Rethinking South African Security Architecture

Jakkie Cilliers, Institute for Defence Policy

Paper presented at an AIC conference on the Defence Industry,
11-12 October 1994, Gallagher Estate, Midrand

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 20, 1994

INTRODUCTION

South Africa has made fundamental strides in recent years in the field of safety and security, but much remains to be done to ensure stability and thereby enable development. In particular we should look at the future division of functions between the police and the military, the responsibilities for public order policing and border security, and the future manpower policies of the various security forces.

ACHIEVEMENTS

When contemplating the security spectrum South Africa appears to have set the scene for much reorganisation, greater co-ordination and improved efficiency. Several areas deserve mention:

The impetus for politically oriented violence has been reduced through the establishment of a legitimate government. Although pockets of intransigence still exist, such as within die-hard right secessionists, they are of little strategic importance at present.



In the run-up to elections arms flows to gangs, youth groups, SDU's and SPU's increased significantly due, in part to political parties which used gangs to create 'no-go' areas for rival political parties. This flow has now tapered off.



The integration of the military, (to a lesser extent) the police and (to an unknown extent) the intelligence communities are, at least on the surface, proceeding apace. While problems can be expected, on the whole there is remarkable progress in integrating 11 statutory police forces, 5 statutory military forces, 2 non-statutory armed forces and their associated intelligence structures.



The framework for a much greater degree of parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny of defence, intelligence and foreign affairs, as well as public participation via community police forums has been established. A civilian Ministry of Defence and civilian Ministry of Safety and Security will both soon be in place. Both the National Defence Force (SANDF) and ARMSCOR have made great strides towards greater transparency and communication and the Police Services Bill has been widely circulated for comment. Although the relevant parliamentary committees have not yet fully swung into action, one hopes that these trends will continue.



Discussions have begun regarding regional stability as a necessary partner to development - although South Africans need to think carefully about the practical implications of joining a regional security alliance in the manner that the South African Development Community (SADC) recently proposed in Windhoek.

While we have made progress, there remains much to be done. South Africa may be well on its way towards a single, integrated socio-economic policy, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), but there is no sign of a concomitant National Security Plan without which the RDP will certainly fail. Security and development go hand in hand. Without security there will be no development.

Contrary to its previous experience, the RSA finds itself in the unfamiliar situation in which its frontiers no longer seem immediately or directly threatened. Rarely, however, has there been such a strong sense of insecurity. Where, indeed, is the National Security Strategy which will provide the stability to make the RDP possible?

CHALLENGES FACING THE POLICE SERVICE

The Police Service and the new Ministry of Safety and Security face a number of important challenges which, collectively, are daunting.

The existing 11 police agencies have to be amalgamated into one service. This will, amongst others, involve the rationalization of differing personnel systems and policies. Whereas the SANDF has designed a comprehensive system of accreditation, adjudication, placement and demobilisation at Walmansthal and De Brug, there does not appear to be any parallel programme in the SAPS. One gets the impression that the SAPS will eventually comprise the amalgamation of all personnel from the 11 existing agencies without any attempt at merit assessment. In this manner the excesses of many of the former homelands will be perpetuated into the SAPS and the suitability of former SAP members are unquestioned



Only after the passage of the new police services act (recently postponed to early 1995) or a constitutional amendment (the preferred option) can functions be devolved to the provinces. Thereafter the MEC's for Safety and Security and Police Commissioners in each province will nominally become responsible for crime prevention, the development of community policing, the provision of visible policing, etc. The National Commissioner will, however, maintain detailed, central control over all resources. In reality South Africa will still have a highly centralized police. Little provision has been made for the devolution of meaningful powers to either the Provincial Commissioners or the relevant MEC's in the Police Service Bill at present. In fact, the division of both resources and functions at national and provincial level is bound to become a bone of considerable contention (and confusion) in the months ahead.



Community-oriented policing inherently requires a devolution of powers to the lowest denominator, particularly to station commanders and, of course, the establishment of police-community liaison forums. It also implies that the police should be demilitarized, the perception of an impervious police command structure be removed and the institution of a 'flatter' organisation with less command layers than exists at present.

All of these worthy endeavors are challenging in themselves. Collectively they present a very ambitious organisational re-engineering programme indeed. None of them are achievable without a dramatic increase in man- and women power, and therefore of resources, allocated to the Police Service at national and provincial level.

This being said, the Police budget is presently some R7,2 bn. No budgetry provision appears to have been made for the amalgamation and rationalisation of the 11 police agencies which the Commissioner of SAPS recently estimated at about R1,3 billion. The Department had already taken a R200 million cut to assist with the implementation of the RDP programme and a futher 4% decrease was expected in the 1995/6 budget. Such cuts would require a moratorium on recruitment or the retrenchment of up to 2 500 officers. Already, on 20 September, Minister Sidney Mufamadi told Parliament that the planned cuts in the public safety and security budget would have a disastrous effect on policing. The crisis in resources is further illustrated by the statements by the PWV public safety and security minister Jessie Duarte that the PWV's police service alone was presently understaffed by about 12 000 officers. Without significantly more resources allocated to the police budget, there is little chance of either succesful community policing or of a greater degree of law and order.

The Self Defence and Self Protection Units must be disarmed and brought under control. No country can countenance politically partisan armed forces to run free in its towns and cities. On the East Rand the PWV government's plan is to absorb some of the SDU and SPU members into the Police Service, the Police Reserve and/or neighbourhood watches. This proposals do not seem to have been met with wild enthusiasm on the part of the SAPS and has already run into financial problems. Some may also be employed in 'catch-up' programmes for school pupils. Yet this is clearly only a partial solution. A large number of former SDU and SPU members will neither qualify nor may they desire such a 'solution'. Together with former MK and APLA members who, for whatever reason, do not form part of the SANDF, these men and women complicate the re-establishment of law and order considarably in many of our towns and cities.

For reasons that may relate to the challenges listed above, there are increased indications of a crisis in morale, leadership and therefore, efficiency within the Police Service. In a virtual ongoing saga of revelations members of the former SA Police have been implicated in violence, even at the most senior of levels. People are leaving, recruitment of quality personnel is inferior and the transition to community based policing in many townships halted by the repeated murder of policemen and -women on and off duty. Police salaries are not up to standard and private security firms offer better pay and working conditions. No wonder that police efficiency is further undermined by strike action. Faced with ever escalating crime and unrest - developments that would themselves have taxed the capacities of the SA Police Service under normal circumstances, we face a situation where police efficiency has been greatly undermined, albeit possibly at their own hand. This is a process which may be drawn out further by the deliberations of the Truth Commission.

The Internal Stability Division faces a particular crisis in terms of legitimacy. It has encountered massive popular resistance in much of metropolitan South Africa. In an area such as the East Rand, the ISD has had to withdraw in favour of the deployment of the former SADF. Research conducted by IDP and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) on the East Rand found that the ISD was perceived as neither effective nor legitimate. The spill-over of the legitimacy crisis of the ISD onto the police impacts negatively upon the reorientation of the Police Service to a community-oriented style of policing.

The challenge facing the SAPS in transition is therefore massive - particularly if the legitimacy/efficiency crisis is as bad as implied in the preceding paragraphs. Yet, although legitimacy bestows authority, in itself legitimacy is insufficient if not supported by effective and impartial execution. Given the alleged involvement of the former SA Police in violence and ongoing morale problems, there appears to be little chance of the Government being able to reduce its reliance upon the military to support the police in large areas inside the country despite the uniform unpopularity that this role engenders amongst military commanders and analysts across the spectrum. An unemotional analysis would indicate that support for the SAPS in internal law and order duties will remain a semi-permanent task of the SANDF for many years to come. South Africa would be wise to plan and prepare accordingly.

CRACKS IN THE CRUTCH? THE CHALLENGES FACING THE SANDF

Given this analysis, the greatest danger is that we could 'overload' the SANDF and thereby set the scene for presently unimaginable developments. In particular the rapid unionization of that organization, a massive decline in operational standards, breakdown in discipline and the effective (in not actual) disintegration of the military within a matter of years. No-one should underestimate the implications of such developments.

This is not as improbable as it may sound if one lists the challenges faced by the SANDF, despite the degree of planning and effort that has and is being put into dealing with these challenges. There is the amalgamation of the different statutory and non-statutory forces (in itself a very complex and delicate undertaking); the requirement for integration (in terms of race in particular) and affirmative action; the problem of first bloating (to 130 000) and then massively downsizing (to 90 000 or less) the standing forces; movement from a manpower procurement system based on white male conscription to an all-race, all volunteer system; the imminent establishment of a civilian Defence Secretariat the appointment of a military ombudsman; the creation of a powerful and possibly intrusive parliamentary defence committee; a changed strategic posture (from offensive to deffensive); regional cooperation as opposed to regional confrontation; the implications of the possible unionization of the military; demands on the armed forces to involve themselves in internal socio-economic projects in support of the RDP which would include the creation of the unbudgeted Service Brigade; and so on and so forth.

These demands and the attention and energy that they will soak up will inevitably have a dramatic effect upon the combat efficiency, discipline and morale of the military, using former SADF standards as a benchmark. Similar to the NPKF, months, possibly years, will go by while individuals from very different backgrounds, standards and training struggle to meet minds, determine new procedures and come to accept one another. A new military ethos will have to develope. In the interim collective industrial type action, born of dissatisfaction and frustration, threatens the utility and dependebility of the SANDF. On the one hand, within the former SADF, the steady carving away of the service benefits (such as the removal of duty busses and increases in medical and housing contributions) "... has created the feeling that the chain of command can no longer be relied upon to protect individual interests, and that perhaps collectivism is the only workable response if interests are to be protected." Given that the traditional military service benefits such as housing, pensions and medical care are major incentives for joining and staying in the military, "... it can be expected that any decline in such perks could propel service members to adopt civilian type labour practices to protect their interests." On the other hand dissatisfaction with the command echelon of the former MK highly unrealistic expectations and limited state resources have steadily undermined the morale and discipline of the larger mass of MK (evidence by attacks on the property of senior MK commanders, mass demonstrations, smaller strikes, etc.). Three other developments support this trend. First, "The shift to an all-volunteer force ... carries with it the seeds of military unionism." Secondly, MK recruits, in particular, are less socialized into a traditional (conventional) military culture and sympathetic to the cause of the unionization of the uniformed services (evidenced by their attitude towards POPCRU). And finally, the increase in the number of non-combat civilians within the SANDF (25 000 during January 1994 and set to increase with the establishment of the Defence Secretariate) will also increase the potential for trade unionism within the military since these persons will inevitably tend to associate more closely with their counterparts in the civilian labour force in many respects.

In the short to medium term there can be little doubt that standards have already dropped, and will continue to do so - possibly quite dramatically. Senior non-commissioned officers (NCO's) and middle-ranking former SADF officers, the backbone of the conventional forces, are and will leave the Force once the economy improves. There already has been a steady flow of quality personnel out of the SANDF and all the indications are that this stream may become a flood. All of this translates into a SANDF which could, for some years, be substantially less capable than the former SADF to react quickly, effectively and in a sustained manner. This is an extremely serious development given the dependence of the Police and indeed the Government, on SANDF support to the SAPS. In reflecting on this one should remember to what extent the former SADF had stablized the situation on the East Rand, in Bophuthatswana and in Kwa-Zulu Natal prior to the April elections and the role it had played during the elections themselves.

It is perhaps not adequately appreciated to what extent the SANDF is already experiencing - and will experience to an increasing degree - either a military cultural renewal or a process of institutional cultural collapse. Interestingly enough, the debate on this issue has been forthcoming from a small group of academics at the Military Academy in Saldanha Bay. Mark Malan is incisive in his remarks upon the challenge facing the 'old' SADF:

The withdrawal from Namibia coincided with (and was partly precipitated by) the ideological revolution in the then Soviet Union and its East European satellites. The last vestiges of credibility were removed from the doctrines of total onslaught and total strategy, and an essential pillar of the SADF's corporate ideology collapsed. Concomitantly, the dominant political ideology of apartheid was officially denounced. The officer corps was sucked into an ideological vacuum at both the political and organisational level, where the meaning and worth of military service is normally defined.

When referring to MK, he continues:

The political ideology with which it has been indoctrinated and motivated is in international disrepute, and their corporate ideology, in as far as it exists, was influenced by the necessity for an armed struggle for political liberation which appears to have lost relevance, as the 'oppressor' is apparently committed to granting emancipation through a process of peaceful negotiation.

In the case of the armed forces of the former TBVC countries military culture appeared to resemble that of many independent African countries during the sixties and thereafter where military service was closely linked to patterns of political power and patronage.

Yet, the value-oriantation of the SANDF is therfore a newly contested area. In the immediate future the problem which should focus our mind is the future of the part-time forces - in many ways the backbone of the SANDF.

THE CRISIS IN THE PART-TIME FORCES

Until very recently, the SANDF, as was the case with the previous SADF, remained a Force composed of a much larger component of (white) part-time forces than full-time members.

During the introduction of his Defence Vote in the National Assembly on 10 August 1994, Defence Minister Modise announced a moratorium on part-time members who face or are liable to face prosecution for failing to respond to their call-up papers. The Minister further announced that the moratorium would come into immediate effect and that it would last until administrative mechanisms were in place to encourage voluntary participation in the part-time forces. This is only expected in 1995. Prior to this, the part-time forces essentially comprised the Citizen Force (the reserves for conventional operations) of about 120 000 men strong, the Commando's (or Rear Area Protection Force Units) of roughly equal strength and a number of other reserve categories.

This announcement must surely have a dramatic effect on the ability of the SANDF to fulfill its constitutional mandate, and in particular, to respond rapidly to either internal demands in support of the SA Police Service or wider afield. Together with the earlier abolition of compulsory white national service, the moratorium must severely affect both the Citizen Force and Commando's at least six to eight months before a new method of manning the SANDF's part-time component is likely to be effective. Whereas, in the past, the mainstay of the former SADF was its reserve forces, which effectively bound the military into the (white) community, and placed a structural limit upon the development of too rampant a corporate military culture, South Africa may have lost a large portion of its trained reserve forces and thereby lost its ability to expand quickly and deal with emergencies of whatever nature. It would also appear as if a precedent has been set which, taken together with the demands of integration, will lead to a large standing SA Army (in particular) and an insignificant reserve or part-time component, barely meeting the constitutional requirement that the SANDF must consist of both a full-time and part-time component.

At this stage the only known replacement system to feed personnel into the reserves is the Voluntary Military System (VMS), which require volunteers to sign on for 12 months' full-time service and eight annual 30-day training camps thereafter. According to Minister Modise the first 4 000 recruits for the SA Army and 200 for the SA Navy entered service this year and will complete their training at the end of 1994. This will provide a considerably smaller number than the approximately 20 000 National Servicemen which joined the part time forces each year under the old system.

Yet the VMS, regrettably, is not a system well suited to feed a part-time force. In fact it is a volunteer version of the former compulsory national service system, where the primary aim was to provide a low-cost, full-time force. This being the case, one must ask whether it is the right foundation for the new all-volunteer part-time force. But the main problem is that this system is not proven in the present South Africa before the old system has collapsed. If the VMS system fails, or is only partially successful, there will be no time left for corrective action. And there is virtually no chance of reverting to the old system. What should be reduced is not the amount of persons fed into the reserves, but the unpopular extent and duration of the initial compulsory continuous training. There is, in fact, the very real chance that in three or four years, when an effective manpower system which feeds the reserves is in place, there will be little of the present Citizen Force leadership cadre left (officers and NCO's) to receive, administer and train the intakes. Most important of all, the culture of the part-time forces will not be transferred.

By way of illustration, the VMS may have to produce as many as 100 000 trained men at short notice to re-stock the part-time force and up to 20 000 men a year to keep it topped up after a few years of operation. These figures would apply even given the stated objective of halving the size of the part-time forces to roughly 250 000 (an unnecessary high figure, one should add). Given tight defence spending, and the need to offer good financial inducements - not to mention the lack of training staff and facilities - this appears virtually impossible.

There can be little doubt that the SANDF is aware of these implications but that they and the Minister had little choice but to announce the moratorium due to the incompatibility of continued call-up system of the (white) reserves with the interim constitution and fundamental rights. An alternative explanation for the action by the Minister is that the effective destruction of the Citizen Force has emasculated any potential that a core of the former SADF could have mounted to challenge the Government of National Unity - an unrealistic sceanrio at the best of times.

Whatever the case, the problem is that these changes may have deprived the SA Army of a large portion of its mobilizable operational strength at a time of possible instability - virtually overnight.

When there was a last-minute shortfall in police and military manpower during the recent general election, the only way even barely adequate security forces could be put on the ground was through mass mobilization of the Citizen and Commando Forces. Before and during the April elections South Africa experienced one of the largest military call-ups of reserves since the Second World War. Admittedly, prior to these events the response rates to call-ups had dropped quite dramatically - down from more than 80% in the eighties (for up to 90 days) to about half that in the last year or so. As a result, by April of this year, the ability of the SANDF to continue to rely on large numbers of the Citizen Force in times of prolonged crisis, had already declined. Following the announcement of the moratorium, an effective last-resort action to recruit existing leader group for the new system may now no longer be feasible. The detailed consideration of the building of the part-time forces requires the rapid development of a coherent and specific military personnel recruitment and retention policy - part of our still to be formulated National Security Policy. The country will benefit if a variety of options are available and instituted as rapidly as possible in an attempt to salvage what is left.

Against this, one should add, the much more widespread use of part-time elements by the SAPS seems to have been ignored almost entirely, despite the obvious contribution that the training and use of such forces could make to community policing.

THE TOUCHY ISSUE OF BORDER SECURITY

Given the lack of a clear external threat environment, an issue that will complicate the deployment of South Africa's existing Security Forces, make massive demands upon our available resources as well as strain relations with neighbouring countries is that of the influx of refugees, illegal immigrants and the problems posed by these occurrences, including those of gun running, vehicle and cattle theft, drug smugglers, poachers and bandits.

South Africa has massively long, poorly controlled borders. We share borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho. Recently rising discontent has been reported from premiers such as Matthew Phosa over the degree to which a lack of border security is affecting the viability of the Eastern Transvaal to stabilize and develope economically. More recently President Mandela visited Mozambique, partly in an attempt to effect better co-ordination on issues relating to cross-border crime and border security. Mozambican border-crossers comprise more than 80% of all illegals deported and the SAPS estimate that the illegal Mozambican community alone in South Africa numbers anything between 500 000 to 2 million.

The table below provides a summary of the illegal aliens which were expelled from South Africa from 1988 to 1993.

Under a previous system South Africa built a 134,5 km long electrified fence with Mozambique and Zimbabwe - essentially in an effort to keep insurgents out and tighten 'national security'. Recently up to 3 000 Mozambicans have been forcibly repatriated per week and the number of migrants from further afield is also rising. Ghanaians have now established a small colony in Hillbrow, and Zairois, Ugandans and Zambians can be found in urban centers throughout South Africa. According to the SAPS there are an estimated 1 million illegals in the PWV alone (one our of every 5 squatters in the PWV is apparently an illegal immigrant) and illegals now make up 5-8% of our population - a number growing at a rate of one every 10 minutes and estimated at between 500 000 to 2 million. This year it will cost more than R210 million just to house, educate, police and provide medical care to the illegal Mozambicans in South Africa - a figure set to rise to R500 million by the year 2000.

While the police could arrest much larger numbers of aliens, the prisons and Home Affairs officials simply can not cope. The Aliens Control Act originally envisaged a force of 1 200 immigration officers but budget cutbacks have brought about a force of only 240. The police must hand over illegals to the immigration officials for deportation - who are totally overwhelmed.

This is obviously not only a South African security problem but an issue which confronts the region as a whole. Nor is it even primarily a security issue, although it has obvious security and stability implications. Essentially many of the illegal aliens are economic refugees. What was once a war refugee influx had become full-scale economic migrancy. It is, therefore, essentially a development problem facing the region as a whole. Admittedly physical security measures along our borders would have a limited effect in this tide. Unless growth and development occur throughout the region the effects of human insecurity and economic misery will continue to be felt upon South Africa. Given South Africa's limited resources, such development would only occur through freer trade and heightened economic co-operation.

Recently an interdepartmental task group on immigration was set up by the Department of Home Affairs to address these problems in an integrated manner but the status of the report of this group is unclear. at the same time the SAPS has established a dedicated border unit at national level. But even given these measures, the extent of the future problem can hardly be overestimated. The ability of the SAPS therefore, to reclaim this responsibility from the SANDF in its entirety must, be questionable.

The former SADF was increasingly involved in border control operations since 1976 and this role was expanded on a large scale since 1980. Before the recent announcement regarding the deployment of the SANDF on the borders, "On overage some 17 companies representing 2 500 men are deployed primarily on the borders with Mozambique and Swaziland and to a lesser extent on the borders with Botswana, Zimbabwe and Lesotho."

Closely related to the issue of illegal immigrants and refugees is that of cross-border drug trafficking. The United States has already expressed its formal concern about the rapid development of South Africa as the drug centre of Africa with more than 200 internationally linked syndicates obtaining huge amounts of cocaine and heroin accross our borders. Studies have shown that 40% of murders in South Africa are drug-related. In 1993 the domestic drug market was so flooded with cocaine that the price dropped from R180/R250 to R120 per gram. And much of the multi-billion rand vehicle theft racket in the country is linked to drugs. With massive money involved, and police paid appalingly low salaries, it is no wonder that corruption is on the increase.

There is an obvious requirement for a much greater degree of vigilance along our borders than has been the case recently. Both aerial and ground surveillance need to be expanded. We need controlled border crossing points where necessary and extended powers of search and seizure in border areas. The question is, who is going to do this and where is the money going to come from? In terms of the constitution, border security is the responsibility, in the first instance, of the Police Service. In practice it is more often than not the SANDF which does the physical patrolling of the border with the police doing certain portions thereof and in-depth work. Present legislation must obviously be revised in their entirety so as to speed up the whole process. The processing of genuine refugees must not clog our jails. Provision must be made to accommodate them in proper camps for the briefest of periods prior to repatriation, whilst involving the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Most important of all - the SANDF will have to continue to support the SAPS in this task in the short medium and long-term.

THE CHALLENGE

The picture presented thus far is that of a discredited and demoralized SA Police Service in the throes of a massive transition and without a credible public order force. Of a SANDF which often has to stand in for the SAPS and ISD, but itself suffers all the trauma of transition and has a decreasing ability to rely on the call-ups of its part-time forces to augment its full-time strength. Finally, it should be clear that border security will require a particular and a dedicated effort.

A crisis appears in the offing in the not too distant future. A number of considerations should guide us on our way forward in meeting these challenges:

I think we will soon have to reconsider the model of community-based policing in South Africa. This is not Amsterdam or London. But even if we are to retain at least on the retorical level, our commitment to community based policing it is imperative that attention be given to separating community-based policing from public order policing. If the Internal Stability Division has become so discredited so as to be beyond redemption, affecting the acceptance by the community of the SAPS as a whole, a replacement will have to be created.



Secondly, the SAPS will continue to have to rely on the SANDF for support for many years to come. We should therefore accept that we need to structure the SANDF accordingly so as to limit the effect that this reliance will have on the primary function of the military, defence against possible foreign aggression.

South African security priorities of the future will inevitably be those of internal stability and border control within a reduced external threat environment. Following the recent elections the SANDF stated that: "On average some 67 companies representing some 10 000 troops are deployed throughout South Africa. ... on the election days [25-27 April 1994] this peaked at 143 companies or 20 500 full and part time force members." Do we need reminding of the pressures building up from communities accross the political spectrum who demand houses, jobs, electricity, flat rates and the like? And are we not losing sight of the potential disruption that may occur during the 1995 local government elections planned for late in 1995 (or more likely, early 1996)?

One solution to the dilemma which I have often promoted would be to combine the responsibility for border security and public order policing in a single organisation, nominally part of the military. In this we would borrow from the French example of the Gendarmerie, the police who fall under the Department of Defence as an arm of the service, but who act as a decentralized rural and riot control police, and also borrow from the German Bundesgrenschutz - the border police who also act as riot squad. Practically this means that the Internal Stability Division of the SA Police Service ceases to exist. Instead a separate service arm of the National Defence Force (such as the SA Army and SA Navy) is created which also contained the territorial forces of the SA Army (commands groups and commando's). This force is then made responsible for public order (under provincial control), and border control (under national control).

Vested interest and departmental rivalries have convinced me that this solution, attractive as it may be, is politically unachievable. It is a great pity!

Thirdly, the issue of the SDU's and SPU's and our disadvantaged youth need to be addressed. If the SANDF can create a viable Service Brigade, replete with all adult education/literacy training, this may yet present a model for youth development in general. The purpose of the Brigade would be to provide an alternative training programme for those soldiers either demobilised from the SANDF or not suited for acceptance into the SANDF at their appropriate skills level on a voluntary basis. But such organisations cost vast amounts of money. Yet, at present no provision is made in either the transitional costs or the SANDF budget for the Service Brigade. This brigade was initially estimated to cost R250 million for about 8 000 cadres. The subsequent planning was for the brigade to eventually cater for up to 15 000 cadres, with an initial intake of 4 000 in late 1994. While the intention appears that some of this funding will be sought from the private sector and some from international sources this must, at best, be a doubtful starter. Apart from the role of the South African Medical Services, in real terms the Service Brigade is probably the most important contribution that the SANDF could make to the RDP. This issue, the potential crisis that demoblised soldiers will present in future, warrants much greater emphasis than it has received in the past.

These are radical proposals, and would require a boldness on the part of the authorities (not to mention a constitutional amendment). Along with any other options, they certainly warrant serious and transparent investigation. More important than any other consideration, it will require South Africans to consider the building blocks for a national security strategy.

Finally, before concluding, we need to briefly consider the resources allocated to defence.

THE DEFENCE BUDGET

In South Africa the proportion of government spending on social services has been steadily increasing from about 20% some twenty years ago to more than double that today (44% of R134 bn). At the same time spending on 'protection services', notably defence, has been dropping. While spending on a white pupil is still four times higher than that on a black pupil, that ratio was 18 to 1 some twenty years ago. Bear in mind that between 1982/3 and 1993/4 real GDP grew at only 0,9% a year. Despite this dismal performance, real growth in expenditure on education, health services, social pensions and police exceeded population growth (2,4% a year). No wonder then that government consumption expenditure as a proportion of GDP rose from 15% to 21% over that period, the share of gross domestic fixed investment declining from 28% to 15%. And no wonder that the senior members of the GNU are expressing increasing concern about this relationship.

At present (1994/5) defence spending represents 7,4% of Government expenditure and 2,7% of GDP, slightly up from last year due to the transitional and integration costs. Excluding integration and assembly points the defence budget has been cut by 13% in real terms from last year. According to newspaper reports the draft RDP Green Paper set an explicit target to reduce defence expenditure to below 5% of Government expenditure and to redirect this saving into housing. This intention, if true, did not appear in the White Paper on the RDP. Departmental expenditure targets for 1995/6 have already been set and departments are to respond to the Finance Department by 7 November. By all indications we are heading, once again, for yet another substantial cut in defence expenditure.

Massive reductions in defence expenditure have already occurred over a number of years. Further cuts threaten the ability of the SANDF to ensure stability for development as is evident from even the most cursory analysis of the downsizing that has occurred in the SANDF over the last four years and the ever-increasing integration costs. Against this background the uninformed calls which are often made for South Africa to desist from participating, with due care and constraint, in the international defence trade, thereby reducing pressure on both the defence budget and foreign reserves are shortsighted. In many, if not most, instances, calls for the destruction of the South African defence industry come via the larger defence exporters - countries essentially interested in creating foreign policy leverage through relationships of dependency on their military exports and wishing an increased slice in a declining international arms market. South Africa should, of course, act responsibly in such actions. And if the recent debacle regarding the alleged export of AK-47's to Lebanon, Yemen or wherever is anything to go by, we still have a long way to go.

South Africa should exploit those opportunities available in the international arms market as far as is responsibly possible. The export of defence equipment results in overheads being spread over a wider base and thus lower unit costs. In a wider context defence exports are a source of revenue for the country and subsidise the wider manufacturing base and R&D expenditure.

It is also apparent that a further revision of the integration process will have to occur if costs are to be contained within any reasonable limits. The present process is a political compromise agreement which essentially had to first integrate all armed formations into a single structure and then rationalize down from there. Despite numerous warnings about the financially untenable situation that this approach would create, the obvious alternatives, demobilization before integration or the placement of many soldiers into the reserves, were not persued with any vigour. Although apparently fair, the present system is unaffordable. The extent to which the exising system has been abused was evident in Parliament recently when Minister Joe Modise revealed that as on 30 August 1994 the following ratio's applied in terms of rank:

the Transkei provided a list of 3 333 soldiers, of which only 826 were privates (25%);



the Bophuthatswana National Guard provided a list of 3 658 soldiers of which only 2 115 privates (57%).



Venda provided a list of 1 187 soldiers of which only 570 were privates (48%);



Ciskei provided a list of 1 654 soldiers of whom only 757 were privates (46%);



MK provided a list of 22 000 soldiers of which about 2 000 had been 'placed' by 30 August of which only 810 were privates (40,5%); and



APLA provided a list of 6 000 soldiers of which about 200 had been 'placed' by 30 August of which only 92 were privates (46%).

Rarely, if ever, in the annals of military or revolutionary history could so many Chiefs have commanded so few Indians! Literally thousands of former homeland officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers are earning higher salaries through artificial promotion designed to boost their rank and pay in the new SANDF. In the case of the non-statutory forces, where a formal system of ranking was only introduced very recently, very few ordinary cadres seem to have been involved in operations in the field.

The 1993/4 personnel component of the then SADF budget already represents 32% of the total SADF budget, compared to 19% in 1989. "This upward tendency corresponds with a world-wide trend, but is exacerbated in the South African case by the low salaries paid to National Servicemen in the past.."

By 1994/5 all of this has translated into an increasingly unhealthy SANDF budget division of 72% on running costs and 28% on capex as opposed to 44% spent on capex in 1989. In fact, the 1994/5 equipment procurement budget (equipment, spares and munitions acquisition plus R&D programme investment) stands at R3,09 billion, down from R4,38 bn in 1993/4. According to the draft A National Policy for the Defence Industry a minimum of R420 million should be spent annually to preserve critical technologies in the form of R&D spending. The 1994/5 budget allocates only R218 million to this. By all indications the South African defence industry is on its last legs. South Africa has had, and already spent, its peace dividend. There are no large chunks of fat left in defence which can be chopped off and added to the RDP, housing or education budget. Further reductions in defence spending will require the use of a scalpal and not of a butchers cleaner. Yet the argument put forward in this paper is that South Africa is not getting real value for money. In fact, by taking a new look at our real security priorities, by challenging our "accepted" division of functions and responsibilities we may not save any additional money for development - but wemay succeed in making development possible.

CONCLUSION: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND THE RDP

There is, at present, much talk about the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP is not a shopping list for houses, water reticulaton, schools, clinics, etc. It is a strategy for the "fundamental transformation of government at national, provincial and local level and across every department in government." The RDP is no longer the policy of the ANC. It is now the government's strategy for the 'fundamental transformation' of our society and economy. This means budget resources must be shifted to reflect the priorities of the GNU and human resources to ensure that all citizens are provided with the same services. Implicit in both these objectives is the reorganisation of the civil service to provide the appropriate services to our people. In the words of Minister Jay Naidoo: "government must shift expenditure from recurrent government consumption to investment in capital infrastructure." South Africa has a vastly bloated civil service, some 1,2 million people are employed by government. Our problem is not that we pay our civil servants and politicians too much - at many levels quite the reverse. It is that we have far too many of them. Seen within the context of the RDP the challenges facing the Department of Defence is not how the 'collateral utility' of the SANDF can be used to provide water, or build roads. It must, of course do all of these things. The real challenge facing the military is twofold:

how to reduce consumption and increase capital investment (i.e. how to save or convert the defence industry); and



how to restructure and reorientate the SANDF to focus on its 'real' tasks, i.e. those of support to the SAPS and border security without losing its core defensive skills base.

We are presently rethinking many areas related to past structures. Change simply for the sake of change is dangerous. When dealing with institutions upon whose efficiency the transition process depends, we need to proceed with caution.

Yet it is time that South Africans have a serious look at the interrelationship between the various state security agencies at national, provincial and local level, as well as that between the state and private sector. We need to challenge our 'accepted' division of responsibilities and state funding for security. Above all else, it is time that politicians, the military and police accept that we require a comprehensive re-structuring and re-organisation of our total security architecture in this country. We need a National Security Policy. We need it to provide better value for money. To make our daily life in our homes, offices, factories and shops safer. To provide stability so that development becomes possible.

ENDNOTES

See L. Gumbi & J. Cilliers, South Africa, SADC and a Regional Security Regime, Africa Institute Bulletin, forthcoming.



Measures to cope with the cuts included a moratorium on recruitment and retrenchments of officers. (A. Hadland, Cuts 'will harm policing', in Business Day, 21 September 1994)



Recently a group of 55 SDU and SPU members from Katorus completed a month long SAP training course in preparation for their incorporation into local police structures as police reservists. The trainees were subject to a competency evaluation and persons with a criminal record were excluded. A further 70 were taken in for training at the end of September. An initiative to re-integrate other former SDU members into Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus faces collapse unless funding is secured. SDUs, SPUs start reservist training, in The Citizen, 14 September 1994; J malalla; Gentleman’s agreemant turns sour in The Star, 3 October 1994.



L. Heinecken, Soldiers and employee rights: South African trends and issues, Journal of Strategic Review of Southern Africa, forthcoming.



Ibid., p. 7



Ibid.



See, for example, M. Malan, Military Culture - the need for professional value articulation in the emergent South African Defence Force, in the African Defence Review, issue no 14, 1994 and L. Heineken, op. cit.



This section is based on a short paper by W. Steenkamp, J. Cilliers & B. Sass, Crisis in the Part-Time Forces, IDP, 7 September 1994



Experience with the extended-service system in the 1980's would indicate that many conscripted national servicemen who volunteered for an extra 12 or 24 months' full-time service (mostly as junior leaders) did so, not because of interest in military matters, but because they were after the re-enlistment bounty, the better pay and the prospects of a safe job at a time of high unemployment. Once they completed their period of extended service, very few showed any interest in part-time service.



On 21 September 1995 Mr. Modise admitted in parliament that fewer than 10% of the Citizen Force memers called up for the annual conventional exercise at Lohatla in July. Only 1 589 out of the 15 889 people summond eventually reported for duty.



For example:

* A 12-month VMS, but with annual camps reduced to three or four, so that the part-time obligation ends in the mid-20s, with a volunteer option thereafter to retain leadership/obligation for further service upon promotion to certain ranks/completion of certain courses.

* A three month VMS, followed by three or four training camps and weekend training in between.

* Non-continuos training for non-VMS veterans (weekend, short 10-day camps, etc.) to instill basic military knowledge, or to sharpen up and expand previously acquired military knowledge in the case of doctors, mechanics, etc.

* The provision of voluntary school cadet training by the SANDF at selected schools and after agreement with the staff and parents to provide early basic military knowledge, cultivate future recruits - and serve the community by providing disciplined extra-mural youth activities.

* Facilitation of transfers by trained part-timers between units and even corps, and voluntary re-activation by people on the inactive reserve, so that person could serve in the unit of his or her choice.

* Introduction of a system similar to the American ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) at universities wishing to participate. This scheme allows students to qualify militarily during vacations thus making them suitable for direct commission as officers upon graduation. It therefore also provides a possible second career as well as employment during vacations.

Ideally each part-time unit would consist of several layers of expertise, so that it would be of immediate, albeit limited use for routine tasks and could soon be trained up to adequate operational standards.



The SAPS reserves constitute some 90 000 men and women, In the past they have not been paid for their services.



Phosa recently handed Mozambican authorities seven vehicles and two-way radio's to allow them to patrol their side of the border.



Anon., No turn of the tide, in Financial Mail, 9 September 1994, p. 22



Ibid.



SANDF, The Defence Force and Election 1994, information bulletin issued by the Chief Directorate of Communications, SANDF, undated.



B. King, South African drug trafficking a major headache for Europe and US, in Sunday Tribune, 2 October 1994



Ibid.



J. Kane-Berman, PW led way with socioeconomic spending, in Business Day, August 26, 1994.



The defence budget for 1994/5 is R10 610 million, which represents a real increase of 4,8% on last year, but includes R1 486 million for integration costs and R313 million for assembly points.



G. Steyn, Tough bargaining ahead on draft RDP Green Paper, in Business Day, August 26, 1994



Erwin takes tough stand on spending, in Business Day, 14 September 1994.



R1 486,2 million has been budgeted for military integration of MK and theTBVC armed forces at R54 000 per head based on a figure of 22 000. This figure includes R775 million for salaries and R77 million for administration as well as R634 million for logistics. Recent estimates put the integration costs at R6,8 billion over four years (D. Breier, SANDF unity cost shock, in Weekend Star, September 10-11, 1994) There have already been indications that recurring costs of R1 billion would occur next year.



Questions by Senator James Selfe and reply by Minister Modise in the Senate, 6 September 1994



Venter in Restructuring, integration and rationalisation - an overview of the future size and shape of the NDF, paper presented at an IDP/CPS conference on Rethinking South African Security Architecture, 28 July 1994, Midrand.



There is a 23,8% reduction in allocations to the Special Defence Account (of which 70% used for capital projects).



C. Reed, Taking steps to ensure survival, in Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 August 1994, p. 29.



A. Manga, The strategy of fundamental Transformation, in New Nation, 23 September 1994, p. 6.



Ibid.