Conclusion
The traumatic and violent political power struggles which racked the subcontinent during 1997 provide clear evidence that perceptions of Southern Africa as a `zone of peace' are misguided, and that there is a need to institutionalise a mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. On the other hand, the historical development and present restructuring of SADC mean that it is increasingly difficult to incorporate political and security dimensions, as well as mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict into the organisation through simply drafting an additional protocol to the SADC Treaty.
Moreover, since the articulation of the objectives for the SADC Organ, the Heads of State have agreed to admit two new member states (Congo `Kinshasa' and the Seychelles) into SADC, based primarily on (perhaps unwarranted/highly exaggerated) predictions of mutual economic benefit. There is also a strong likelihood that a number of other sub-Saharan states (such as Kenya and Uganda) will soon seek admission to the SADC fold, thus further complicating the issue of simultaneously broadening and deepening SADC co-operation in both the economic and security spheres.
It is therefore time to create a new security family in Southern Africa, with a flexible legal framework which can adapt to the (all too frequent) changes in regional security dynamics. The starting point could be a `Southern African Security Convention', or a series of such meetings, convened initially by SADC, to which all sub-Saharan African states and observers from farther afield are invited. The purpose of the convention should be to deliberate on the sixteen objectives articulated for the Organ, with the view to determine their veracity and to examine modalities for the pursuit of an appropriate and achievable agenda for security co-operation. The result of such a process may be the drafting of a treaty establishing something like a `Southern African Union', which would act as the principal forum for security discussions and the harmonisation of security policy in the region, and which may move towards establishing the capacity and structures for conflict management.
Aside from the sixteen `Organ' objectives, comparative arrangements from other regions suggest that the structural issues for debate might include matters such as:
- the provision for various categories of membership accommodating overlapping and discrete membership of the `Southern African Union', SADC, ISDSC and other organisations such as the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), etc.;
- levels at which members meet and the frequency of meetings at each level;
- relationships between the `Union' and SADC on the one hand, and between the `Union' and the OAU and the UN on the other;
- `early warning' in the regional context;
- mechanisms for promoting democratic institutions and human rights;
- modalities for handling issues of national minorities and promoting national reconciliation, and
- whatever else is necessary to contribute to confidence-building, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution.
Of course, matters relating to the establishment of a secretariat, various offices, funding, etc., would also have to be addressed, but these issues would probably be beyond the ambit of an initial gathering.
While conventional wisdom holds that `the devil is in the detail', the failure to institutionalise the SADC Organ highlights the dangers of being overly prescriptive, and of suggesting anything like a detailed `model'. Rather than a model, a process may be initiated that begins as a conference and results in an organisation with a wider and more varied membership than SADC, and with a more suitable structure for promoting preventive diplomacy, confidence-building, and common security. Through such a process, it may indeed prove possible to achieve a balance between that which has historically worked well in the subregion, and that which is currently necessary to cope with evident and emerging challenges.
Finally, the idea of organisationally divorcing security from economic development and integration need not undermine the cohesion of SADC. Indeed, the Southern African Development Community would yield the core membership and probably be the driving force for the process. This would obviously require the abandoning of existing, ego-inspired `turf wars' and a commitment on the part of all Heads of State and Government to be true to the SADC Treaty. In this they promised to be "mindful of the need to involve the peoples of the Region centrally in the process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law," and recognised that "mutual understanding, good neighbourliness, and meaningful co-operation among the countries of the Region are indispensable to the realisation of these ideals."28
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