SADC Admits New Members into the Community, Southern African News Features, 29 September 1997.

  5. For an idea of exactly how acrimonious the debate on the future of the SADC Organ has become, see for example SAPEM, 10(12), 15 September 15 October 1997. In this issue, the Organ debate is covered in the editorial comment and in two cover page articles all of which focus on the animosity between South Africa and Zimbabwe, rather than presenting a logical analysis of the problem of creating viable conflict resolution mechanism in Southern Africa. While the editorial comment points to the need to redefine a subregion "which was made after the image of white domination," H Campbell's article, entitled SADC Heads at Loggerheads?, reduces the problem of the Organ to South African arrogance in general and to the continued influence of `apartheid era ideologues' on South African policy in particular. Indeed, an earlier attempt by the ISS to propose a structural model for the SADC Organ made the Institute a prime target for vitriolic (and factually incorrect) criticism in Campbell's article.

  6. Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of Southern African States, Towards the Southern African Development Community, Declaration Treaty and Protocol of the Southern African Development Community, Windhoek, 17 August 1992.

  7. The SADC Programme of Action (SPA), which is meant to give effect to the overall objectives of SADC, is still based on a complex and confusing array of sector co-ordinating units charged with co-ordinating a portfolio of about 470 projects at a total cost of some US $8 500 million. The SPA is extremely reliant on donor funding. Only about twelve to fourteen per cent of the total cost of the project portfolio is sourced within SADC, while donor funding amounts to approximately seventy per cent of the total funding secured for the current SPA.

  8. Summarised from Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action, submitted to SADC in April 1997 by a team of consultants consisting of Chinyamata Chipeta (Malawi), Berenice V Lue (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, South Africa), and Keith Atkinson (Imani Development, Zimbabwe).

  9. J Dludlu, Slow Work Building Regional Bloc, Business Day, 28 January 1998.

  10. Article 21 of the SADC Treaty states that, "In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, Member States agree to co-operate in the areas of:

    a) food security, land and agriculture;

    b) infrastructure and services;

    c) industry; trade, investment and finance;

    d) human resources development, science and technology;

    e) natural resources and environment;

    f) social welfare, information and culture; and

    g) politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security
    ."

    For the purpose of simplicity, the collective omissions in the author's point of departure (issues pertaining to common political values, systems, and institutions; the promotion and defence of peace and security; solidarity; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; peaceful settlement of disputes; diplomacy, and international relations) are hereafter referred to as `political principles and objectives of SADC'.

  11. Paragraph 4.3.1 of the communiqué of the June 1996 SADC Summit of Heads of State or Government states that, "... [t]he SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security shall operate at the Summit level, and shall function independently of other SADC structures ..."

  12. J Cilliers, The Evolving Regional Security Architecture in Southern Africa, African Security Review, 4(5), 1995, p. 40.

  13. See endnote 10 above.

  14. The support of these roleplayers should have been deemed essential, as they had been collaborating on security issues for a number of years under the auspices of the ISDSC. The ISDSC is a forum at which ministers of Southern African states responsible for Defence, Home Affairs/Public Security, as well as State Security meet to discuss a wide range of issues relating to their individual and collective defence and security issues. Such meetings also take place at the level of officials, in order to increase functional co-operation in the realm of defence and security. Established in 1983 under the aegis of the FLS, the ISDSC initially included seven member states. During November 1994, South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland became members of the ISDSC, and its membership now mirrors that of SADC. The ISDSC is also an informal structure which operates in accordance with practices that have evolved over time with the mutual agreement of member states. It has neither an executive secretary nor a permanent secretariat.

  15. SADC Summit Communiqué, Johannesburg, 28 August 1995.

  16. For a more detailed exposition of the institutional developments preceding the Gaberone meeting of 18 January 1996, see J Cilliers, The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa, African Security Review, 4(5) , 1995.

  17. According to the SADC Summit Communiqué, Gaborone, 28 June 1996, the Organ is to:

    *
    protect the people and safeguard the development of the region, against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and external aggression;

    *
    promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common political value systems and institutions;

    *
    develop a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest and to lobby as a region, on issues of common interest at international fora;

    *
    co-operate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention management and resolution;

    *
    mediate in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts;

    *
    use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system;

    *
    where conflict does occur, to seek to end this as quickly as possible through diplomatic means. Only where such means fail, would the Organ recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures. These responses would be agreed in a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution;

    *
    promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states, and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the OAU and the UN;

    *
    promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;

    *
    give political support to the organs and institutions of SADC;

    *
    promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security;
    develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere on the continent;

    *
    develop close co-operation between the police and security services of the region, with a view to address cross-border crime, as well as promoting a community-based approach on matters of security;

    *
    encourage and monitor the ratification of UN, OAU, and other international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights and peaceful relations between states;

    *
    co-ordinate the participation of member states in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and

    *
    address extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa.

  18. Actually, Mandela had threatened to resign as chairperson of SADC, and not to take South Africa out of SADC.

  19. SADC Summit Communiqué, Blantyre, 8 August 1997.

  20. Campbell, op. cit., p. 6.

  21. Information provided during a briefing by officials of the L'ANAD Secretariat, Abijan, 1996. See M Malan, W Nhara & P Bergevin, African Capabilities for Training for Peace Operations, ISS Monograph Series, 17, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, November 1997.

  22. The first Summit Meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia in February 1976, during which the five member countries signed the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. There have been four more Summits held in the thirty years of ASEAN's existence. At the fifth Summit, held in Bangkok during December 1995, the leaders agreed to meet informally on an annual basis between summits.

  23. Some of the most important accords adopted by ASEAN include the 1971 declaration designating Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976 and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) of 1995. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord contains the principles and framework for ASEAN co-operation in the political, security, economic and functional fields.

  24. OSCE, OSCE Fact Sheet, <www.osceprag.cz/info/facts/factshet.htm>

  25. The most important OSCE documents are: the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (which deals with co-operation in the military, human and economic areas); the Copenhagen Document of 1990 (which addresses issues of democracy, human rights and rule of law); the Paris Charter of 1990 (confirming previous results and establishing new institutions); and the Budapest Document of 1994 (by which the CSCE was turned into a permanent organisation through the creation of OSCE and the strengthening of the role of chairperson and other institutions. Moreover, the 1994 Vienna Document obliges states to show transparency and predictability in their military activities. The OSCE has also recently adopted a military Code of Conduct setting out principles to guide the role of armed forces in democratic societies, and the organisation is the repository of the EU-initiated Pact on Stability.

  26. It is interesting to note that the 1997 SADC Summit also discussed the establishment of a SADC Parliamentary Forum, which would comprise members of parliament of all the member states. It approved the establishment of the SADC Parliamentary Forum as an "autonomous institution which will play a major role in promoting dialogue and popular participation in the affairs of SADC." SADC Summit Communiqué, Blantyre, 8 August 1997.

  27. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, states that, "[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

    Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security
    ."

  28. Preamble, Declaration Treaty and Protocol of the Southern African Development Community, Windhoek, 17 August 1992.