Military control over the Armed Forces during the transition:

Proposals on the creation of the Sub-council on Defence and joint Command Council

Dr Rocklyn Williams
Co-ordinator, Military Research Group

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 9, 1993



INTRODUCTION

A degree of consensus is emerging with regard to the desired forms of political control over the armed forces both in the transition and in the future. As yet, this consensus concurs on the principles underpinning political control over the armed forces in a multi-party democracy (accountability, transparency and legitimacy) and, in a very broad sense, the mechanisms whereby this control should be instituted (parliamentary mechanisms, ministerial control, access to ombuds systems etc.).

The consensus being achieved with regard to political control is not being reflected in the debate concerning unified military control over the different armed forces of the country. Joint military control, in this paper, is used in the very general sense to refer to the "nuts and bolts" of day-to-day control over the military personnel, military equipment, military deployment and military structures of the six different armies within South Africa (SADF, MK and TBVC armed forces).

This paper argues that both political and operational control over the armed forces during the transition are desirable for a host of reasons. It remains essential, on the one hand, that the armed forces are subordinated to effective political and civilian control both in the transition and the future. However, it remains vital, on the other hand, to ensure that the activities of the different armies of the country are synthesized with a view to their eventual integration into a cohesive national Defence Force (it remains equally imperative to ensure that neither of the armed forces acts in a partisan manner both prior and consequent to an election).

The institution of joint political and joint military control is not a "one off" phenomenon and will be determined, to a large extent, by both the political will that emerges from the transition, and the particular stage of the transition through which the country is moving. An understanding of this process is, therefore, inseparably linked to the consensus that exists amongst the major political players with regard to the proposed phases of the transition itself.

The aim of this paper is to stimulate debate and provide possible policy options with regard to the institution of joint political and military control over the armed forces of the country. However, the proposed modalities of military control over the armed forces cannot be considered in isolation from existing forms of political and military control over the armed forces of the country. It is, therefore, necessary to make reference to these mechanisms and procedures in as much as they pertain to the control of the SADF, MK and the TBVC armies.

POLITICAL CONTROL AND MILITARY CONTROL: BASIC DEFINITIONS

POLITICAL CONTROL


Political control over the armed forces refers to the supreme control over the armed forces as exerted by both the political and civilian authorities. In a democratic system such control normally resides in a largely civilian Ministry of Defence answerable to the State President (who is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces), the Cabinet and parliament. It should be noted that political control over the armed forces is not necessarily the sole preserve of democratic systems. Effective political control over the armed forces exists in a wide range of undemocratic regimes (one-party states and dictatorships for example). However, the fundamental features of this relationship remains intact: the supremacy of civilian and legislative control over the armed forces.

Political control of the armed forces is deemed desirable within the South African scenario for a number of reasons:
  1. It ensures the subordination of the corporate ambitions of the armed forces to those of the civilian and political authorities and is, therefore, a powerful weapon in the anti-coup arsenal.
  2. It ensures that national security policy - as determined within the framework of national policy - is transmitted to the command echelons of the armed forces.
  3. It ensures that the armed forces act within this national security policy framework and do not unilaterally devolve political responsibilities onto their shoulders.

JOINT MILITARY CONTROL


Joint military control over the armed forces refers to the joint control exercised over the deployment, training and discipline of the different armies by their commanders. Joint military control over the armed forces provides the military commanders with the authority to ensure that the deployment of the armed forces takes place according to agreed military guidelines. It represents the acknowledgment that the commanders of the armed forces are best-equipped with the requisite technical and moral expertise to ensure the effective management of this deployment process.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES OF SOUTH AFRICA AT PRESENT

POLITICAL CONTROL


Future civil-military relations will be determined both by present forms of political control over the different armed forces, and by those "models" which will be instituted during the transition and thereafter. Effective political control over the armed forces thus requires an understanding of present patterns of political control over the different armed forces within the country and, crucially, the extent to which these can be transformed into effective mechanisms of accountability and transparency.

It should be stated that political control over the different armed forces within South Africa at present varies considerably. Uneven political control and a lack of uniformity in civil-military relations are evident when we consider the military cultures and political relationships inherent within these respective armed forces.

The SADF at present admits to incomplete forms of political control over its activities. Most sectors of the SADF remain subordinate to the political and civilian authorities - a product, partially, of its institutional culture and the strong ascriptive ties that exist between the present political, bureaucratic and military elites. However, this subordination is informal to the extent that it is not necessarily secured via the Defence Ministry itself. Executive political control over the SADF is, in many cases, weak. This is examined below.

The incomplete levels of executive political control over the SADF are largely a product of its institutional past. At present immediate executive political control over the SADF is exercised by the State President, and his political appointee, the Minister of Defence. However, this political control is uneven and asymmetrical as a result of a number of factors.
  1. The first remains the political profile of the SADF in the post-1978 period. Its influence within the state - particularly the State Security Council and the National Security Management System - remained substantial in the pre-1990 period, whilst its urban counter-insurgency responsibilities continue to provide it with a measure of influence at both local and regional levels of government (as testified to by the influence of its Army tactical intelligence agencies at this level).
  2. At present immediate political control over the SADF is exercised by a small Ministry of Defence whilst civilian control at a departmental level remains virtually non-existent. Although defence and security policy is formulated by the Cabinet, advised by the Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs and the State Security Council, the SADF retains a large measure of influence in the formulation of this policy. The decision of the Hiemstra Commission in 1966 to transfer the civilian functions of the Department of Defence to the SADF saw key areas of civilian control being transferred to 'armed bureaucrats' (Chief of Staff Finance; Chief of Staff Personnel and Chief of Staff Planning for instance). This has equipped the present SADF with responsibility for decisions that are, fundamentally, of a political nature.
  3. The absence of a developed tradition of "checks and balances" akin to that existing in many democratic countries - ombuds systems, budget committees, parliamentary committees etc.
Political and civilian control over the TBVC armies varies according to the administration concerned. Political control over the armed forces of the Transkei, Ciskei and Venda resides in the Military Councils of these respective regions. As a result of these features, civilian control over the armies of the Transkei, Venda and Ciskei is virtually non-existent. The recent coups in these territories have resulted in the military dominance of the executive levels of these administrations. Political control over the Bophuthatswana Defence Force remains vested in the person of Mangope and his 'cabinet'. Civilian control is exercised via a minuscule Ministry/Department of Defence function.

Political control over Umkhonto We Sizwe is exercised by the President of the ANC and the ANC's supreme executive decision-making body, the National Executive Committee. Given the fact that the ANC considers itself a liberation movement and not a government (and hence does not possess the plurality of administrative features characterizing a formal state), political and civilian control over MK is fused in the executive nodes referred to above. Political control over MK has been generally good in the past and possibly represents the strongest example amongst the different armed forces considered.

Effective political control over the armed forces is often best ensured via the separation of the political and civilian functions of the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Defence respectively - although both remain part of the what is popularly referred to as the "Defence Ministry". In this relationship, the Ministry of Defence remains responsible for immediate political control over the armed forces (and consists of a relatively small staff) whilst the Department of Defence remains largely civilian in composition and ensures civilian control over the armed forces in certain key areas (finances, mobilization, personnel policy, research and general planning functions).

MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES AT PRESENT


Given the relative heterogeneity of military and institutional cultures within the different South African armed forces, military control varies according to the specific structure involved. However, the differences in executive military control over these armed forces is not as pronounced, or as varied, as those characterizing their political control.

The SADF - given its size, institutional complexity and command and control patterns - provides the most sophisticated example of military control over the armed forces. Command over the SADF is exercised by the Defence Command Council which consists of Service Chiefs, Staff Heads and select senior officers from the SADF General Staff. The Chief of the SADF, as the chairman of the Defence Command Council, exercises command through the structures of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Medical Services respectively. Regional control over the SADF's counter-insurgency structures is exercised by its regional command structure, whilst its Conventional Forces are commanded and controlled by the Chief of the Army.

In addition to its command functions the Defence Command Council remains the supreme planning body within the SADF. Its responsibilities in this sphere include oversight of and involvement in the following planning processes: strategic planning, force structure and force application planning. To facilitate its functioning, the Command Council utilizes the services of a small secretariat with a senior Defence Force officer functioning as its secretary on a part-time basis.

Operational control over MK is exercised by its Military HQ with its various staff functions via the MK regional command structure. Regional command structures reflect the staff divisional structure at the MHQ level. Operational control over the TBVC armies is vested in the respective Command Councils of the different armies. These parallel, in a more simplified version, the command patterns of the SADF's Command Council.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES DURING THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE TRANSITION


Political and military control over the armed forces can assume a number of different forms during the transition. This will depend on the particular phase of the transition through which the country is progressing, and the consensus that emerges with regard to these forms of control. The initial phase of the transition referred to in the context of this paper remains the institution of the Transitional Executive Authority in the pre-election scenario.

THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY: LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD


Consensus appears to exist between the principal political actors that a Transitional Executive Authority will be instituted in the pre-election scenario to "level the playing field" prior to the country's first non-racial and democratic elections. This Transitional Executive Authority will consist of a series of executive councils which will oversee crucial areas of state and political society (security, elections, media etc.).

It is proposed here that control over the security establishment (armed forces, policing and intelligence) be delegated to an executive Security Multi-Party Committee/Council (or a similarly named structure), and that this Committee/Council delegate specific responsibilities to a series of Sub-Councils - Sub-Council on Defence (SCD), Sub-Council on Policing and Sub-Council on Intelligence.

The size, composition and chairmanship of the SCD must be determined by the different actors within the anticipated constitutional multi-party forum. To facilitate neutral oversight a number of chairing options can be suggested. Chairing can be done either on a rotational basis; through the appointment of a respected, neutral and non-political actor (a retired judge or eminent person for instance), or through the consensual appointment of a permanent chair from within the SCD itself.

To facilitate its functioning, it is proposed that the SCD possess two additional structures: an administrative Secretariat and an advisory Council of Defence.
  1. The SCD Secretariat: the administrative infrastructure for the Secretariat could be provided from the present Ministry of Defence - whose co-terminous retention with the Defence Sub Council (itself an effective Defence Ministry) would remain an anachronism anyway. The personnel for the Secretariat could consist of a mixture of present Defence Ministry personnel and new personnel from as chosen by the SCD.

    To facilitate the civilianization of a future Defence Ministry it is recommended that an early start be made with the transfer of certain Ministry functions from the presently militarized Department of Defence to the Secretariat. This would include the transfer of many of the present functions of the present SADF Chief of Staff Finance, Chief of Staff Logistics and SADF Chief of Staff Personnel. Key military personnel working within these functions could be retained within the Secretariat on their present salaries but working as civilians. Those military functions that remain thereafter, could be retained within the armed forces within their respective paymaster, ordnance, quartermaster and personnel functions.
  2. The Council of Defence: It has to be anticipated that many, if not most, of the members of a S/MPC will only have a fleeting knowledge of matters military. An appropriate advisory body consisting of civilian, military and academic experts from the defence community could be created to advise the SCD on possible policy options pertaining to matters military. Several detailed suggestions vis a vis a proposed Council of Defence have been made recently. These proposals have their historical roots in a similar Council that was created in 1912 to oversee the creation and integration of the Boer and British military formations of the post-Boer War period into a single Defence Force

    Such a structure could divide itself into various expert commissions each relating to a particular area of defence restructuring: force structure; doctrine; standardization of training cultures; integration; regional security relations; demobilization etc. The Council of Defence would provide policy inputs into the Security Multi- Party Committee on request, and would be available for commissioned work via the structures of the Joint Command Council.
The SCD would be responsible for providing political direction to the armed forces and all armed forces of the region should be subordinate to its authority.

The creation of a Defence Sub-Council should at best be a temporary measure designed to ensure that the integration, restructuring and operational application of the different armed forces occurs in a non-partisan and neutral manner. It is a measure designed to ensure the leveling of the security 'playing field' prior to country's first national elections.

In the post-settlement scenario it could become transformed into either a parliamentary defence committee or a future Ministry of Defence.

Unified military control over the different armed forces can be secured via an integrated, joint command structure. This is deemed desirable for a number of reasons. Firstly, whilst this stage does not refer to the integration of personnel from the different armies at a unit level, it does refer to their joint monitoring and joint identification. The country cannot afford to have soldiers from any of the armies referred to above standing "outside of" the transition process. Secondly, it prevents the fragmentation of the armed forces both in the pre-election and post-election period as a result of the range of ideological, regional and political pressures to which they are already being subjected. Thirdly, it provides the basis for the eventual integration of these forces into a single, national and representative Defence Force. Fourthly, it prevents their utilization in a partisan or party-political manner during the run-up to the forthcoming elections.

The mission, responsibilities and composition of the Joint High Command (JHC) require careful consideration. It is suggested that the primary and secondary responsibilities of the JHC could include the following:
  1. To ensure that the deployment of the armed forces, if authorized by the Sub Council on Defence, occurs within the framework prescribed by the SCD.
  2. To provide command members from the different armed forces serving on the Joint High Command with as much transparency into the functioning of one another's structures as possible.
  3. To ensure joint command and control over the intelligence activities of all armed forces and their centralization in the structures of the Joint High Command.
  4. To ensure that members of the different armed forces are provided access to the facilities of all the armed forces - regardless of whether these facilities an internal or external nature.
  5. To ensure the joint participation of all military personnel in specific confidence- building exercises. Such exercises may be of a social or joint training or nature.
  6. To ensure that the decisions reached by the executive levels of the JHC are translated into action at a regional and local level. This will require sufficient forms of monitoring and co-operation as well as the necessary administrative arrangements.
The structural features of the Joint High Command could include, amongst others, the following:
  1. Joint Military Control exercised via the JHC itself.
  2. The creation of a Joint Forces Committee to oversee and co-ordinate joint deployment - if and when this happens.
  3. The creation of Joint Inspection Teams to facilitate the realization of (d) above. Such teams will not only ensure that the different armed forces are being deployed in the manner prescribed by the SCD, but will also build confidence amongst the different players on the JHC (and could be coupled with a range of confidence-building measures between the different armed forces).
  4. To ensure that specialist committees are established to facilitate the integration of all armed forces into a united, national Defence Force. These could include the following:
    1. A Joint Training Committee to ensure the standardization of training cultures within a future Defence Force. Such a committee could also investigate the utilization of the existing training establishments for the upgrading and retraining of all military personnel, as well as the utilization of external training establishments and experiences.
    2. A Joint Logistics Committee to ensure the co-ordination of military housing, weaponry, transport and equipment requirements for all members of the different armed forces.
To ensure the effective execution of the above-mentioned tasks, it is advisable that a Secretariat be established to ensure the co-ordination of these diverse responsibilities. The control over and integration of these different forces will require command and control patterns that are already established and are capable of being utilized in pursuit of these tasks. A Secretariat and its various sub-structures could possibly benefit from the following:
  1. The creation of a Joint Command HQ via which command and control over the different armed forces can be exercised. This structure could either be located at a neutral venue (a preferable option) or utilize the existing structures of the SADF.
  2. The utilization of existing secretarial infrastructures from within the SADF as the basis for the JHC's secretarial functions. As with the creation of a secretariat for the SCD, this will entail the utilization of the resources available but not necessarily the personnel. The personnel for a JHC secretariat must reflect the diversity of military and institutional cultures within the different armed forces of the region.
  3. The harmonization of existing administrative infrastructures on the ground to ensure the effective implementation of decisions reached at an executive JHC level. For example, the MK regional command system and the SADF regional command system are very similar in geographical definition and could provide the necessary interface to ensure the integration of MK and SADF personnel on the ground.
The composition of the JHC should avoid the temptation to privilege the influence of one army over the other. Regardless of the differences in training levels, institutional cultures and military profiles, an attempt at equal representation at JHC levels should be pursued. Two senior members drawn from each of the different armies will ensure a balance and diversity of military opinion that will prevent the monopoly of military decisions by one structure over the others.

The chair of such a structure could be unanimously elected by the commanders present within the JHC, or could be chosen on a rotational basis. Given the South African nature of the integration process it would be advisable to limit command and control positions to command members of the different South African armed forces themselves. International military expertise, however, could certainly be sought within the specialist committees and the regional structures of the JHC.

CONCLUSION


The proposals referred to above are tentative. They are designed to stimulate debate rather than offer absolute positions. Although the processes and suggestions referred to above were confined to the initial stages of the transition, they can become the basis upon which a restructuring of the Ministry and Command functions of a future defence establishment takes place. Restructuring, in present and future political contexts, will remain an ongoing and dynamics process.

The institution of a Joint High Command makes both political and military sense. No major military actor in the present transition can claim the monopoly of skills, expertise and experience required to constitute a new Defence Force. Whilst some armed forces possess technical advantages over their counterparts, others enjoy greater levels of legitimacy than their technocratic rivals. South Africa can neither afford the real or potential divisiveness inherent in the maintenance of six different armies, nor the inequalities entailed in the dominance of one military structure over the others.

Reconciliation, restructuring and integration has been effected between vastly disparate armies in this region in the past. Namibia, Zimbabwe and this country in 1912 are some of these examples! There exists absolutely no reason, therefore, why the emerging political consensus cannot be duplicated on the present military terrain!