Manpower and Industrial Relations:

Integration and Equal Opportunity in the South African National Defence force (SANDF)

Vice Admiral P. van Z Loedolff, SD,SM,MMM
Chief of Staff Personnel, SANDF

Paper presented at a conference on South African Defence Industry on the 11 October 1994 at Gallagher Estates, Midrand hosted by AIC Conferences.

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 20, 1994



INTRODUCTION

Since 1992 the Defence Force has had to plan for wide ranging fundamental changes to every aspect of its being. It has had to undergo a metamorphosis from an organisation geared for and practiced in waging war, to an organisation with no immediate external threat and a duty to support new goals set by a new government. This has meant that a new strategy has had to be formulated in order to develop an organisational/force structure that is designed to enable the new SANDF to fulfil its revised role and function.

The strategic process to evolve a human resources strategy, is exactly the same as the overall SANDF process, and is completely integrated with the latter. As such the human resources strategy as a supporting strategy, is also supportively connected to the force design. Based on the mandate and values of the Defence Force, it takes due cognisance of all relevant factors. Provided that it is correctly applied and engages the right role players, the chances are good that a successful strategy will ensue. It is this process which the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) and its workgroups have used to formulate a strategy for the future.

The SANDF now operates - and probably will in future - in a harsh environment of great uncertainties requiring it to be one step ahead of developments. Without a viable human resources strategy an effective Defence Force cannot be ensured, which could only lead to the collapse of one of the country's most valuable assets.

Some of the most important elements of the present manpower strategy of the SANDF includes aspects such as the continuation of viable part-time forces, the apolitical nature of the whole Force, maintenance of high standards, equal opportunities, fair labour practices, the importance of the SANDF's nation building role and professional training and development. It suffices to say that consensus has been reached on these elements between all the constituent forces forming the SANDF. It is within this framework and strategy that I wish to address the various topics of this paper.

SCOPE


As time will not permit me to expand further on the human resources strategy, I will only deal with the following aspects in relation to the human resources strategy, as requested by the conference organisers:
  • The process and progress of integration.
  • Problems encountered integrating the non-statutory forces into the SANDF.
  • Correcting the imbalance of colour in the SANDF.
  • Training the new integrated SANDF.
  • Retrenchment in the SANDF due to the integration process and how it will be handled.
  • Industrial relations in the SANDF : uniformed and civilian personnel.
  • Expectations of the new SANDF.
  • Conclusion

THE PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF INTEGRATION


Background. The most critical short-term element of the manpower strategy concerns the integration of five statutory forces and two non-statutory forces into a single force, namely the SANDF, and the subsequent rationalization of these forces to the size and shape required by the Force Design and Force Structure.

The statutory forces number 95 000 in toto. Some uncertainty exists in respect of the exact number of non-statutory force members to be integrated. It is, however, expected that some 26 000 of these members could integrate into the SANDF. After integration, the full-time force could therefore initially number approximately 121 000 members. Not only will a force of this size place a great strain on the budget in terms of salary costs, but many related aspects must also be considered such as logistic costs, shortages of accommodation and infrastructure (including training facilities and staff), etc. Rationalization is therefore, a reality.

The Integration Process. The assembly, and personnel integration, of ex non-statutory forces, will occur as follows:
  • Three assembly areas are being used: Wallmanstal, Hoedspruit and de Brug (Bloemfontein). The latter was initially used for the National Peace Keeping Force, but is now utilised for the assembly of APLA members.
  • At present the first MK intake at Wallmanstal (3 563 members) is in the process of being placed, while the second intake of approximately 3 000 is undergoing induction training, also at Wallmanstal. The first APLA intake of 1 200 is also undergoing training, and their placement should be completed by the end of September.
  • A total of 6 Wallmanstal, 4 Hoedspruit and 4 de Brug intakes are envisaged, with the last persons being placed by mid 1996.
The implications of integration are as follows:

The intake of
  • MK : Approximately 20 000
  • APLA : 6 000
  • TBVC and armed forces 10 000
  • SADF: 85 000
Will give the SANDF a total strength approximately 121 000 as against a planned affordable strength of 91 000.
  • The position of APLA is that, in terms of the constitution, they are not members of the SANDF as their names were not submitted to the Transitional Executive Council by midnight on 26/27 April 1994. A system by which they can join the SANDF as individuals requesting enlistment, has been devised. Just like all other integrating forces they will be evaluated and placed, with adjudication by the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), according to qualifications, experience, knowledge and potential.
  • The British Government will have to be requested to extend the period of BMATT attachment if the personnel integration/placement continues past the originally planned dates.
The integration process is based on the decision that the approved posts of the erstwhile SADF shall form the initial basis for integration and that:
  • all members of the SANDF shall hold positions in the SANDF in a temporary capacity until the rationalization process is completed;
  • supernumerary members will be accommodated in vacant or additional posts whilst orientation or bridging training occurs; and
  • a phased approach has been adopted for integration, ?which started with the senior members of all the constituent forces.
The steps in the process that have been accepted during the strategic planning process are as follows:
  • The placement process and the evaluation norms will be evaluated with the assistance of BMATT.
  • Former Non-Statutory Force Members.

    *     The members of the non-statutory forces will be taken on strength in the Assembly Areas for administration and pay purposes, as permitted by the logistic restrictions.

    *     Members will be identified in accordance to the Certified Personnel Registers (CPR).

    *     Members not on the CPR and those not meeting ?the minimum entry requirements (ie younger than 16, older than 60, medicallly unfit, illiterate, etc) will not be accepted into the SANDF and may be given the opportunity to join the Service Brigade. Some of these older members may be able to register an application for a special pension with the relevant state department, in terms of Section 189 of the Interim Constitution.

    *     These members will also of course be played, administered, accommodate and fed including those required to undergo the initial orientation training.
  • The placement process, involving members of all the constituent forces and the assistance of BMATT, will then:

    *     evaluate each member's abilities and special skills;

    *     confirm/consider rank, service system and salary proposals;

    *     specify training requirements;

    *     administer members entering into an agreement with the SANDF to ensure continued correct personnel administration;

    *     place members.
  • Members are then transferred to units where the necessary orientation and bridging training takes place.
  • Former Statutory Force Members

    *     These members are already on strength in their respective former administration systems and they will continue to be administered in this manner until the conversion measures as approved by the Public Service Commission have been implemented.

    *     Members will be have to provide proof of their identity to ensure that the CPR is strictly adhered to.
  • The placement process, involving members of all the constituent forces and BMATT, will then:

    *     evaluate each member's abilities and special skills;

    *     confirm rank, service system and salary administration;

    *     specify training requirements;

    *     obtain approval for appointment;

    *     transfer administration of applicable members to the NDF system to ensure continued personnel administration; and

    *     place members.
  • Members are then, where necessary, transferred to units where the necessary orientation and bridging training takes place.
Participation by BMATT: BMATT will be involved in the following:
  • The evaluation of SANDF training to ensure that international standards are maintained.
  • Assessing and certifying the criteria to be used for the evaluation of individuals prior to placement and possible bridging training.
  • Observing and overseeing the screening done by evaluation teams.
  • Assisting in the evaluation of competencies.
  • Giving advice on an individual's training requirements.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN INTEGRATING THE NON-STATUTORY FORCES INTO THE SANDF


The Unknown Factor. Due to the covert nature of the integrating non-statutory forces, as well as a perceivable lack of in depth administrative expertise and supporting structure, the real problems facing the SANDF in respect of the integrating forces are probably not all visible yet. Although real efforts have been made over the last five months to finalise, for example the CPRs which in terms of the Constitution, had to be finalised by 27 April 1994, only limited success has been achieved. This is of course playing havoc with the SANDF budget estimates as the total period of integration, in fact until rationalisation is finalised, must be renegotiated to provide for salaries for all these members.

Finance and Facilities. The speed of integration is retarded by, inter alia, limited infrastructure and the arrival of members in the assembly areas whose names do not appear on the CPR etc. This impacts on finances and unnecessarily occupies limited infrastructure.

Limited Instructors. The restriction of only having limited suitably qualified military instructors is also having an impact on the number of members that can receive bridging and orientation training at any one time. This is also slowing down the integration process.

Military Culture. The unique requirements of a strong non-partisan and apolitical military culture are not easily accepted by all in the modern era. Teething problems are being experienced and systematically sorted out, but the requirement for training and orientation into an international military culture cannot be overemphasised.

CORRECTING THE IMBALANCE OF COLOUR IN THE SANDF


The former SADF has never been exclusively white and it is common knowledge that during both World Wars people of colour contributed significantly to the war effort. Contrary to common belief, the white component of the SANDF has for sometime not been numerically the strongest and this is especially true since 1975. Before integration commenced the SADF's full-time force composition was comprised of some 46,6% of whites. As at 31 August 1994, whites make up only 42,25% of the full-time force and it is projected that after integration, the SANDF will be made up of some 29% of whites. The anomaly in the past was that non-whites were poorly represented in the higher levels of command and, for instance, the highest rank carried by a person of colour was that of brigadier, although people of colour were much better represented in the senior NCO ranks. This anomaly will be addressed during integration and in fact results have already become visible with the first appointments that have been made recently. To date the situation in respect of representativeness of non-white members has improved as a result of integration from 0 to 19,6% in the case of general officers and from 1,6% to 9,29% in the case of senior officers.

The SANDF has accepted an approach to equal opportunity which includes the correcting the colour imbalance within the SANDF. Various means are available to correct this imbalance. However, under the planned equal opportunities programme the following is planned :
  • The NDF is to introduce specific training in order to allow those who, as a result of a disadvantaged background could not complete their education, to compete on an equal basis with those who had the benefit of a normal education. This training will include adult education for the leader group, that is, for those who have displayed the necessary leadership ability and potential to become both officers and non-commissioned officers. It must be added that those who do not display these attributes will, nevertheless, receive life skills training (literacy and numeracy) in order to equip them for successful integration into the community. Furthermore, supplementary training will be introduced on those courses where the individual has difficulty in mastering the learning material as a result of inadequate former education. Again the individual must have displayed the aptitude and potential prior to admission to the course.
  • Another action that will be taken is to review all sectors within the SANDF to ensure that the correct balance is being maintained in any particular grouping. Steps will also be taken to correct the imbalance by means of specific recruiting programmes or the elimination of unfair selection criteria due to any discrimination in appointments to that group. Of course, the education and training programmes alluded to earlier also form part of these actions.
The SANDF is committed to making its composition more representative of the population, but insists on high standards. This implies that all newcomers will be given the opportunity to develop their potential and be evaluated and employed accordingly. To this end, to ensure fairness, no effort will be spared in training.

TRAINING THE NEW INTEGRATED SANDF


During the strategic work group discussions, the JMCC also approved the specific training strategy for the various integrating forces. This training may be summarized as follows:
  • All members of the various integrating forces are to undergo orientation training. This training is designed to bring all to the same basic level of military development and at its very basic level this is largely a repetition of the more pertinent aspects of basic regimental training. However, included in this training is cross-cultural training, developed by a team made up from both former-SADF and MK members. The latter training was designed to bring the various members of the integrating forces nearer to one another in order to ensure smooth integration.
  • Once all the new members have undergone the orientation training, the individual is evaluated and the training needs determined to bring them up to the norm required for the particular rank and mustering. This training, referred to as bridging training, can consist of the full course or only selected modules. Once the individual has successfully passed all the bridging training, he or she will commence normal career development, such as pertains to each soldier. An example of this bridging training is the placing of a former MK member on a company commanders' course to qualify him for employment as an infantry captain, if after screening, he was found not to have received this training previously. Another example is the attendance of selected modules of the Junior Staff Course by an individual in order to equip him or her for entry to the Senior Staff Course, particularly, where it is found that the staff training he or she has already received did not include those specific modules.

RATIONALISATION IN THE SANDF DUE TO THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND HOW IT WILL BE HANDLED


Rationalisation to an Affordable Force. An affordable force with a ceiling of 91 000 full-time force members (which is to be achieved within three years after integration and thereafter maintained) has been accepted as the basis for the rationalisation process of the SANDF. The "excess" of members (according to provisional plans) will be rationalised over a period ending on 31 March 1998. Rationalisation will be dealt with in terms of Section 236(8)(c) of the constitution and "in accordance with a law". This will be accomplished by a combination of natural attrition (retirements, resignations, discharges, etc), by the lapsing of short term and medium term contracts, and lastly by laying off people. This could mean a reduction of approximately 30 000 members, of which the majority in the lower levels could be managed by means of the termination of contracts. Most of the senior reductions, however, will have to be achieved by means of retrenchments which will place a greater burden on the budget.

Criteria, principles, factors and guidelines for the rationalization process have been approved by the TEC/JMCC process and include the following:
  • The factors to be considered shall be the main determinant of the rate and scale of rationalization, with special reference to:

    *     parliamentary guidelines;

    *     the needs of the SANDF (with due consideration to standards and productivity); and

    *     legal provisions, SANDF policies, orders, directives and fair labour practice.
  • All members of the SANDF shall be considered for rationalization.
  • Focussing on members who do not object to being retrenched (volunteers), with due consideration of organisational requirements and the retention of expertise.
  • Retrenchment takes place in accordance with laid down criteria and processes.
Organisational interests shall be of primary importance, with due allowance for the performance, potential and personal circumstances of each individual. Members will be afforded the right to appeal to a system of Boards of Review, culminating at the Ministry of Defence as an independent overseeing mechanism.

Depending on available infrastructure, members who are rationalised will have an option of entering the proposed Service Brigade which will further prepare them for employment in the private sector in certain occupational directions.

The costs of rationalisation and integration have been estimated as follows. This is in addition to the "ordinary" budget and excludes logistic costs:

1994/95 R 996 000
1995/96 R 1 555 000 000
1996/97 R 892 000 000
1997/98 R 763 000 000
TOTAL R 3 210 996 000

The SANDF manpower strategy explicitly states the absolute requirement for superior manpower. To ensure that the SANDF can fulfil its mission at all times, it is, therefore, imperative that the rationalization process ensures a balance between the retention of expertise and cost-effective development of those individuals with the required potential.

The rationalization of the SANDF has the potential for catastrophic implications to the SANDF superior manpower base, and in fact to the economy of the country as a whole, if not handled correctly. Injudicious actions could cause a spiral of ineptitude and mistrust which could take years to repair, if at all. It is, therefore, imperative that the rationalization be actioned carefully and correctly according to set and approved guidelines.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE SANDF : UNIFORMED AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL


Uniformed Personnel. It is internationally recognised that defence forces are entitled to prohibit their members from joining trade unions or participate in related protest actions. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) acknowledges this principle and leaves the prerogative to the individual countries. The military culture demands that its members will subject themselves to this principle, because the soldier has bound himself to military authoritative structures and discipline. It is in keeping with this principle that uniformed members of the SANDF are excluded from the Public Service Labour Relations Act and are, therefore, obliged to submit any grievance originating in the work environment through the normal official channels as prescribed in section 134 of the Military Disciplinary Code. Although this system appears to be terse and autocratic, the SANDF prides itself in the fact that within its military culture, provision is made for a grievance resolution procedure that has stood the test of time throughout its history. This procedure enables the individual to have his or her grievance attended to through the command channel and is known as "Redress of Wrongs". In addition, the member has access to his or her immediate superior officer to inform the officer of any grievance, complaint or irregularity that the member may experience.

It is precisely because members of the SANDF are prohibited from joining trade unions and or participating in their activities that Chief of the SANDF and the command cadre are particularly sensitive to the needs of their subordinates and the use of fair labour practices. These grievance procedures have existed before labour relations had become formalised and the fact that the SANDF has not had any serious breaches of discipline till the present is ample proof that the system works. Should the SANDF, contrary to general international practice and accepted military culture, allow organised trade unions, then the very real risk exists that:
  • the SANDF could be handicapped as defender of the constitution;
  • the opposing stance between a trade union and the SANDF during dispute resolution could result in rumours that could create confusion and suspicion amongst soldiers;
  • unfounded and unattainable promises could be made which could result in the undermining of morale, military discipline and good order, military culture and esprit de corps in the SANDF; and
  • the soldier and military structures can be politically exploited to the detriment of the country and in conflict to the apolitical stance the SANDF is committed to.
Civilian Personnel. Since the promulgation of the Public Service Labour Relations Act on 2 August 1993, the SANDF has established a Departmental Chamber on 27 October 1993 with the following personnel associations, as prescribed by the act:
  • Public Servants Association (PSA).
  • Public Service League of South Africa (PSL).
  • Institute of Public Servants (IPS).
The above act makes provision for collective bargaining in respect of civilian personnel through the Departmental Chamber. Labour matters of a collective nature, which fall within the ambit of the constitution of the Chamber can be dealt with in the chamber. Section 20 of the act however prohibits collective labour action eg strikes etc.

A co-operation and procedural agreement between the SANDF and the Public Service League of South Africa, has been agreed to on 7 July 1993, in terms of which the parameters of association between the league and its members during working hours, have been agreed to. Similar agreements are being negotiated with the Public Service Association and the South African Health and Public Service Workers Union. At present, a recognition agreement between the SANDF and the National Education Health and Allied Workers Union is being formulated.

The SANDF labour relations policy and several procedures have been formulated to ensure proper conduct of labour relations in the SANDF by all uniformed and civilian personnel employed by the SANDF. These procedures include the following:
  • Discipline Procedure.
  • Grievance Procedure.
  • Procedure for the handling of collective labour action.
  • Misconduct Procedure.

EXPECTATIONS OF THE NEW NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE?


The SANDF has only just come into being, and has the opportunity to create an effective organisation based on new strategies and within a new political and economic environment. It will only succeed if its further development will be based on a realistic vision, careful considered planning and the cautious and dedicated execution of those plans. What we can expect from the SANDF for the future will be conditioned by the provisions of the Interim Constitution and will be directed towards supporting the relevant national goals contained in the Constitution.

It goes without saying therefore, that the SANDF is expected to share within it's vision those same common critical elements that are found in the Constitution.

Balanced, Modern and Technologically Advanced Military Force. The SANDF will have to ensure that it remains a balanced, modern and technologically advanced military force in order to sucessfully accomplish its primary mission of defending and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the RSA, while at the same time posing as a strong deterrent against any future threat. The SANDF will have to ensure an affordable credible force, representative of all our people and free from any form of discrimination. This force will be based on a strong part-time force supported by reliable and competent leadership, that will be provided by a professional regular force. To attain this the SANDF will have to encourage and earn the acceptance and support of the whole nation, by displaying its apolitical posture, high standards and professional conduct, further characterised by its firm commitment to fair labour practices and equal opportunities for all its members. In order to maintain this status, it is of cardinal importance that the SANDF maintain training that, at the least complies with international standards of competency.

Flexibility and Affordability. The SANDF faces the challenge that it serves in a time where resources, most notably finance, are limited to say the least. The tendency over the past few years appears to be that of annually serving the SANDF with a ever shrinking slice of the proverbial fiscal cake. Bearing in mind that the SADF budget has decreased by 41% during the past 3 years, it is obvious that the inevitable rise in the personnel budget will have a marked detrimental effect on the rest of the budget ie capital and running costs. The SANDF faces the situation where, although it is aware of what force design and structure it requires to perform its function, the reality of affordability dictates how it is to perform its function. As a consequence, the SANDF has had to address this dilemma in its Strategic Plan which has resulted in a force design where flexibility was a characteristic.
  • The Part-time Force. The SANDF relies heavily on its Part-time Forces, and will continue to do so in future, to supply and maintain its conventional forces and reserves. It is through this system that the SANDF can escalate or reduce its size most cost effectively and rapidly, without reducing its operational capabilities. The part-time forces comprise 88% of the SADF, yet utilise less than 3% of the salary budget per year which made it ideal to cost effectively provide the services that the country expects of the SANDF.
  • The Full-time Force. In addition to restructuring the Part-time Force, the SANDF has structured its Full-time Force to reflect the same flexibility. The Regular Force constitutes 68% of the Full-time Force and consists of three service systems, a Short Term System (STS), a Medium Term System (MTS) and a Long Term System, (LTS). The STS is a system which is aimed at the new and young entrant to the SANDF who enters service on a two year renewable contract, ie the most economic component of the Full-time Force. By controlling the contracts, the SANDF can increase and decrease this cheaper, low level component as the requirement dictates.
Secondary Missions. It is expected that the SANDF will continue to perform the secondary tasks assigned to it. Some of these tasks, although secondary, have become accepted by the public as legitimate tasks, such as upholding law and order in co-operation with the South African Police Service, performing services in the maintenance of essential services, preservation of life, health or property and service in support of other departments of state. In addition, the SANDF will provide service in compliance with the international obligations of the RSA with regard to international bodies and other states. It is to this end that the SA Navy has already made a very valuable contribution in showing the new national flag and together with the SA Air Force they have represented the RSA handsomely during various humanitarian missions.

Ministry of Defence. As part of the task of making the military community more acceptable to the people of South Africa, the process of "civilianising" the Ministry of Defence has been initiated with the aim of establishing greater transparency and accountability. It was recently announced that former Lt Gen Pierre Steyn has been appointed to the post of Secretary of Defence with effect from 1 September this year. The ministry is tasked, inter alia, with ensuring that the SANDF uphold the democratic constitution and it is expected that this will create a greater degree of accountability to the parliamentary process.

Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The SANDF is committed to supporting the RDP and its 1994/95 expenditure guidelines has been decreased by RM650 in support of the RDP, to assist in initiating this programme. This amount represents some 26% of the RDP budget. Because socio-economic development has become a national priority, the restructuring of the SANDF in such a way that it becomes a national economic asset will have to be ensured. The SANDF has considerable collateral utility and the scope and availability of the SANDF's infra-structure and expertise already enables the SANDF to be regarded as a national asset. It is to this end that the Service Brigade has been established under the control of Lt Gen Moloi, with the aim of channelling individuals who have been rationalized from the SANDF into skills orientation and development programmes in the public and private sector. Those chosen to join the Service Brigade permanently will receive further training for various maintenance tasks within the SANDF. Although the SANDF has taken the initiative in establishing the Service Brigade, it is intended that the brigade will eventually function as a seperate entity and enjoy funding from external sources. Details are still to be finalised and it is hoped that the Service Brigade will start to function on a small scale in the near future. The Service Brigade can play an invaluable role in social upliftment projects and during times of natural disasters.

CONCLUSION


The different constituent forces have passed over the threshold into a SANDF and it has had to prepare itself for paradigm shifts. The most important elements of the present human resources strategy that have featured in setting the SANDF on course include aspects such as the apolitical nature of the Force, maintenance of high standards, equal opportunities, fair labour practices, the importance of the Defence Force's nation building role, religious freedom, discipline, professional training and development, etc. The most critical short-term element of the human resources strategy concerns the integration of all the constituent forces into the SANDF and the subsequent rationalization of these forces to the size and shape required by the affordable force design and force structure. While the SANDF conducts the integration and rationalization process it must simultaneously address these important elements and herein lies the challenge in preparing for the future. New critical aspects, of which some are unfamiliar to the cultures of various members have to be introduced, thereby cementing the traditional "military culture" within the SANDF. Fortunately the different forces display more adaptability than they are credited with - this augers well for the creation of a truly National Defence Force of which the nation can be proud of.

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