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Restructuring the Armed Forces
INTRODUCTION
The political realities of South Africa will demand some form of restructuring of the armed forces including the amalgamation of the SADF and the TBVC armed forces, and the incorporation of MK into a wider national defence force. This process must be handled pragmatically and rationally:
- Pragmatically, to overcome the serious political differences and suspicions that will inevitably bedevil the process;
- Rationally to ensure that South Africa emerges with effective armed forces.
This paper will address some of the key aspects involved:
- Basic principals of the restructuring process;
- Some basic mechanics of restructuring;
- The question of maintaining the professional standards of the armed forces; and
- The question of how to proceed once the initial restructuring has been carried out.
RESTRUCTURING: TWO BASIC PRINCIPALS
The fundamental principle that must underlie all planning in the matter, is that the existing Defence Force, the SADF, must form the basis of the restructured armed forces.
The notion is cherished in some circles that the SADF should be disbanded and replaced by entirely new armed forces. That might provide the 'politically correct' armed forces so dearly desired by some politicians, but would be grossly inefficient and would see South Africa stripped of functioning armed forces at a time of serious political strife within the country and in the region.
The SADF is a functioning organisation holding all of the skills, institutional and individual experience that are essential to any effective armed force. Further, whether or not it is to the liking of their former opponents, the SADF is recognized internationally and highly respected as competent, effective and professional. That does not apply to the armed wings of the 'liberation movements', let alone to the more recent armed elements of the left and the right. The TBVC armies enjoy some recognition as armed forces, but have not been formally recognized, and are in any event too small and lack too many key elements to take the place of the SADF in this process.
Any rational consideration of South Africa's future armed forces must, therefore, begin with the assumption that the current SADF will form their basis and foundation. How they are built up from here on, is for the political leadership to decide.
A second core principle is that there must be a clear concept of where the armed forces are to stand constitutionally. It is inappropriate to rush ahead with a restructuring program before there is clarity in this area. While one might argue that there is no need for any in-depth discussion of this subject, given that there are already armed forces in the state, and there has not been a constitutional problem with them per se, the state is itself changing quite dramatically in both composition and form. That process of change will not leave the relationship of the armed forces to the community and to the state untouched. Fundamental constitutional changes will affect all elements of the state, including the armed forces. This area must, therefore, receive early and serious consideration.
The key factor in this regard will be to develop an armed forces - state relationship that will satisfy all elements of the South African population - that the armed forces will always act in the national interest rather than in the interests of one or another political party. This is relevant not only from the viewpoint of those who argue that the SADF has been partisan, but also in the light of calls for 'politically correct' armed forces brought up to revere one particular party line. Another area that demands study is how the armed forces should be structured in the event of a strongly regional political system.
The position of the armed forces vis a vis the community and the state must be clearly defined and agreed. One such concept has recently been proposed by the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP), and was set out in issue no 8 of this journal. There is room for further discussion and thought concerning this aspect, and this process needs to be driven ahead now, so that a core-concept can be in place ready to be refined when the overall constitutional package has been developed.
RESTRUCTURING: SOME BASIC MECHANICS
The basic considerations here, are which groups should form part of South Africa's armed forces, and how they can be incorporated into the wider South African armed forces. It is also necessary to consider the matter of specifically excluding any individuals whose background suggests that their presence would be divisive.
SADF/TBVC AMALGAMATION
The four TBVC states seem likely to be reincorporated into South Africa in the course of the current political development. This will make it necessary to provide for the incorporation of their armed forces into a wider South African Defence Force, in effect amalgamating them with the SADF.
Amalgamation of the TBVC armies with the SADF should not present serious difficulties. While the TBVC armies are vastly smaller, and are composed primarily of light infantry elements optimized for counter-insurgency, they are 'proper' armies replete with the typical elements and structures associated with and characteristic of military forces. They can therefore amalgamate with the SADF quite readily, providing both established units and individuals for posting within the wider armed forces. Should South Africa develop a federal or confederal constitution, they can form the core of state forces in their regions, as well as providing some elements of the main force.
Complete units of the TBVC armies can be taken over into the wider South African armed forces without too much difficulty. They are similarly organized to the equivalent SADF units and employ similar doctrines and systems. Equipment is also largely similar or at least compatible, as is the training of their personnel.
There is little reason, for example, why the 1st Battalion of the Transkei Defence Force should not be incorporated into the South African Army 'as is'. It would stand in a similar relationship to South Africa and to Transkei (as a region of the 'new South Africa') as that of any of the British Army's traditional and largely regionally-recruited regiments to Britain. While first and foremost a 'local regiment' that is permanently based in its home region and concentrates its recruiting effort there, it would still be a unit of the South African Army. Not all of its personnel would necessarily be Transkeians, not all members would serve only in that battalion, not all Transkeians joining the SA Army would necessarily serve in that battalion, and the battalion itself would be available for service wherever needed. There is very little political danger in this approach, and much potential benefit in the form of regimental esprit.
Their existing administrative and logistic infrastructure can be retained in place as part of the wider defence infrastructure of South Africa, albeit cut back to avoid duplication. Some of the existing training establishments might also be retained to offer local training for standing force and Citizen Force elements in these regions. One early step in this respect must be to carry out an accurate audit of what facilities actually exist, and how they would fit into the wider armed forces.
As far as individual members of the TBVC armies are concerned, a large proportion of the more senior officers and NCOs as well as many specialists have been trained by the SADF. Most others have been trained in accordance with its training doctrines. It will, therefore, be comparatively simple to carry out a 'skills audit' of their personnel to allow them to be posted efficiently within the wider armed forces. Where additional training is necessary to equip officers to function in the more mechanized force based on the existing SADF, this should again not present difficulties given that they are already familiar with SADF training concepts and systems.
INCORPORATING MK
The situation regarding MK is slightly more difficult, and this aspect will have to be addressed with particular care and tact.
Given that MK is not a formal military organisation in the normal sense of the word, it will not be possible to amalgamate it with the existing SADF and the TBVC armies as part of the wider armed forces. It has no real structures or units that can be usefully incorporated, nor does it have any large numbers of trained and experienced personnel immediately useful to the armed forces. While there will be MK elements that can be incorporated into the wider South African armed forces to good effect, MK is not an organization that can usefully amalgamate with the others. It is too different in its nature and make-up.
Equally, there can be no place in the South African armed forces for any elements specifically aligned to any one political group or party. That would not be accepted in any democratic country, and would be very dangerous in the political situation in South Africa, which could remain very volatile for many years to come. Allowing any party-political - or 'movement-political' - element into the armed forces would render them politically unstable and unreliable. There can thus be no question of forming any MK unit of formation within South Africa's armed forces.
Those MK personnel who wish to serve South Africa as soldiers must, therefore, join the wider armed forces as individuals, and must also accept that they cannot, as soldiers, have any political affiliation. That is fundamental in any democratic society. What their private political views are, is no business of the armed forces, as long as they do not impinge on their loyalty to South Africa.
This does not necessarily require that MK personnel must simply swallow their pride and join the current SADF. They will, rather, be 'getting in on the ground floor' of the wider armed forces as they develop from where their component forces stand today.
Turning to some more detailed mechanics of incorporating MK into the wider armed forces, the primary consideration will be for MK to carry out a 'skills audit' of its personnel. This must take into account military and other relevant training, service and operational experience, and it must be accurate and realistic. Any attempt at 'padding' by inflating training levels or service experience will only embarrass the individuals concerned, and be to the detriment of the armed forces.
Once this skills audit has been carried out, it will be possible to develop a program and schedule to make the best use of MK personnel in the armed forces, ensuring that they are efficiently posted.
A potentially tricky question here will be to match MK personnel to armed forces ranks and posts. MK personnel who have completed and passed recognized military courses, can be placed relatively easily. They will only need to undergo refresher and adaptation training to allow them to function within the SADF structure and systems that will form the initial basis of the armed forces. It will be more difficult to assess personnel who may have valuable experience but lack formal training. In those cases, the answer will probably be to send them on those Citizen Force courses most equivalent to their MK status. Successful completion of these courses will then gain them the relevant rank. Functional training will then still be necessary for specific appointments.
It is possible that some MK personnel might resent being judged by their former opponents. Those who feel particularly strongly in this matter, could be sent to attend similar reserve courses in the armed force of a foreign democracy.
OTHER FORCES
There are many small groups that claim to be 'armed forces' that must be amalgamated into South Africa's new Defence Force. These include APLA and a variety of left- and right-wing groups. None of them have any real right to be considered as 'armed forces': APLA has demonstrated that its skills lie in outright terrorism, not mitigated by any attempt at guerrilla operations. The other groups have yet to demonstrate that they exist in more than name or are more than simple opportunistic bandits or terrorists. It will hardly be in South Africa's long-term interest to include elements of these groups in the armed forces.
INDIVIDUALS
Having considered the groups involved, it is also necessary to consider some individuals. In this respect the armed forces are rather like a gentlemen's club: it is not who you allow to join, but who you keep out. There are three groups of individuals who cannot find any place in South Africa's armed forces: political soldiers, terrorists, and criminals.
Those officers of the CDF, TDF and VDF who were closely involved with the coups d'etat in those states, will have to seek another career. The last thing South Africa needs, is a group of senior officers who have the notion that it is their God-given right to topple the government if they disagree with it - or it disagrees with them. These officers have set a dangerous precedent.
Equally there can be no place in South Africa's armed forces for anyone who participated in the planning, execution and/or direct support of acts of outright terrorism. This exclusion clause is not directed at personnel involved in attacks on security force elements, nor at personnel involved in attack on valid economic targets. Those are legitimate operations in any armed conflict. It is equally not directed at members of the security forces who were involved in operations against MK and its intelligence and logistic support structures and personnel, or against any other groups involved in armed actions. Those were equally legitimate targets.
It is directed at those who bombed restaurants, shops and public toilets, mined ordinary public roads, or threw hand grenades into politicians' bedrooms. Those were acts of outright terrorism by any definition, not the actions of soldiers. Anyone guilty of participation in such acts must be excluded from South Africa's armed forces. That applies equally to any member of the security forces who might have been involved in such activity.
People who were involved in outright terrorism would be divisive to the armed forces. Their presence would also be detrimental to the internal and international standing of South Africa's armed forces.
Careful consideration will also have to be given to whether or not the armed forces should accept personnel who have changed sides during the past conflict. The inclusion of people who have 'flip-flopped' in the past, holds seeds of dissension. Those whom they betrayed when they changed sides, are hardly likely to ever trust them again. Those whose side they joined, will be no more likely to trust them in the future than they do today, beneath a superficial veneer of welcome for one who 'has seen the light'. No armed force has ever really trusted someone who has betrayed his own, no matter how apparently honourable his reasons. People who have changed sides once, will always be suspect. They might, after all, choose to do so again.
Such suspicions, resentments, and doubts are something the South African armed forces can do without during the tricky period of 'getting to know you' that will accompany political transition. The interests of the South African armed forces will probably be best served by according these people a honourable retirement - regardless of which side they were on before or after.
Finally, anyone with a criminal record must be excluded from any place in the armed forces.
MAINTAINING THE PROFESSIONAL EDGE
The matter of maintaining the military professional standards of the armed forces must be addressed with particular care. Failure to do so, will incur grave risk of creating a situation in which it becomes impossible to restore those standards in the future. That would leave South Africa with armed forces incapable of deterring or defeating attack.
This matter has proven to be contentious, chiefly because it has not really been properly thought through. The stands of the main actors are dictated by their relative status and strengths, and also by political considerations:
- The SADF is determined that the professional standards that have been built up over many years must not be sacrificed to political expediency.
- MK tends to view any discussion of professional standards as just another trick to exclude its members, who lack many of the skills and the service experience of soldiers.
- The TBVC armies seem to fear being overshadowed by the more experienced and better trained SADF officers.
These differences need not be a serious obstacle. If the matter of military professionalism is addressed with due realism, there is no reason why the core needs of all parties should not be met without serious damage to the armed forces.
These 'professional standards' centre on military and military-technical skills. They can be considered on three quite distinct levels: Operators, commanders and generals.
The 'operators' are those people who actually man tanks or radar systems, fly fighters or helicopters, man the weapons systems of strike craft and submarines, or maintain these complex systems. Their skills are essentially military-technical, and are simple to define. Either the pilot can fly a fighter in combat, or he cannot. Merely being able to take off and land is not enough.
There can be little argument that it is essential that these skills be maintained and even improved. Any decline in standards will result in a serious loss of effectiveness. Once allowed to slip, standards at this level will be very difficult to make up quickly. Men who are themselves not up to standard as operators, will not be able to train others to a useful standard. A downhill trend is easily established and very difficult to reverse.
Fortunately this area need not present a long-term problem. Many of these posts are low-ranking, and the personnel in them 'turn over' quite frequently. Thus, while the SADF currently enjoys a virtual monopoly in these skills, that is hardly relevant. Most of these posts will be filled by new personnel within a very few years. For the time being, many members of the TBVC armies have military-technical skills in various areas, as do some personnel of MK. Many others can be trained to an acceptable standard.
The 'commanders' present a rather more complex problem. They are the battalion commanders, the submarine captains, and air force squadron leaders. This group also includes key staff officers such as operations, intelligence and logistics staff officers and air force strike planners, as well as the technical experts and project officers. Their expertise rests not only on training, but also in years of experience in various parts of the armed forces in different roles. That experience is invaluable and irreplaceable. Training alone is not sufficient.
This group is the heart of the armed forces. They run the armed forces on a day to day basis and they provide the basis on which the armed forces move into the future and improve their capabilities. They develop doctrines, the equipment with which to execute them, and the training programs to make it possible. Come the time, they win the war. Again, there can be little question of lowering the standards demanded of this group. There is no quick way to make up for a lack of experience.
Fortunately the TBVC armies have officers with both the training and the experience to move into some of these posts. They will be relatively few, given the disparity in size between the TBVC armies and the SADF, but they are there. The real problem will be how to give MK meaningful representation in this group. Some MK personnel have useful training in some of these areas but all lack experience of conventional-type armed forces service and operations.
MK appears to foster the hope that it can side-step this problem by sending personnel on course in India and elsewhere. That will not be enough. One cannot spend a year or two attending various courses and expect to emerge competent to command a battalion or a division. Only in time of war has it really been possible to condense the years of training and varied service experience that are essential to developing a component field-grade officer. MK must accept that its share of the posts at this level will be small until its officers have served long enough in the armed forces to gain sufficient experience. In the mean while, some of its officers will be able to fill administrative, logistic, and intelligence posts in these rank groups.
The final level is that of the 'generals', the heads of the four services, the chiefs of the major staff departments, and some of the very senior staff officers. At this level the key skills are a blend of military training and experience, and the ability to manoeuvre in the political environment. The latter refers not to party-political situations, but to the ability to work with the politicians and civil servants who make up the government.
Assuming that South Africa can contrive to stay at peace for a reasonable period, this level will present the least difficulty in the amalgamation context. This is so because general officers are defence generalists, not specialists. Many of the details are already outside the scope of a general officer's experience: Too much changes too quickly for any general to be an expert on what is needed at company and battalion level, or which tactical doctrines will be best under current conditions. Given only that the generals are also wise enough to understand and need their limitations, some lack of military-technical expertise at the general officer level need not be dangerous to the armed forces over the medium-term future.
One of the immediate and critical tasks facing the amalgamated armed forces, will be to gain and to retain the good will and trust of both the general South African public and its political representatives. That task will fall primarily to the generals. Their primary role will be to bind the armed forces to the South African citizen and to his political representatives during what will be a period of some turmoil. They will also have the normal task of ensuring that their political masters properly grasp the capabilities, limitations and needs of the armed forces.
The key skills at this level will, therefore, be more political than military. This will enable the armed forces to absorb in general officer posts some personnel from the TBVC armies and MK, who otherwise lack the military or military-technical skills and experience to have reached general rank. These officers need only have the wisdom to keep away from purely military matters. Given that wisdom, they will be able to play a vital part in restoring the armed forces to their rightful place in society, without their personal lack of military training or experience being either a handicap to them or a danger to the future of the armed forces. At the same time, their appointment at the general officer level will serve to satisfy the political imperatives of a 'New' South Africa.
To sum up: amalgamation and maintaining professional military standards are not mutually exclusive goals. A judicious blend of pragmatism and rational thinking can allow both to be achieved.
TOWARDS THE FUTURE
Having completed restructuring the armed forces without any loss of professional competence or effectiveness, the next priority must be to blend their rather disparate components into one cohesive force. A second, actually concurrent, priority will be to 'grow' a new generation of leaders and commanders who will develop with and within the 'new defence force' in the 'new South Africa'.
BUILDING COHESION
The first steps toward creating cohesive armed forces, will have already been taken during the restructuring process by:
- Ensuring that everyone is a member of the armed forces as an individual, not as a member of some other organisation; and
- Ensuring that potentially disruptive persons are kept out.
The next set of steps will involve creating cohesive officer and NCO corps from some very disparate individuals of very different military, social and political backgrounds.
The first step here will be to ensure that the armed forces take on the essentially apolitical characteristic of the 'western' tradition. South Africa cannot afford to be burdened with commissar-ridden forces endeavouring to be 'politically correct'. The soldier is first and foremost a citizen, with his own political views. He is then also a professional soldier - full-time or part-time. As a professional he must keep political views quite distinct from his professional duties. The armed forces as a professional organisation may not have any political coloration or stand. It is their duty to provide professional services to the government of the day in terms of the constitution, quite regardless of who may be in government as long as it is legally constituted.
Ensuring that the armed forces remain apolitical will remove one of the most dangerous potential causes of strife and rift within them. This is a critical consideration in a situation where the armed forces have been restructured to incorporate elements that were recently hostile to each other. Any attempt to 'politicize' the armed forces will, at the very least, serve to degrade their effectiveness. There are many excellent examples readily to hand of how real this danger is.
The second step in this process, will be to make every effort to foster regimental esprit. Regimental esprit can sublimate former group hostilities and loyalties within much less time than might seem feasible. It binds soldiers to each other, to their leaders and to their regiment, creating a second family in which former differences begin to fade, and mutual loyalty soon overrides any new differences. This concept is well-proven in many of the best armies, and has worked its magic under some exceptionally tricky circumstances. One example close to the circumstances pertaining in South Africa today, might be the separation of the old Indian Army of the Raj into the armies of India and Pakistan. Regiment proved stronger than belief or politics for many of the officers and men during that difficult time, which enabled both countries to emerge with functioning armies.
From the basis of the regiment, this esprit can spread to branch of service (e.g. Infantry) and service (e.g. Army), and then through the armed forces to the country itself. The men pride themselves on their regiment, and on its ability to serve the country. The regiment becomes a strong family staunchly loyal to the country. It does not become a pseudo-political entity.
The key in fostering regimental esprit will lie in large part in retaining as many of the older units as possible, ensuring that their histories and traditions live on through new generations of officers and other ranks. While this applies particularly in the case of the Army's Citizen Force, there is also a very strong base of tradition in the Air Force and Navy. And the Army can draw on a solid base of tradition for its standing elements. For those who might wonder whether black South Africans would feel at home in such traditional units, the best answer lies in the Afrikaners, Germans and Jews who are proud members of the Highland regiments of the South African Army. The Anglo-Boer War and the two World Wars live on only in the traditions of these old regiments, not in their officers and men of today.
While the four TBVC armies do not have units with histories that go back far enough to have evolved such traditions, there is no reason why they cannot develop their own traditions. In this they could adopt and maintain military traditions that predate white ruled South Africa. The situation is more difficult in respect of MK, which never conducted true military operations, although many of its former members might readily find a military home in one of the existing SADF or TBVC regiments. On possible solution would be to form a number of new regiments - both standing and Citizen Force - to foster new traditions. An essential proviso here would be that the new units may not be exclusively MK in composition, any more than a Highland regiment is a preserve of South African soldiers of Scottish extraction.
The third step in this process, will be to ensure the maximum of mixing of personnel from the different forces during training at all levels. Course members quickly form a 'family' united by the 'oppression' of the directing staff or instructors. The pressure of military courses forces students to accommodate each other professionally and personally. It also builds mutual respect. Firm friendships will often also be formed during such training. Ensuring the maximum mixture of backgrounds in training will go a long way towards the goal of blending disparate elements into cohesive armed forces. This applies to all forms of training, be that academic or technical courses or field training at the Battle School by mixed units.
The fourth step in this process, will be to send similarly mixed student groups to attend training courses in other countries. In this case the purpose will be threefold. Not only will they be receiving useful military training, they will also bring back to the South African armed forces a wider perspective on training and operational matters, and the members of the mixed group will have grown into a cohesive team. This program will, admittedly, largely be limited to officers, but there is some potential for senior NCOs to attend advanced or technical training courses.
The advantage of foreign courses is that they will not only put all of the normal course pressures on the students, but that the group will be seen by everyone else as 'the South Africans'. The students will find, to their surprise, that fellow students and directing staff do not see them as a disparate group, and do not expect to find major differences among them. That experience can only serve to accelerate their self-image as South African soldiers and as South Africans. Considerations of cost and disruption will, of course, limit the number of officers and NCOs who can be sent on foreign courses.
The process can further be enhanced by sending officers and NCOs on exchange tours with foreign armed forces. While this normally involves individual soldiers, it should not be too difficult to arrange such tours for small groups. Even if it is not possible to accommodate a group in one specific unit, the individuals can meet up during their tours, and probably will do so even without official 'encouragement'. The program could also specifically be structured to include time spent as a group. Even where it is only possible to send individuals, the experience will still be valuable, also in respect of building cohesion.
The complementary exchange postings and its various training establishments of foreign officers and NCOs to the South African armed forces will further facilitate the process.
The fifth step in this process will be to arrange for exercises with elements of foreign armed forces. Initially this might best take the form of further naval exercises and then deployments of small army or air force elements from other countries to South Africa. In time South Africa could deploy elements of its armed forces to other countries for joint exercises. Quite apart from the diplomatic and training value of such joint exercises, they represent one of the few opportunities for the other ranks to be exposed to foreign soldiers.
The sixth step in this process will be to participate in as many international operations as possible - be they emergency relief, peace-keeping or even peace-making operations. The South African armed forces have expertise, experience, and equipment that is ideally suited to such operations, and could easily make a major contribution. Deploying 'mixed' elements once they have trained up to the necessary standard as a unit, will serve to cement the new loyalties and cohesion. Such participation will also do much for the image of the armed forces in the eyes of the general population, which will help to restore them to their rightful place in society, and their self-image.
A NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS
The second priority once the armed forces have been restructured successfully, must be to grow a new generation of leaders. Given the very disparate population of South Africa, this process will have to be an ongoing one.
The immediate priority here, will be to provide a new generation of junior officers and NCOs who are free of past attachments and resentments. Their primary role will be to train and to lead the new recruits to the restructured armed forces, helping to lay a foundation of personnel not compromised by sectarian past loyalties.
This can be achieved by instituting accelerated officer and NCO training programs. The programs would be intended primarily for new entrants drawn directly from high school or from one of the tertiary education establishments.
These programs can initially be based on the existing national service junior leader training system. They would, thus, be one-year programs, concentrating on functional training for future officers and NCOs. The one-year officer training program can then be followed by a two-year program that includes a year of academic work for a Military Science Diploma. The graduates of this program will be the first new officers who can be sent on foreign training or exchange tours without feeling at a disadvantage vis a vis their contemporaries from other forces.
At the same time that these accelerated programs provide junior officers and NCOs to meet the immediate needs of the armed forces, a new training system can be developed for future career officers and NCOs. This should centre on a multi-service Officer Academy and service-specific NCO Academies which would then serve as the primary entry routes for career officers and NCOs.
The armed forces could also make the maximum use of an expanded graduate entry officer appointment system similar to the US ROTC program. This would see the armed forces sponsor the student's tertiary education in return for full-time service as an officer for a specified period. A complementary scheme would see service as a junior officer after high school rewarded with funding for tertiary education, during which period the students would also be liable for Citizen Force service. Similar schemes could be made available for NCOs.
Making the most use of such schemes would bring the armed forces a useful number of short- and medium-service officers and NCOs. Quite apart from allowing more efficient manning, this will also serve to provide better balanced officer and NCO-corps, guarding against the armed forces becoming too insular. This effect could be further enhanced by encouraging Citizen Force members to come into the standing force on limited tours of full-time service.
The result of these steps will be to create truly professional officer and NCO corps without running the danger of armed forces that become insular and detached from society.
CONCLUSION
Restructuring South Africa's armed forces will be neither simple nor painless. A properly thought-out, planned, prepared and executed restructuring program will make heavy demands on the pragmatism, realism and professionalism of all concerned. Given that these demands are met, there is no reason why South Africa should not emerge from the current time of change and turbulence with armed forces worthy of being its Defence Force - effective, efficient, and fully integrated into the society.
The work must, however, begin now. It is not good enough to wait for the political process to be completed, and then scramble to develop an armed forces concept to fit. The core principles are clear. What we need is action.
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