Disarmament and arms control with specific reference to the RSA

Prof M Hough
Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 9, 1993



THE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Although the terms disarmament and arms control are sometimes used synonymously and are obviously related, the distinction lies in the difference between reduction and restraint. Disarmament always implies a decrease in the number of weapons or even abolishing certain categories of weapons, whereas arms control could even involve a controlled increase in the level of armaments

Neither arms control nor disarmament need be formal. It can also be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

Currently the emphasis is on arms control, although abolishing certain categories of weapons such as chemical weapons, leans towards disarmament. There is also an increased tendency towards formal multilateral agreements and the expansion and strengthening of existing agreements such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The arguments for disarmament and arms control include ethical and economic objections, as well as arguments to the effect that arms result in a militarising of civilian life, and causes tension and war. It is also argued that arms control results in status and respect internationally.

The critics of disarmament and arms control reverse these arguments by stating that disarmament can contribute to recession, and in view of the need for status and external and internal security, is not feasible on any large scale. Inspection, verification and enforcement systems for arms control are also problematic.

THE MAJOR MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS


Modern-day examples of disarmament and arms control agreements have shown a marked increase. There appears little doubt that the massive cost of an arms race, as well as the reduced potential for large-scale international conflict following the end of the Cold War, have given new impetus to arms control. While this has affected mainly the quantity of nuclear and conventional weapons held by major powers, it has not always prevented improvements in quality.

The unilateral or multilateral reduction in levels of armament, increased pressure on arms manufacturers to seek new markets. In turn, this contributed to the problem of the proliferation of arms to Third World countries, so that attempts to limit arms transfers, have in fact become an integral part of arms control. In the broader sense, agreements aimed at crisis management have also been considered part of arms control. Confidence-building measures such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) would be an example.

Some of the major multilateral arms control agreements include the following: 1

(a) The partial test ban treaty (PTBT)

Prohibits the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion: (a) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted.

(b) Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT)


Prohibits the transfer by nuclear weapon states, to any recipient whatsoever, of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over them, as well as the assistance, encouragement or inducement of any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or devices. Prohibits the receipt by non-nuclear weapon states from any transferor whatsoever, as well as the manufacture or other acquisition by those states of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(c) Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and on their destruction (BW Convention - 1972)


Prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition by other means or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification of prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The destruction of agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery in the possession of the parties, or their diversion to peaceful purposes, should be effected not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention.

(d) Convention on the prohibition of military and other hostile use of environmental modification techniques (Enmod Convention - 1977)


Prohibits military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to states party to the Convention. The term ‘environmental modification techniques’ refers to any technique for changing - through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes - the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space. The understanding reached during the negotiations, but not written into the Convention, defines the terms ‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’ and ‘severe’.

(e) Convention on the prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (Inhumane Weapons Convention - 1981)


The Convention is an ‘umbrella treaty’, under which specific agreements can be concluded in the form of protocols.

Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons intended to injure by fragments which are not detectable in the human body by X-rays.

Protocol II prohibits or restricts the use of mines, booby-traps and similar devices.

Protocol III restricts the use of incendiary weapons.

(f) The chemical weapons convention (CWC - 1993)


To prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons.

In addition, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed by 22 original signatories in 1990 and to be phased in, sets ceilings on treaty-limited equipment in the Atlantic to the Urals Zone; the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), providing for the control of transfers that could make a contribution to nuclear weapon delivery systems; the START Treaty of 1991, committing the US and the USSR to reducing their strategic nuclear weapons; and the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (1987), providing for the destruction of all US and Soviety ground-based missiles of 500 - 5 500 km range and prohibition of their future production, re important examples of arms control.

ARMS EMBARGOES, AND THE LIMITING AND MONITORING OF ARMS TRANSFERS AS A FORM OF ARMS CONTROL


Arms embargoes, such as those imposed on South Africa and Iraq, do represent a form of arms control, albeit less effective than persuading a country to voluntarily adhere to arms control measures and conventions. Of course, even formally signing a treaty does not imply that a country will permanently adhere to the conditions.

Two other developments, both having implications for arms control, are also worth mentioning. The five Permanent Members of the Security Council agreed to guidelines for conventional arms transfers during 1991, and declared that:
  1. They will consider carefully whether posed transfers will:

    (a) promote the capabilities of the recipient to meet needs for legitimate self-defence;

    (b) serve as an appropriate and proportionate response to the security and military threats confronting the recipient country;

    (c) enhance the capability of the recipient to participate in regional or other collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations or requested by the United Nations;
  2. They will avoid transfers which would be likely to:

    (a) prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict;

    (b) increase tension in a region or contribute to regional instability;

    (c) introduce destabilising military capabilities in a region;

    (d) contravene embargoes or other relevant internationally agreed restraints to which they are parties;

    (e) be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient State;

    (f) support or encourage international terrorism;

    (g) be used to interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign States;

    (h) seriously undermine the recipient State’s economy.     2
  3. During 1991, the UN General Assembly also called for greater transparency in armaments. The main provisions of the resolution are as follows:
7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish and maintain at United Nations Headquarters in New York a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies, as set out in paragraph 10 and in accordance with procedures and input requirements initially comprising those set out in the annex to the present resolution and subsequently incorporating any adjustments to the annex decided upon by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session in the light of the recommendations of the panel referred to in paragraph 8 below;

8. Also requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental technical experts to be nominated by him on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to elaborate the technical procedures and to make any adjustments to the annex to the present resolution necessary for the effective operation of the Register, and to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production, and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session;

9. Calls upon all Member States to provide annually for the Register data on imports and exports of arms in accordance with the procedures established by paragraphs 7 and 8 above;

10. Invites Member States, pending the expansion of the Register, also to provide to the Secretary-General, with their annual report on imports and exports of arms, available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies; and requests the Secretary-General to record this material and to make it available for consultation by Member States at their request. 3

Data required for the register would include information on tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.

Most countries also have national guidelines for arms transfers. The motivation is, however, not always one of arms control in the broader sense. The relationship between the supplier and the recipient, the ability of the recipient to pay etc., are also important considerations. Currently, there is for instance concern over Chinese and Russian arms sales. Strapped for cash, less discriminate selling by these countries could become a problem.

SOUTH AFRICA AND ARMS CONTROL


South Africa is a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty, and Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Seabed Treaty, the Biological Warfare Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention (as well as its predecessor, the Geneva Protocol).

Regarding South Africa’s policy on disarmament and arms control, a memorandum, also signalling South Africa’s intention to adhere to the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime, was published in the Government Gazette. (See next page) 4

During January 1993, Mr Pik Botha also stated that South Africa would support all initiatives to keep Africa free of weapons of mass-destruction.

During 1992, Mr Riaan Eksteen, the Permanent Representative of the RSA at the UN, also participated in the UN Conference on Disarmament. In the opening lines of his address, he stated the following:
Our presence here today is an historic occasion for South Africa. It is the first time that we address the Conference on Disarmament. We see this as being of particular relevance for the Southern African region and also for the African continent as a whole. We regard our presence here as yet another signal that South Africa stands ready to take its rightful place in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, when we commit ourselves to a role in Africa we want it to be positive and constructive so that all of Africa’s interests can be served. 5
In its Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, the ANC also committed itself to arms control:
R3.5 A democratic South Africa will ensure that it remains a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as a token of its resolve and commitment to help create a world free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, it will seek to promote Africa and the Indian Ocean as nuclear-free zones and areas free of foreign military forces and bases.

R3.6 A democratic South Africa will abide by the relevant Covenants and Treaties relating to the peaceful use of Outer Space, international waters and air-space, and will engage in multilateral co-operation in the exploration and conservation of the universe. 6
In addition, it could be argued that to some extent, budget cuts have forced South Africa to unilaterally reduce armaments, especially in the Air Force and the Navy. Although it could be argued that some of the equipment was obsolete at any rate and that some of it may be replaced at some or other time by more modern equipment, there is currently probably a nett reduction in military holdings.

The arms embargo has undoubtedly also contributed to this situation of forced arms control, as US and other pressures seem to have contributed to South Africa’s signing of the NPT and its intended adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

MEMORANDUM

ON THE OBJECTS OF THE DRAFT BILL ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

  1. The RSA possesses valuable technology, capabilities and products, some of which the international community considers to be sensitive in nature because these can be used, or misused, for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. There is thus a lot of international pressure that the RSA, like other responsible nations, should exercise control over these technologies, capabilities and products, in order to restrict proliferation.

  2. Various international Regimes and conventions have already been established with the purpose of inhibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Compliance with the principles of these Regimes and conventions is a requirement for international free trade. The main requirements that these Regimes and conventions place on participants is the promulgation of non-proliferation legislation, the establishment of a National Authority to execute the requirements of this legislation, as well as being subject to international inspection and verification measures. The RSA signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1991 and since then all nuclear material and facilities are inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The RSA has also signed the Biological Weapons Convention and is expected to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993. The USA is currently exerting pressure on the RSA to sign a bilateral agreement in respect of missile technology control and the Minister of Foreign Affairs has already indicated to Parliament that the RSA will shortly publish the necessary legislation as required by this bilateral agreement.
  3. There is therefore a view on government level that it is in the interest of the RSA to establish the necessary legislation and control structures as soon as possible.
  4. This act is aimed at promoting and ensuring free trade with the international community, and especially with the RSA’s traditional trading partners.

    The intention is thus to minimise government intervention. Minimum international norms with respect to control must however be complied with. These norms require that specified dual-use technology, materials, chemicals, components, products, capabilities and facilities that can be used in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction must be registered and controlled in terms of end-use and end-user.
  5. The concept legislation covers the following four main areas:

    specific dual-use technology and equipment that can be used in nuclear weapons or in the manufacture of

    * nuclear weapons;

    * scheduled chemicals, chemical precursors, as well as related dual-use technologies, materials, equipment and facilities;

    * scheduled biological materials and toxins, as well as related dual-use technologies, materials, equipment and facilities;

    * unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, as well as related dual-use technologies, materials, equipment and facilities

    NOTE: Nuclear materials, technology, equipment and facilities will be controlled by the Atomic Energy Corporation in terms of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and in terms of the Nuclear Energy Act 1982, (Act No. 92 of 1982).
  6. The designation of activities, capabilities and goods, to be controlled in terms of this act, will be by means of regulations. These regulations will be based on the guidelines for control as issued by the international conventions and non-proliferation regimes and will meet the minimum international norms.
  7. Implementation of the requirements of the Act will be mainly vested in a National Authority. The legislation defines the structure, functions, powers, and activities of this body.

    This National Authority will be under the control of a Board which will determine the policy for the National Authority. In order to achieve the objects of the Act the Board will manage the authority’s execution of responsibilities and the exercise of power.

    The committee for the preparation of this act has recommended that the National Authority be placed under the Department for Trade and Industry.

    A final decision in this regard has still to be made.
  8. The criteria that must be taken into account in the establishment of the National Authority are:

    * Credibility in the international community
    * International visibility
    * Swiftness and flexibility for effective action
    * Competence and autonomy in order to be accepted by the industry
    * Cost effectiveness/affordability
  9. The RSA cannot afford a large National Authority compared to other countries. It is therefore planned to establish a core group and thereafter to make use of work groups and committees utilising personnel from other state departments, the industry and other organisations that can make a contribution.

    The broad approach will be that control will be exercised through registration of facilities, processes and products, the issue of permits for the operation of processes and the manufacture of specified quantities of scheduled materials as well as end-user restrictions that may be imposed. Wherever possible permits will be issued for a series of products and activities.

There is also no definite indication regarding the lifting of the arms embargo. Both the UN General Assembly and the ANC have indicated that military sanctions against South Africa could be lifted once a democratic government has been established. If this refers to an interim government which would follow elections, it points to mid-1994.

 There is, however, no guarantee for the automatic lifting of sanctions by the Security Council: all five Permanent Members will have to agree; a large number of countries have adopted national legislation in accordance with the mandatory arms embargo and this will have to be revoked or amended; and in the case of Namibia for example, the embargo is still in force three years after independence, although it was recently reported that Britain had supplied military transport vehicles to the Namibian Defence Force.

Even if the arms embargo is lifted, the cost of importing major weapon systems may serve as an inhibiting factor as far as the quantity and sophistication armaments of a future defence force in the RSA is concerned.

The General Assembly arms boycott against South Africa, of course also implies a type of control over arms exports from the RSA, although unlike the arms embargo it is not mandatory. To what extent South Africa practices a form of arms control by voluntarily limiting certain exports, is unclear. It has recently been stated that South Africa would be selective as far as its exports are concerned. However, allegations of South African arms exports to war-torn Rwanda have been made recently.

CONCLUSION


In the more immediate future, it seems as if arms control initiatives will focus on the Middle East (especially Iran), and the East (especially China and North Korea). Regional arms control initiatives have also become important, and the strengthening of existing treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and further measures to limit the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass-destruction in Third World countries, will also be high on the agenda. In view of its new international role as the only real superpower, the US is also certain to be in a position to exert more pressure on countries to comply with arms control initiatives. A balance between national security and arms control will, however, have to be maintained. Although in certain instances a high level of armaments does contribute to tension and conflict (for example in the Middle East), arms are also often a symptom of underlying conflicts, which need to be resolved. In this regard, the termination of internal conflict in Southern Africa and improved regional relationships could obviously pave the way for reduced threat perception and a lower level of armaments.

Within the broader African context, the following recommendation which formed part of the Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), is highly relevant:
Confidence building measures

To restore a lasting state of national and continental security, confidence building measures between African countries are called for under the CSSDCA process to cover inter alia exchange of information on troop locations and movements; joint military training; joint military manoeuvres; joint naval patrols; joint studies and seminars on sub-regional and continental security issues.

Non-aggression pacts

A more enhanced policy measure for continental security requires a non-aggression treaty among all African countries under the CSSDCA process, along the model of a similar treaty that already exists between the member states of ECOWAS. The non-aggression treaty among African countries should also incorporate commitment to defend each other in the event of external military aggression.

Lowering of military expenditures

The undertakings involving all the security preventive measures outlined above should appreciably reduce, if not substantially eliminate, inter-African tension and dangers of open military conflicts. Such collective effort must pave the way for a collective process of lowering military expenditures in Africa under the CSSDCA process. Overall reduction of military expenditures by participating member states should involve actual reductions and ceilings in manpower and reduced expenditures on military hardware. Consideration should also be given to collective understanding of the type of military equipment justifiable for procurement or manufacture by African countries. To gradually build up some measures of relative self-reliance in the military field as well, collective African effort should be undertaken under CSSDCA for the selective manufacturing of desirable military equipment for Africa’s defence. 7

REFERENCES

  1. For an interview of these agreements, see SIPRI Yearbook 1992 World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, 1992.
  2. SIPRI Yearbook 1992 World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp 304 - 305.
  3. UNGA Resolution 46/36, 9112/1991.
  4. Government Gazette, 1992, pp 70 - 72.
  5. Mr R Eksteen, Permanent Representative of the RSA at the United Nations, Statement to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, released by the South African Permanent Mission, Genéve, 21 May 1992, pp 1 - 5.
  6. African National Congress, ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, as adopted at National Conference 28 - 31 May 1992, p 86.
  7. Kampala Document of a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), Kampala, Uganda, 23 May 1991, p 6.