Handful of Armies: The Future Prospects of the Homeland Armies

A Response to Brian du Toit

Greg Mills and Geoffrey Wood

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 7, 1992

We welcome the response to our article (South African Defence Review, No 5) from the SADF Liaison Officer of the VDF (South African Defence Review, No 6), yet would like to pick up on a number of the points raised.

Firstly, the fact that a SADF officer has seen fit to reply to our analysis, suggests that we were correct in noting that the VDF should not be seen as a truly independent force distinct from SADF structures. Indeed, Du Toit argues that 'VDF personnel have undergone, or are currently undergoing the same courses attended/required by the SADF'. Thus, he maintains, inexperienced officers are not rapidly promoted. However, as a SADF officer, he should know that the SADF's own promotion standards vary considerably between the different arms of service, enabling rapid and early promotion.

Secondly, while the above might indeed assist with integration into current SADF structures, it is unlikely that this will be the only prerequisite in the new SADF. More important, though not necessarily desirable, will be the political and disciplinary records of such forces. In this regard, we think it is safe to say that the VDF is not 'apolitical', and that its involvement in politics will complicate its future role. The VDF and the current government (Council of National Unity) of Venda are not accountable to the people of Venda. VDF soldiers are not 'servants of the state', but rather serve their own needs. And the regime will, in the Colonel's own words, 'remain in power until Venda has been reincorporated with South Africa'. Even then a return to civilian rule is not certain and depends 'on the outcome of negotiations and discussions'.

Thirdly, we are not alone in stating that the VDF and its predecessor, the VNF, should not be seen as a serious army. Kenneth Grundy, a leading authority on South African security affairs, states in Soldiers Without Politics that it was 'not fashioned for military purposes', noting that it was not trusted by the SADF to adequately defend the strategic Limpopo salient. This resulted in this strip of territory being excised from the bantustan prior to independence.

Grundy also comments on the repressive nature of the Venda government under founding President Mphephu and suggests that the VNF/VDF was used to bolster the regime. This repressive function of the VDF has also been reported in the press, and should some of its actions not be classified as indiscipline, the conclusions to be reached are far more serious. The case of Ramkulakusha vs Commander VNF and confidential in-depth interviews substantiate these allegations.

We have little doubt that the VDF has a difficult job to do in difficult times. However, the military takeover in 1990 has made that task more complex and has seriously limited its options for the future. Untested at the ballot, 'stalwarts' of the Venda homeland the VDF might be, but stalwarts of the Venda people they are not.