The Development Brigade:

The Namibian Experience

Simon Shikangalah

General Manager, Development Brigade Corporation, Namibia

Paper delivered at a conference on Guns and Butter, held jointly by the Institute for Defence Policy and Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 1 September 1994 at Pretoria.

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 20, 1994

INTRODUCTION

Everywhere today the most popular word you hear is "Development". One gets a feeling, however, that the actual development taking place lags far behind the amount of talking devoted to development. This being so I am going to share with you the Namibian experience with one type of development namely the Development Brigade Corporation.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

At independence, the new government in Namibia found itself faced with some tens of thousand demobilised fighters from both side of the conflict. Some of these men and women were absorbed into the national army and others into the police force. A good many others, however, had nowhere to go and effectively swelled the ranks of the unemployed in the young country.

These people possessed no skills of any kind which they could sell in the labour market. Their expectations dreams and aspirations were monumental. But there they were, having nowhere to go. No jobs, no shelters, no food. They needed special attention to alleviate their predicament. The socio-political and security considerations were also paramount in the minds of our leaders.

Taking a panoramic view of the situation, two fault lines dominated the picture, namely:

Lack of practical skills for self-employed whether as individuals or in co-operative groups.

Lack of jobs in the small Namibian private sector.

The only logical conclusion was, therefore, to:

give the people training in functional skills (as plumbers, carpenters, bricklayers, etc.) and thus enable them to support themselves economically; and



identify viable projects (job creation) where these people can be productively deployed. The Development Brigades idea (already being implemented in Zimbabwe and to lesser degree in Botswana) was therefore decided on.

For two years (1991, 1992) the Development Brigade was a department of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. This was appropriate in the sense that these people needed land, to be resettled and rehabilitated. The Brigade also shared the budget of this Ministry. But with the passing of time some serious problems were experienced.

Inadequate funding: As is the case with many training organisations, the demand far out-stripped the financial resources. It was necessary to engage in some income generating projects to supplement government allocations. The Brigades went into water drilling, erven servicing, brick making, poultry, construction (houses), etc.



Managerial expertise: The above mentioned projects needed a lot of managerial expertise in order to successfully achieve the objectives. This expertise was and still is, a very rare commodity in this group of people.



Other impediments: It was also discovered that the Development Brigades as a department of a Ministry could not engage in pure commercial activities for profit.

Towards the end of 1992 it was decided that the Development Brigade needed to be converted into a parastatal. This was achieved with the passing of Act 32 of 1992 which established the Development Brigade Corporation as it exists today.

THE ATTITUDE PROBLEM

It is true that the people who enter the Brigade sacrificed quite a lot. They offered their lives and sacrificed education to fight for the liberation of their country. Now that the goal has been achieved and having no other way of securing a decent living, they are saying "we have performed our part it is now your turn. Our Government must now provide."

The belief is "pay up, you owe us, you owe us!" Yet, their expectations are unfulfilled and are unlikely to be fulfilled soon. With limited resources on one hand and a compelling need for social stability on the other hand, the call to pay up is, indeed a very serious problem.

PROGRESS

To date about four thousand trainees have passed through our hands. This year alone one thousand six hundred are graduating in different field towards the end of year. About fifteen percent of all graduates of the past three years have found work in the private sector, about twenty percent in the public service and about fifty five are running their own business concerns mostly as co-operatives/partnerships. However, management skills (project management) and financial assistance (start-up capital) will continue to be headaches for the foreseeable future.

CONCLUSION

The Namibian experience has provided a number of lessons. Some of the more important are as follows:-

Spell out exactly what you want to achieve with anything like a Service Brigade and make sure the public and all concerned understand this.



Take a long term perspective, short term conviences very easily result in long term nightmares.



There is no substitute for good planning. If you don't have enough time to plan properly now, you will need more time to do it over again.



Socio-economic accommodation and rehabilitation of ex-fighters should be treated as a national responsibility regardless of political affiliations. It is in the interest of every citizen that peace and stability prevails. A hungry man is an angry man.



Consult widely- The danger comes from ignorance of what is really going on. Even the beneficiaries may balk.

Looking at the Namibian experience, it is fair to say that it was mostly a trial by error exercise and some bitter lessons have been learnt. It is also clear that the basics are now in place and some successes have been recorded. Yet the terrain ahead still looks tough. However, in the spirit of nation building and national reconciliation we hope to succeed.