INTRODUCTION

Negative comments on South Africa's foreign policy abound. These include comments referring to the non-existence of a foreign policy, or to foreign policy as an ad hoc process, devoid of any specific direction or principles. It is therefore necessary to establish the underlying principles and the contents of the foreign policy of South Africa, before endeavouring to identify or analyse any possible problems. The main purpose of this analysis will not be to list all possible or imaginable problems, but rather to focus on some of the more salient problems already visible in the foreign policy process of South Africa.

No official document on Pretoria's foreign policy exists as yet. The declared foreign policy of South Africa, however, can be determined by analysing the speeches and actions of relevant politicians and officials. The most important sources of information in this regard are the speeches of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, especially those in Parliament. Other sources include research papers on foreign policy, as well as the policy documents of political parties and foreign policy discussion documents of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Before explaining the foreign policy of the present Government, it is important to briefly describe the development of the foreign policy of South Africa under the previous Government. This will emphasise some of the important historical and political factors that underlie the foreign policy of South Africa.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOUTH AFRICA

The development of South Africa's foreign policy can be divided into two phases. The first phase spans the years of National Party rule (1948-1994) and the second, the phase of the African National Congress (ANC) led Government (since April 1994). This phase includes the transition period of 1990-1994 as it formed the foundation of post-1994 foreign policy. The foreign policy that was implemented before April 1994 by the National Party Government will not be dealt with in its entirety, but the emphasis will be on the more salient features of National Party foreign policy.

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE APRIL 1994

According to Olivier,1 South Africa's foreign policy up to 1977 can be classified as consisting of a number of separate foreign policies and lines of conduct. The main characteristics of South Africa's foreign policy were:2

non-isolationist, anti-sanctions and pro-western aimed at enhanced co-operation with non-communist states and international organisations; with emphasis on international trade and commerce because it was a strong instrument to fight isolation and to strengthen the position of South Africa;



peaceful co-existence and regional co-operation based on geographical realities, the need to foster friendly relations with neighbouring states, and South Africa as part of the African continent (with a permanent white population); and



external justification to enhance South Africa's image abroad and the maintenance of internal sovereignty by refraining from interference in the internal affairs of other states (based on Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter).

The most important foreign policy problems that faced South Africa in this era were:

issues of South West Africa (later to become the independent state of Namibia) and of Rhodesia (later to become the independent state of Zimbabwe);



security concerns and the means to safeguard South Africa from external attacks; and



relations with the UN which were characterised by tension and hostility.

The foreign policy of South Africa up to 1977 can be described as reactionary and tentative. It is also important to keep in mind the influence of the internal policies (apartheid policies) on the foreign policy of South Africa.3

The ensuing period in South Africa's foreign policy, from 1978 to 1989, was dominated by the leadership of Prime Minister and later State President P W Botha. Foreign policy in this period was based on the perception of a 'total onslaught' against South Africa, as well as the 'total national strategy' of South Africa,4 aimed at defeating the total onslaught against South Africa.5

The foreign policy of South Africa during this period was shaped by increased hostility against South Africa. South Africa's response was an increased reliance on 'strong arm tactics' against any perceived enemy or threat. The result was an escalation in the use of violence as a means of addressing problems in the regional context (the infamous destabilisation policy). This came to an end in 1989 when F W de Klerk succeeded P W Botha as State President.

The events that took place in South Africa since February 1990 saw remarkable changes, not only in South Africa itself, but also in the foreign policy of South Africa. Apart from this, changes such as the acceptance of South Africa back into the community of states, necessitated a review and adaptation of the foreign policy of South Africa. The country was now in need of a foreign policy suited to a new world, not only as a result of internal changes, but also as a result of global changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. The new foreign policy had to provide for increasing regionalisation in world politics and the increasing importance of multilateralism in world affairs. This foreign policy was also the foreign policy of South Africa during its transition from apartheid to democracy after April 1994. This transitional foreign policy was based on two pillars:6

the quest for a political solution to the internal problems of South Africa that would satisfy the international community and ensure their support; and



the revitalisation of the South African economy.

Foreign policy was at this stage influenced by factors such as the need to interact with the rest of the world, economic and development needs, and the limitations inherent in South Africa's position as a (small) middle-ranking country.7

New priorities emerged in terms of South Africa's foreign policy. The first priority was relations with Africa, and especially Southern Africa. The second priority was the expansion and consolidation of South Africa's position in other regions of the world, such as the Middle East, Far East, South East Asia and Eastern Europe. The third priority was to expand South Africa's relations with the UN and other intergovernment multilateral organisations. It was also important to enhance the image of South Africa as it emerged from the isolation of the past.8

The period 1989 to April 1994 saw the review and redirection of South Africa's foreign policy to underpin the process of internal political reform and the emergence of South Africa into world politics as a 'normal' member of the international community. This latter phase in the development of South Africa's foreign policy formed the foundation of the foreign policy of the first democratically elected Government of South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER APRIL 1994

The development of South Africa's foreign policy after April 1994 can be described as the foreign policy of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and as that of the ANC after the withdrawal of the NP from the GNU. This has created the situation where the foreign policy of South Africa is of necessity even more influenced by the perceptions and objectives of the ANC,9 despite the continued participation of the Inkatha Freedom Party in the GNU. The analysis of the nature and development of the foreign policy of South Africa after 1994 turns on three aspects:

declarations of intent, especially as communicated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs;



the influence of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) on foreign policy; and



important developments in foreign policy since April 1994.

The declared foreign policy of South Africa, as explained by Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo to Parliament in May 1994, was aimed at a commitment to:10

human rights, specifically the political, economic, social and environmental circumstances conducive to these;



the promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the world;



the principles of justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;



international peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the resolution of conflict;



the interests of Africa in global affairs; and



expanded regional and international economic co-operation in an interdependent world.

In August 1994, Mr Nzo gave the following guidelines regarding South Africa's foreign policy:11

that the conduct of South Africa's international relations should be transparent and take place in close consultation with Parliament;



the national interests of South Africa will always dictate its policies;



that South Africa must expand its participation in regional, continental and global multilateral organisations;



that the security and the quality of life of South Africans, as well as justice and the international rule of law, peace, economic stability and regional co-operation were some of the fundamental principles underlying the foreign policy of South Africa; and



that South Africa could not become involved in all laudable initiatives and issues in international politics, because of a lack of adequate resources.

Priorities that were already decided on, as far as foreign policy was concerned, were the following:12

peaceful co-existence and the promotion of economic development in Southern Africa;



constructive interaction with Africa, specifically to address the challenges of the next decade and to find solutions to conflict;



interaction in multilateral organisations;



improved relations with the G7 nations, as well as with South Africa's major trading partners; and



the continuation of traditional friendships and the promotion of new partnerships.

Mr Nzo also focused on important problems that had to be provided for in the foreign policy of South Africa. These included:13

bloc-formation in international politics and the possible exclusion or denial of South African participation in specific 'blocs';



the risks of protectionism, the undermining of the international trade system, the impact of refugees and mass migration and the threat that these issues posed for job creation;



the proliferation of arms and weapons of mass destruction; and



disease, drought and the occurrence of other natural disasters and the impact of these issues on economic and social development.

The analysis of the principles and objectives of the foreign policy of the GNU leads to the conclusion that it reflects the foreign policy of any 'normal' state. It was also noticeable that these principles were contained in the basic foreign policy aims of most states, and that it implied an emphasis on the national and security interests of the own state as fundamental policy principles. The focus on regional co-operation and peaceful co-existence was also a normal part of the foreign policy of any state. A second conclusion regarding the development of South Africa's foreign policy since April 1994, was the emphasis on democracy, justice and human rights, which brought a new dimension to the declared foreign policy, namely that of morality. This posed important challenges for South Africa as it could lead to conflict between perceived interests and the 'right' decision, and had implications for the allocation of resources for essential foreign policy goals (national interests) as opposed to morally justifiable objectives that might, in the long run, negatively influence the material position of the own state.

The foreign policy of South Africa under the GNU had also been influenced by the acceptance of the RDP as an internal policy framework. The RDP White Paper included the following statements that were relevant to the foreign policy of South Africa:14

It is impossible to rebuild the economy of South Africa in isolation from its Southern African neighbours. It would also be dangerous for South Africa to dominate its neighbours, as it would restrict their growth, reduce their potential as markets which will worsen their unemployment and lead to increased migration to South Africa. It is therefore important for South Africa to participate in regional development through multilateral forums such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).



It is important for South Africa to co-operate with its neighbours to develop an effective growth and development strategy for Southern Africa, in order to overcome the negative results of World Bank and International Monetary Fund programmes which had been forced on the region.



The integration of foreign policy and trade policy as part of a broader strategy to strengthen South-South relations is important, as well as the democratisation of international institutions, thereby ensuring better prospects for developing countries.

The provisions of the RDP as a policy framework for South Africa have important consequences for South Africa's foreign policy. It clearly indicates the interrelationship between the foreign and economic policies of South Africa. It also underlines the interdependency that exists between South Africa and its neighbours, also in terms of internal policy objectives. Lastly, it identifies the importance of co-operation with South Africa, as a leading economic roleplayer, as well as co-operation between states in the southern hemisphere to satisfy their economic and foreign policy needs and objectives.

With a description of the principles and objectives in mind, developments in the foreign policy of South Africa since 1994 need to be analysed. This will serve as a basis to identify some of the problems of South Africa's foreign policy by analysing the following:

the constitutional and institutional dimension of South Africa's foreign policy; and



the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of South Africa.

The constitutional and institutional dimension of South Africa's foreign policy

The constitutional and institutional changes that took place in South Africa since 1994 provided for important changes in the foreign policy formulation and implementation processes. These aspects need to be explained to determine their influence on the foreign policy process in South Africa.

The constitutional changes that took place in South Africa since 1994 included the replacement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 110 of 1983, with the transitional constitution, (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993) and the subsequent acceptance of a 'final' constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. These constitutional changes have formed part of the process to democratise South Africa in all respects, including the foreign policy South Africa follows or would like to implement. The Constitution does not include any specific foreign policy guidelines, but provides a framework for procedural matters and policy decisions. The Constitution also provides a framework of values that ought to be present in the declared and implemented foreign policy of South Africa. In order to evaluate the influence of constitutional changes on the foreign policy of South Africa, the sections in the Constitution that have a bearing on the foreign policy process need to be briefly explained and linked to the institutional changes that resulted from the constitutional changes.

The transitional Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) provided for the President (in consultation with the Executive Deputy-Presidents) to exercise important powers relating to the foreign policy of South Africa. These include:15

the appointment, accreditation and reception of ambassadors and foreign representatives;



the negotiation and signing of international agreements (parliamentary ratification was required before these agreements could have been implemented); and



the development and implementation of the policies of the national Government.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 does not include the same provisions contained in the transitional Constitution, but also provides for matters related to foreign policy. The Constitution of 1996 provides for the President to:16

receive and recognise foreign diplomatic and consular representatives and to appoint ambassadors, plenipotentiaries and diplomatic and consular representatives;

and for the national executive (including the President) to:

negotiate and sign international agreements, but only requires parliamentary ratification in the case of agreements of a technical, administrative and executive nature. It is, however, a requirement that all international agreements be tabled in both houses of Parliament, even if ratification of a specific agreement is not required by the Constitution; and



develop and implement national policy and to co-ordinate the functions of state departments and administrations.

This change from the more specific provisions introduced in the transitional Constitution of 1993 establishes a more independent position for the executive in the foreign policy process of South Africa. This, in the end, may limit the role of Parliament in the foreign policy process, although the role of Parliament in the policy process of South Africa has changed from that of the pre-1994 parliaments, when it served mainly as a rubber stamp of government foreign policy with very little input or influence on policy decisions. When the ANC assumed power, it envisaged a more active role for Parliament in the foreign policy sphere. The rules of Parliament were changed to give parliamentary portfolio committees a more direct and active role in the process of policy formulation.17 Although Parliament has undergone important and wide-ranging changes, the role of the legislature in the foreign policy formulation process seems to be very limited. The problem will be exacerbated by the fact that the Constitution seemingly strengthens the role of the executive at the cost of the legislature. Parliament may therefore find it very difficult or even impossible to be more than an ex-post facto roleplayer in matters of foreign affairs.18 This may result in limited participation and inputs in the process of foreign policy formulation as it institutionalises and entrenches the independent role of the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs. The nature of the foreign policy to be followed by South Africa will undoubtedly be influenced by this.

The conclusion that one can draw from this is that, in spite of important constitutional and institutional changes, the process of foreign policy formulation has not changed as much. This necessitates an analysis of the process of foreign policy formulation and implementation in South Africa.

FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The analysis of some of the decisions regarding the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of South Africa is necessary in order to understand the problems of foreign policy formulation and implementation in South Africa. The policy issues that need to be explained include the comparison of declared policy principles and objectives, as explained above, with the policy decisions that have been taken, some of these quite controversial in the eyes of some stakeholders.

The process for foreign policy formulation has also undergone important changes. One of these changes was the release of a discussion document on foreign policy by the Department of Foreign Affairs towards the end of 1996. This was the first time in South Africa that such a foreign policy document was released for discussion and comment by interested parties.19 Although the document did not live up to the expectations that some had, it at least opened up the debate on foreign policy issues and gave those interested parties the opportunity to participate in forging a new approach to policy formulation. The end result and future of this approach to policy development are not clear. It may not lead to anything concrete, although it may be the beginning of a more inclusive approach to formulating foreign policy in South Africa. This exercise served the purpose of exposing the divergent views in South Africa on matters of foreign policy. The problem with general participation in the policy process is linked to the dominant role of the executive (as explained in the previous section).

Some of the problems identified in the discussion document also apply to the foreign policy decisions that have been taken since 1994. These include problems such as:

the lack of a South African identity that is evident in foreign policy decisions;



uncertainty over the values that apply / should apply in South Africa's foreign policy;



the lack of clearly defined national interests;



a dualism prevalent in the foreign policy of South Africa;



the contradictions and ambiguity in foreign policy decisions and actions;



a lack of policy co-ordination;



the influence of personal and ideological preferences in policy decisions; and



a lack of adequate resources for foreign policy purposes.

The existence of these problems will be better understood if analysed against the background of some of the more noteworthy foreign policy decisions that have been taken. Examples of this include South Africa's relations with states such as Cuba, Libya, Iran, Syria, the two Chinas and the effect of this on relations with other states, such as the United States. In order to understand the importance and effect of these policy decisions, a brief description of the relations between South Africa and these 'problematic' states are provided. The reasons for the development of relations between South Africa and these states cannot be explained by referring to the declared foreign policy only.

South Africa and Cuba

South Africa's relations with Cuba seem to be contrary to the declared principles underlying the foreign policy of South Africa. The importance of these relations do not centre around material benefits or the influence of Cuba in global politics, but are important to South Africa for historical, symbolic and political reasons. Cuba supported the ANC during the liberation struggle and played an important role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It is therefore important for the South African Government to show its gratitude to Cuba by developing closer ties, and at the same time to demonstrate its solidarity with the NAM. The opposition of the US to South Africa's relations with Cuba also serves to demonstrate the fact that the foreign policy of South Africa is no longer exclusively pro-western in orientation. Closer ties with Cuba thus also serve to indicate a break with the foreign policy of the previous Government.

South Africa and Libya

Relations with Libya can be explained by using the same arguments as those that apply in the case of ties with Cuba. An important additional reason is the position of Libya as part of the African continent. The South African Government supports the initiatives of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to lift the UN imposed sanctions on Libya and for the trial of the two Libyans accused in the Lockerbie air disaster to take place in a neutral country.20 This serves to demonstrate both the solidarity of South Africa with the OAU and the importance of Africa in the foreign policy of South Africa. The position of South Africa with regard to ties with Libya also emphasises the fact that South Africa has broken with the pro-western policies of the past. In the case of Libya, even more importance can be given to this fact because more states are opposed to ties with Libya than to the relations of South Africa with Cuba.

In spite of the reasons given, the South African Government seems to be careful in the development of its relations with Libya. The reason for this probably lies in the fact that more governments are opposed to the Libyan Government. These include governments that are not as negative towards South Africa's ties to Cuba and include the major European trading partners of South Africa.21

South Africa and Iran

The reasons for the development of closer ties between South Africa and Iran are much the same as those that apply in the case of relations between South Africa and Cuba and Libya. An additional reason is the material benefit for South Africa in the form of oil purchases from Iran. It is believed that Iran supplies in as much as 65 per cent of South Africa's oil needs.22 South Africa stands to gain even more if Iranian oil is stored in South African oil storage facilities (dependent on the result of environmental impact studies).23 The cultural and religious symbolism of ties with Iran is also important and again serves to illustrate the shift away from an exclusive pro-western (Christian?) orientation by the Government.

In reaction to criticism against Iranian President Akbar Hasjemi Rafsanjani's visit to South Africa in September 1996, President Mandela said that the enemies of the West are not necessarily also the enemies of South Africa. He stressed that South Africa wanted to develop good relations with all countries, including the superpowers, but not at the cost of the ties that existed with good friends who supported the ANC against the apartheid regime when the superpowers supported the apartheid regime.24

South Africa and Syria

South Africa's relations with Syria have never been important. This changed when the possibility of an arms deal with Syria became an issue. Arguments against the deal included the opposition of the US and Israel to such arms sales, because of the possible destabilising effect an inflow of advanced weaponry would have on the peace process under way in the Middle East. The US has accused the Syrian Government (with that of Libya and Iran) of supporting terrorism. Members of Congress in the US have also threatened to withdraw all development aid to South Africa if the sale of arms to Syria goes ahead.25 The response of the South African Government was that it had the right to decide if weapons were to be sold to any customer that did not violate human rights, and that it would not be dictated to by anyone.26 An important question raised in this regard concerned the refusal of permission to South African arms manufacturers to sell arms to Turkey. The sale of arms to the Turkish Government was prohibited on the grounds of its human rights record, as well as its aggression against a neighbouring state.27 The South African Government explained its position on the marketing of weapons systems to Syria by describing it as a change in the previous government's pro-Israeli policies, as well as repeating its position that the enemies of the West were not necessarily the enemies of South Africa.28 No decision has so far been taken on the marketing and sale of weapons systems to Syria.??? The South African Government, however, has refused the sale of arms to Iran, Libya and Iraq.29

South Africa and the People's Republic of China

On 27 November 1996, President Mandela announced that South Africa would establish full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) towards the end of 1997.30 This announcement was met with some surprise by South Africans as it meant that the diplomatic relations with Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) would come to an end. In July 1996, President Mandela had stated that South Africa had no intention of severing its ties with the ROC.31 The diplomatic ties between South Africa and the ROC was seen to be very special, as it developed at a time when the previous Government had very few friends in world politics. The decision to establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC implied that the South African Government no longer recognised the ROC. The ROC supported the ANC in the run-up to the first democratic elections in 1994, made contributions to the RDP, had substantial investments in South Africa, had successfully democratised its political system and improved its human rights record. In terms of the declared foreign policy of South Africa, the ROC seemed to be ideally suited as a diplomatic partner for South Africa. However, the South African Government decided to develop diplomatic relations with the PRC instead. The new diplomatic partner contravenes all the principles underlying the foreign policy of South Africa. It is not democratic, currently has one of the worst human rights records in the world and has no significant investments in South Africa. The reasons for the decision to develop diplomatic relations in this instance can be found in the national interests of South Africa. The relations that South Africa had with the ROC was inconsistent with South Africa's role in international affairs. As a normal member of the community of states and as a potentially important role player in the UN, the NAM and OAU, it was no longer in the best interest of South Africa to maintain its strong relations with the ROC. The PRC also offered South Africa a stronger relationship with another permanent member of the UN Security Council, the government that will take control over Hong Kong (where South Africa has vested interests) on 1 July 1997, access to a market with immense potential and the possibility of more influence to South Africa in north-south relations.32

The Principle of Bilateral Relations

The principles that form the framework for foreign policy formulation as explained by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (see the section on South Africa's foreign policy after 1994), are clearly not followed to the letter in the foreign policy of South Africa at this stage. How can Government explain the relations it forged with Libya or the People's Republic of China if the principles of democracy or human rights are fundamental to the foreign policy of South Africa? From the above description of South Africa's relations with these states the following serve as possible explanations.

The position of the South African Government is that bilateral relations must be approached within the framework of resolutions of the UN and other international initiatives. Bilateral relations are seen as a matter between South Africa and any other involved country. The fact that South Africa forges ties with another country does not imply express support for or agreement with the internal policies or practices of that government.33 The foreign policy decisions of South Africa must be based on the national interests of South Africa and not on those of any other roleplayers.34 Based on this point of departure, relations with these states are defended on the grounds of:

the principle of universality: this implies that South Africa will develop ties with all states of the world that falls within the framework of its foreign policy principles (and national interests). The position of President Mandela is that the enemies of the west are not necessarily the enemies of South Africa;35



showing appreciation to governments that supported the ANC during the liberation struggle;36



South Africa will not be dictated to by anyone;37 and



South Africa will not avoid relations with states where violations of human rights may be possible, because South Africa follows accepted international practice in its relations with others.38

This does not necessarily answer the criticism referred to at the beginning of this document, but explains the approach of the South African Government to its foreign policy and associated foreign policy problems.

CONCLUSION

The foreign policy of South Africa has undergone important changes, but also include important problems. This is the result of several factors. The recent transformation of South Africa to a democratic system of governance and the subsequent reintegration of South Africa into a much changed international community have resulted in the introduction of the conflicting demands of world politics into the foreign policy of South Africa. These will inevitably emphasise aspects such as incompatibilities, value differences and dualism in the foreign policy of South Africa. The fact that South Africa is nothing more than a (small-) medium roleplayer in world politics, from which much is expected, will accentuate this even more.

It is however also important for the South African Government to start evaluating the impact of its policy decisions on the long term prospects for South Africa. The danger of a foreign policy based on a lack of clear values and uncertainty or unwillingness to clearly define national interests, is a directionless and ad hoc policy approach. This will cause decisions that need to be changed often and will inevitably lead to a perception of South Africa as being untrustworthy as an ally.

This does not imply that South Africa has a weak foreign policy, but rather that it may be time to refine the process of foreign policy formulation and implementation. A more cautious, stable and permanent approach to issues of foreign policy will result in more predictable foreign policy decisions and actions. This will be to the advantage of South Africa, because it will provide everyone associated with the country with a better idea of the interests of South Africa. This need not be at the expense of flexibility or creativity in the foreign policy of South Africa.

ENDNOTES

G C Olivier, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid, Academica, Pretoria, 1977, pp. 210-211.



Ibid.



For a discussion of this relationship see R Henwood, South Africa's Foreign Policy and International Practise – 1993 – An Analysis, in South African Yearbook of International Law, 19, Verloren van Themaat Centre for Public Law Studies, University of South Africa, 1993/94, pp. 249-262.



G Mills and S Baynham, South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1990, in G Mills (ed.), From Pariah to Participant, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1994, pp. 18-33.



D Sole, South African Foreign Policy Assumptions and Objectives from Hertzog to De Klerk, South African Journal of International Affairs, 2(1), 1994, p. 104.



L H Evans, South African Foreign Policy and the New World Order, ISSUP Bulletin, 3/94, 1994, pp. 8-9.



Ibid., p. 10.



Ibid., pp. 11-13.



For a detailed explanation of this see R Henwood, op. cit., p. 301;



Republic of South Africa (RSA), Debates of Parliament (National Assembly), 27 May 1994, col. 216.



RSA, Debates of Parliament (National Assembly), 8 August 1995, cols. 914-916.



Ibid., col. 916.



Ibid., col. 917.



RSA, RDP White Paper, Government Printer, Pretoria, September 1994, pp. 10, 31-32.



RSA, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 200 of 1993), section 81(1)(f), (l); 82(a-e) and 231(2).



RSA, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, section 84(g,h,i); 85(b,c); 231(1,2,3).



For a more detailed discussion of this see R Henwood, South Africa's Foreign Policy and International Practice – 1994/95 – An Analysis, in South African Yearbook of International Law, 20, Verloren van Themaat Centre for Public Law Studies, University of South Africa, 1995, pp. 271-274.



R Henwood, South African Foreign Policy and International Practice – 1995/96 – An Analysis, in South African Yearbook of International Law, 21, Verloren van Themaat Centre for Public Law Studies, University of South Africa,1996, pp. 247-249.



RSA, South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 1996.



Beeld, 4 March 1996.



Times, 19 April 1996.



Beeld, 12 September 1996.



Henwood, op. cit., 1995, p. 283.



Beeld, 14 September 1996.



Pretoria News, 20 January 1997.



Ibid.



RSA, Debates of Parliament (National Assembly), 15 May 1996, cols. 737-738.



Pretoria News, 20 January 1997.



Beeld, 18 March 1997.



Pretoria News, 28 November 1996.



Pretoria News, 3 July 1996.



Pretoria News, 28 November 1996; Beeld, 3 December 1996.



Ibid., pp. 24 - 25.



Developing South Africa's Foreign Policy – Parameters and Process, Global Dialogue, September 1996, 1(3), p. 2.



The Natal Witness, 19 April 1996.



Sunday Tribune, 18 February 1996; Beeld, 14 September 1996.



Financial Mail, 16 February 1996.



Beeld, 7 March 1997.