From Cold War to Detente, Security and Politico-Economic Scenarios for Southern Africa Part 1

MARGINALIZATION? A CHECKLIST OF GLOBAL PLAYERS

In the first part of this article I noted the impact for Africa of reform in the former Eastern bloc. The positive result of the superpower rapprochement that paved the way for Namibia's independence and raised prospects for the end of other conflicts in the subcontinent was also emphasized. Yet the East European revolutions, and the sensational developments that have occurred in the international system, may have far-reaching and negative consequences for Africa.

There are at least three reasons for concern. Firstly, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe is turning out to be infinitely more challenging for the West than was anticipated two years ago. The stand-off between a number of CIS countries (for instance, the row between Russia and Ukraine over ownership of the Black Sea fleet), and the civil war in Yugoslavia, are just two instances of these concerns. Secondly, West European states are intensely preoccupied with the growing demands of economic and political integration, and there are plenty of non-EC countries knocking on the door to get in. Thirdly, the aftermath of the Gulf War, and the continuing crises relating to both Israel and Iraq, have ensured that the industrialized countries will make the strategic Middle East region their overseas priority for some years to come. Together with the global economic recession, these tendencies and developments have contributed to the marginalization of Africa.

Nevertheless, it would be rash to generalize about the intentions and actions of the outside world as if such a world represented some sort of cohesive whole. With this in mind, this second part of my article will examine the potential role of a number of players that are likely to figure prominently in African, and especially Southern African, affairs.

USA

A year or more ago, one leading African newsletter made the point that it was unlikely that James Baker spent even 5 per cent of his time thinking about Africa - and most of that would be devoted to Egypt.1 But the end of the Cold War has all but eliminated Washington's interest in most of Africa, which was in any case mainly based on containing Soviet influence and activities.

As one American analyst noted:

We can disengage from Zaire or Kenya or distance ourselves from the civil wars in Liberia, Sudan, and Somalia without worrying about the Soviet gaining (or even wanting to assume) anything like our influence or support role.2

This is why Mobutu's importance to Washington, for example, has been greatly diminished. On the other hand, the same observer added that there were now two new justifications for US involvement and aid. Firstly, 'that aid should be used to promote 'core values' (usually defined as democratization)'. Secondly, 'that aid should be used to promote U.S. exports.'3

The process of democratization in Southern Africa is well under way and one can expect selective increased US economic activity, for instance in Angola, where American businessmen will find themselves increasingly in competition with their South African counterparts. And at this juncture it is important to remind ourselves that, despite there being no diplomatic relations between Washington and Luanda, the USA is Angola's main trading partner. In fact, Angola is second only to Nigeria among US trading partners in Africa.4 Luanda's importance lies, inter alia, in the fact that known oil reserves are at least 2 billion barrels. Moreover, exploration has yet to begin on Angola's estimated 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas.

On the military side, the recent (January 1992) joint field exercises between 200 US Airborne/Special Forces troops and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) - "Operation Silver Eagle" - together with speculation that the soon-to-be-completed air facilities in Botswana will be leased to the US Force, and the announcement earlier this month that Washington would assume some new responsibilities for training Zambian army officers - suggest that US disengagement from the continent is not being contemplated across the board. This need not be regarded as threatening, since the Western powers may be thinking in terms of regional security co-operation - with the armed forces of a future South African government taking a leading role.

But the peace dividend resulting from the relaxation of East-West tensions may also have unexpected economic costs for the region. I refer, for instance, to the February 1992 announcement from the Pentagon of its intention to reduce the $9 billion stockpile of strategic commodities by $2,4 billion over the next few years. These commodities include large supplies of chromium, manganese and cobalt. Such reductions (not forgetting the potential for similar re-evaluations on the part of former Warsaw Pact and Nato countries) might have a significant impact on the export earnings of especially South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zaire.

Another potential threat is that a post-apartheid South Africa will be regarded by Black Caucus members of Congress as just another African state. Indeed, in a recent major article entitled 'Setting Global Priorities', the editor of the influential Foreign Policy journal, William Hyland, fails to even mention sub-Saharan Africa, let alone South or Southern Africa. India and Iran get a mention but, with the exception of North Africa, there is not a single reference to the rest of the continent.5

THE CIS

For several decades, Soviet aid to the continent was motivated, primarily, by geopolitical interests: Soviet-African relations were characterized by ideological and strategic objectives that had priority over economic and commercial considerations. The days when Soviet military assistance dominated Moscow's overall aid outlay are now over; but this does not mean that economic aid is in the ascendant. Far from it: 'In Moscow, as in Washington, the aid budget has become a target of the deficit-cutting effort'.6 Given the economic crises confronting the ex-Soviet states, this trend towards aid fatigue will in all probability continue, but Moscow and the other CIS capitals will attempt to pick up the pieces and keep African friendships alive - though not, of course, by giving weapons.

As far as Russia (and also Ukraine and the others) is concerned, there can be no doubt that Southern Africa is virtually the only focus of interest south of the Sahara. As one scholar at Moscow's Africa Institute noted last year:

Soviet diplomats worked hard to ... secure Namibia's independence ...[and the] success of the Namibian negotiations encouraged greater interest in cooperative efforts to achieve peaceful solutions to other conflicts in the region, including the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. In a striking departure from past policy, Moscow now takes the position that the civil wars in these two countries can be resolved only by political and not by military means.7

However, the removal of military assistance could, paradoxically, create something of a power vacuum in the region - as has clearly already occurred on the Horn of Africa. In addition, the severe reduction of Eastern bloc funding for scholarships and training will have important skilled manpower consequences for countries such as Angola and Mozambique.

A third uncertainty relates to the negative economic and social consequences involved in the repatriation of migrant labour - especially of Mozambicans from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). This will add yet another burden to the problems of the unfortunate Mozambicans, with ramifications for other countries in the region - especially South Africa.

One can certainly expect growing political interaction between Moscow and South Africa but also a major reduction in the ex-Soviet states' role in Angola. Quite simply, the CIS is not in a position to compete commercially with the sophisticated Western enterprises that already have a foothold in Angola. Nor will it secure repayment of the $3 billion debt owed by Luanda. For the same reasons, I am somewhat sceptical about the development of major trading links between the CIS and Pretoria. Nevertheless, one can anticipate limited co-operation in the fields of minerals, metals and mining and in the exchange of information concerning the conversion of military technological capabilities to civilian applications.

Lastly, although the CIS countries are keen to sell some of their huge arsenals of military hardware to cash-buyers in Southern Africa, the prospects for such sales seem very slim - a topic I shall return to later in this essay.

INDIA

Very sensibly, India has now abandoned socialism and its previous negative attitude to foreign investment for a market-friendly, outward-looking economic policy that is already opening India's market of 200 million middle-class consumers to the outside world.

The country's growing economic base is reflected in the current expansion of its navy, with the likelihood that it will launch its own locally-built "Charlie" class nuclear-powered submarine by the turn of the century. With the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean may become something of a power vacuum which India, as a potential great power, would be keen to fill. The possibility of an Indian Ocean Rim economic bloc - similar to but smaller than the dynamic Pacific Rim - (taking in India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa) is also very much on the cards in the medium to longer term.

IRAN

Iran is also expanding its naval, air and ground forces, with major new purchases from North Korea, China and the CIS. Teheran has recently bought three new "Kilo"-class diesel-electric submarines from the former USSR, and crews are currently undergoing training at Riga in Latvia. It is already evident that Iranian Islamic influence in the Sudan (where Teheran is re-arming the Khartoum authorities), and also in East Africa, is growing. On a different tack, South and East African business prospects in the Persian Gulf offer huge potential - especially in the sale of foodstuffs and fresh fruit. In this sense, the prospects for mutually beneficial relationships between South Africa and the Gulf states look very promising.

BRAZIL

Although Brazil is going through an economically difficult time and a period of socio-political instability, Latin America's largest state is gearing up for a major push into Southern Africa. Brasilia's two-way trade with South Africa was $260 million in 1990 and over $300 million last year. By 1994, it will probably reach $500 million - the level in 1985 when the period of democratization and civilian rule had led to a hardening of attitudes towards Pretoria.8

For historical and linguistic reasons, Brazil is Angola's largest partner in terms of financial aid and co-operation, and the Brazilians are pushing to expand their business activities in Angola (especially in the agricultural sector and in the rehabilitation of the transport infrastructure) through the creation of joint ventures with Portugal. Lisbon will also use South Africa for development projects in Angola - in line with other countries using South Africa for development and investment in Southern Africa.9

Given that a large amount of Brazil's oil comes around the Cape, and that a much larger proportion will in future come from Angola, one can expect to see a lot more of the Brazilians in a South-South bridging exercise, which will reflect their perceptions of the south-east Atlantic as their "African frontier".10

CHINA

The People's Republic of China is another leading Third World country that will increasingly have a greater voice in international issues. Already a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has been predicted (by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy) that by the year 2010 China may become the world's second largest economic power. Currently, the southern provinces of China constitute the seventh largest economic bloc in the world; and the reintegration of Hong Kong in 1997, together with the possibility of reunification with Taiwan, will serve as further catalysts in the modernization process.

However, the suppression of the democracy movement in Beijing in June 1989 has delayed the economic reorganization of the world's most populous country (1,1 billion people) and it might be more realistic to see China only as an influential regional power rather than as a global one within the next decade or so.11

For these reasons, and because Beijing is so distant from here, China is unlikely to effect Southern Africa very much one way or the other. For the next 5 to 10 years, South African relations with the Tiger economies of the Far East (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and so on) will reap much greater dividends than will accrue from the People's Republic.

JAPAN

In contrast with China, Japan is going to have a much greater impact on this part of the world. Japan's success story, of course, reads like a financial fairytale. In 1960, Japan's share of world GNP was 3 per cent (to the USA's 36 per cent). By 1986, it was 12 per cent (to the USA's 23 per cent). In 1980, the USA was the undisputed world leader in every broad measure of economic power.12 Today, the Japanese economy is roughly half the size of its American counterpart (and certainly the most dynamic) while its industrial production has risen to approximately three-quarters of the US level. If past trends continue, it will be about 85 per cent of the US level by the year 2000.

Additionally, Japan has become the world's largest source of capital and Tokyo has a growing rather than a declining economic aid programme (over $10 billion) that is already larger than the figure for the USA's official development assistance. As William J Barnds put it:

... it does not take profound insight to reach the conclusion that as countries become more dependent on Japan for economic aid, technical and private investment ... the U.S. leverage over developments in these countries will decline.13

In Africa, Japan is now the biggest bilateral aid donor to Kenya, Zambia, Ghana and even Nigeria. Overall, Japanese bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa now ranks fourth after France, Italy and Germany and is ahead of both the USA and Britain. However, most of Japan's aid remains predominantly a loan programme - unlike, say, Britain's which is mostly in the form of grants.14

As is well known, the Japanese constitution proscribes military activity overseas, so Tokyo offers increased aid instead. In the past, Japan appeared happy to hide under US skirts on all the major international aid policy issues (structural adjustment and conditionality, debt relief, environmental protection, and so on) but Tokyo is now adopting international responsibilities, using development co-operation as a means of gaining global political influence and sustaining markets.15

It is also beginning to impose linkages between aid and policy reform. At the same time, Japan (which spends 1,6 per cent and not 1,0 per cent of GNP on defence as is commonly assumed) is building the technological infrastructure for a modern armaments industry and increasing its defence budget each year.16 It is also interesting to note that proposed legislation is currently before Parliament that would allow Japan to take part in UN peacekeeping operations abroad.17

Although Japan does not aspire to replace the USA as the world's Number One (Tokyo will be happy to stay Number Two), South African leaders would be wise to give careful consideration to Japan's increasingly important role.

While South Africa accounts for less than 1 per cent of Japan's trade, 'SA is still one of the most important trading partners for Japan' according to Yoshiaki Murakami, Japan's ambassador to Pretoria.18 This is because Japan has virtually no natural resources, other than its enormous reservoir of human skills, and relies on South Africa's raw materials.

On the other side of the coin, South Africa needs Japanese technology and investment if economic growth is to meet political aspirations. Five years ago, Japan was South Africa's largest trading partner. Five years from now, Japan will probably push Britain, Germany and the USA aside to resume that status. But much depends on an orderly reform process and on an end to both political violence and labour instability in South Africa.

More widely, Japan regards South Africa as the gateway to trade with the rest of the region and there are advanced plans to establish regional business headquarters here by the turn of the century.

EUROPE

The main points to emphasize with regard to Western Europe's future interests and influence in Southern Africa are the following. First, the population of the EC countries is larger than that of the USA and more than twice the size of Japan's; the EC's GNP is 250 per cent larger than that of Japan and comparable to that of the USA.

The EC is already an economic superpower (and an enlarged EC would be an economic and demographic giant); but at the moment it behaves like a political dwarf, because of disagreements between European countries in the early years of economic and political union and a preoccupation with internal matters before international economic relations.

The major exception, of course, is EC concern for the monumental task confronting Eastern Europe and the CIS republics, which has captured the imagination of Western decision-makers. Concern about Eastern Europe will take precedence over the Third World, since it is clearly one of the EC's priority interests to have stable rather than unstable neighbours. This suggests that there is a danger of "crowding out".19 Also, and as noted earlier, West European aid will be increasingly conditional upon democratic behaviour, human rights and other criteria.

But in the longer term, 'a rise in per capita eastern European imports to western levels could represent a significant improvement' for Third World exporters 'The benefits would tend to accrue mainly to ... sub-Saharan Africa ... as it is still heavily dependent upon the export of traditional primary products'.20

But how important is Southern Africa to Western Europe? What is remarkable is that this region of apparently second-rank importance has attracted (and continues to attract) so much attention. In economic and geopolitical terms, Southern Africa is of some, though limited, importance.21

Nevertheless, the subcontinent 'consistently attracts a higher level of attention from [Western Europe] than any other Third World area except the Middle East. The reasons are complex, and owe more to politics than economics'.22 But militarily, and especially economically, South Africa is the giant not just of Southern Africa but of black Africa as a whole (South Africa's GNP is 50 per cent greater than that of its nearest rival, Algeria, and 2,5 times larger than those of Nigeria or Egypt). Looking at the continent as a whole, South Africa accounts for one-third of Africa's GNP.

For these reasons, and because South Africa has attractions for foreign investors (including a functioning free-market economy, technical and managerial know-how, a world-class transport system and a superb financial infrastructure) the EC countries hope that South Africa's real future role lies in the regeneration of a dying subcontinent and as a catalyst for a regional economic renaissance.

No country is pushing for a greater South African role in promoting regional prosperity and peace than Britain, which has interests in, and connections with, the Republic and the region exceeding those of any other state in the international community. For this reason, British diplomatic and military activity in Southern Africa is going to be an enduring feature of the regional scene throughout the rest of the 1990s.

FINALLY

To the extent that South Africa is seen as promoting stability and development in the region, it can count on attracting private investments as well as financial and other support from Western governments and international agencies. The more this takes place, the stronger will market forces become in the South African economy. No less important: the closer South Africa becomes integrated into international economic and other networks, the more secure will democracy and human rights tend to be in the future South Africa.23

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Space precludes more than a short section on the future role of international organizations in Southern Africa, but it now seems quite clear that

... existing tendencies of prescriptive involvement in the internal affairs of the Third World by international and multinational organizations such as the [IMF, World Bank and UN] are bound to intensify. Since such involvement has now apparently come to reflect that of a single dominant value system, as opposed to the previous situation of competing ideological systems, such intervention will marginally reduce the requirement for armed forces, strengthen the growth of democracy and a respect for human rights and hopefully reduce regional tensions. However in this same process Third World states will be threatened with a loss of freedom of action and independence. [In short], the era of true neo-colonialism may be just around the corner.24

In the future, Africa will have to listen, more than ever before, to the prescriptions of the IMF, which has rarely been in greater demand. Already heavily committed in Eastern Europe, the IMF has emerged as the West's principal instrument for assisting the transition to capitalism in formerly centrally-planned economies. Indeed, the IMF and the World Bank have become the most important external economic forces in Africa. This trend is bound to intensify for the remainder of the 1990s.

In South Africa itself, the Fund is already influencing the economic debate by stating that redistribution of wealth through increased taxes will wreck South Africa's growth prospects. Mr Mandela and the ANC are being told that the same sanctions that were applied to Pretoria will be applied to a future government should it commit itself to a socialist economy.

With reference to the United Nations, one can hardly disagree with Mr Sergei Plekhanov (Deputy Director of the Moscow Institute for USA and Canadian Studies) when he argues that the problems that the UN has dealt with in the past may look insignificant compared with the massive global agenda facing us today.

Let's take the problem of relations between the North and the South. I think the United Nations is the only mechanism that can prevent the confrontation between East and West from being replaced by a North-South confrontation. The gap is growing between poor and rich nations, and the situation is intolerable. Another time bomb is foreign debt. We must use the United Nations to resolve these problems.25

The vertical and horizontal proliferation of ABC weapons (atomic, biological and chemical), and the means to launch them, also raise questions of collective security; and the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as other key powers, have a common interest in preventing their proliferation. It is estimated that 15 countries could have the capability to manufacture ballistic missiles by the turn of the century. In the 1990s, therefore, we can expect a much tougher attitude on this question, especially from Washington, which sponsored the multilateral effort to stem this tide through the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Thus, the end of the Cold War does not mean a world at peace. On the contrary, there is still a security threat to Western countries from the retention of nuclear weapons by the CIS states and from the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology from them and others to unstable regimes in the Third World. There is also concern about over-stocked conventional military hardware in the former Warsaw Pact states finding its way to the world's conflict areas. For these reasons, there can be no doubt that the machinery of an American dominated UN will be heavily geared to increasingly interventionist anti-proliferation and arms control verification programmes.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the main target to feel the heat will be Armscor. But given the Corporation's importance to South Africa as an export earner, a solution of sorts might be found in a quid pro quo in which the armaments embargo against South Africa is dropped in return for a policy of responsible and open arms exports on the part of Armscor. More widely, the UN's threats of unspecified "serious consequences" - including the use of force - against Baghdad, will serve as a useful indicator of UN intentions and credibility in Third World hot-spots. Finally, South Africa's decision to sign the NPT - and the fact that no country in Africa (and this includes Libya) will be permitted to produce even a crude nuclear device in the next 15-20 years - suggests that the vision of a militarily nuclear-free continent will become a reality.

THE THREAT

The final part of this article will focus on a variety of threats facing South and Southern Africa.

Every state in the global system is confronted with a range of security dilemmas, but it is important not to conceptualize security in purely politico-military terms. For most of the world's population, the term also embodies food security, job security, resource security and other associated aspects [in] the everyday life of human beings.26

Such issues constitute the most basic threats to the health and very survival of many Third World populations and to the subsequent stability of these states and their neighbours. In addition, and because of the growing interdependence of the global system, local and regional disorders have wider repercussions for the stability of the world at large.

Modern states are threatened from without (by the possibility of external aggression) and from within (by the possibility of internal subversion). In the West, threats to the security of the state usually emanate from the international environment; but many developing countries confront both external threats to their sovereignty and security, and a variety of domestic challenges to their ruling élites and to their territorial integrity.

Nevertheless, a variety of threats in the modern world are common to both the industrialized countries and to the developing ones. Pandemic diseases such as Aids, international terrorism, the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, and environmental destruction, are just some of the ones that come to mind.

With this in mind, a wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional menaces threaten South Africa and the region. But let me begin my ten-point list on an optimistic note, because the prognosis for the 1990s is not all gloom and doom.

In a lecture two years ago, I pointed to the continuing danger of a sustained build-up, especially in qualitative terms, of high-tech (mainly Soviet) military hardware in nearby states.27 That assessment now needs to be substantially revised with regard to the remainder of the 1990s. Even if the Russian and other CIS countries are willing to sell weapons for the hard currency they so desperately need, they will have considerable difficulties in finding markets in Southern Africa.28

On the other hand, the proliferation of small-arms in the subcontinent, and their use for political and criminal purposes, will represent a real threat to the region for many years to come. Within South Africa, the availability of such weaponry will continue to fuel ethnic and ideological conflicts as well as antagonisms between the haves and the have-nots. And an escalation of violent crime will increase the risk of white emigration, to the detriment of the economy as a whole.

A third challenge relates to the arms embargo against South Africa, which, even when lifted, will almost certainly result in periods - perhaps prolonged - where specific categories of military equipment become obsolete. This is a very real security dilemma for South Africa.29

In terms of resources for the armed forces of the future, whereas one can be reasonably certain that more money spent on health services will improve the quality of life in a given area, it is less easy to demonstrate that higher cash allocations for defence will make a state more secure. Indeed, there may even be circumstances in which enhanced military capacity diminishes security by altering the regional balance of power. By the same token, too little spent on deterrence and defence may ultimately prove very costly. Just as South Africa wants to see stability across its borders, so a stable South Africa is in the security interests of its neighbours.

Unfortunately, the continuing civil war in Mozambique - and the potential for increased political strife in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Zaire (but also of course in Angola and Malawi) - all threaten South Africa's security. As discussed earlier, the borders of the world's states are not immutable and the international community is much more willing to contemplate (and be favourably disposed to) secessionist tendencies and self-determination than before, especially where it is apparent that the core is unable to sustain its regions. Croatia has been recognized and, de facto, so has Eritrea. So why not Shaba and other parts of Africa? Associated with this point are the social and economic problems that would (and, indeed, already do) spill over the borders into the Republic: rebel bands, refugees and the like. Just look at Malawi, where as previously noted, a tenth of its inhabitants are escapees from the economically ravaged territory of Mozambique. 'Herein lies the potential for an even more fundamental Catch-22: political stability inhibiting economic growth, and declining economic performance exacerbating political instability.'30

The refugee threat is closely linked to demographic problems, threats to the environment, famine and poverty. Let me deal with these three interrelated issues in turn.

Population growth is one of Southern Africa's biggest problems and the outlook must be considered very bleak indeed. This is because several of the region's states cannot support their present populations, let alone greater numbers. Despite some encouraging successes in family planning, the populations of Southern Africa have a youthful profile and hence a built-in demographic momentum. Thus the period to the year 2000 could witness massively high levels of unemployment and enormous pressures from landless migrants - both inside the region's states and across the borders of Southern Africa.

For this reason South Africa - which will also have growing millions of nothing-to-lose dispossessed citizens - must ask itself a basic question: what are the prospects for future illegal immigration? A realistic outlook over the next 5 to 10 years is that several of South Africa's neighbours will be more impoverished than they are today. If economic decline, famine and political unrest continue (as they surely will), new waves of immigrants will flow southwards, adding to the havoc of uncontrolled population movements and to the Republic's instability and insecurity. These concerns also apply to a number of other states in the region.

As we are becoming acutely aware, our planet is increasingly interdependent environmentally as well as economically. The fragile environment of Southern Africa is also a matter of great concern - not just aesthetically but also in terms of development and regional security. When overpopulation and environmental degradation stunt economic growth, all too often the result is civil turmoil and outright violence, either within a country or with neighbouring ones. For this reason, the linkage between environmental conservation and aid - which will be a major feature of international relations and conditionality in the 1990s - should be viewed as benign and not as a threat. This also goes for the protection of wildlife and the coastline, key factors in drawing tourists to Southern Africa, where the potential for the industry is enormous.31

Although environmental conditionality will be regarded by many Third World countries as an unwarranted intrusion on their sovereignty, the 1990s will see the widespread use of outside environmental audits in South Africa as well as "debt-for-nature" swaps, as arranged for Mexico in 1991.

I believe it is no exaggeration to say that, on the agenda of economic issues facing the global community, few challenges appear more daunting or less tractable than the festering problem of Third World debt. South Africa's debt is not large (the ratio of debt to GNP in 1990 was 19 per cent, the average for the Third World is 230 per cent) but it is in the South Africa's vital interests to push for debt relief for her neighbours. In a very real sense one keystone to South Africa's security is economic recovery in the subcontinent. Put another way, South Africa needs to boost the income-earning capacity of her neighbours through regional cooperation for the benefit of all concerned.

Intraregional competition for water resources could also materialize in Southern Africa. As early as the mid-1980s, the US intelligence community estimated that there were at least 10 places in the world - 4 of them in Africa - where war could break out over dwindling shared water.32

Egypt, for instance, is threatened by Ethiopia, which controls the Blue Nile tributary that is the source of approximately 80 per cent of the Nile water entering Egypt. Egypt has virtually no rainfall, but Addis Ababa has regularly asserted that it feels at complete liberty to divert up to 40 per cent of the Blue Nile's water for new settlements. Naturally, this prospect alarms Cairo; and as the then Egyptian foreign minister, Butros Ghali, stated 'The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not over politics.'33

Frictions based on the competition for water in an overpopulated Southern Africa could also assume strategically-important proportions during the next decade.

Ninth on the agenda offered here is the global problem of drug-use and drug-trafficking, which represents a serious challenge in this region and for South Africa in particular. The abuse of narcotics greatly affects the Third World, where up to 20 per cent of the world's 40 million illicit-drug users live.34 Already, considerable quantities of Mandrax are trafficked from India to South Africa; and cocaine - which until a year ago had not been a problem here - has the potential of becoming as big a crisis as dagga and Mandrax. Ever since the anti-cocaine war against the drug barons in Colombia, South Africa has been at the top of the list as an import area.35

As two recent reports note,36 as well as causing widespread suffering and deaths among addicts, the drug trade engenders corruption and violence, and many addicts resort to theft and prostitution to support their habit. It also diverts national resources away from other important social requirements. In some countries, it is destabilizing the entire economy, forcing the state to spend exorbitant sums on security and threatening the fabric of society and political security.

In addition, there is increasing alarm about the growing collusion between the international drug trade and terrorist organizations.37 Also, in Southern Africa, much of the illicit drug trade can be attributed to currency devaluations which make money an increasingly meaningless medium of exchange. Drugs can do the job instead. Also, it should be stressed that a Southern African state heads the list of drug-trafficking countries on this continent. That country is Zambia.

The basic challenge for South African policy-makers, therefore, is to fashion a strategy that addresses both the demand and supply side of the equation in co-operation with the international community. No other approach will offer anything more than momentary relief. Finally, under this heading, it should be noted that heroin, cocaine, amphetamines and other drugs can be injected - a practice that when used with non-sterile needles presents a particular risk of infections, including the Aids (HIV) virus.

On this question it has been argued that Southern Africa will not need a population policy in ten years time because Aids will do the job instead. But in a recent and much-publicized study, Professor Roy Anderson of Imperial College, London University, who has investigated the potential demographic impact of HIV in black Africa, concludes that Aids will not cause the population growth to turn negative until at least two or three decades after HIV has begun to spread in the populations.38

Nevertheless, the world-wide impact of Aids - and the manifestation of this tendency in Southern Africa - could eventually have other very serious economic consequences for this region. In Southern Africa (as in other parts of the Third World), the death of each working adult leaves proportionately more dependent children than in Western countries. In addition, the loss of key workers from sexually more promiscuous groups like the African monied élite, and in the migrant mining work-force of Southern Africa, leads to an impoverishment of the economy, so that scant resources are spread ever thinner. Also, Aids-related deaths are already affecting production in the rural areas, which account for a very high proportion of GDP in Africa - the only continent where food production per capita has been declining over the past 20 years.

Other susceptible professions, for instance the military, are also being decimated by the virus and by secondary illnesses such as tuberculosis and pneumonia. Indeed, serious gaps are already appearing in the leadership cadres of African armies, most noticeably in Uganda and Zimbabwe. This trend is set to continue throughout the 1990s. If the 1980s was the decade of HIV in Africa, the 1990s will be the decade of Aids in Africa. It will be the decade when the millions of HIV infections picked up in the 1980s will translate into chronic Aids.

Aids threatens to overwhelm not just South Africa (where the Department of National Health estimates 100 000 are already HIV positive, with an estimated figure of 200 000 by November 1992) but the entire subcontinent: the social dislocation and chaos that looks set to flow from disasters in these fields will almost certainly have far-reaching but unpredictable economic, political and security implications for this region. Indeed, one leading authority maintains that the problem will have effects comparable to those of a nuclear war.

In short - and to conclude this essay - the momentous challenges, risks and opportunities that seem likely to confront South Africa and its neighbours during the transition of the 1990s appear so urgent that it does not seem wise to allow events themselves to set the region's agenda. They need to be co-operatively addressed and faced up to now.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

From Cold War to Detente Security and Politico-Economic Scenarios for Southern Africa * (Part 1)

MARGINALIZATION? A CHECKLIST OF GLOBAL PLAYERS

USA

We can disengage from Zaire or Kenya or distance ourselves from the civil wars in Liberia, Sudan, and Somalia without worrying about the Soviet gaining (or even wanting to assume) anything like our influence or support role.2

THE CIS

INDIA

IRAN

BRAZIL

CHINA

JAPAN

... it does not take profound insight to reach the conclusion that as countries become more dependent on Japan for economic aid, technical and private investment ... the U.S. leverage over developments in these countries will decline.13

EUROPE

FINALLY

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Space precludes more than a short section on the future role of international organizations in Southern Africa, but it now seems quite clear that

THE THREAT

The refugee threat is closely linked to demographic problems, threats to the environment, famine and poverty. Let me deal with these three interrelated issues in turn.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

From Cold War to Detente

Security and Politico-Economic Scenarios for Southern Africa *

(Part 1)