The South Atlantic has been an area of maritime conflict in the past. Indeed, the most intensive naval fighting of the post 1945 era took place between the United Kingdom and Argentina in South Atlantic waters in 1982. Since then, however, the situation has become more benign. Tension between Britain and Argentina has largely disappeared with the creation of a communications and confidence building regime for the area around the Falklands. Fisheries management and search and rescue arrangements have been normalised, although disputes about offshore oil remain. The end of the Cold War has also abolished the traditional Soviet threat to the region and its shipping that provided the strategic rationale for past proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Finally the recent welcome transformations here in South Africa have both removed a posible source of regional conflict and opened the way to South Africa playing a full role in any co-operative arrangements in the region.

But what are to be the dynamics of this co-operation? With whom and against what? The main maritime threats in the South Atlantic are no longer traditional military ones. They take the form, for example, of threats to fish stocks from uncontrolled fishing, often by distant states. Given the migratory nature of many fish this brings into question the possibility of some form of international control of waters outside declared zones of national responsibility. There is also the problem of poaching in areas where states do not have the naval constabulary forces to enforce their rights. Another threat is ecological. Half the oil bound for Europe and America from the Middle East still goes round the Cape and many tankers, especially the super tankers still usable on the Cape route, are old and badly maintained. The prospects for major oil spillages means an extra dimension has to be added to normal search and rescue tasks. The isolated nature of many islands and other settlements in the South Atlantic region also puts an emphasis on mutual support. Despite being British, Tristan Da Cunha's main link with the outside world is the patrol vessel Agulhas, South Africa's civilian manned equivalent of HMS Endurance.

Such imperatives as these all reflect traditional naval functions that that go back to the earliest days of organised fleets (at the beginning of the Thirteenth Century England's earliest known naval administrator was put in charge of galleys for fishery protection) provide significant pressure for co-operation between the naval forces of the states of various shapes and sizes in the region. But there are also more military pressures also connected with the general nature of the post-Cold war strategic environment in which risks and uncertainties have replaced threats as the dominant forces. The world of today and the forseeable future is as uncertain as it is unstable with old conflicts left over from the Cold War such as the continuing Angolan tragedy vying for attention with new conflicts reflecting the resurgence of nationalism, various forms of political and religious extremism and ethnocentrism. The world is dotted with such conflicts that modern communications bring - albeit differentially and arbitrarily - to the attention of the global public. This often leads to demands that "something be done" militarily , to which governments have to respond weighing political pressue for instant action against difficult assessments of national interest. Not least in consideration of the latter however is a sense of international responsibility to play one's part combined with the more selfish desire to be seen to be fulfilling one's responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security. Naval forces are particularly useful in an environment such as this. Their unique capacity of to exert presence without over-committment allows options to be kept open and contingency plans to be maintained in fluid uncertain situations in which governments have even more problems than usual in making their minds up. And in the South Atlantic region much that is significant is close to the sea and thus many of the the nations of the region are particularly subject to the various modern dimensions of naval diplomacy.

Whatever the motivation for action, or the resolve to take it, the more forceful forms of naval action will probably be taken in a combined way with other nations in an international framework. The end of the Cold War has seen considerable reductions in the strength of the US and other navies, putting a greater emphasis on combined action. It has also seen the emergence of the United Nations as both the context of and legitimisation for military action. Although the debate continues on the best forms of organisation and command and control for UN forces and the effectiveness of the various kinds of UN intervention it is hard to see any major operations taking place without at least UN authorisation and legitimisation. If anything, the United States is now even less likely than it was in 1991 to engage in unilateral military action, putting the emphasis on other states to co-operate with US forces or bear the brunt of activities themselves, perhaps with US support in the form of high technolgy cover together with command, control, communications, computer, intelligence and information assets,. This might well lead South Atlantic states to contribute to ad hoc coalition forces, as Argentina did in the Gulf in 1991. and as she has been doing off Haiti more recently.

Alternatively the UN might prefer to work through more local organisations and nations, like the NATO/WEU joint Task Force in the Adriatic that operates with national US/US/ French support. If some more formal political arrangements were come to in the South Atlantic Region, connected perhaps with a strengthened Zone of Peace and Co-operation Of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) this might provide a framework for local co-operative action in which naval forces would play a significant role. Other organisations such as the OAU might also be used.

Such co-operation might well include the constabulary and nation building roles of navies. At the meetings of ZPCSA states in Brasilia this year Brazil is proposing an interesting agreement on marine protection. This calls for:

harmonisation of national legislation on the territorial seas, contiguous zones and EEZs;



exchange of information about the parties' experience on the delimitation and establishment of the outer edges of continental margins;



harmonization of innocent pasage provisions and regulations in territorial seas;



mutual assistance in means of controlling contiguous zones to prevent infringements of regulations within territorial seas;



mutual assistance in considering measures to ensure compliance with laws and regulations in EEZs (boarding, inspection, etc);



common efforts to exercise rights in EEZs and on the Continental shelf and to obtain the benefits of sustainable exploitation;



common efforts to manage migratory living resources and those that straddle EEZs and the high seas;



common endeavour on both national and international levels to prevent pollution;



sharing of technological knowledge and the results of scientific research;



the progressive building of national technical and human resources to carry out activities in the marine environment, nationally, bilaterally and multilaterally;



the creation of focal points to exchange information and the formation of common data bases.

These interesting proposals would have certain implications for naval co-operation. They would provide a clearer framework for such co-operative actions as are currently carried out on a bilateral basis, eg South Africa's support for Namibian fishing rights, and the aid provided by South Africa to Zaire in rebuilding maritime facilities. Putting such activities into a co-operative framework prevents perceptions abroad of "big brother" interference and questions at home of the need for and desirability of more distant operations when other priorities closer to home seem more pressing.

Another interesting, and this time well established, South Atlantic initiative in naval co-operation is CAMAS, South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination, founded in 1966. This is a merchant shipping control organisation in which Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uraguay exchange data on a daily basis on shipping passing through the designated South Atlantic Maritime Area. CAMAS is directed by an admiral chosen every two years from the navies of Argentina, Brazil or Uraguay. He would become Commander South Atlantic Maritime Area if a threat developed to this shipping. Membership of this organisation might be broadened to take in more littoral states with its area of interest expanded to cover the entire South Atlantic. The problem arises, however , in defining quite who the enemy is against whom the shipping has to be defended. It might well be possible, however, to re-orientate CAMAS into a more general maritime surveillance organisation supporting the ZPCSA nations' efforts at maintaining environmental and resource security. Potential poachers could be tracked and polluters monitored. Surface, sub-surface and air assets would be used. These could be the simplest of platforms but the potential of modern command systems to create a common surface picture ought to be exploited. It might not be too far outside the bounds of possibility to obtain outside help with satellite communications to allow the picture to be readily updated and disseminated to all participants. Such an ambitious project could only be carried out collectively. Whatever its form or sophistication, a South Atlantic wide maritime surveillance organisation would be both a useful asset to the littoral nations' attempts to manage the oceans and a useful way of preventing unpleasant surprises at or from the sea, thus increasing both confidence and stability.

Co-operation based on ZPCSA or an expanded CAMAS is not necessarily the only form of co-operation that is possible. Indeed South Atlantic co-operative structures that were too narrowly defined might inhibit rather than enhance the more complete integration of South Atlantic states into the structures of global order. The USA, whose support is probably essential for most combined naval endeavours against serious opposition still finds itself to be unable to support ZPCSA because of fears about the freedom of the seas. The South Atlantic is, of course, a key deployment path for US aircraft carriers too large for the Panama Canal. The draft declaration which has been prepared on the denuclearisation of the South Atlantic also raises fears. Although neither US nor British aircraft carriers nor other surface ships now carry nuclear weapons a formal denuclearisation of the high seas in the area might create problems for the transit of nuclear armed ballistic missile submarines whose role is becoming much more flexible than it was in the Cold War. It is also possible that circumstances might dictate a redeployment of other kinds of land attack niclear weapon in carriers or other platforms. A denuclearised South Atlantic would then be an unwelcome barrier or source of conflict.

Rather than make them feel unwelcome, it is in the interest of the South Atlantic nations, if they wish to play a part in the increasingly co-operative system of maritime security, to improve still further the ability of their own maritime forces to operate with the main NATO navies. Navies are inherently good at operating together. All seamen share a common foe - the sea. However there are numerous examples old and new of the difficulties of international naval co-operation if the participants do not share interoperable communications and common procedures. NATO now provides the "industrial standard" for combined naval operations in terms of procedures and communications. Given the reluctance in some quarters to allow free dissemination of the well known Allied Tactical Publication 1 (ATP 1), a NATO Unclassified publication EXTAC 768 Maritime Maneuvering And Tactical Procedures has been produced that "provides naval maneuvering concepts and signalling instructions for units of different navies that have not historically operated together and do not have any other agreed on procedures." This could well be useful in a South Atlantic context.

Of course, many navies in the South Atlantic have a long record of exercises between themselves and NATO navies that has helped define basic common procedures and to develop communications on the basis of ATP 1 and its derivitives. The South African Navy had access to earlier editions of ATP 1. More consistently, UNITAS, the long standing series of exercises between Latin American navies and the USN has been the key to establishing a basic capability for combined naval action. Spain now takes part in these proceedings, and although the old South Africa's strong desire to take part did not prove capable of fulfilment there is surely no political block now to South African participation in UNITAS. Indeed 1993 saw a South African Task Group of a support ship, three strike craft and a submarine cross to Uraguay and Argentina for bilateral naval exercises, the beginning of what is hoped to be the first of a series of biennial naval events. A second such ATLANSUR exercise is due next year in South African waters and Brazilian participation is being considered. Argentina, Brazil, Uraguay and Paraguay have had their own bilateral exercise programme in place since the 1970s and a new dimension was added in 1993 when the Brazilian carrier Minas Gerais allowed the Argentine Naval Air Arm to have some carrier experience, given the persistent indisposition of Argentina's own carrier 25th of May. The Americans also exercise with South American navies as US carriers pass through the South Atlantic on deployment; these events have included operations by Argentinian aircraft from the American carrier's deck. The Argentine Navy has played a leading role in the joint exercises with the USN given its intention to begin to deploy a ship with NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL).

Naval co-operation has certain hardware implications. First, if one wishes to play a full part in oceanic co-operative operations either in- or out-of-area one needs proper ocean going vessels with sufficient reach. No one has exploited the sea going potential of fast attack craft more than the South African Navy but if the newly democratic nation wishes to play the role she seems to wish to do (and which her neighbours might expect) she must acquire larger, helicopter equipped, sea going combatants with some three dimensional capability (preferably including ASW). Other nations, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Nigeria already posess suitable assets in the shape of frigates and destroyers of various vintages. Argentina's Almirante Brown class destroyers are the most impressive of these with their modern command systems and data links which allow quite a high level of interoperability with most Western warships, and the Gulf war provided useful lessons on the extra communications fits required in such situations. It is important if South Atlantic navies wish to operate together and with other fleets that they ensure their most capable and combatant assets are equipped with similar modern command systems with data links, preferably Link 11.

This is not to say that less combatant offshore patrol vessels would not have useful roles to play in certain co-operative surveillance and constabulary tasks, Smaller coastal craft also could have important roles to play in co-operative action in offshore and inshore contexts. There might well be scope for the provision of small craft to less well endowed countries, rather like the Australian patrol boat initiative with her smaller neighbours. This would have useful effects on the industries of those South Atlantic states who could provide such assets.

Aircraft play key roles in all aspects of maritime operations - not least surveillance - and traditional demarcation disputes, over which service flies land based maritime aircraft, should not prevent all the major states in the region contributing maritime patrol aircraft to the common surveillance task. These machines need not be overly sophisticated, but they must be there. Air capability in the shape of helicopters is also one of the many features of large auxiliary ships (of which the South African Drakensberg and Outeniqua are classically flexible examples). Such vessels are capable of a wide range of roles from patrol and presence to disaster relief and limited force insertion/evacuation all of which might be useful in a co-operative context. Their refuelling capacity might also provide useful support and reach to navies less well equipped with such assets.

Given her utility therefore, it was especially welcome that Drakensberg was able to exercise with the Royal Navy during her recent visit to Britain. The Joint Maritime Courses organised by the Royal Navy have played a crucial part in developing NATO's high standards of interoperability and they still offer an excellent means of familiarising navies from further afield with the modalities of international operations. The USA has also recently used its Fleetex series of exercises to familiarise Argentinian ships with NATO procedures.

Naval co-operation is thus taking place already in the South Atlantic context and could be developed further as both national capabilities and co-operative frameworks evolve. It seems likely, in fact that co-operation will become deeper as this evolution takes place. This will both make the chances of intra-regional conflict less and provide cost effective means to deal with problems should they arise. It will also mean that the more powerful South Atlantic nations will be able to play any wider role they might desire to, in the maintenance of global peace and security.

In this context it is important to reiterate the dangers of exclusivity. Co-operative ventures risk being counter productive if they exclude states who feel they have interests in the region. This allows me to make a national point. Although not, as yet , a member of ZPCSA, the United Kingdom sees herself as very much a littoral nation in the South Atlantic Context. This is not just because of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia but also because of Ascension, Tristan da Cunha and St Helena. The UK has no intention of giving up these territories, none of which are colonies in the sense of having subservient native populations. Indeed the boot is on the other foot, with the local populations possessing a determination to remain British that has in the past been sometimes not a little embarrasing to governments who have wished to be acommodating to countries with clashing claims.

It is fervently to be hoped that the progress towards constructing a bilateral co-operative security framework around the Falklands will continue and that the question of offshore oil will be resolved as the next part of this process. The provisions in the Anglo-Argentine agreements for mutual ship visits should be exploited to begin a programme of Royal Navy-Argentine Navy contacts and exercises. But much more than this is, in my opinion, desirable. As a littoral power the United Kingdom should be allowed to play a fuller part in wider South Atlantic frameworks, notably ZPCSA - which she has always supported in the United Nations General Assembly. The Royal Navy maintains a permanent South Atlantic presence and has considerable forces earmarked for reinforcement if required. Protection of overseas dependencies is a key component of the recently defined "Defence Role One". In short, the UK is a major player in the South Atlantic security game and, hence, would expect to be a full participant in any South Atlantic co-operative security arrangements. Indeed a true Zone of Peace and Cooperation The South Atlantic would have to include the UK if it were not to be a contradiction in terms Being allowed into any more substantive development of ZPCSA would also open up welcome opportunities for the Royal Navy to develop further its connections with local navies - most of which go back many years - and make its own distinctive contribution to the maintenance of stability and sound resource management in an area of continued fundamental national concern - always, of course in close co-operation with the other littoral states.