"Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy."
– ANC President Nelson Mandela, 19931

"We start from the premise that South Africa is committed to human rights. The problems we face in this regard is the issue of possibilities and limitations on South Africa in the real world. How do we get human rights enforced and implemented in the international environment? There must be a possible [sic] contradiction between South-South co-operation and the values which we may want to project. There has to be interaction between theory and practice."

– Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, September 19962

INTRODUCTION

In the continuously shifting scene of international relations, foreign policy does not rely so much on direction as an orientation or 'leaning'. In South Africa's case, its foreign relations could be said to be lacking the necessary broad orientation and strategic purpose.3 There is a danger that South Africa may develop a self-image as a benign foreign policy godmother. It has perceived itself to have a long-list of guiding principles, including a symbol of democracy and human rights; an even-handed friend of all, as epitomised by the underlying spirit of 'universality'; and an international go-between and mediator. Unless South Africa is to end up with an insolvent foreign policy, it will have to define and prioritise its objectives and take cognisance both of its own limitations and the nature of the world outside. The wide-ranging variety of self-appointed roles is one of the key problems in identifying South Africa's foreign policy orientation.

In this, South Africa appears to be in a dilemma over some of the fundamental issues which underscore its guiding principles: it is caught between being part of Africa, yet being part of the West in Africa. Now that it does have an opportunity to play an expanded role in Africa and the region, it is in a quandary over whether or not regional development and involvement will detract from domestic imperatives. It is trapped between a desire to assist the region, given that Southern Africa's problems have domestic consequences, and not to appear to dominate the region even though it does. Hence, it is apparently reluctant to take the policy lead in Southern Africa, and hesitant to become involved, for example, in African peace support operations.

The African National Congress (ANC) spent decades appealing to the world's conscience to help bring about an end to the morally repugnant system of apartheid. Now in power, they appear to be incapable of making any moral judgements about who they should deal with and who they should not – instead preferring to treat all equally. From their background, it would be expected that discriminating against countries that support terrorism is a pretty easy call, and terrorist groups an even easier one. Although morality is a contested principle of foreign relations, South Africa, and President Mandela in particular, have overtly attempted to seized the moral high ground, and it is this facet beyond all else which gives the country such international stature.

But critics have argued that South Africa has essentially a 'twin-track' foreign policy: that, on the one hand, it pursues the national interest above all else, embracing human rights. Hence the opening of relations with Beijing in preference to Taiwan and the close ties with Indonesia, Cuba and Libya. Yet, on the other hand, perhaps mindful of the success of its own recent transition, Pretoria outwardly displays concern over human rights and democratisation elsewhere, which since the 1994 elections has notably manifested itself in stricter control over the export of South African manufactured arms, but not an end to arms sales. Many countries would of course agree with this stance (if they cared about democracy), though – as with President Mandela's blast at Nigeria at the 1995 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Auckland – few would express such sentiments. To confuse the issue even further, since 1994 Pretoria would appear to have attempted to redress the foreign policy imbalances of the apartheid era (and the National Party) by a shift towards the opposite direction without going all the way. Hence, its policy stance towards the Middle East has seemingly shifted from being pro-Israeli to pro-Arab, and its policy towards the US and Cuba has also moved in the opposite direction.

The public furore in January 1997 over proposed South African arms sales to Syria once more raised fundamental questions about the nature of Pretoria's foreign policy, which this article seeks to address, notably:

What is the overriding objective of South Africa's foreign policy?



What strategies should be adopted to achieve this objective?



What attributes are required to ensure that the correct strategies are adopted and followed?

ASSESSING THE PAST

It is necessary to recall where South Africa has come from in the foreign domain. In 1990, the South African Government was extremely isolated, with only 30 overseas representations. At that time, the ANC's 28 diplomatic offices abroad were focused on increasing that isolation. Today, South Africa has relations with all but 22 (including North Korea, Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti and Sierra Leone) of the 170 or so countries and institutions holding diplomatic status; with 108 residential diplomatic accreditations (75 embassies/high commissions) abroad (as opposed to 167 in South Africa, of which 96 are embassies/consulates) and 44 non-residential accreditations. To give a comparison of similar size powers, Argentina has 80 embassies, 52 consulates and five multilateral missions; and Chile, 66 embassies and eight multilateral missions.4

The development of new diplomatic and international relations has thus involved bringing in different parties with markedly opposing styles and contrasting ideological baggage. As a result, Pretoria, not surprisingly, has so far followed a foreign policy underscored by the principle of 'universality' – essentially, the opening of diplomatic doors to any state that would care to do so. Foreign policy has thus become a highly personalised affair, with President Mandela's international superstar status overshadowing all else. His deputy and heir-apparent, Thabo Mbeki, also takes a keen interest, echoing his earlier, and pre-government role as head of the ANC's Department of International Relations. His active participation is facilitated by the comparative absence of high-profile leadership in the Foreign ministry. The Minister, Alfred Nzo, has long been the butt of public ridicule and rumoured to be on his way out.

Like other government departments, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has inevitably been embroiled in a process of transition. The 'old' DFA comprised 1 917 staff. Following the election in 1994, 139 'overseas trained officials' (including ANC cadres) as well as 415 former TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) 'homeland' diplomats joined the DFA. Prior to 30 April 1996, 259 redundancy packages were approved, and from July 1996 to date, 112 applications for severance packages were received. Of the eighty ambassadors currently abroad, twenty are political appointees, 42 are from 'previously disadvantaged' communities, and ten are women. Such an inevitably turbulent process could not have been improved by the temporary nature of leadership in the DFA. The appointment of its Director-General, Rusty Evans, expires at the end of September 1997, and rumours are rife about his possible replacement. This has perhaps not been the most healthy environment in which to establish foreign policy priorities.5

It is also important to point out that, while there have been definite problems with foreign policy orientation overall since 1994, there have also been a number of successes which have not necessarily stolen the limelight. South Africa's constructive role in negotiating consensus around an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, was for the most part warmly received by the international community. The presidential and DFA roles in crisis management in both Lesotho and Mozambique in 1994 and subsequently in Lesotho and Swaziland have also received justifiable warm praise. The improvement in relations with Zimbabwe, which threatened to flounder on tariff discrepancies between the two, is another, and Pretoria's engagement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in attempting to encourage regional trade and development can also be seen as a positive step in the right direction.

ESTABLISHING FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

The DFA has attempted to redress a perceived lack of policy consistency and co-ordination through the formulation of the South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document – a kind of draft white paper – released in June 1996. Once comments on this paper have been absorbed, a foreign policy framework will be formulated based, in the words of Minister Nzo, "on national consensus."6 Whether such a consensus is achievable or even desirable is moot. Not only is this a difficult, almost impossible task, but it could take foreign policy issues out of the hands of the professionals, thereby diffusing the focus from key priorities.

Undoubtedly, it is desirable for South Africa's foreign policy experts to establish a general understanding of the values on which decisions and standpoints are premised. It is also important to establish a clear chain of command, throughout which there would be an acceptance of South Africa's role in the international community, and of the evolving nature of that community.

As it stands, however, the Discussion Document does not provide this lead. Its stated design is to assist the Government in the task of "shaping, directing and executing South Africa's foreign policy." Frankly put, however, the document can best be described as an ambitious, but misguided wish list for South African foreign policy which understates the importance of the international operating environment and South Africa's abilities and resources to work within that context – in other words, its capacity to act, which always has limitations. This is of critical importance. Foreign policy, by its nature, often has to be reactive – responding to unanticipated and often unwanted developments in the international setting. The state's aim should be to develop a systematic response in the biological rather than the mechanical sense – that it responds and reshapes according to the environment.

The Discussion Document identifies an all-inclusive list – variously described – of pillars, cornerstones, principles and priorities for South Africa's foreign policy, covering virtually everything from "responsible global citizenry" to "the advancement of human rights and the promotion of democracy" to support for "the work of the UNHCR" and to "secure world-wide peace, promote disarmament, prevent genocide, restrict proliferation of nuclear arms of mass destruction and achieve a new world security regime." Ironically, the document states that "South Africa's policy initiatives should be modest and not overly ambitious." Though few would take exception to these noble goals, it is doubtful, given South Africa's limited resources and size, that all of these can realistically be achieved.7

Clearly, the necessary move from South Africa's current foreign profile to a nuanced foreign policy requires the prioritisation of goals and the creation of an orderly and systematic manner to achieve these, mindful, of course, of domestic personnel and resource limitations. In this regard, democratic South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy needs to be based on an understanding about its self-interest in the global village. The national interest may be said to be underpinned by the general values enshrined in the Constitution, and encompasses the security of the state and its citizens and the promotion of their social and economic well-being, as well as the encouragement of global peace, regional stability and development. Put simply, this is achieved by a focus primarily on two areas:

encouraging stability and development in Southern Africa; and



securing incremental improvements in investment and trade links world-wide.

These strategic 'pillars' of foreign policy involve tactically, in turn:

keeping South Africa's established trading and investment partners on-side;



encouraging new links with emerging markets in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere;



representing the interests of Southern Africa in international forums, and;



extending assistance to the region, where necessary, in the interests of stability and development.

South Africa's policies and the manner in which it interacts with the outside world will thus be shaped by a number of factors.

The Role of Personalities

This is a crucial factor. President Mandela's stature in the international domain has meant that South Africa's image (and its foreign policy) tends largely to be equated with the President's profile. As a result, policy has often followed his public statements, rather than the other way around. His successor(s) will have to co-ordinate responsibility, and learn to rely on those involved in the process of policy formulation to make the right decisions, which (s)he will then articulate to a greater extent than at present. Of course, given the nature of modern diplomacy, a head of state cannot be expected to be a mere microphone and, from time to time, will take a prominent foreign policy role.

South Africa's External Political Relations

As noted above, here it is critical for South Africa to identify the key objectives in its foreign policy – notably the economic and physical well-being of South Africans. Only with this in mind (and with an appreciation of its own strengths and weaknesses, as well as the nature of the world outside), will it be able to establish and maintain a foreign policy orientation – to 'lean' in the direction arguably of securing incremental improvements in its trade and investment ties, and towards closer relations with the neighbouring states. At the moment, Pretoria is instead leaning all over the place. Outbursts of barely concealed anti-American/Western sentiment will not assist South Africa's long term cause, and neither will consorting with so-called 'pariah' states simply for the sake of maintaining old friendships and ideological ties.

Familial Ties

These will obviously help to define relations with Europe, especially with the United Kingdom, given the preponderance of UK passport holders (1,1 million) in South Africa, Portuguese passport holders (600 000), as well as Commonwealth ties.

The Success of the South African 'Experiment'

The success of South Africa's transition to democracy and the extent of external involvement in the country over the long term, hinges on the success of its economy and the existence of economic opportunities, and its stabilising role in Southern Africa. This is related, in turn, to the role of leadership, the implementation of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution macro-economic strategy (GEAR), levels of interaction with the global economy, regional stability, socio-political stability (including crime), as well as its image as a responsible, reliable international partner.

The World Around Us

In Southern Africa and further afield, South Africa's transition to economic, political and security normalcy will have a profound effect on South Africa's image and fortunes, especially given our increased business interaction with the subcontinent. South Africa could also stand to profit in a role as a bridgehead for international trade with the region.

Resources

These relate to the availability of personnel (leadership especially), natural and financial resources, and also South Africa's technical attributes and skills. The allocation of diplomatic resources and the focus of external business activity in the future will be determined by a number of criteria, including:

levels of trade and investment (both ways), and rates of growth;



sustainability of growth, which relates to: the size of the population (market), population growth and demography, population wealth, and GDP/manufacturing ratios; and



the availability of South African resources, diplomatic or otherwise, including personnel and finances.

BUDGET SHRINKAGES, THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE AND THE DFA/DTI INTERFACE

In terms of resource allocation, budget shrinkages have meant that the DFA, in the future, will have to disperse its resources in a creative manner which best represents South Africa's national interests. The Department was allocated R1 146 billion in the 1996-7 Annual Budget, only a 0,7 per cent increase on the previous year. Already far below the domestic inflation rate of around 9 per cent, this cut has been exacerbated by the 20 per cent fall in the value of the Rand in 1996, consequently increasing the cost of maintaining foreign missions. This will also make an expansion in the number of missions more difficult, and the books will probably have to be balanced by 'downsizing' in some countries, in the form of staff cuts, the closure of whole consulates or even embassies, and the possible use of 'sleeping diplomats'. The sharing of missions with other member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also reportedly been mooted.8

The issue of representation abroad is complicated by the experience and qualifications of such representatives and their skills and raises, in turn, the question of the value of having separate departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry (DTI). It has been asked whether South Africa should not do what the Australians, for example, have managed successfully, and simply merge the two, while maintaining two separate ministers? This would certainly facilitate policy homogeneity (which was notably absent between the DTI and the DFA over the issue of the Indian Ocean Rim initiative in 1995) and would stimulate DFA expertise in foreign trade and multilateral economic issues which it does not (at least not at the level of the DTI) possess at present. The setting-up of special units dedicated to expanding trade - along the lines of the French Poste d'Expansion – is another possibility. Alternatively, the DFA should play a greater role in co-ordinating the various departments concerned with foreign relations: DTI, Defence, Culture, Sport, Tourism, Transport, and so on.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In an age when much of foreign relations is in essence about foreign economic relations, given the need to address social inequalities through economic growth, it is inevitable that South Africa's foreign policy will be geared to this end. As Nelson Mandela put it in 1993: "The primary motivation of the ANC's foreign economic policies as a whole will be to place South Africa on the path of rapid economic development with a view to addressing three key problem areas: slow growth, severe poverty, and extreme inequalities in living standards."9

Given that it is impossible to buck geography, there will inevitably be an African focus, though care will have to be taken to balance this against other demands and priorities: trade with Africa amounted to 8,3 per cent of the overall total in 1995; with the European Union (EU) 33 per cent; the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA – Mexico, US, Canada) 9 per cent; the states of Latin America's Mercosur grouping 1,7 per cent; Asia and the Middle-East 26 per cent; and surrounding states of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU – Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland) 8,5 per cent.10

THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually equitable and beneficial trade arrangements;



ensure efficient production within SADC reflecting the current and dynamic comparative advantage of its members;



contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment;



enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialisation of the Region; and



establish a Free Trade Area in the SADC region.

Importantly, the SADC free trade protocol binds South Africa to SADC in its negotiations, whether these are with the EU or potentially with the US over a free trade agreement. The SADC protocol explicitly states that "[n]othing in this Protocol shall prevent a Member State from granting or maintaining preferential trade arrangements with third countries, provided such trade arrangements do not impede or frustrate the objectives of this Protocol" and "any advantage, concession, privilege or power granted to a third country under such arrangements is extended to other Member States."15

FINDING ITS AFRICAN ROOTS

President Mandela has argued that "South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts."16 Aside from improvements in relations in the more obvious areas of political and security interaction, there has also been a tremendous growth in South Africa's trade and investment ties with the African subcontinent. In terms of foreign investment, South Africa's foreign assets in Africa stood in 1994, in terms of direct investment, at R3 752 billion, with total African assets at R6 143 billion. This may perhaps be low by comparison to the total of South African Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) abroad of R74 billion (1994), but the figure is increasing all the time with an estimated additional South African-African investment of around R9 billion since the election in 1994.17

The trade relationship (excluding SACU) increased by some 30 per cent for 1993-94 from a total of R8 456,9 billion (exports, R6 827,4 billion; imports R1 629,5 billion) to R10 986 billion (exports, R8 632 billion; imports, R2 354 billion); and again leapt some 52,6 per cent between 1994-95 to R16 771,2 billion (exports, R13 916 billion; imports, R2 855,2 billion). This amounts to roughly 8 per cent of South Africa's total trade flows.

It is important, however, to view these increases not only as a part of South Africa's total trade (which is significant though not excessively so) and trade as a part of a pattern of general relations with the continent (which is important) but in terms of the potential for the future (which could be the most significant). In this, trade could be said to be led by South Africa's other interests, whereas with the EU, for example, trade is the lead in the relationship.

These changes in its African relations are also illustrated by the increase in the number of South African-based companies operating in the subcontinent. For example:

The Standard Bank now operates in fourteen African countries, with a total of 103 African branches. South Africa's top eight banks represent US$ 6 billion of the total of US$ 8 billion of the capital of African banks.18



South African mining investments and interests are becoming increasingly diversified throughout the continent.



South African Breweries now operates in Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania, in addition to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.



Shoprite-Checkers have opened retail supermarket stores in Zambia, while Pick 'n Pay plans to expand into Namibia, Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe.

This expansion has been made possible by political and economic changes throughout the continent, and has been largely facilitated through privatisation campaigns. In this, South Africans possess the competitive advantage of geographic location coupled with knowledge of African working conditions, sensitivities and opportunities. And when one considers that South Africa currently, according to the DTI, supplies just 15 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa's imports and just under 30 per cent of SADC's imports, Africa must be an attractive growth market and opportunity given South Africa's inherent advantages.19

In this regard, it is also important to note that, although SADC has been esablished to provide region-wide development-type project assistance, the success of regional development will be dependent, to a great extent in future, on increased levels of private investment in projects which are attractive for very sound commercial reasons which, in turn, is dependent on relative stability and growth potential.20

One such project is the Maputo Corridor with Mozambique, potentially one of the most positive and ambitious cross-border development projects in Southern Africa. The first phase of the project entails the construction of a highway – a toll road from Witbank in South Africa to Maputo in Mozambique – estimated to cost over R600 million. Only 10 per cent of the costs will be covered by public funds, and the rest is expected to be raised by a consortium of private investors. The next stage involves the rebuilding of the adjacent railway line, as well as the modernisation of the Maputo Harbour at a cost of R150 million. Maputo is the nearest port to South Africa's industrial heartland, and before Mozambique's independence used to carry 40 per cent of the old Transvaal province's foreign trade. This figure is today only at five per cent, which gives an estimation of the potential for this scheme.

A second area, particularly in Mozambique, Namibia and Angola, concerns the exciting possibilities for the opening up of new gas and oil fields.

Power generation and transmission are two further areas. In June 1996, power executives from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and Zaire gathered in Kinshasa to discuss plans to build export links across the region from the Inga River hydroelectric scheme on the Zaire River. With a potential to generate 44 000 MW (compared to Cahora Bassa's installed capacity of 2 000 MW), the Inga Dam has a capacity of 17 775 MW so far. Currently it produces only about 650-700 MW, just enough for local demand. Sub-Saharan Africa's current generating capacity is 48 646 MW, 82 per cent of which is supplied by South Africa. Studies by the African Development Bank have estimated that a regional approach to power system development could result in generating savings of some US $3 billion between 1995-2010, could save some US $400 million annually in operating costs, and provide US $800 million annually in export income.

Of course, the success of regional programmes is dependent on the pace of privatisation and deregulation within Southern Africa, and on the path of political development and creation of conditions of socio-political stability.

CONCLUSION

To continue to punch beyond its weight in the international arena and capitalise on the virtual global hero worship of its current President, Pretoria will have to ensure that its foreign policy has a significant economic underpinning, thereby providing a product for its Department of Foreign Affairs and its other representatives abroad to sell. At the same time, to stretch the analogy, even if a nation is able to punch beyond its weight, it gains little if it is only a flyweight taking on the heavyweights. There is a need for South Africa to learn discretion, and not to lean all over the place in the international arena.

To maintain a flexible foreign policy capable of coping with global change, there will always be a need to understand and monitor the continuously shifting international milieu. In this, South Africa will require carefully defined foreign policy goals and priorities and not the ambitious wish list articulated at present. Looking to the future, a state that wishes to pursue a human rights agenda internationally will have to be 'pure' at home. This encompasses styles of domestic governance, as well as issues concerning crime, policing and arms sales.

Given the need to attract investment funds and the primary concern of potential foreign investors about rates of return, a cogent economic policy is critical for an overall successful foreign policy. This will be assisted, in turn, by any number of the following:

improved dialogue and confidence between Government and business, and greater co-operation and co-ordination between state departments concerned with foreign policy;



a greater willingness to engage with Africa and its problems and not seek refuge from commitment by deferring decisions to the multilateral environment. This can only serve to strengthen external impressions of South Africa's seriousness as a global player, and of Africa's intent to deal with its affairs;



encouraging SADC to work in a manner that is complementary to global trends and to South Africa's external trade relations (such as those with the EU). This could demand less sensitivity towards current regional suspicions and greater farsightedness;



placing its foreign diplomatic resources in a manner that ensures the greatest return; and



restricting its role to those areas where it has the greatest capacity to be effective.

ENDNOTES

I am grateful to James Barber and Alan Begg for their helpful comments in the preparation of this paper. All faults remain mine alone, however.

N Mandela, South African Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1993, p. 88.



Summary of concluding remarks, DFA Foreign Policy Workshop, Randburg, 9-10 September 1996, pp. 8-9.



I am grateful to James Barber for this point.



See Business Day, 10 and 13 January 1997. South Africa currently has 75 embassies or high commissions in foreign countries, while there are 96 embassies or high commissions in South Africa. South Africa also has consulates in 18 countries, and 57 countries have consulates in South Africa. South Africa has accredited a nearby embassy to cover 44 countries, while seven countries have non-residential accreditation in South Africa. Interestingly, the Republic's 1996-97 foreign affairs budget amounted to US $250 million; while Chile and Argentina's were US $130 million and US $456 million (1995-96) respectively, though each had a similar number to South Africa of foreign missions. In the Argentine case, the budget includes the cost of trade representatives.



This information was supplied in correspondence with the Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 15 January 1997.



Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo, DFA Foreign Policy Workshop, op. cit.



See, South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 1996, 38 pp.



See Business Day, 10 January 1997.



Mandela, op. cit., p. 93.



For these and other trade figures, see G Mills (ed.), The South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1996, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1996.



J Herbst, Africa and the International Economy, in A Handley and G Mills (eds.), From Isolation to Integration: The South African Economy in the 1990s, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1996, pp. 62-85.



Discussion Document, op. cit., p. 18.



The importance of SACU receipts for the BLNS states is critical in their negotiating position on the EU FTA. Currently, income from SACU accounts for 46 per cent of the budget of Swaziland, 15 per cent of Namibia's, over 50 per cent of Lesotho's, and 16 per cent of Botswana's. See Business Day, 9 September 1996.



Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region, 9 September 1996, pp. 7-8.



Ibid., p. 16.



Mandela, op. cit., p. 89.



See, SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, September 1996; and for figures on an increase in South Africa's African investments since the election, see Business Day, 4 October 1996.



See Financial Mail, 5 January 1996; C Ryan, Standard's African Adventure, Millenium, October-November 1996, pp. 96-102.



Conversation with DTI official, November 1996.



See P Mistry, Building Infrastructure in Southern Africa and the New South Africa, The South African Journal of International Affairs, 4(1), Summer 1996, pp. 56-71.