When the South African state is being threatened by internal political unrest, the SA Army could be required to provide back-up support for the SA Police Service



It may be necessary for the SA Army to provide a border security service on a permanent basis. This could become necessary for a variety of reasons, such as preventing drug trafficking, preventing illegal immigration (as is the case at present) or to contain a possible overflow of animal and human diseases into South Africa.



It may become necessary for the SA Army to become involved in global and regional peace initiatives. Such actions could cover a wide spectrum of activities from being part of an international peac force on the one hand to, for example, socio-economic and election support on the other.



Utilising its professional competencies, the new SA Army could become involved in the logistic and technical support of national or community development projects.



As in the past, it is most likely that it will continue to be expected of the new SA Army to provide the logistic and technical support for disaster relief.

Categories of trends, emerging developments and uncertainties to be considered

The trends, developments and uncertainties that may impact on strategic programmes of the new SA Army can be subdivided into two broad categories, viz.:

those affecting the growth and nature of the demand for the services of the new SA Army; and



those affecting the ability of the new SA Army to supply the quality and quantity of services demanded of it.

As far as the demand for services is concerned, it can be surmised that the following categories of concerns could conceivably be of importance:

Shifts in the global and regional political power equation, including emerging ideologies and emerging global and regional powers.



Economic, demographic and resource patterns of change which cold affect the levels of societal stress within particular countries (including in South Africa) and between countries.



Trends and behaviour affecting South Africa’s economic and political standing over the long term, globally and regionally.



Foreign political initiatives by the South African government which produce a need for military back-up (e.g., South Africa’s involvement in the two World Wars, the Korean War and the Angolan War).

The ability of the new SA Army to supply the quantity and quality of services required over the long term will in all likelihood be influenced by the following trends:

Economic growth trends.



Demographic trends.



Political developments over the next five years, especially with respect to South Africa’s constitutional development which could stabilise or worsen intergroup relations.



Technological and industrial development and stagnation.



South Africa’s global standing, which will affect its ability to source military equipment from outside the country.

Issue statement

Based on the above-mentioned assumptions about possible future strategic programmes and the factors and trends that may affect them, the following two strategic issues are selected to guide this paper’s scenario-based inquiry:

The emergence of South Africa as a moral force internationally, and a politico-economic force regionally, could produce new demands on South Africa’s military resources. Given the country’s economic constraints, and the trend towards social development expenditure, this poses a dilemma to decision-makers, especially against the background of the needs and expectatios of African countries.



South Africa is faced with a double transition over the next ten years noted by constitutional and economic transformation. This double transition is bound to produce more societal and political stress over the medium term, which could produce serious complications for the organisational effectiveness, efficiency and morale of a new South African Army.

GLOBAL FORCES, TRENDS AND UNCERTAINTIES SHAPING THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY

On 20 April and 10 May 1994 South Africans experienced a social and political bifurcation as fundamental as that of 1652, the early 1800’s (the Chaka wars), the 1830’s (the Great Trek) and 1902 in its own history - or for that matter comparable with the American experience at the end of its civil war in the previous century. The road ahead will be directed by the imperatives and expectations of a new governming class which - in a fundamental deviation from the past - is now largely representative of a majority of extremely poor voters. It will be shaped and influenced by the practical components, needs and problems of managing a relatively sophisticated South African economy. This economy, which is the envy and hope of Africa, will have to be the basis for bulding a new South Africa - and for contributing ultimately towards African upliftment. Aouth African political development will be influenced by a New World Order which requires from its members "good behaviour" in terms of domestic policies, which support political and economic freedom. Within the "Brave New World" the new SA Army will have to design and implement strategies that will facilitate the political and economic development of the country.

The trend breaks of 1989/91

Developments inside South Africa are as much a function of trend-breaks internationally, as of the spontaneous and planned developments inside the country. The 1990s were heralded with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, the fall of the Estern European communist regimes and the intensification of the democratisation process in the USSR. This process culminated in the August 1991 putsch in Moscow, which was then turned around by the Soviet people’s "popular" support for democracy within a period of four days. With amazement, the world observed the banning of the Communist Party in the USSR and the nationalisation of the party’s property. The USSR then ceased to exist. An unstable Russia, committed to co-operation with the West, and to market principles, but unconvincing about democracy, replaced the USSR. The dominant ascendance of the United States of America (USA) and a growing role for the United Nations (UN) are two of the consequences of the disappearance of the ideologically-based bipolar world (i.e., capitalist vs. communist).

The world of the 1990s is not necessarily a safer place, as the 1991 Gulf War attested. Intraregional rivalries, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and a depletion of finite resources may precipitate trends that could create new sources of conflict in areas such as the Middle East and/or Eastern and Central Europe. Six years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall (November 1989), there is still no certainty over the ultimate shape and characteristics of the post-Cold War world. The collapse of the Berlin Wall signified a groundshift in international power relations. It was predated by Gorbachev’s perestroika and glastnost in the Soviet Union. The euphoria which followed about the likely emergence of a New World Order of peace and freedom was reminiscent of the post-World War II feeling of release. These new global conditions created the belief that conflict can be contained through international co-operation and by the judicial applications of international institutions, such as the United Nations and if necessary NATO, in problem areas.

However, the inability of these institutions to effect peace in Bosnia and even to solve the militarily less demanding problems of Africa, is a clear pointer towards the limitations of international "solutions" for local crises (Spies, 1994). It seems that the problems of post-Cold War developments are not to be solved simply by international solutions. The developmental problems of the Russian Federation is one case in point. Africa, long thought of as marginal to the international mainstream also seems to be incompetent to solve her problems of stagnation and disintegration (Vale, 1994). It is a continent which is generally (with a few exceptions) characterised by change without progress, by bad governance, by collapsed economies, by ethnic conflict and by corruption. Small wonder that the April 1994 election in South Africa produced such an upsurge of hope (and fear of giantism) in countries north of its borders.

Shifts in the global power equation

What are the underlying reasons for the trend-breaks in international power-relations in the 1990s? The answer probalby lies in the long-term technological trends which drive the economic power base of modern societies.

The main reason why the world of the late 20th century is so different from, for example, that of the 17th century lies in the impact of the scientific revolution and its progeny, the industrial revolution. The explosion in scientific discoveries and industrialisation in the 18th century produced the supportive socio-economic conditions which spawned high rates of population growth and continuously increasing welfare in some countries (and deprivation for others). In general, the world was transformed by man’s increasing ability to artificially produce his future conditions of existence - whether by design or default; whether conducive to inhibiting (e.g., environmental destruction) his long-term welfare. Technological change thus produced an initiating stimulus for societal transformation which was a complex interrelated process of economic, social, environmental and political change.

Our interest in this process lies in its implications for political and military power.

We know that the power equation between the major powers of the world shifted continuously over the past 400 years (Kennedy, 1987). These shifts were produced, firstly, by changes in the control over strategic resources and, secondly, by changes in the focus and efficiency of different nations in their utilisation and application of strategic resources.

The basis of political power during pre-industrial times was to have control over natural resources (including minerals) and trade routes. This is the reason for the dominance of the ruling agrarian oligarchy who controlled domestic politics in Europe, as well as in many other parts of the world up until the 19th century. The rise of powerful mercantile societies, such as the Venetian in medieval times, and of colonial nations, such as at first Spain and later Great Britain, was essentially based on their ability to control trade routes and to exploit colonial raw materials and minerls. This resource and trade-based political power, sometimes reinforced by efficient bureaucracies (e.g., the Turkish Empire before the 18th century) provided the dominant nations with the economic means (as well as the need) not only to support their large armies and navies, but to support their large armies and navies, but also with the means for continuous improvements in the quantity and quality of equipment used by these forces.

However, the scientific and technological revolution, which emerged in the 17th century, changed these power relations systematically because of the shift in the basis of the power it produced. As a consequence of scientific and technological advances, the technical sophistication of military equipment increased rapidly - especially since the 19th century. Through their new industrially-based wealth-generating capacity, the new world powers could not only pay for the new equipment, but also finance even larger armies and navies than before. Capital growth became the key driver of industrial growth, and thus of political power. This change in the power equation was evident during the rise of Great Britain as a dominant world power in the 19th century - not least because of the ideological schism it produced between capitalism and Marxist/Leninist communism. In this new and different industrial world, wealth and power were primarily based on control over capital and, through the power gained thus, only in the second instance on control over natural resources and trade routes.

Since World War II, and especially since the 1960’s, the world started to experience another socio-economic revolution, one which sociologist Daniel Bell (1973) described as a post-industrial society and Kostopaulos (1988) called a "nomacratic society". In this late 20th century society, the driver of economic power started to shift again, with emphasis moving slowly from capital accumulation to the accumulation of knowledge and the increase of human competence, innovativeness and technological progress.

Technology is perceived here as being more than just an artefact. It is a way of doing things, of ordering society. The scientific knowledge and technological abilities of a nation are therefore minimum requirements for progress and development. This requires the development of a technological culture which communicates technological understanding and aspirations in society. This technological culture is reinforced by an interlinking system of appropriate socio-political and economic structures, and by human behaviour patterns which integrates society, the market, the production system and resource system into a creative, developing and harmonious whole: A self-generating bundle of human competencies which becomes progressively less dependent on natural resources - and even on capital - for progress. National development is dependent on maximam freedom for creativity and personal motivation (produced, inter alia, by competition) and on global accessibility to and networking with, the world community of scientists, technologists, world technologies and with world markets.

Seen against this background, the isolationist and unfree policies of the Soviet Marxist/Leninist state, and also of the South African apartheid state, were bound to fail sooner or later, because of constraints on the long-term development potential produced by these systems. Internationalism became the cornerstone of national progress. Policies which invite or promote isolation either through sanctions, or generally through restrictions on the free flow of science, technology and trade, will cause serious damage to the long-term development potential and power of nations.

The implications of the New World Order for Southern Africa

From the previous overview we have established that economic and political power are today inseparable. It was pointed out that a New World Order emerged over the past decade; an order which is fuelled by institutionalised knowledge expanision, which in turn spawned new technologies at an ever increasing rate in industrialised nations. Within these countries one finds the supportive conditions for knowledge-based economic expansion, i.e., the technological and socio-economic infrastructure to support institutionalised technology development, and the technical and organisational competitiveness to manage the technologically complex societies it produces.

Countries, societies or sections of populations without these characteristics and competencies are bound to fall behind over the medium to long term. With the high rates of population growth which is a general characteristic of today’s poorer countries, these countries will in all likelihood continue on a Malthusian-type decline and disintegration. Even more disruptive is the urban-rural (and elite-populace) dualism which this process will by necessity reinforce in poor countries (Kennedy, 1993: 21 - 46). A biblical dictum comes to mind: "To those who have shall be given, and from those who have not will be taken even the little they may have".

This New World Order is progressively becoming borderless (Ohmae, 1991). National boundaries are steadily losing much of their economic meaning (and consequently some of its political relevance) in a world dominated by global economics and stateless corporations globally, they interact through ever-expanding electronic communications networks and through a 24 hour a day international financial market system with volumes many times the aggregate size of the global economy. Clearly, defensive nationalistic economic policies could cut the oxygen from a nation’s economic machine in the long term.

Moreover, a New Global Alliance is today writing the frames of reference of economic policy-makers for "lesser countries". With the demise of biolarism and the emegence of a unified global power centre within the New Global Alliance dominated by United States-United Nations-G7 institutions (see also Barnet, 1983), the definition of what constitutes good policy behaviour and threats to international peace changed completely. With the World Bank and the IMF pointing the way there are clear guidelines for economic policy. There is also clarity on what is politically acceptable. Only in exceptional instances will states go to war with other states and when they do - as the Gulf War has illustrated - the outcome will tend to reflect the wishes of the all-powerful New Global Alliance.

However, the problem of underdevelopment and poverty, which almost 80 per cent of the global population lives, breeds its own particular type of instabilities. These instabilities are more difficult to contain than ill-mannered expansionist adventures. The demographic pressure on extremely limited resources, the disparities between the nations of impoverished regions, disparities between ethnic groups within such nations, disparities between cities and rural areas, and disparities between a relatively prosperous elite and a demographically dominant populace in particular countries, produce a brittleness in relations - regionally and nationally. These factors create what Gharajedaghi (1985:64) calls a "social pathology" noted by socio-economic and political processes of polarisation, the alienation of important sections of the population, corruption, endemic conflict and criminality. Around the world one observes countries which display some or all of these signs of systemic collapse (see Table 1). In such cases one should expect national instability and conflict, which could then spill over the borders into neighbouring countries.

The difficulties of containing these systematically produced conflicts (and calamities) are clear from the number of peace efforts which have failed over the past few years. It seems that the United Nations, an institution which is already financially stretched, often lacks the necessary support for its peace efforts. As a consequence it was the United States which took the lead in most of the instances in the recent past. Other countries of the New Global Alliance, joined often with reluctance.

Within this New World Order, South Africa finds itself in the precarious position that all kinds of expectations have emerged with its new status of moral symbol and as the example of peaceful transition. It is a country which exists on a sub-continent which Kennedy calls the "Third World’s Third World" (Kennedy, 1993:46) says "... is becoming the symbol of world-wide demographic, environmental and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the central "strategic danger".

While being a poor country with a gross national product of less than half that of countries such as the Netherlands, Spain, Australia and Mexico, South Africa is relatively speaking a giant on the Southern African sub-continent (see Table 2). With only 38,7 percent of the population in the region, it produces almost 80 percent of the region’s economic product. Its gross national product per capita of US$2 670 in 1992 was approximately five times that of Zambia and Zimbabwe, nine times that of Nigeria and Kenya, 13 times that of Malawi, 26 times that of Tanzania, and 45 times that of Mozambiue (World Bank, 1994: 162 - 163). The size of the second and third largest economies on the sub-continent, Zimbabwe and Angola is only approximately 70 percent of that of Metropolitan Cape Town, and 17 percent of the PWV metropole. South Africa is therefore relatively speaking a giant, but one with the limited resources of an emerging nation listed by the World Bank (1994:163) at the lower end of the "upper-middle -income countries", below countries such as Mauritius, Botswana, Brazil, Mexico, Gabon, Argentina, Greece and Portugal. 

Total excludes Mozambique.

Proportionate contribution to the 1986 GNP used as a base for calculation.

Proportionate contribution to 1984 GNP used as a base for calculation.

Sources:

Africa south of the Sahara. 1989 (18th ed.) London: Europa Publications.

World Bank. 1988. World development report. New York: Oxford University Press.

Africa Institute. 1992. Africa at a glance. Pretoria: Al.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRENDS

It should now be clear that economic growth per capita is a leading indicator of stable political development in Southern Africa over the long term. Of course, economic growth in itself is a result of a number of interacting factors, of which political and social stability and the commitment of a population to work hard and produce what is consumed are but a few examples. Generally speaking, societal progress is a complex process of societal transformation in which the spiritual and cultural variables are as important as the "hard" variables of economics and technology.

Sub-Saharan Africa