INTRODUCTION

This Article is a brief response to the current debate on South African foreign policy. A number of points, often raised, are dealt with very briefly. The idea is to comment on and make some suggestions regarding further areas for investigation and research. The discussion focuses mostly on South Africa's regional policy and attempts to put it in the context of 'general' South African foreign policy, as well as in a broader perspective.

Regional policy is foreign policy relating to the region of which the country in question is part. In the South African case, it can refer to South African policy towards Africa as a whole, in which case it may perhaps also be called 'continental' or 'Africa policy', or towards Southern Africa – however that concept is defined. For purposes of this discussion, the broader meaning, implying 'Africa policy', will be under discussion, unless otherwise specified

Making a distinction between regional policy and 'general' foreign policy, raises the question regarding the nature of the relationship between the two. This should be investigated more thoroughly than can be attempted here, and not only with regard to South Africa, but in the broader context as well. Common wisdom has it that relations with one's neighbours are usually most immediate, as these will have a direct effect on how a country is otherwise able to function in the international community.1 Whether this implies that 'other' foreign policy is simply an extension of regional policy, is doubtful. Different factors come into play in different contexts. However, it may be true that 'general' foreign policy should be understood in terms of regional policy, rather than the reverse. In the South African case, it has been understood by policy-makers for a long period that the country's fortunes elsewhere were intimately connected to, if not determined by what it manages to attain in Africa. The new South Africa, of course, has made Africa the central focus of its foreign policy. How does South African regional and 'general' foreign policy compare and interrelate? How does it compare with and relate to past South African regional and general foreign policy and with the foreign policies of other countries, at least in terms of some salient characteristics commonly ascribed to it?

INCOHERENCE AND A NON-PURPOSEFUL FOREIGN POLICY

There can be no question that South African regional policy has undergone an almost complete change since the bad old days of conflict over the continuation of the old regime. Certainly, there were different interpretations regarding the exact nature and intent of the policy during that time.2 However, few doubted that it was purposeful and coherent. This is an obvious area in which there has been a change: one finds repeatedly in the literature on South African foreign policy that it is criticised for not being coherent and having no clear purpose. For example, the point is made again and again that although South African foreign policy is supposed to emphasise the promotion of human rights and democracy, thus far the country has not given any real effect to this. The Nigerian case is often cited in this regard.3 Naturally, coherency, or the lack of it, does not only apply to regional policy, nor only to the issues of human rights and democracy. Relations with Cuba, Iran, Syria and the People's Republic of China are obviously also relevant, and the issues of arms trade and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament also come into play.

A number of interrelated questions arise from this:

Is the South African foreign (including regional) policy unique in its apparent incoherence and in apparently not being purposeful?



What are the reasons for the incoherence and associated non-purposefulness?



Can this state of affairs be changed?

It would seem as if South African foreign policy, especially with regard to the twin issues of human rights and support for democracy, is not that unique in its apparent incoherence and non-purposefulness. This has certainly often been the reaction of foreign diplomats when the matter has been discussed at workshops or symposia and it has been claimed that 'normal' foreign policy is to an appreciable extent fairly incoherent. This contrasts rather sharply with South African regional policy under the conditions of conflict during the 1980s when it was quite obvious that the policy-makers were fairly single-minded. Likewise, under the old regime it was quite clear that the general foreign policy priorities were the defence of the status quo in South Africa, and countering the effects of international action against it. In spite of this apparent clarity of purpose, South African foreign policy during the 1970s was described by at least one commentator as ad hoc and reactive.4 The implication was that, even though it was clear what South African decision-makers wanted to attain, the actual execution of the policy was often haphazard and therefore not that coherent. This seems to bring one back to the description of current regional and foreign policy: clarity with regard to purpose, but apparent incoherence in implementation. The main difference between 'old' and 'new' foreign policy seems to lie in the greater number of aims included in the new foreign policy and the apparent problem of inconsistent prioritisation – and this is probably the more 'normal' situation faced by most other states.

Academics have also begun to put the new South Africa's foreign policy into theoretical perspective. Van Aardt,5 for example, points out that much of what can be said about South Africa's foreign policy, can also be applied to those of many other states, especially those in transition. If we accept this – and we probably have to, as it would be difficult to point to many examples to disprove that most countries tend to be rather inconsistent when applying, for example, the criterion of respect for human rights and active support for democracy to their foreign relations – the question arises why states, including South Africa, find it so difficult to be coherent with regard to foreign policy issues such as these. Answers to this question can probably be found in a number of areas, as will be indicated below. What is interesting, is that we seem instinctively to look first for the reasons for incoherence in the foreign policy-making process itself. This then raises questions pertaining to constitutional provisions, the role of different personalities and the nature and state of bureaucratic processes.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, PERSONALITIES AND BUREAUCRATIC PROCESSES

According to Henwood, the final South African Constitution leaves more to the President with regard to foreign relations, than did the transitional Constitution.6 The implication is that the role of Parliament may be weakened further in future. However, does this have any bearing on coherency? Is a single person necessarily more inclined to formulate a coherent policy than a body of people in the form of Parliament or the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs? Is the incoherence that has been perceived due to different forces influencing policy in different situations, or is it due to the interplay between various forces within the decision-making process? If the latter, will this be a passing phase which will come to an end, for example, once the Department of Foreign Affairs has been fully transformed?7 While press reports have often implied that the Department of Foreign Affairs is still dominated by the 'old guard', resulting in a lessening of its influence in the policy-making process, Department of Foreign Affairs officials report that there is in fact today in many cases better relations between 'desks' and the political leadership, that more consultation takes place at these levels, and that it may even be said that more weight is sometimes given to the opinions expressed at 'desk' level than before.

Closely connected to these questions and issues are those related to the roles played by the Foreign Minister, Mr Alfred Nzo, and his deputy, Mr Aziz Pahad. The former has often been made out by the press as a 'non-factor' in the foreign policy process and the latter as the true 'power behind the throne' in foreign affairs.8 Contrary to these reports, one also hears that Mr Nzo is in fact an extremely effective negotiator, in particular in multilateral situations.

The current and future role of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki is another matter which needs to be investigated more closely. Is some of the 'versatility' in foreign policy due to his increasing influence, and in what way will he interrelate with Parliament, with the Portfolio Committee, and with the Department of Foreign Affairs if and when he takes over from President Mandela? Will he have other forces playing a role which may not have been influential before? Add to this the relationship between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade and Industry,9 and it becomes clear that research should certainly focus more closely on processes of foreign policy-making in South Africa. As in the past, though perhaps less so with the current emphasis on openness and transparency, these processes take place largely within a 'black box' which is not easy to open. It is also doubtful whether such analysis will deliver all the reasons for the alleged incoherence of South African foreign policy and more specifically South African regional policy and the search therefore should continue.

PRIORITIES AND 'NEW FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES'

It is inside the 'black box' of policy-making that priorities are set among different aims in particular situations. Politics is about both interests and values. However, it would seem that in a play-off, the former normally wins and South African decision-makers know this. As a result, South African decision-makers have been careful not to infringe openly and actively on the interests of other states in pursuit of stated values and for obvious reasons: South African best interests are served in this manner. During his 1997 visit to Singapore, President Mandela verbalised this by saying that South Africa would not let the issues of human rights and democracy stand in the way of beneficial economic relations with other countries. Is this a matter of prioritising under a specific set of circumstances or inconsistency? Is there a clear hierarchy of foreign policy aims which stipulates that the promotion of human rights and democracy is the first principle? This does not appear to be the case – and, indeed, why should it be the case?

As Van Aardt10 indicates, part of the problem with the new South African foreign policy, as with many others, lies in the nature of the issues involved: " ... traditional foreign policy decision-making processes, based largely on the realist world view, do not facilitate the making of any policy that is at odds with the basic rules of the international system."

This means that there is an inherent tension between the issues involved in much of current foreign policy-making and the context in which the policies are made and implemented. Thus, the old policy only seemed more 'coherent' because of the approach followed, which made foreign policy something that was always directly related to the concerns of a state (security, autonomy, welfare, status and prestige), and accorded with the basic principle on which the state system was based (sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention). The issues simply did not reflect concerns with 'new' goals or values, such as human rights or democratisation.11 Because of the contradictions involved, it is one thing to include pursuit of these as foreign policy goals, but quite another to implement such policies. The alleged incoherence, non-purposefulness or inconsistency of South African regional and general foreign policy, as well as of the foreign policies of other countries, may therefore arise from the contradictions between the issues involved and the approach applied in their pursuit, rather than from problems within the policy-making process or an inability to prioritise.

A word of warning with regard to democratisation as a foreign policy goal should be sounded. Much has been written on the relationship between democracy and foreign policy, and recently the theme has been taken up again with particular reference to the impact of democratisation on international security, identified and explained with special reference to transitionary regimes.12 The conclusion reached is that the transition to democracy could have quite serious negative effects on the foreign policy of the transitionary state and through that, on the security of its region. Of course. one may disagree with the findings or argue that this may apply to Russia, but not necessarily to African countries. The point is that support of democratisation elsewhere in Africa may not necessarily imply a short term contribution to regional security. Without in any way discouraging democratisation as a goal for South African regional policy, it may be important to at least be aware of the possible repercussions for regional security and to pose some questions regarding ways and means of helping to effect democratisation while minimising any possible negative impact on security in Africa.

THE DIVERSITY OF FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND OF ACTORS

A further implication of what has been said, is that due to the nature of the issues involved, they may not be susceptible to normal, traditional instruments of foreign policy. As more and more 'new' issues are included in foreign policy agendas, the problems associated with these will hold true for more and more states and will probably become a permanent feature of foreign policy. A simple comparison of the principal aims of earlier and current South African regional and foreign policies bears this out, and the same would apply to the foreign policies of many other states. The fact is, quite simply, that the traditional foreign policy instruments may not be effective in dealing with many of these issues13 and the attempts at 'forcing' this or at finding alternative instruments or combinations of instruments may well seem to be a very 'untidy' process. Chances are that it may also resemble incoherence or seem non-purposeful.

Criticism has also been expressed regarding an 'overuse' of multilateral diplomacy by South Africa. The old South Africa much preferred bilateral diplomacy, and the new emphasis on multilateral relations is one of the more salient changes which has taken place in the conduct of foreign relations by the new Government. However, multilateral diplomacy is more visible and its increased use does not necessarily imply the non-use or 'under-use' of bilateral methods, which tend to be 'quieter'. Van Aardt's analysis of the handling of the Nigerian issue, for example, shows that ample (unsuccessful) use has been made of the latter. The fact is that international political practice offers a variety of instruments and that all have a role to play, depending on the particular circumstances. When taking into account what has already been said about the unsuitability of traditional instruments in dealing with many of the 'new issues', the argument for preferring bilateral methods to multilateral methods may weaken further.

South African foreign policy also functions within an environment in which a great variety of international actors participate. This does not only imply a variety of state actors, but also many non-state actors as well. This fact of modern international politics is expressed in the concept of the so-called 'mixed actor perspective'.14 The implication for South African regional and general foreign policy is quite far-reaching. Both as targets and as potential allies, actors are no longer a monolithic group.15 Certainly, many of Africa's problems cannot be addressed without taking into account the role of non-state actors, such as private companies operating there, opposition groupings, and many others.

PERCEPTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

It would seem from what has been said thus far that at least some of the common perceptions regarding the weak points in South African foreign policy and its implementation can be refuted as not necessarily accurate or based on an oversimplification and, at the very least, that such 'weak points' are not confined to South African alone. South African regional policy, in particular, has come in for sharp criticism as inconsistent. However, as has been pointed out, on closer analysis it would seem that South African policy, both regional and 'general', is quite normal – at least when compared to similar cases. It is not that unique, and there are a number of sound reasons for its being the way it is. Perhaps, it is simply a case of too much having been expected of the new South Africa, its policies towards its neighbours in Africa, and its policies in general. The new South Africa occupies the moral high ground and therefore it is expected to comply with all, even rather exaggerated expectations. Perhaps, and this has been the basic contention here, it is time to place the 'new' South Africa's policies towards Africa in some perspective, to attempt to rectify some misperceptions and to judge it on the same basis as that of other states. South Africa will not be able to put all, most or even many wrongs in Africa right. It will act much like all other states, according to prevailing perceptions of what is 'in South Africa's best interest' in any single set of circumstances, often incoherently, especially while decision-making processes are still very much in flux, but also where 'new' issues and a variety of instruments and actors are involved. The plea here, therefore, is for a more realistic appraisal of South African external policies. This does not mean that those that make and implement policies should not be pushed hard to make decisions that can be justified on the basis of declared aims, and that South Africans can be proud of, or that the most effective and preferable ways of implementing these policies should not be pursued. However, pushing for this and criticising existing policies and their implementation on the basis that it is somehow uniquely inadequate, is something entirely different.

LEADERSHIP IN THE REGION, LEADERSHIP ELSEWHERE

South African attempts to assist the transition process in Zaire and general support for peacekeeping in Africa,16 should be applauded. Admittedly, the former is an arduous and thus far not a very rewarding process. However, such actions give effect to the aims and principles expounded as underlying South African policy in the continent of Africa. It also focuses South African efforts in the region, where it is much needed and where South Africa has a far better chance of being effective and making a difference, than anywhere else. South Africa's chairpersonship of SADC also offers countless opportunities.

However, South African leadership in Africa does not exclude leadership elsewhere, should the circumstances be favourable. The country should be careful not to be too ambitious, trying to deal with too much at the same time. However, the relevant decision-makers have already shown, through South African policies on the continent, that they are sensitive to this and careful not to overextend themselves. Such caution may not always be popular with all partners within, for example, the Non-Aligned Movement, where South Africa has now also been called to leadership. One thinks here in particular of India with regard to the issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Effective leadership should be responsible, yet daring, and demands a careful weighing of opportunities and capabilities. Academic observers of South African foreign policy could best aid the process by doing what they are best suited to do: academic effort should be directed more in the area of sound basic research into the issues, the interplay of actors and the possibilities regarding effective state actions, and should perhaps involve a little less intense scrutinising of every move made (or not made) by South Africa in the region and in the world. We may have reached the point in the debate on South African regional and foreign policy where some more substantial inputs are also needed.

ENDNOTES

This is, for example, expressed in the so-called 'concentric circle approach', as formulated by L J Cantori and S L Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970.



See M E Muller, Kompeterende Interpretasies van Suid-Afrika se Regionale Beleid, unpublished D Litt et Phil thesis, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, 1991.



See for example M van Aardt, A Foreign Policy to Die For: South Africa's Response to the Nigerian Crisis, Africa Insight, 26(2), 1996, pp. 107-119.



G C Olivier, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid, Academica, Pretoria, 1977.



Van Aardt, op. cit.



Henwood, South African Foreign Policy and International Practice – 1995/96 - An Analysis, in South African Yearbook of International Law, 21, VerLoren van Themaat Centre for Public Law Studies, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1996.



See for example M E Muller, South Africa and the Diplomacy of Reintegration, Diplomatic Studies Programme Discussion Papers, 16, Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, Leicester, April 1996, for a discussion of the transformation of the DFA.



See Muller, op. cit., 1996.



See for example the reference to this in M E Muller, The Foreign Ministry of South Africa: From Isolation to Integration to Coherency, paper read at a conference on Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation, Canadian High Commission, London, 5-7 February 1997.



Van Aardt, op. cit.



Van Aardt, op. cit., p.108.



A V Kozhemiakin, Democratization and Foreign Policy Change: The Case of the Russian Federation, Review of International Studies, 23, 1997, pp. 49-74.



Also see Van Aardt, op. cit.



See for example B Hocking and M Smith, World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Prentice Hall, London, 1995.



Also see Van Aardt, op. cit., p. 109.



See for example J Cilliers and M Malan, From Destabilitzation to Peacekeeping in Southern Africa, Africa Insight, 26(4), 1996, pp. 339-346; C de Coning, Making Peace in Africa: South Africa's Role in the Organisation of African Unity, Global Dialogue, 2(1), February 1997.