|
A Response
Manpower Considerations for a Future Defence Force
THE QUESTION OF FORCE SIZE
Obviously one cannot make accurate forecasts of size in an article such as this but I feel the following considerations are important.
- I agree on a figure of 2% of GDP for the Defence Force.
- Dr Cilliers did not spell out the size requirements for the Air Force and the Navy. I feel that this requires careful investigation because of the importance of these areas of the service, both in peace and in war, and because of the cost implications in equipping, operating and maintaining such forces. The size of these forces will therefore directly affect the size of the Army and support services.
- In my opinion we cannot maintain a full-time force capable of meeting any eventuality. There will have to be a part-time force or a trained reserve, which can be called up in an emergency. How such a force should be manned and trained, is another matter for investigation.
- One way of doing this would be to continue with the Citizen Force policy. Before World War II, these units were manned strictly on a volunteer basis. Many such units have established proud traditions over the years and many members would like these regiments to continue operating. Whether one would continue to get a regular intake of volunteers requires further study. Another interesting point is how our black citizens would take to the idea of serving in a part-time Citizen Force unit.
- The present full-time force of 105 000 will have to be reduced considerably, whereas the incorporation of TBVC and MK forces would add to the numbers. Careful consideration will have to be given to the proportion of SADF, TBVC and MK members absorbed into the new Defence Force.
ROLE AND TASKS
A subject which continues to create a great deal of controversy is the role of assisting the police in the maintenance of law and order. Dr Cilliers is ambivalent on this issue for, having said 'disentangle the military from internal law and order supportive duties as a matter of urgency', he later discusses the limited use of such forces and their role in a federal system.
While acknowledging that the maintenance of law and order is primarily a police task, the preservation of life and property and the maintenance of essential services are tasks allotted to the Defence Force. If, therefore, law and order has disintegrated to the extent that the police can no longer cope on their own, it is surely the duty of the Defence Force to render assistance in restoring law and order. We have reached that stage in South Africa and to withdraw the military now would be tantamount to giving anarchy a free reign and is generally accepted in all Western countries as demonstrated by the present United Nations actions in Somalia, the recent Los Angeles riots and the use of the British Army in Northern Ireland. Obviously the circumstances under which the military can be deployed must be stipulated accurately in the Defence Act.
Dr Cilliers goes on to say that should military forces be used internally, they should be placed under the operational command of the police or the appropriate civilian authority. I am afraid I cannot agree with this. The military should always operate under command of their own officers. I feel that they should act in support of the appropriate non-military authority, who could well control the operation, and that instructions to military personnel should be issued along military channels from a combined headquarters.
Although the primary task of armed forces is to protect and defend the country from external threats, this is not their only task. One of the reasons for elucidating the various and diverse roles and tasks of the Defence Force is to ensure that personnel are adequately trained and equipped to carry out their different missions. Maintaining law and order requires specialized training, and equipment and must, therefore, be included.
Dr Cilliers is concerned that the amendment to the Defence Act has weakened the civilian and political control over the military. I feel that he has misinterpreted para 2A (a) of the Act, i.e. the preservation of life, etc. I quote the epic rescue of passengers from the ill-fated Oceanos as an example of time being of the essence. The ship sank shortly after the last passenger was lifted off and any delay in obtaining permission to proceed with the rescue would have been catastrophic. The applicable paragraph could be re-worded in order to remove any doubt as to its intention.
Finally, I feel that certain 'civilian' tasks should be included. Despite what Janowitz has to say, I feel that the Defence Force can make a positive contribution to progress in the new South Africa. Creating units broadly similar to the old Special Service Battalions (SSB) is but one example of this.
CONSCRIPTION VS VOLUNTEER FORCES
As stated in the paper, a large professional army is an invitation to a coup; a conscript army is an automatic constraint. This has been demonstrated in many African countries and in each of the TBVC states. We cannot ignore the obvious political threat.
Conscription serves three purposes: To ensure the manpower requirements of the force in being; to establish a mobilization reserve and to ensure that the armed forces represent a political, social and geographic cross-section of the population. If conscription is to be replaced by a volunteer system, every effort must be made to see that it meets the above requirements. Care must be taken to prevent the Defence Force becoming representative of any single section of the community and, to enable this, a selective service system might well have to be considered during the transition period.
The SA Air Force has had considerable experience with short service systems but, as stated in the paper, pay incentives play an important part with all volunteer forces. Much will depend on what we can afford and whether we can attract all strata of the community.
Every effort must also be made to keep the Citizen Force system functioning. Consideration should be given to committing those who have completed short service appointments to serve for some time in the CF.
CONCLUSION
A great deal of hard work is still required before we can form a new Defence Force. It is interesting to note that the US took six years to change from a selective conscript system to an all-volunteer force. This is but one of the problems which we face.
|
|
|