INTRODUCTION

South Africa passage from apartheid to majority rule, currently in its transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) phase, has been greeted internationally with enormous enthusiasm. Here, in the midst of the mounting conflict and confusion of purpose of the post-Cold War world, is an undeniably good news story: a triumph of peaceful negotiation (notwithstanding the thousands of lives lost) and democracy over violence and racist authoritarianism. It has produced a government led by a man, Madiba Nelson Mandela, sometimes described as the "last twentieth century hero": a truly inspirational figure with unequalled international stature and moral authority. And it has provided a source of optimism on a continent habitually described as being "in crisis."

In this article, the substance and implications of South Africa's relations with its continental neighbours, near and far, are examined. The conclusions can be characterised as analytically sceptical, but prescriptively hopeful. That is, while a close and unblinkered analysis of the challenges confronting South Africa and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa leads to expectations of a future marked by strong continuities, increasing inequalities and mounting insecurity, it also reveals clear bases for hope that a more co-operative and constructive future can be brought into being – however slowly, painstakingly, and perhaps haphazardly.

These themes are explored within three expanding concentric circles: the 'new' South Africa itself, the Southern African region, and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY SOUTH OF THE LIMPOPO

There is no gainsaying the change in the discourse, and indeed the practice of South African-African relations which has followed the inauguration of the GNU. The new policy élite, centred around the ANC, has repeatedly professed its intent "to become part of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in the region based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence."2 Moreover, through a variety of co-operative initiatives with its neighbours, Mandela's South Africa has created "an important impression ... in contrast to apartheid South Africa ... that the new government operates in concert with other states of the region. The GNU has been at great pains to avoid using its predominant power in regional relations."3 The contrast with the attitude and activities of the doomed apartheid state during its last decade – the era of destabilisation in the 1980s – is stark.

Yet, at levels of policy-making, political economy, and popular opinion, the forces of continuity are also very strong. South Africa remains the regional hegemon, and most South Africans of various classes and identities continue to be preoccupied with their own formidable problems first. Without South African commitment and leadership, rooted in a successful domestic transition at the socio-economic and political levels, the prospects for a new era of co-operation and community in the region and continent are grim. These conditions will not be easily attained.

Economic Growth, Development and Continuing Decline

The attempt to re-make South Africa – to promote development, as well as growth in a manner which begins to address the historical injustices and grossly inequitable life chances which are the legacies of the past – is handicapped from the outset by the impact of prolonged economic decline. Patrick McGowan has summarised that, in the light of its deteriorating relative circumstances in most significant areas since the mid-1970s, "South Africa will be fortunate to retain a place among the world's semi-peripheral powers over the next twenty years .... Rather more likely," he adds, "is relative descent, so that South Africa will increasingly resemble a big Zimbabwe, at the border between the periphery and the semi-periphery."4 This is bad news for Africa. South Africa's increasingly marginal place in a global economy which imposes increasing constraints on even the most powerful of countries, severely limits its room for manoeuvre, and any inclinations towards generosity.

To be sure, the country's economic performance has improved, but only slowly. GDP growth estimates for 1997 of 2,5-3 per cent remain well short of the 4 per cent required to make any inroads into South Africa's acute unemployment problem. This is so despite Nelson Mandela's remarkably successful, and sometimes controversial efforts to gain the confidence of the South African and international business communities. In the meantime, the traditional mainstay of the South African economy, gold, is experiencing a 'crisis' marked by sharply worsening production figures. In sum, even if the GNU, or its post-1999 successor, is able to engineer a reversal of South Africa's relative economic decline, the process will be a long and difficult one. It will make it all the more challenging to generate the resources and the political will required to finance South Africa's ambitious Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

Post-Apartheid Reconstruction and Development

The RDP is the centrepiece of the GNU policy agenda. Among other things, it embodies the Government's 'justice agenda'. It provides the political assurance that, along with fiscal responsibility, economic restructuring and growth, the ANC (with its 'partners' in Government) is committed to real change for the poor majority which is its primary base of electoral support. Yet, the RDP and its associated programmes will place an enormous strain on South Africa's limited human and financial capacity.

The RDP process as a whole has come under increasing criticism for its preoccupation with bureaucratic structures and limited progress in meeting concrete targets. At the same time, the RDP White Paper, designed to set out plans for implementation, has been criticised by progressive academics as a compromise to neoliberalism.

Obviously, the political stakes around the RDP are very high. Notwithstanding the fact that the RDP itself enjoins the "democratic government" to "negotiate with neighbouring countries to forge an equitable and mutually beneficial programme of increasing co-operation, co-ordination and integration,"5 it seems likely to absorb a great deal of time, energy, and resources for essentially domestic purposes, with relatively little left over for the region and continent. While progressive politicians and analysts in the 'new' South Africa periodically point out the country's historic culpability for much of the hardship which currently besets the region, and note that a strong case can be made for South African reparations, there will be no large scale influx of South African public resources to help fuel a regional recovery.

Forces of Continuity

Along with the limitations of relative economic decline globally and pressing priorities domestically, the prospects for fundamental change in South Africa-Africa relations are also inhibited by strong forces of continuity in the South African political economy and society. In the political economy, policy options are constrained and 'moderated' by the central role which a small number of highly concentrated corporations continues to play. Powerfully reinforced by the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the influence of corporate South Africa will sharply discourage options entailing substantial planning and intervention, at both national and regional levels. Moreover, these corporations are likely to strongly reinforce the position of South Africa's 'growth firsters' who argue that, above all, South Africa must generate growth; that to do so, it must attract investment; and that in light of these priorities, its foreign (economic) policy should continue to emphasise extra-continental linkages with South Africa's largest sources of trade and investment in Europe, North America and Asia. On the other hand, South African corporations and other private interests are themselves playing an increasingly prominent role as architects of trans-social links between South Africa and the rest of the continent.

At the social level, too, forces of cultural continuity and (mis)perception constrain the prospects for more co-operative intra-regional relations. South Africans have historically "lived up against" their neighbours. These habits of mind are resilient. Obviously, much of the white economic élite has traditionally seen itself as 'European' and 'Western' in identity and orientation. These perceptions, strongly reinforced by patterns of white emigration over the past several decades, will not be easily reoriented. But there are strains of chauvinism and parochialism among black South Africans as well, capable of generating a sense of both superiority and hostility towards their African neighbours.

Finally, and returning to the level of the state, it should be noted that even with the best will in the world, a major stumbling block to the decisive reorientation of South Africa's policy towards its continental neighbours is the onerous challenge of bureaucratic reorganisation and reorientation. Indeed, much of the slowness of policy change in domestic and foreign policy alike can be attributed to the difficulty of engineering change in the machinery of Government, and then establishing and implementing new priorities. In other words, there is a problem of simple bureaucratic overload. Under these circumstances, the forces of inertia can weigh heavily. This has perhaps most notably manifested itself in ongoing arguments over 'new directions' in foreign policy.

In sum, the tremendous domestic and global challenges confronting the new South Africa, allow only for cautious optimism concerning the prospects for a qualitatively new, more co-operative and constructive level of commitment to the region and continent. Yet, it would also be misleading to underestimate the changes which have already occurred. Thus, the emerging South African-Southern African relationship is characterised by ambiguity.

SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: PARTNER AND/OR HEGEMON?

What, precisely, has changed in regional relations since the South African elections? What are the benefits, and where are the dangers? Above all, the region as a whole has benefited from the cessation of inter-state hostilities between South Africa and its neighbours, and the former's destructive campaign of destabilisation.6 While the bonds of regional (inter)dependence ensured that a variety of more and less open economic and even political links were maintained throughout the apartheid era, the dawning of a new era of legitimate communications and co-operation created opportunities for a range of novel bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the region. What forms are these initiatives likely to take?

Regional Security

Some of the most dramatic changes have taken place in the security sphere. In a situation replete with ironies, whereas the old South African security establishment – both military and police – has been the major source of regional insecurity, the 'new' security establishment is engaged in a variety of co-operative exercises to combat regional insecurity. For example, under the terms of a bilateral crime combating agreement, code-named Operation Rachel, "South African police specialists ... have destroyed mortars, rocket-launchers, hand-grenades and landmines since starting an operation against illegal weapons with their Mozambican counterparts."7 Similar agreements and operations have been initiated with other neighbouring states. More broadly, the 'new' South African National Defence Force (SANDF), despite strong continuities at the level of personnel with the old South African Defence Force (SADF), has played a leading role in the planning for a new regional security arrangement: the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. It is anticipated that the functions of this security mechanism will include the provision of "intelligence support for preventive diplomacy initiatives in the case of pending or actual conflicts within the region," planning for combined operations, and the establishment of "security arrangements between states on specific issues such as countering weapons smuggling."8 Indeed, given the relatively promising development of regional security links, there are some scholars who argue that, in building regional co-operation, "a focus on security should precede rather than follow economic integration."9

Democracy and Human Rights

A second important regional effect of the South African transition is that, through the power of its example, a new regional norm of democracy and human rights has been strongly promoted. Whereas in the past the persistence of apartheid allowed SADC states to largely escape critical scrutiny of their own democratic shortcomings, and indeed justified certain important derogations from democratic norms in light of the security threat posed by Pretoria, the advent of a freely elected South African Government, featuring strong constitutional safeguards for human rights, has created strong pressures on neighbouring governments to accelerate their own reform processes. This is not to suggest that the trend towards democratic practices and civil liberties is irreversible in the new South Africa. Nor is it to suggest that the new regional norm of democracy and human rights is irresistible for neighbouring governments determined to retain political control. However, as long as the South African state and society continue to move in this direction, the pressures on regional governments to do likewise will continue to mount. Indeed, the problem-filled, but promising processes of political reform and democratisation in countries such as Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, need to be understood in relation to the process of change in South Africa.

Continuity and Change in Regional Political Economy

At the level of the political economy, pockets of the region – in both spatial and class terms – are beginning to benefit from increased South African interest and investment. Much of South Africa's renewed economic interest in the region and continent is based on the pursuit of new markets for trade, rather than opportunities for longer term investment. Yet, some substantial new investment projects are coming on line, particularly in Southern Africa. For example, Eskom and its subsidiary Roshcon are developing and/or rehabilitating power grids in Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia with a long term view towards establishing a SADC grid. Mining giant Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (JCI), in conjunction with other South African organisations, has entered into a turnkey supply agreement to rehabilitate Maamba Collieries in Zambia. South African hotel companies are making new investments in Southern Africa and beyond, and various South African mining, transportation and energy firms are either considering or undertaking major projects in the extraordinarily difficult, but potentially lucrative context of Zaire.

Perhaps most remarkable is the advent of what has been described as "another Great Trek," a process formalised in mid-1995 by an agreement between the South African government and Angola, Mozambique and Zaire "for the settling of hundreds of mainly Afrikaans-speaking farmers on millions of hectares of prime agricultural land in those countries."10 It is likely that Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe will also welcome South Africa's 'new trekkers'. Fears concerning the effects of land redistribution, illegal immigration, loss of protection for agricultural goods, among others, have persuaded numerous white South African farmers to seek greener pastures (literally) in the more fertile and less regulated rural areas of their increasingly prostrate neighbours. In some respects, this process builds upon the (re)emergence of large scale, corporate-owned plantation agriculture, notably in Mozambique.

What do these emerging linkages imply for post-apartheid development prospects in Southern Africa? At one level, South African firms and farmers are providing much-needed investment, technology, and employment. There can be no doubt that some individuals, groups, and areas in neighbouring countries will benefit materially – in some cases very significantly – from renewed South African interest.

At another level, however, in the absence of effective institutional frameworks and regulatory safeguards, both nationally and regionally, these various projects will significantly exacerbate disparities and promote private networks of patron-clientélism. They are likely, in other words, to reinforce and accelerate the emergence of regional 'growth poles' and 'backwaters', in both spatial and class terms. At the risk of sounding anachronistic in this era of marketisation and privatisation, it can be anticipated that this trend will, unmitigated, exacerbate human insecurity throughout the region. Those inside the charmed circles of growth and development will take steps to protect themselves, their families and their property from the immiseration outside, while those outside will resort to various illicit 'modes of accumulation' (theft, drugs, wildlife poaching and trade, guns, etc.). Moreover, should the state structures of the region continue to experience declines in effectiveness and legitimacy, this process will continue to be marked by increasing resort to private 'protection rackets' – both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate'.

At yet another level, however, it may rightly be asked how much of this is really novel, versus simply a restoration of the status quo ante. After all, South African corporations, such as Anglo-American, have had long-standing holdings and investments throughout the region, while white farmers or settlers have maintained a presence in areas as remote as Botswana's far-western Ghanzi district. South African investments in and promotion of tourism in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, for example, in some respects simply resurrect pre-independence patterns.

Notwithstanding the acceleration of regional interpenetration and concurrent human insecurity, what is occurring is in some respects simply the 'normalisation' of historic regional economic patterns and trends which have always been particularly beneficial to South Africa. It is not surprising, therefore, that South African interests, both private and government, have been somewhat lackadaisical in their attitude toward the reform and renegotiation of regional trading and investment arrangements.

Institutional Frameworks for Regional Co-operation

All of this points toward the continuing relevance of the institutional frameworks within which regional economic relations take place. There have been no shortage of regional organisations in Southern Africa designed, formally at least, to foster regional economic co-operation and/or integration. To this point in time, however, none have been sufficiently coherent and effective to provide a framework within which regional economic relations can be restructured on a more balanced and complementary basis. Of the organisations extant, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has long been the most extensively and effectively integrated. Yet, this arrangement between South Africa and its four smallest and most dependent neighbours is manifestly based on profound asymmetries of power, and is not operating to the satisfaction of either South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia or Swaziland. It is currently being renegotiated.

SADC, after a long honeymoon with the international donor community, has had trouble adapting to the post-apartheid context and giving shape to its new status as a development 'community'. It has come under increasing criticism from donors and scholars alike.

Finally, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), despite "impeccable credentials in that it constitutes one of the five sub-regions that the ECA has indicated as building blocs for the proposed African Economic Community," has had limited practical impact. This is most fundamentally because "most governments fail to live up to their treaty obligations,"11 although numerous other problems with this organisation could be noted. COMESA and SADC, with substantial overlap in membership and objectives and fearing for their organisational lives in a more hostile donor climate, have been engaging in increasingly open conflict over how their efforts and mandates should be harmonised.

An added factor is that, while many of the states of Southern Africa may be suffering through a prolonged decline in authority and effectiveness, they remain sufficiently strong and jealous of their sovereign prerogatives to effectively stymie any regional integration schemes they regard as threatening. As a result, Rob Davies has summarised the situations confronting both SADC and COMESA as "weak commitments by weak states to weak organisations."12

South Africa and the Status Quo

With the emergence of a legitimate, post-apartheid South African state into the regional political equation, there has been some hope and expectation that South Africa would provide the leadership necessary to sort out this confusion of organisational purpose, and to give new direction to the regional institutional 'project'. Indeed, the story of Southern Africa's regional institutions since the early 1990s might be sub-titled 'Waiting for South Africa'. The GNU did give a fillip to SADC and struck a blow to the prospects of COMESA by choosing to join the former, but not the latter. But beyond that, it has done little. This is partly attributable to the fact that South African policy makers have not sorted out their own policy towards these two regional institutions, despite South Africa's ostensible foreign policy priority on the SADC region. The fundamental problem is that, despite the many looming challenges and opportunities of regional relations, in economic terms, the status quo serves South Africa's immediate interests well. Hence, as noted above, Pretoria simply does not share the urgency of many of its neighbours concerning the need to give new purpose and direction to regional economic relations and institutions.

Thus, in light of the continuing dominance of economic links with Europe and both the size and promise of links with Asia, a great deal of the new Government's energy has gone into the effort to negotiate a new, Lomé-like arrangement with the European Union (EU), and talks concerning the creation of an Indian Ocean Forum in which Australia, India, and South Africa would be the principals. South Africa's early negotiating priorities have focused, in other words, beyond the (sub)continent – though in fairness, it should also be noted that it has argued that any Indian Ocean Forum must include the entire SADC region.

The one major exception to this extra-regional focus has been SACU. Here, a major initiative to renegotiate the agreement was launched in 1994. All parties appear to be firmly committed to what is anticipated to be a multi-year process. In sum, insofar as the GNU's negotiating priorities are an indicator, the 'new' South Africa's foreign economic policy priorities appear to be extra-regional on the one hand, and in that portion of the region where it is most clearly hegemonic, on the other. Despite discursive change, South Africa's actions in this issue area indicate continuity.

There are, however, other issue areas and relationships which hold out the possibility of fostering a new and more equitable degree of regional co-operation. Some of these will be discussed below. In the meantime, the third concentric circle is focused on: South Africa in Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA: GROWTH POLES, BACKWATERS, AND THE POLITICS OF FORGETTING?

The struggle against apartheid was profoundly Pan-African in character. No issue united African governments and peoples like the struggle against white minority rule, above all in South Africa. While much of this opposition was rhetorical in character, and a significant number of African states maintained more or less open economic and political links with South Africa, many others made real commitments of scarce resources to the struggle. These included, above all, those countries immediately adjacent to South Africa, but also others, such as Uganda and Tanzania, which were further afield. Their contributions included hosting refugees and both political leaderships and armed cadres of the ANC and other liberation movements, often in large numbers, as well as providing material assistance to the struggle.

As a result of this long-standing commitment and the bonds of solidarity forged with the ANC, there was an expectation among African states as a group that the ANC-dominated GNU could be turned to for both material support and enlightened political leadership in increasingly crisis-ridden Pan-African organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and African Development Bank (ADB). Moreover, it was also reasonable to expect that those states which had been unswerving in their solidarity and had made the largest sacrifices, would be 'rewarded' by the 'new' South Africa, while those which had co-operated, tacitly or otherwise, with the apartheid state could anticipate a cool and difficult relationship.

Early evidence suggests, however, that these expectations are misplaced. Notwithstanding sincere expressions of gratitude and goodwill towards Africa, the OAU, and leading allies, such as Tanzania, South Africa's political leadership has been distinctly reticent about taking on a significant leadership role in its crisis-ridden continent, and providing tangible political or material 'rewards' to the ANC's stronger allies. There are a number of fairly obvious reasons for this. Systematically, the end of apartheid coincided with what might be described as a tectonic shift at the level of the world order which had the effect of shaking the ANC (and others) loose from its traditional normative and solidarist anchors. Economically, South Africa's own intimidating needs and challenges have meant that it lacks surplus resources to devote to the continent's manifold problems, while its top priority has been to develop and exploit trade and investment opportunities which can help it to re-establish economic growth and generate employment. On the continent, the better short term economic opportunities tended to be located in states, such as Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, which were at best lukewarm in their support for the anti-apartheid struggle. Stalwart supporters, such as Tanzania and Uganda, have rather less to offer at this point. Finally, the process of negotiation and compromise on which the South African transition rests, embodied in the awkward executive structure of the GNU, has led to a significant watering down of the ANC's core influence and more radical alignments and priorities.

Preventing Conflict, Building and Keeping Peace

This does not mean that South Africa will entirely eschew a leadership role in the continent's political and security affairs and organisations. To some extent, the cautiousness with which the new leadership, including Mandela, has approached continental forums, reflects an admirable degree of modesty concerning the need to understand Africa's problems thoroughly and have a clear policy approach before plunging in. Similarly, South Africa's officials have been rightly chary of usurping the leadership of continental mediation processes already under way, and thus appearing to seek a position of dominance which would trigger political alarm bells in the State Houses of Africa. On some issues, however, such as regional peacekeeping and the development of the OAU's Conflict Prevention Mechanism agreed to at its 1993 Summit, South Africa is moving towards a more active leadership role.

Ironically, and perhaps of concern, the initiative in these areas once again rests primarily with the South African defence establishment, as it has with the emergent SADC Organ. There is a strange (though not unfamiliar) circularity to South Africa's emergence as a leader in addressing issues of continental insecurity and armed violence which it has itself helped to foment, through its arms trading and the covert activities of its apartheid predecessor. Despite these tensions, however, it makes sense that the 'new' South Africa should use its relatively strong military-security technology and capabilities to aid in continental conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

South Africa as Continental Conscience?

Even more troublesome is the question of whether and how South Africa should contribute to the promotion of a 'culture of human rights' and the strengthening of democratic norms and procedures on the continent. It is here that Mandela's vaunted moral authority and the country's own powerful example would seem to give it a distinct comparative advantage. Without doubt, the GNU will confront a number of telling tests on this issue during its five-year lifetime. However, recent controversies over South African relations with Nigeria, with Taiwan and mainland China, and the decision to sell weapons to Syria, suggest that little more than moral 'lip service' can be expected in foreign policy formation.

Entrepreneurs of 'Security'

While official South Africa moves gingerly towards a more prominent role in Africa's political and security affairs, the most immediate impact of change in South Africa on the continent's security equation has come, once again, from the private sector, specifically profit-seeking former SADF mercenaries. According to one source, South African mercenaries in Africa are now thought to number in the thousands. Battle-hardened veterans of guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa employed by the Pretoria-based firm Executive Outcomes have helped to turned the tide of war in Angola from UNITA to their former enemies in the MPLA, thereby facilitating the latest peace process there. More recently, they have achieved the same reversal of fortunes on behalf of the ruling military junta in Sierra Leone against the rebel Revolutionary United Front. As state capacity declines in many parts of the continent and disorder spreads, the prominence of such 'private armies' is likely to continue to increase, and South Africans are likely to be prominent among them.

Traders and Investors, Winners and Losers

Beyond this political economy of violence,13 more conventional South African traders and investors are also having an increased impact on the continent. Both trade and, more slowly but still significantly, investment between South Africa and the continent are growing. In trade, South African exports to Africa increased by almost 50 per cent in two years to a total of almost US $2,5 billion in 1994, while imports tripled over the same period from US $220 million to US $664 million. This placed Africa as a whole fifth among South Africa's trading partners, behind Germany, the UK, the US, and Japan – though continental markets have always been disproportionately important as purchasers of South African manufactures. While the main criterion governing increasing interaction appears to have been whether African countries offer viable markets for South African goods, and thus short term opportunities for trade, there have also been a range of new investments on the continent beyond Southern Africa. Predictably, many of these have been in the mining sector, but others have occurred in tourism, transportation, and breweries.

It would be a mistake, however, to overestimate the significance of these developments, however. Spread over a whole continent and several hundreds of millions of people, their impact is significantly dissipated. Moreover, most African countries have relatively little to trade with South Africa. Thus, small, debt-distressed economies, like those of Uganda and Tanzania, Guinea and Sâo Tomé, are likely to experience increasingly unbalanced trade relations with South Africa, particularly in the context of International Monetary Fund (IMF) mandated liberalisation conditionalities (that is, when they attract the attention of South African traders and investors at all). Moreover, where significant investments do occur, they will create and reinforce patterns of winners and losers, in a context where the price of losing may be high indeed. In total, as with the Southern African region, the effects of South Africa's increasing commercial interchange with the rest of the continent are likely to be highly uneven. They are likely, therefore, to increase tensions and insecurity within and between African countries, though the extent to which they alter current trends on the continent is likely to be limited.

It should be added that the 'normalisation' of South Africa's relations with the continent has opened the door to an increase in a range of illicit forms of exchange. As the continent's formal sectors decay, various forms of buccaneer capitalism flourish, creating new loci of political and economic power.

Given this rather chaotic and unpromising set of prospects, it is hardly surprising that some powerful interests in South Africa advocate focusing the country's attention on extra-continental markets and alliances, and that some scholars argue that "a 'fortress South Africa' policy may not be a politically incorrect option at all, but also something of a socio-economic necessity."14 Yet, should South Africa seek to 'live up against' its neighbours, the continent's myriad problems which transcend state-centric solutions (from environmental decay to disease to arms trading to drought and food insecurity) will only worsen. Inevitably, they will spill over into South African society, economy and polity. How, then, might a more co-operative and hopeful future be constructed?

BRIDGES OF HOPE? BUILDING A MORE CO-OPERATIVE FUTURE

Unfortunately, the analysis in this article points towards the irresistible conclusion that movement toward a more co-operative and secure South African, Southern African, and Pan-African future will be slow, erratic, and uneven at best. There is nothing to be gained through panglossian attempts to minimise the scale and diversity of the challenges to be confronted. The transition from apartheid in South Africa has not fundamentally altered important structural challenges and trends in continental affairs, and, in some respects, may indeed exacerbate inequalities and insecurities in the Southern African region and beyond.

Nevertheless, the slow process of normalising South African-African relations and the difficult, but thus far successful birth of a (more) democratic and non-racial order in South Africa itself, have also created a range of new openings and opportunities for positive-sum co-operation and transnational community building. Where do these opportunities lie, and how can they be encouraged?

Promising beginnings have been made in several areas. Some of these have already been noted: bilateral agreements to deal with small arms trading, for example, and the emergent SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Among other key areas in which co-operation is both possible and strongly desirable are:

health, particularly in view of the alarming spread of AIDS throughout the region;



the environment, notably with regard to scarce water resources and shared watershed ecosystems;



energy resources;



tourism;



agricultural research and food security;



telecommunications: and



labour.

This list is by no means exhaustive, but gives some indication of the potential scope for co-operative efforts.15

Such sectoral co-operative efforts should be encouraged to proceed as far and as fast as possible. More and less extensive schemes of regional co-ordination should be allowed, indeed encouraged, to co-exist, without being forced to conform to some sort of regional 'grand design'. The ADB's notion of 'variable geometry' could usefully serve as a guiding principle in this regard: dynamic sectors should not be held back or deliberately stunted in the hopes of achieving 'balanced development'. At the same time, however, political efforts should be made to establish linkages and synergies between these schemes, so that they spill over into more extensive forms of regional co-operation.

There is, of course, nothing terribly new in this approach to building co-operation. What is proposed is essentially a latter day and region-specific variant of the old idea of 'neo-functionalism'. However, unlike the neo-functionalism conceived in relation to the process of European integration, it may be that in Southern Africa, attempts to deepen co-operation in the areas of trade and investment should be downplayed, as compared with some of the issues noted above. The fact is that, for the developing countries of (Southern) Africa, trade and investment issues are 'high politics', and are likely to generate a high degree of inter-state competition and conflict. Hence, although the longer term goal of a more fully-fledged economic community should not be neglected, regional efforts should probably be concentrated, in the first instance, on other areas in which positive-sum outcomes will be more readily achieved.

This leads to the question of agency, i.e., how are such co-operative efforts to be encouraged, and by whom? Here, two related points deserve particular emphasis. The first is that, notwithstanding regional and continental fears of South African dominance, much of the leadership for co-operative efforts – technical, entrepreneurial, and political – will need to come from South Africa. The reality is that in many cases, the greatest concentration of the requisite knowledge and skills rests with South African groups and institutions, while on many issues, other African states and groups will be at best hesitant to move forward without a clear signal of South African support. Hence, it is incumbent on those South Africans who 'think regionally' to articulate their position consistently and forthrightly, and to work actively to forge transnational coalitions of like-minded people to provide what Peter Vale has referred to (with apologies to George Bush) as "the vision thing."16

The second point which bears emphasis is that this leadership – both national and transnational – cannot be expected to come exclusively, or even primarily from states. Indeed, given the record of formal inter-state co-operation in Africa, it may be that states will frequently constitute stumbling blocks rather than allies in co-operative efforts. Although co-operative schemes are unlikely to be sustainable in the face of active state antagonism, much of the impetus in their conception and consolidation needs to come from regional and continental civil societies. Without trans-social co-operation, imagination, and pressure on regional states, co-operative efforts cannot be expected to succeed. How realistic is this fashionable prescription in post-apartheid (Southern) Africa?

The short answer is that, given the historic weakness of civil societies throughout the continent, the odds are long. However, despite difficulties in adjusting to the new era, South Africa's civil society remains more diverse, vibrant, and independent than any other on the continent, and has given some evidence of a desire to work with, learn from, and provide leadership to its counterparts elsewhere.

The promotion of effective regional co-operation and community-building will rest on the efforts of a wide range of interests and actors, developing and promoting a 'regional consciousness' rooted in concrete and immediately relevant achievements. These interests and actors will include corporations, universities and research institutes, trade unions, environmental non-government organisations (NGOs), women's organisations, and cultural groups, along with state-based organisations. While this approach may appear idealistic, and will indeed require a long term vision in the face of uncertainty and setbacks, it would appear to be the only alternative to a future of mounting human insecurity and continued continental marginalisation.

CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDERS

Obviously, the challenges before South Africa and its continental neighbours are daunting. The needs for timely and well-targeted international support are wide-ranging and extensive. This is a disheartening statement, given the current mood of 'donor fatigue' and the global decline in real spending on development assistance. Still, there is much that the international community can do to support a successful transition in South Africa and beyond, even within the parameters of reduced resources. Several injunctions apply to these efforts.

Firstly, in South Africa itself, international assistance must embody both short and long term dimensions. For the South African transition to succeed, popular support must be consolidated through the success of, for example, housing and school feeding programmes associated with the RDP. At the same time, policy within and toward South Africa must support much longer term and larger scale projects, in health care, education, energy, and the like.

Secondly, in focusing on the importance of a successful transition in South Africa, external governments, NGOs, and private sector organisations must not lose sight of the rest of the region and continent. They must support those groups and institutions championing a regional and transnational vision, and provide assistance to concrete regional initiatives. This will pose some problems, particularly for official (national and international) aid agencies. The experience of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in attempting to promote regional integration in the context of its 1991 strategic policy framework Africa 21 is illustrative.17 CIDA has had considerable difficulty in attempting to organise programming on an integrated regional basis, primarily because the principal political and judicial units with which it must deal are still national states. This makes the task of regional programming a trying one, both administratively and politically. Nevertheless, while the modalities of a regional approach may have to adjusted, the effort and philosophy behind it should be maintained and reinforced.

Finally, it needs to be recognised that the process of South African, regional, and continental 'reconstruction and development' will be a long term and politically difficult one. It is not one which can be successfully achieved within a straitjacket of economic and political conditionalities. Hence, without abandoning the need for 'policy dialogue', donors would be well-advised to avoid dogmatic adherence to and insistence upon neoliberal policy prescriptions. Such an approach will generate ill-will and thwart the sense of 'ownership' necessary for difficult policy initiatives and reforms to succeed. This observation suggests one final way in which the emergence of the 'new' South Africa may be beneficial to the development and security prospects of the continent. Given the high stakes and profile of the South African transition, and the country's relatively robust capabilities and resources, South African policy-makers will be accorded a degree of flexibility and space, in the medium term at least, which most of their African counterparts no longer enjoy. By aligning themselves with South Africa in regional and continental initiatives, other African countries can perhaps regain a degree of autonomy and independence in the establishment of their own priorities and processes.

ENDNOTES

David R Black is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Larry A Swatuk is Senior Lecturer, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana. The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. They would also like to thank the Cooperative Security Competition Program at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada for support of this and related research. Dr. Black and Dr. Swatuk are editors of and contributors to Bridging the Rift: The New South Africa in Africa, Westview, Boulder, 1997.



K Booth and P Vale, Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism, International Affairs, 1995, p. 286; AN C, Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa – A Discussion Paper, Department of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1994a.



R Suttner, Some Problematic Questions in Developing Foreign Policy After April 27 1994, Southern African Perspectives, 44, Centre for Southern African Studies, Bellville, 1995, p. 15.



P J McGowan, The 'New' South Africa: Ascent or Descent in the World System?, South African Journal of International Affairs, 1(1), 1993, p. 58.



ANC, The Reconstruction and Development Programme, African National Congress, Johannesburg, 1994b, p. 117.



J Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1986.



The Star, 20 June 1995.



R Southall, Regional Security: The 'New Security' in Southern Africa, Southern Africa Report, 10(5), July 1995, p. 5.



G Mills, The History of Regional Integrative Attempts: The Way Forward?, in G Mills, A Begg and A van Nieuwkerk (eds.), South Africa in the Global Economy, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1995, p. 238.



See, for example, P McDowell, White Farmers look Northward to Greener Fields, The Ottawa Citizen, 15 May 1995; N Chandler, SA Farmers Poised to Venture Into Africa, The Star, 27 June 1995.



E Leistner, Considering the Methods and Effects of Regional Integration, in Mills, Begg and Van Nieuwkerk, op. cit., p. 273.



Ibid.



According to information reported in International Security Digest (July 1995, p. 1), Executive Outcomes is reportedly paid US $20 million a year, plus US $20 million for weapons and equipment for its work in Angola. In Sierra Leone, it has settled for a diamond concession.



G Mills, Introduction: Waiting for the Fig Leaf to Drop,? in Mills, Begg and Van Nieuwkerk, op. cit., p. 12.



The collections edited by M Venter (1994) and K Cole (1994) also deal with many of these issues in Southern African-regional and South Africa-specific contexts.



Quoted in L A Swatuk, Of Growth Poles and Backwaters: The New South Africa in Africa, a conference report, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1995.



AIDA, Africa 21, Canadian International Development Agency, Toronto, 1991.